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Электронное приложение к журналу «
Международная жизнь
»
Author : S. Gasratyan
Research associate, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Candidate of Science
(History)
SET UP IN 1948, Israel a year later was officially rec-
ognized by Turkey that became its closest partner in
the Middle East, the region swept by the Arab wars
of independence in which Turkey was the only pro-
Western state. In 1954, Gamal Abdel Nasser ex-
plained that "Turkey, because of its Israeli policy, is
disliked in the Arab world." At that time, their ties
were mostly symbolic.
In Turkey anti-Semitism was fed by Islamism, left
anti-Zionism and right nationalistic extremism; practically all analysts were pro-Palestinian and
anti-Israeli which explains anti-Semitic hues of all debates on the conflict in the Middle East.
Having quarreled with all their neighbors and with Russia, the leaders of Turkey, recently the
most irreconcilable enemy of Israel and the benevolent patron of Hamas, are moving toward
normalization of their relations with Israel.
Turks have a century's worth of poor relations with Arabs. They resent the fact that Arabs refuse
to support their position in Cyprus and find Arabs generally unreliable as economic partners.
For their part, Arabs frequently blame the Ottoman Empire, which controlled much of the Mid-
dle East through four centuries, for their current plight.
According to analysts, the strong Turkish-Israeli ties enhanced the region's stability by serving
as a powerful military deterrent against would-be enemies. The United States profited from the
Israeli-Turkish alliance that might open a road to a pro-American alliance of democratic states,
similar to that in Europe.
Despite the indignation stirred up by Ankara's demarche, the Israeli leaders and Israel's Defense
Minister Ehud Barak cautioned against excessive criticism and pointed out that the Turkish-
Israeli disagreements notwithstanding, Turkey remained the key figure in the region and that
both countries should, therefore, preserve their strategic relations.
It looks as if Ankara decided to exchange its NATO membership for domination in the Middle
East. This explains why Erdoğan intensified the conflict with Israel: This was the first step toward
a Middle Eastern NATO of sorts that would unite all Arab countries under Turkey's leadership.
Normalization does not mean a strategic alliance as it was ten years ago. The road toward final
agreement is very long and very difficult; much depends on good will and political determina-
tion.
Israeli-Turkish Relations Today and the Islamic Factor