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Author : Armen Oganesyan
Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs
BEFORE THEY BROKE DOWN under pressure of
London and Washington which insisted on anti-Russian
sanctions, the German politicians had been saying over
and over again that politics was more important than
economy. This mantra was addressed to the German
businessmen and the potential unemployed: they had to
accept losses and deprivations because "Politik über
alles." There is a clear understanding shared by many in
Germany that, having agreed on sanctions against Russia
and having retreated under joint British and American
pressure, the country started losing its political weight in Europe and elsewhere in the world. The recent
humiliations - spying on Merkel's mobile phone, spies at the German Defense Ministry, and the German
gold in the U.S. scandal to say nothing of Berlin's capitulation to the sanction program - are damaging
Germany's political image.
For many years, Germany not merely claimed the role of a buffer between the European Union and
Russia, the post-Soviet space and Eurasia - it was the buffer. Berlin skillfully diversified its political and
economic ambitions in China, Asia and the Middle East; it was treated as an independent power which
came third after the U.S. and China where its share in world economy was concerned.
Berlin's recent interest in possible contacts with the BRICS countries caused a lot of concern in the
White House. No matter how strange it looks today, Ukraine would have been an ideal platform of a
new type of cooperation between Germany and Russia and other CIS countries. This would have hap-
pened if Berlin proved perspicacious enough to assess soberly and independently an invitation to tri-
partite talks between Russia, the EU and Ukraine before the Ukrainian crisis burst out.
Germany's unexpected pro-American bias which surprised many was probably caused by many factors,
one of them being more obvious than the others. In recent years, Germany has been seeking the biggest
trade surplus with the United States and UK which occasionally reached 20%. Washington and London
have probably hinted to Berlin that they will not hesitate to use "latent" economic sanctions to force
Germany comply with their Russian policy. Washington refused to return to Germany the larger part
of its gold reserves and insisted on the meager 10% for the simple reason that, if returned in full, it
will not only be a guarantor of German industry but, to a certain extent, a financial stabilizer of united
Europe and of Germany's leading role.
What about the trade rules, the WTO and other norms? They were sacrificed to politics long ago. As
people say, "everything is well as long as it is well": this is best illustrated by the ruling of The Hague
Arbitration Court on the YUKOS case.
Can we say that Germany has selected the least of two evils? Yes, this is one of the answers. On the
other hand, the Atlantists used sanctions as part of their strategy: they no longer seek containment of
Russia but want to push Russia aside. In case of Germany this is tactics imposed from outside; its Russ-
ian strategy is opposite to the Atlantic.
Farewell, Germany?