Упрощенная HTML-версия
Author : V. Trubnikov
Member of the Directorship, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (Russian
Academy of Sciences), Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative Commission Member, Working Group on Mssile
Defense Co-chair (Russia)
The idea of a Euro-Atlantic Security Community belongs to the
public organization formed less than a couple of years back in the
wake of the Munich Security Conference and named the Euro-At-
lantic Security Initiative Commission.
By today, the Commission has reached three main points: first, it is
important to employ a comprehensive definition of security - one
that includes everything from nuclear weapons and conventional
arms control to cyber threats and climate change. Second, EASI is
not about institutional invention. Third, there is no "silver bullet"
to solve the problem of Euro-Atlantic security architecture (and
Euro-Atlantic security). The answer is not a matter of creating the
perfect institution; it will be a complex, multi-step process.
Successful cooperation on ballistic missile defense would be a game changer. It would go a long
way towards overcoming the legacy of historical suspicion and achieving the strategic transfor-
mation that is needed. Cooperation on missile defense would establish a pattern for working to-
gether, build trust and encourage further cooperation in other areas.
The U.S.-Russia intention to "re-set" or "re-load" their relations, the decisions by the Lisbon
NATO Summit and the Russia-NATO Council to work out a mutual missile defense system
have given the Euro-Atlantic states another chance to take a step towards a Euro-Atlantic Security
community.
Earlier I mentioned the problem of determining the source of threats by a Government of an
individual state, but the same process is much more complicated for a bunch of states which
just recently were antagonists and still have to step over mutual suspicions and mistrust to agree
on equally significant and real outside sources of existing or potential danger for their security.
The Working Group on Missile Defense (WGMD) believes that cooperation on missile defense
meets the following shared understanding.
Summing up I'd like to stress that defensive measures such as ballistic missile defense are ulti-
mately aimed at moving away from deterrence by threat of retaliation towards deterrence by de-
nial of objective. That's why cooperation on ballistic missile defense can rightly be framed as
reflecting a 21st century approach to 21st century threats.
Электронное приложение к журналу «
Международная жизнь
»
Russia-NATO Cooperative Missile Defense