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Sergey Lavrov's Congratulatory Message

*Sergey Lavrov's Congratulatory Message on the 95th Anniversary of International Affairs
Addressed to Armen Oganesyan, Editor-in-Chief*



Dear Armen Garnikovich,

On behalf of the Foreign Ministry and myself, I cordially congratulate you and all employees of International Affairs on the 95th anniversary of the journal's foundation.

During these years, the journal has become an inherent part of the country's diplomatic history. Today, it is rightly among the most influential publications on international relations and a source of important analytical materials for a wide range of Russian and foreign readers, as well as for the expert community.

It is highly encouraging that International Affairs offers its pages not only to prominent diplomats and scholars but also to young researchers, organizes contests for best articles by young experts on international affairs and holds themed conferences and roundtables.

Relying on traditions as befits the needs of the time, the journal continues to make its contribution to the overall efforts to pursue the country's foreign policy course and promote a positive, forward-looking agenda in global affairs.

I wish you and your staff good health, well-being and new successes in your work for the benefit of our Motherland.

S. Lavrov

March 20, 2017

The 25th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations With the Central Asian Countries

Author: Sergey Lavrov

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation



Over the past quarter of a century, the Central Asian countries have become full participants in international life. Russia has established allied ties or strategic partnership relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Today, we have a solid legal framework: over 900 bilateral treaties and intergovernmental agreements. It is hard to overestimate the role of a regular trust-based dialogue at the top level in our joint efforts.

We note with satisfaction that our countries' approaches toward the main issues on the regional and global agenda are identical or similar.

Russia and the Central Asian states have deeply structured trade and economic ties. More than 7,500 Russian companies or joint ventures work effectively in the region. We take a positive view of the current level of interregional cooperation.

Cultural exchanges are steadily advancing. Over 150,000 Central Asian citizens are studying at Russian colleges and universities, including 46,000 in state subsidy programs.

We look forward with a positive attitude. We hope that our relations will deepen further as a result of Russian President V.V. Putin's visits to Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in late February, timed to coincide with the celebration of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of our diplomatic relations.

Russia has always respected the choice made by the peoples of former Soviet republics in favor of sovereignty and an independent path of development.

Russia remains an important participant in international efforts to provide humanitarian aid to Central Asian states in need. In 2013-2016, our country provided \$65 million to the UN World Food Program fund for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Q: What is the role and place of the Central Asian countries in developing and consolidating interstate cooperation in the CIS format at the present stage?

A: We appreciate the Central Asian states' contribution to making the Commonwealth more effective. The countries of the region have held CIS chairmanship, fostering cooperation within its framework.

We note with satisfaction that the Central Asian states are unanimous about the need to preserve the CIS as an influential international organization.

The main security threat in the Central Asian region comes from the territory of Afghanistan. What is especially disturbing is ISIS's attempts to gain a foothold in northern Iran and to expand its ranks with militants from other terrorist groups. Last August, a suicide bomber linked to ISIS carried out a terrorist attack against the Chinese diplomatic mission in Bishkek.

We devote special attention to training Russian language teachers in our country from among foreign nationals. Russian language training courses at Russian science and culture centers in Central Asian countries have been put on a systemic basis.

With regard to fostering the sustainable development of the Eurasian continent as a whole, we believe that there is far greater potential in the focused efforts to create a common economic and humanitarian space from Lisbon to Vladivostok based on the principles of undivided security and broad cooperation. In this context, special importance belongs to "integration of integrations," that is fostering practical cooperation between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union.

Overcoming Uncertainty: Russia's New Foreign Policy Concept

Author: V. Kuznechevsky

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ON DECEMBER 1, 2016, at the end of the fifth year of his third (overall) presidential term, Vladimir Putin signed Russia's new Foreign Policy Concept, which establishes the constitutional status of the state's foreign policy.

Over the past 25 years, that is, since a new sovereign state entity appeared in the world arena in December 1991, this is the fifth document adopted by Russia's supreme leadership that presents its views on the fundamental principles, priorities, tasks, and goals of Russia's foreign policy.

An outline for the concept was aptly described in April 2000 by the Foreign and Defense Policy Council in a document entitled *A Strategy for Russia: An Agenda for the President 2000*.

