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Author : E. Solovyev
Sector Head, Primakov Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Candidate of Science
(Political Science)
IN 1992, FRANCIS FUKUYAMA brought "the good news" of the
end of history: Liberal democracy had won, putting an end to the "his-
tory of conflicts" between states. Classical bipolarity had become a
thing of the past. The Cold War ended in the "complete triumph" of
the West (Western interpretation) to be replaced with tectonic shifts
in the system of international relations.
The post-Cold War period was highly specific in many respects: The
U.S. global leadership remained uncontested for nearly two decades,
while analysts and experts did not hesitate to talk about America's
hegemony, its status of "hyper-power" and so on and so forth.
As one of the sides in the bipolar world the U.S. was actively involved
in building up a system of international laws adjusted to its interests
and designed to support and develop its values.
The globalization that the industrialized countries of the West had launched in their own interests
was what gradually created the conditions for an economic and technological upsurge in the devel-
oping countries, China and India, the fast growing giants, in the first place.
The system of international relations, however, felt a strong pressure of contradictory and, not in-
frequently, paradoxical effects of globalization and transformation unfolding in world politics.
Placed in a democratic context, market economy becomes a sine qua non of universal security. The
liberal paradigm, however, has not yet agreed on the ways and means through which capitalism and
democracy should be spread across the world.
FOR CENTURIES, war was the most reliable tool applied to achieve a balance of power between
rivaling states. There is a widely shared conviction in the American foreign policy community and
among political scientists that Washington's determination to acquire leadership in international or-
ganizations helps it address a wide range of problems. It has been generally accepted that America
profits from a sustainable world order and the far from pinching rules.
The world order is gradually losing its Euro-centricity The globalization that the industrialized coun-
tries of the West had launched in their own interests was what gradually created the conditions for
an economic and technological upsurge in the developing countries, China and India, the fast grow-
ing giants, in the first place.
Today, economic might is no less or even more important than military force. In future, the soft
power factors will play more important role in many, including conflict, situations. Russia's positions
in this traditionally anarchic, increasingly less predictable and increasingly more pluralistic world as
well as the structure of the new world order, the pace of erosion of the liberal world order and the
"return of history" will depend, to a great extent, on whether Russia will effectively use its military
and economic, informational, organizational, cultural and other resources.
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The Return of History - the End of Liberalism?