Стр. 12 - V

Author : Yu. Belobrov
leading research associate, Institute of Contemporary International Studies, Diplomatic Academy, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Science (Political Science)
THE JULY 2016 WARSAW NATO Summit not only decided to
strengthen its military and political confrontation with Russia but
also strongly invigorated the realization of its strategy designed to
transform the North Atlantic Alliance from a purely regional defen-
sive pact into a global military-political structure of "cooperative se-
curity" accommodating the geopolitical interests of the United States
and the leading Western countries and seen as a substitute of the "in-
efficient" United Nations. One of the key elements of this newly
formulated strategy is creating a global coalition of the NATO part-
ners with the biggest possible number of states and international or-
ganizations from all corners of the world. The NATO strategists
expect that this will bring them closer to their abovementioned aim.
Today, the camp of the NATO partners consists of 41 states, half of them in Europe and Central
Asia, and several international and regional organizations, including the UN, EU, OSCE, etc.
The Western observers have admitted that the new partnership policy created certain tensions
inside the Alliance: "Should NATO privilege partners who can deliver operational impact or
those who are fully committed to liberal democratic rule?"
Practically from the very first day of the "global partnership" concept, Russia was not regarded
as an equal partner: it was a temporal fellow-traveler indispensable when it comes to dealing with
individual albeit critically important international challenges. By and large, there are no common
interests or aims in the true sense of the word between Russia and NATO to serve as the basis
for mutually profitable and equal cooperation. Russia cannot accept the world order that the U.S.
and NATO want to build on the cooperative security basis, that is, in fact, complete subjugation
of all partners to America's diktat. Coordination, to a certain extent, is possible or even necessary
when it comes to certain world policy issues. Having realized that the strategy of punishment
and isolation of Russia failed, NATO is looking for the ways to move toward the strategy of
"elastic" or limited interaction with Russia, albeit on its own conditions.
In view of NATO's persisting refusal to move away from the openly hostile course in its relations
with Russia and the need to prevent the realization of its plans to undermine Russia's independ-
ent role in the world and to destroy the Russian-Chinese and Russian-Indian strategic partner-
ships, the leaders of Russia should arrive at a fundamentally new comprehensive policy of
carefully balanced limited cooperation with NATO designed to reduce tension in Europe. This
balanced trend should include both rivalry and cooperation with the Alliance in individual spheres
in which there is no clash of interests.
Электронное приложение к журналу «Международная жизнь»
Partnership for Peace or Preparations for War: Evolution of Rus-
sia-NATO Relations