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Электронное приложение к журналу «
Международная жизнь
»
Author : V. Olenchenko
Senior research associate, Center for European Studies, Ye.M. Primakov National Research Institute of World
Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Candidate of Science (Law)
TODAY, Latvia (officially Latvijas Republika or the Republic
of Latvia) is at the second stage of its state independence
that began in 1991 even if Latvian politicians prefer different
dates.
Latvia, that had been part of the Russian Empire and, before
that, part of other states, became independent for the first
time in its history on December 22, 1918 on the strength of
the Decree of the Council of People's Deputies of the
RSFSR. It was several years later, on January 26, 1921, that
Western Europe (the UK and France) recognized the independent Latvian state. The first stage of
Latvia's independence lasted from 1918 to 1940 when Latvia joined the Soviet Union.
Today, Latvian officials insist that in 1991 Latvia did not acquire independence: its independence was
restored, which makes Latvia, as we know it today, the successor of the country that existed in 1918-
1940. From the legal point of view, in both cases Latvia became independent thanks to Russia's good-
will.
The anti-Russian agenda of the Baltic states has been based on four points. First, Russia's foreign policy
in the Baltics is allegedly geared at reconquering the Baltic states; second, the Baltic countries are the
barrier that protects Europe from Russia; third, disdainful criticism of Russia's internal and external
policies is nothing more than a repetition of the Western traditional and newly invented claims to Russia;
fourth, demands that Russia should pay for what is called "occupation," by which the Baltic states mean
the period between 1940 and 1991 when they were part of the Soviet Union.
This explains why certain Western, Baltic and Russian analysts and even common people are inclined
to think about the confrontationist feelings against Russia in the Baltic countries as genetic. This opinion
is in high demand with the Baltic rulers as an argument (albeit, a false one) that explains the anti-Russian
politics to their population and the international community.
The relations between the Baltic countries and Germany are no less interesting. Latvian diplomats
pointed out that Germany regularly spread disinformation about a rapprochement between the Soviet
Union and the Baltic counties trying to fan disagreements between them, to cool down their relations
with London and Paris and to draw them closer to Berlin.
On the whole, the interwar period of independence of the Baltic states that is almost as long as the
post-Soviet period shows that Russophobia and rejection of sovereignty in favor of a military bloc
have a reasonable and advantageous alternative in the form of decent neighborly relations, neutrality
and cooperation.
Any attentive reader of the Latvian diplomatic documents will inevitably arrive at a conclusion that a
comprehensive comparative study of Latvia as we know it today and of the same country in 1918-1940
is advisable or even necessary. This analysis will also produce an answer to the question: To what extent
are the statements of historical continuity of the Latvian statehood justified?
Latvia: Different Faces of Independence