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Электронное приложение к журналу «
Международная жизнь
»
Author : R. Dzarasov
Leading Research Associate, Central Economic Mathematical Institute (CEMI), Russian Academy of
Sciences, Doctor of Science (Economics)
CRIMEA WAS UNIFIED with Russia so fast that the U.S. intelligence com-
munity was caught unawares. This was more than a one-time failure to predict
what the Russian special services had been planning: it was a huge political
flop of American strategy in Ukraine. Russia demonstrated that the degree
of its readiness to stand opposed to any challenges of the West was unprece-
dented since the end of the Cold War, something what the United States did
not expect.
THE GEORGIAN-OSSETIAN CONFRONTATION was the lowest, ob-
vious and very local layer of the conflict which led to the war in South Os-
setia; there were higher, regional levels at which the struggle for domination
in the Caucasus and Central Asia was waged; an even greater role belonged
to global processes rooted in the worldwide economic structures and the sys-
tem of international relations. America, the strategy of which tied these levels together, moved them toward
the tragic finale. This is explained by the U.S. unique status as the only superpower and also by what the U.S.
ruling class believed to be the most effective ways and methods of ensuring American hegemony.
THE CASPIAN and Central Asian energy sources constitute the main attraction for the United States. The
Times, a well-informed British newspaper, specified: "Oil may not be the cause of the war between Georgia
and Russia, but it is a central element in the wider geo-strategic picture, and a source of incendiary tension that
has helped to inflame the area." The unfolding world economic crisis added its hues to this picture.
THE INCREASING STRUGGLE for control over the oil rich regions of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia
is often referred to as the "new Great Game"
The United States has chosen Georgia as its major instrument of political hegemony in the Caucasus. During
the Rose Revolution of 2003. they replaced their failed proxy - Eduard Shevardnadze with their new protégé -
Mikheil Saakashvili. This new "color revolution" in the post-Soviet space is another example of how America
used its "soft power."
Such large-scale support of the recently unknown lawyer is no mere chance. Saakashvili was educated in the
United States, worked there in the structures connected with the Soros Foundation and was a "passionate pro-
American polyglot" which made him, according to The Financial Times, a "darling of neocons in Washing-
ton."25 According to the same source, Saakashvili surrounded himself with American consultants and PR
specialists.
THE CRUSHING DEFEAT revealed that people in Washington could hardly adequately assess the situation.
"Georgia did not believe Russia would respond to its offensive in South Ossetia and was completely unprepared
for the counter-attack, the deputy defense minister has admitted." Recently, former president Saakashvili said
the same.50 Life has given Washington this and other important lessons.
IN THE FUTURE, the 2008 events in the Southern Caucasus will be seen as a turning point that convinced
Russia that the West did not want its resurrection and that it should insist on its vital interests. This is the main
lesson of the Five-Day War, which American diplomacy preferred to ignore.
America's Foreign Policy Strategy and the Five-Day War in the
Southern Caucasus