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Электронное приложение к журналу «Международная жизнь»
Author : I. Maksimychev
Chief research associate, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Science (Political Sci-
ence)
SOME TWENTY-FIVE YEARS ago, those who in the old dispute
about the role of the individual in history argued that success of
political initiatives depended on the ability of state leaders to look
into the future acquired another argument.
The results achieved by the initiators of perestroika are amazingly
meager: by the final count, they achieved nothing but the collapsed
state budget, latent and, later open, opposition at all levels of power,
ignominious retreat from all foreign policy positions, loss of allies,
disintegration of the great power, the "wild" 1990s, dictatorship of
oligarchs, the wars in Chechnya and practically complete withdrawal
from the world scene of the Soviet Union and, later, Russia.
The poisonous echo of these spontaneous decisions can be still
heard. In the philosophical context, Mikhail Gorbachev can be described as one of the most
tragic figures in our country's recent political history.
The foremen of perestroika failed because of miscalculations regarding the central trends. In
foreign and security politics, they failed to prevent the eastward expansion of NATO. Even if
written guarantees do not guarantee much, the international legal taboo on NATO phantas-
magoria put on paper would have minimized the losses caused by the Soviet Union's strategic
retreat.
The discussion in the Soviet corridors of power of how to respond to the events unfolding in
the European zone near the Soviet Union was going on against the background of the rising
political tension in the socialist countries of Europe, in the GDR in the first place, the pillar of
the security system at the Soviet western borders.
The Soviet conciliatory position let Americans carry the day. Baker had perfectly played the role
of a good uncle who promised a lot yet guaranteed nothing.
In his April letter to François Mitterrand, President Bush revealed part of the real strategic aims
of his country in Europe. He pointed out that united Germany and its territory should become
a fully-fledged NATO member; the troops of the allies would remain in united Germany when
the Soviet troops had been pulled out; very much as before, NATO would possess nuclear and
conventional weapons in the European region.
THE CONFLICT between Russia and the West is fed by the Russophobic policy of the United
States, the country that refuses to tolerate those who refuse to obey the orders of the trans-At-
lantic master of the world. When Washington becomes fully convinced that Russians remain in-
different to its changing moods and are strong enough to parry its blows, the West will recognize
The Storm Warning that Was Ignored: How NATO's Eastward
March Got Its Start