In defining Russia's conduct in the international arena, the country's leadership proceeds not from a mobilization model of economic development but from a liberal state model of social, political and economic development of society.

As he worked on the presidential assignment, S. Lavrov, speaking at the Foreign and Defense Policy Council last March, offered a historical perspective of Russia's foreign policy, the ideas of which were subsequently incorporated into the text of the Concept 2016. The main thing that the foreign minister noted was that, over the past quarter of a century since the disintegration of the USSR, Russia has not only restored its role as an independent player in the international arena but the influence of the so-called historical West, which for almost five centuries was accustomed to seeing itself as the supreme arbiter of humankind, has declined. Under these circumstances, he pointed out that, considering how the contours of the world order of the 21st century will be shaped, the long-term success of any foreign policy course of any major state consists not so much in achieving partner-like relations between groups of states as in moving toward the partnership of civilizations through interaction between different cultures and religions based on mutual respect.


The document indicates that in defining Russia's conduct in the international arena, the country's leadership proceeds not from a mobilization model of economic development but from a liberal state model of social, political and economic development of society.

Today, the international situation may undergo some tangible changes and this circumstance apparently calls for some corrections in Moscow's conduct. However, it seems unlikely that these corrections will be drastic. Over the past 25 years, the scalded Russians now fear cold water and in their foreign policy they have incorporated the elements that Minister Lavrov talked about in his March 2016 speech.

Who Needs a Strong UN Secretary-General? António Guterres and Mission Impossible

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ON OCTOBER 13, 2016, the UN GA unanimously approved António Guterres, a Portuguese statesman, whom the UN SC had nominated as a candidate for the post of the UN Secretary-General. The road to this "vote of confidence," which looked natural and logical, was winding and tortuous.

From the spring to the fall of 2016, nine candidates (five of them women) from the countries of Eastern and Central Europe joined the race; four candidates from other regions also ran.

This all ended as expected: several rounds of secret straw vote pushed aside the East European candidates. António Guterres led the race and was the first at the finish line.

António Guterres harbors no illusions: in the absence of prompt and radical reforms, the foundations of the UN will be falling apart

at an even faster pace.

The newly elected Secretary-General assumed his post in a much more complex and contradictory world than at least two of his predecessors - Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon.

Today and tomorrow, the UN cannot and will not relax; the situation is far from favorable. The Organization cannot promptly respond to the outbursts of tension and cut short massive hideous crimes in conflict zones. It cannot consistently respond to human rights violations hence accusations of dual standards. In fact, the sphere of extraordinary humanitarian operations is overloaded and, hence, wobbling.

In short, the situation in the UN strengthens the feeling of destabilization of the global governance system.

IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN how the new master of the skyscraper on the East River will rule and what results he will achieve. He will spare no effort to restore the former trust in the global Organization, to prevent crises and to reform the system of the UN development since "the challenges are now surpassing our ability to respond."

I can even say that the international community needs this leader as a moral authority to guide the world at the moments of uncertainty and high risks. He is needed because the world should have well-balanced assessments of events: national governments tend to be one-sided while the media have become an instrument of propaganda rather than a source of information.

In a wider sense, he is needed to preserve the Organization's foundations of multi-sidedness lest it finds itself "in low water" amid the malfunctioning of international relations.

It seems that the UN as the worldwide "cooperative" should look for and arrive, in the near future, at a new combination of values, concepts and goals that would include the views and ideas of the non-Western world.

NATO: Trump's Burden

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PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES Donald Trump called NATO an obsolete organization and demanded that the European allies should contribute bigger "fair shares" to European security. This includes, among other things, total fulfillment of their obligation to steadily raise their share of military expenditures up to 2% of their GDPs. This caused consternation among the European leaders and the fears that America's role and guarantees would be

eroded, transatlantic unity weakened and the role of NATO undermined. Trump's unconditional acceptance of Brexit as the Brits' wise move fanned doubts in the new American administration's wholehearted devotion to the strategic alliance with Europe/EC and its ability to remain NATO's responsible leader.

On the other hand, Brexit deprived the EU and Europe of the leader that ensured European interests in the relations with the United States, in the transatlantic alliance and within the NATO-EU cooperation. Trump's declared readiness to revive cooperation with Russia despite the Ukrainian crisis questioned the earlier agreements and decisions to contain Russia.

