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Электронное приложение к журналу «
Международная жизнь
»
Author : E. Arlyapova
Doctoral Candidate, Department of Comparative Political Science, Moscow State Institute (University)
of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Science
(Political Science)
NEVER BEFORE, throughout its four-year history, has the
Eastern Partnership (EaP) attracted so much attention as in the
months that followed the Vilnius Summit of November 28-29,
2013 at which Ukraine did not sign the Association Agreement
with the European Union.
THE ABOVE APPLIES, first and foremost, to Russia, in-
volved by default by the EU in its political initiatives in the post-
Soviet space. There is nothing enviable in the role ascribed to
it which ranges from indifference, because of its weakness, to
fear because of its power. This means that we should learn to
treat and assess this and similar programs seriously. Before the
Ukrainian crisis, they were seen as a strong political irritant rather than a strong potential
of geopolitical changes. Supported by the United States, a powerful extra-regional player,
the countries of the "second echelon" gained considerable political dynamics in the post-
Soviet space.
Der Spiegel offered uncompromising or even scathing critical comments about the summit
and some of the officials. It refused to treat the signed agreements with Georgia and
Moldova as a consolation prize.
The strategy of accelerating the process of political rapprochement and economic inte-
gration between the EU and Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine
was a response to Russia's stronger international presence.
Moldova stood a good chance to become a "success story" in the EaP format: "The East-
ern Partnership needs a success story, an example to spur on the doubters." The fact that
Moldova and Georgia signed the agreement did not spur enthusiasm; this looked as a con-
solation prize against the background of the Ukrainian developments during and after the
summit. Since much had been done to persuade Ukraine to sign the agreement one may
surmise that the "objects" were replaced as the political process was unfolding and even
try to identify those who initiated the intrigue and why.
Latvia is trying to keep in step with Lithuania which helps the U.S. be maximally involved
in European politics.
In view of Baltic rivalry and possible negative developments, the special mission of Vilnius
Nationalism as a Friend and Foe of the Eastern Partnership