DUE TO THE PERSISTENT EFFORTS of the United States, the burden-sharing issue never left the NATO agenda. At all times, the Americans, first, wanted their transatlantic partners to demonstrate more responsibility and make greater contributions to the collective, and most importantly, European defenses and security. Second, in view of the Americans' much greater responsibilities, they wanted to keep their European partners on their toes.

NATO relies on its formula "Russia's military aggression in Ukraine" to arrange its new, post-Afghan transatlantic balance and consolidate the alliance in the face of the "Russian challenge." In the course of time, the "challenge" has lost a lot of its effect on both sides of the Atlantic and can no longer serve the strategic platform of the Atlantic Alliance. As the common agenda is losing a lot of its significance, the issue of European "non-complementarity" has been inevitably raised again and again.

For a new American card game with Europe, the American president selected a hand of three trump cards: burden-sharing, American guarantees and the Russian joker

It seems that the European NATO allies of Germany will follow suit which means that Trump will have to revise his set of European political instruments. On the other hand, not all European allies are on Germany's side: as distinct from Old Europe, some of its opponents have already responded to the American support of their request to contain Russia by increasing their contributions to defenses.

Each "new" Euro is seen as European investment into the American dollar and the growth of the American military-industrial complex. In plain words, this is a factor of greater European dependence in the military, political and economic sphere, an instrument that further consolidates America's competitiveness.

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IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, almost all indicators of economic cooperation between Germany and the post-Soviet countries, including Russia, have worsened sharply against the background of Germany's dynamically growing trade with the rest of the world.

RUSSIAN-GERMAN RELATIONS have seen better days. The political atmosphere has been poisoned. The imitation of a "strategic partnership" has withered and died. Bilateral trade has been falling for the fourth consecutive year.

Much of this can be attributed to the "war of sanctions." For example, Germany was the biggest supplier of machinery and equipment to the Russian market for many years.

But sanctions are only one side of the coin. An equally significant

role in the reduction of bilateral trade belongs to the economic downturn in Russia, exchange rate volatility, the deteriorating financial position of Russian companies, and the resulting decline in demand for imported goods both in the corporate sector and among consumers.

In the second half of 2016, business attitudes changed significantly. It appears that German entrepreneurs are gradually adapting to the changed conditions for doing business in Russia and are once again ready to invest in the Russian economy. According to a survey of German companies operating in Russia conducted by the Russian-German AHK in the fall of 2016, 22% of CEOs plan to localize production in Russia in the next 12 months, and 72% intend to make additional investments in plants already in operation.

While the problems in Russian-German relations have intensified, Gazprom has been issuing upbeat reports about an increase in the physical volume of natural gas exports to Europe.

The head of the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations, Wolfgang Büchele, has admitted that an orientation towards European integration is of little benefit to the former Soviet republics if they simultaneously lose their position in the Eurasian market, primarily in Russia. "None of the three countries with which the EU has concluded an association agreement," he said, referring to Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, "has been able to increase its exports to the European market."

Berlin's long-term "eastern" strategy is not dictated by momentary considerations. A united and stronger Germany is now seeking to become an independent player in the post-Soviet space. As Germany has turned into the EU's dominant force, these aspirations have become increasingly ambitious. To put it bluntly, their purpose is to expand Germany's political, economic and ideological sphere of influence to the republics of the former USSR, to weaken Russia's geopolitical

position by detaching Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia, and to create alternative energy supply routes from the Caspian region that would bypass Russia.

It is still difficult to say how Berlin will adjust its policy towards Russia with President Donald Trump in office. But it would be naïve to think that the role of the main proponent of anti-Russian policy in Europe assumed by Angela Merkel is the result only of American influence, let alone of the Russophobic complexes of the current leadership of Poland and the Baltic states. It is a voluntary and deliberate choice.

Turkey in Search of Reference Points

Alexander Frolov, leading research associate, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Science, Doctor of Science (Political Science);

Viktor Nadein-Raevsky, senior research associate at the same institute, Candidate of Science (Philosophy)



A. Frolov: Having left the deplorable crisis behind, Russia and Turkey added positive energy to their bilateral relations even though unanimity on certain issues is impossible for objective reasons. For obvious reasons, these relations should be discussed in the context of the deep-cutting political and social transformations unfolding inside the Turkish society, the root of the current ups and downs of Turkish politics.

Today, it is no secret that the country is coping with the complex problems of the transitory nature. It remains to be seen whether this transition will succeed and what will come out of it if and when it succeeds. So far, there are not enough clear trends to answer these questions. At the same time, there are obvious attempts to revise the legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, dominant in the country during the last 100 years.

V. Nadein-Raevsky: I spoke many times of perestroika Turkish style which looks like an ideological perestroika. This definition is signally important: Russia should take this into account in its regional strategy and bilateral relations.

I should say that the educated part of Turkish society has been always looking at Japan as an example to be followed: arm the country with Western technologies and the system of economic management and preserve national specifics, to avoid the danger of being diluted in the Western lifestyle and indiscriminate borrowing of alien customs that might contradict the Turkish traditions. Fethullah Gulen, who had relied on these sentiments to change the country through education, became Erdogan's main enemy. In the last twenty or twenty-five years, his programs educated a new generation of Turks. He created educational structures that taught foreign languages and exact sciences. As for history and social sciences, they were brimming with mythologized Turkish clichés hued with pan-Turkism.

The Turks look at the ideas of the New Ottomans borrowed from the nineteenth century about equal rights for the Muslims and non-Muslims as highly progressive. Arabs who remember plunder, lawlessness and Turkish arrogance vehemently object to Erdogan's statement that Turkey was defending the Arabs for hundreds of years. So far the Turks have not yet understood this and are not ready to abandon Neo-Ottomanism.

A. Frolov: The changes in Turkish policy overlaid, in a strange way, the relations with our country. In Russia, few people doubt that we need good-neighborly relations with Turkey.

I think that Turkey is moving in Russia's direction not only because of the tomatoes and the empty beaches in Antalya. The country is gradually growing aware that something is wrong with

the processes unfolding around it.

V. Nadein-Raevsky: The Turks can help resolve the problem of Syria since the Turkish territory was used to deliver weapons and armaments to Islamist fighters of all hues. However, the situation is even more complicated: the game Turkey is playing against the Syrian Kurds contradicts the position of Russia. Liberation of Aleppo has demonstrated that cooperation with Turkey was possible and even useful. Inside the country, political confrontation and religious conflicts will not be resolved any time soon which was amply confirmed by the fact that the man who killed the Russian ambassador was not a common policeman - he belonged to one of the elite units.

Reconciliation with Russia has not changed Erdogan's position on the Kurdish issue: he is guided by the old slogan "Divide and rule."

A. Frolov: Joint energy projects are not the only Russia's advantage: it is expected that nearly 4 million Russian tourists will visit Turkey to bring from \$3 to \$5 billion to its economy. It is impossible to change the neighbors - it is wise to be smart and remain level-headed when dealing with them. Both Russia and Turkey have reasonably efficient pressure instruments that will be used if needed.

If it wants to ensure its sustainable social, political and economic development, Turkey should revise its policies in different parts of the world: the Arab world, Europe and America. Time will show whether it succeeds.

Five Decades of ASEAN

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THE PRESENT-DAY FRAMEWORK of international relations includes quite a few regional organizations, which have proved their value and efficiency. There is among them, however, one that has always been holding a special place - namely, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was established in 1967 and in the fifty years of its existence has not only successfully confirmed its viability but has also been able to become a focal point for strengthening broad international cooperation, involving the participation of practically all leading world powers.

Over the past 50 years, the Association has become a viable mechanism of political, economic, defense, police, humanitarian, and other

cooperation among the ASEAN member states both in the multilateral and bilateral formats. It is even more important, however, that despite numerous problems inherited by its member states from the period of their colonial dependency, they have been able to demonstrate political will and turn their organization into an effective instrument for overcoming their differences and conflicts. As a result, with the passage of time, ASEAN has become a major factor of peace, stability, and security in one of the formerly most turbulent and explosive world regions.

In 1982, in his monograph *ASEAN: Politics and the Economy*, the author of the present article, for the first time ever in this country, made a comprehensive analysis of the reasons, goals and circumstances behind the establishment of the ASEAN community, examined the driving forces and the areas of interaction of five founding nations of the Association - Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines, as well as Brunei, which joined them some time later. The monograph also contains a conclusion stating that, despite some grave problems which have continued to plague the relations between the ASEAN members, the organization still has a significant potential for growth and positive development.

Even after the monograph's publication, a skeptical attitude to ASEAN's prospects still prevailed in our country for some time, impeding efforts to fully assess the potential of that regional structure, which has been developing new types of cooperation.

At present, ASEAN is generally regarded as nucleus and a driving force of the entire system of multilateral cooperation in the region, in which practically all leading world powers, including Russia, actively operate.

It is important to take a deeper look at what is called the "ASEAN Way" - a political notion broadly used by the Association's ten members. This will allow us to identify the reasons behind ASEAN's material successes in different areas of regional interaction. We also need to examine in more detail the Association's conceptual framework underlying its establishment and opera-

tion.

NO LESS IMPORTANT is ASEAN's member states' rejection of the use of force or the threat of force in their relations with each other. This principle is closely linked to the previously discussed principle of the inadmissibility of any intervention in the internal affairs. It reiterates the generally acknowledged principle of the international law embodied in the UN Charter, envisaging a renunciation by the states of the use or threat of force in resolving any disputes between them.

The Association had to solve some serious matters in the process of expanding the area of international and regional cooperation, and developing new contacts with influential international players outside the region.

Summarizing the above, we can conclude that ASEAN as an organization, despite its relatively amorphous nature and a lack of strict bloc discipline, has been able to achieve significant positive results in the fifty years of its existence. In any case, the Association represents an effective working model of regional cooperation, many elements of which have already been incorporated into international diplomatic practice and successfully assimilated by regional structures and forums. A more profound and detailed examination of ASEAN's 50-year-long operational experience can provide useful information to other integration structures, including on the territory of Eurasia.

The U.S. Presidential Election: A Triumph of Information Technology Innovations

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UNTIL VERY RECENTLY, it had been a general mantra in the United States that it was wrong to put any restrictions on the Internet or bring it under any control. Silicon Valley innovators who designed social network platforms didn't worry too much about how the latter might be used. They planned to organize online communities where members would have facilities for comfortable intercommunication and trade. They had in mind conflict-free, purely progressive development of U.S. digital society and assumed

that their designs were far ahead of the resources of terrorists.

But the Internet hasn't simply grown since it came into being a few decades ago. It has become a conflict zone. Today's cyberspace is a site for fierce economic competition, for ideological struggles, and for measures against foreign cyber aggression, terrorism, and the theft of intellectual property and personal data. All this is a stark contrast to the former use of online networks solely by scientific and scholarly communities.

Politicians and the military in the United States have come to realize that there's a whole gamut of ways in which the Internet can be used against American interests.

When terrorists got hold of technologies that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was powerless to counteract, President Barack Obama urged Silicon Valley innovators to think up ways to prevent terrorists from using social networks for the radicalization of U.S. society and recruitment, in order to stop them from using modern technology against American interests.

The innovative technologies that caused the greatest annoyance to Clinton and Obama were not Russian but American, used by American citizens on U.S. territory.

Internet search engines that are outside public control may pose serious hazards, which should undoubtedly be qualified as information security threats.

The Obama administration set itself the goal of preventing the use of the global information infrastructure against American interests but failed to achieve it. Now not only WikiLeaks and the Chinese but also commercial actors were alleged to be menaces to the United States, and the country's information insecurity assumed truly geopolitical proportions.

DONALD TRUMP drew his online support from the Facebook company and the Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity (CLTC), organizations that had an election campaign strategy based on commercial principles and hence was fundamentally different from that of the Clinton team. Trump knew how to use Twitter but was against all kinds of new electronic gadgets. But tweeting

as a way of talking to voters clearly wasn't enough to make him win the election. Like Clinton, Trump employed the tactic of turning a bad job into a good one, and it worked. The Facebook top brass knew exactly who was responsible for the information security of their clients. They didn't advocate the confidentiality of users. They had a diametrically opposite goal to pursue in Trump's campaign strategy - to take advantage of users' lack of confidentiality. Let us stress that innovative technologies that caused the greatest annoyance to Clinton and Obama were not Russian but American, used by American citizens on U.S. territory. It can be said that, effectively, the election struggle between Trump and Clinton deprived ordinary Americans of their right to a secret ballot, inflicted tremendous damage on the entire U.S. democratic system, discredited it, and demonstrated that the American people had fallen victim to state-of-the-art information weapons - Facebook monitoring and Big Data technology - which were used against them from within the country, and which can make voters stop believing that democratic principles are compatible with the Internet.

Tricky Dick Avenged: Donald Trump's Politics Through the Prism of Richard Nixon's Presidency

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INAUGURATED ON JANUARY 20, 2017 as the 45th President of the United States, Donald John Trump was well known to the nation as a businessman who had never filled any state posts and never craved the presidency. Back in 1990, he said: "I don't want to be President. I'm one hundred percent sure. I'd change my mind only if I saw this country continue to go down the tubes." This means that by 2015 when he decided to run on his own money, without sponsors and lob-

bysts, to become the best American president he had been absolutely sure that the country was going down the tubes.

In his eyes, the U.S. looked a weak country that should be tougher and more determined: "Tough is being mentally capable of winning battles against an opponent and doing it with a smile. Tough is winning systematically."

Convinced that his country has been engaged in interventionist policies far too long he says that the U.S. "should look after its interests" and concentrate at its own problems. America should restore the real sector of its economy by moving back industrial facilities from China and liquidate the unequal trade exchange with China.

In his new book, *Never Enough: Donald Trump and the Pursuit of Success*, Rhys Blakely of *The Times* insists that the Nixons were among the first admirers of Trump. Roger Stone who belongs to Trump's closest circle admitted that "he has, famously, a tattoo of Richard Nixon's smiling face." The Trump-Nixon parallels are not recent inventions. *The New York Times*, newspaper with no soft spot for Trump, called him "a new Nixon" in its coverage of the Republican Party convent in Cleveland that made Trump presidential nominee.

The media have started talking about a possible impeachment of Trump that reminds of Nixon; incidentally, Trump is invited to move into the Old Executive Office Building where some of Nixon's talks related to the Watergate scandal were taped. Trump and Nixon, however, are very different people. The former, with no political experience to talk of, is a man of big business who knows how to earn money, how to assess people and, more important, how to control the unfolding processes, the skills that many American leaders had lacked.

There is an opinion that Nixon was deposed because of his policy of détente, believed to be in the interests of the Soviet Union alone. Interestingly, as could be expected, as soon as Nixon had been removed, the Congress adopted the notorious Jackson-Vanik amendment that deprived the Soviet Union of the status of most favored nation until the Soviet Union had removed the limitations on

the right of emigration. The amendment survived till November 2012.

It should be said that, despite the very negative image of Richard Nixon in the United States he is one of the few positively assessed American presidents in our country. He (and Trump) cannot and should not be described as "pro-Soviet" or "pro-Russian." The reason for this positive opinion was considerably better relations between the Soviet Union and the United States at his time. The fact that Trump is talking, despite an obvious opposition, about his intention to "achieve an understanding with Russia," breeds cautious optimism.

Donald Trump's Nuclear Strategy: First Outlines

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U.S. PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP has inherited large strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals from his predecessor, Barack Obama, and a strategy of "unconditional offensive nuclear deterrence," which allows for the possibility of a preemptive nuclear strike against practically any country that is not an ally, friend or partner of the United States.

The Obama administration drew up and launched a program to create a qualitatively new strategic triad. This program was to be started by building heavy bombers.

Within the next 15 years, the United States is going to manufacture new heavy bombers of the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider type, which is sometimes unofficially called B-3. The B-21s are due to be in service from 2025 to between 2075 and 2080. Altogether between 80 and 100 B-21s are to be built. There will also be new ICBMs of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) class, which is referred to as Minuteman IV for simplicity's sake. GBSDs would be in service from 2029 to 2080 and increase in number to between 400 and 420.

Intensive design work is underway on Columbia-class "experimental" nuclear submarines, which would be armed with nuclear missiles and begin to be put in service in 2028. Altogether 12 submarines of this class are to be built. Each would carry 18 SLBMs.

As a result of this overhaul of the triad, the United States may acquire up to 692 essentially new delivery vehicles by the mid-21st century, excluding long-range air-launched nuclear cruise missiles.

Trump, immediately after taking office, revealed a plan to continue to modernize both the strategic and the tactical nuclear forces.

Russia should by no means cut its strategic nuclear forces any further. Some of these forces have been designed to overcome the American missile defense system, which is expanding uncontrollably; this expansion is dangerous and may set off a missile defense arms race.

RUSSIA should come up with some practical armaments control proposals without waiting for Trump to clarify his position. Moscow should seek no-first-use treaties with the United States and other nuclear member countries of NATO or treaties completely banning the use of nuclear weapons. These should be legally binding documents with no expiration dates. It would, however, be the wrong decision for Russia to agree to the extension of New START or to signing an updated bilateral START because of the uncontrolled deployment of the global missile defense and the modernization of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed near Russian borders. New START is the last bilateral deal that made sense for Russia to enter. All nuclear countries, especially Britain and France as allies of the United States with mutual commitments concerning

strategic nuclear forces, should become involved in nuclear arms control negotiations. Russia should by no means cut its strategic nuclear forces any further. Some of these forces have been designed to overcome the American missile defense system, which is expanding uncontrollably; this expansion is dangerous and may set off a missile defense arms race.

Moscow should, moreover, protest the counting system where one heavy strategic bomber is considered a single unit of strategic nuclear armaments regardless of how many bombs it can carry.

Priorities and Flaws of a Great Project

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THE EUROPEAN UNION, one of the main load-bearing structures of the world order, is still in the process of integration; it has not yet reached its final form. From the very beginning, it was expected to become one of the most prominent initiatives of mankind and an attempt to create the most perfect system of relationships and cooperation between peoples. In many respects, the project was stimulated by the ideas and theories of the best minds of Europe from Victor Hugo and Giuseppe Mazzini, their ideas

being developed by Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, Aristide Briand, the Mann brothers, and the contemporary authors of the European idea.

In significance and impact on the processes unfolding in the world, the project can be compared to the great and highly successful American experiment and the equally great, yet artificially discontinued for the gamut of reasons, Soviet experiment. The founders were probably inspired by the humanitarian aims of bringing peoples together to achieve peaceful coexistence. The practical realization is another matter.

In May 2004, the public learned about a confidential report *Toward a Political Europe* prepared by an ad hoc group of experts headed by the former French Finance Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn on the personal instructions by Romano Prodi, the then president of the European Commission. The authors justified the idea of a united European federative super-state *The United States of Europe*. The Constitution of the European Union elaborated in the process of realization was adopted in 2005 and signed by all EU members.

The aims were even more ambitious, a united European identity in place of de-nationalized national identity. This meant single citizenship and a single people of the European Union.

We should return to the natural state of coexistence of nation-states that have their own history, spiritual and socio-cultural identity, traditions, and sovereignty that they will not share with anyone.

Today, it might sound an exaggeration to say that "a specter is haunting Europe" - the specter of nationalism followed by separatism that is no longer a specter but reality. It should be said, however, that these anti-systemic trends are unfolding with increased rapidity and undermining Euro-integration, or at least its political component.

THE EUROPEAN UNION'S COHESION was diluted by the rising and widening waves of immigrants, the policy of multiculturalism and political correctness. The leaders of the main European powers admitted that the culture of multiculturalism had failed. The conclusion is correct yet the phenomenon is still alive. It will never disappear but will remain an inevitable

component of societies of many EU members. The number and influence of migrants will inevitably increase while the phenomenon of political correctness might mutate if the flows of newcomers are not miraculously stopped.

Historically, all revolutionary ideas were radical and were perceived by the majority in any country as marginal. In the course of time, the ranks of their supporters were swelling with those ready to fight or even sacrifice their lives for the practical realization of these ideas. History has taught us that very often only radical ideas can shatter the pillars of the dominant form of state order, stir up a social storm, anarchy and chaos, mobilize considerable number of people ready to go to the end up to and including a revolution. In fact, many civil wars and revolutions began as radical ideas.

Those who assess the past and future of the European Union should take Soviet experience into account and be ready to face a possibility of dealing with something that at first sight seems impossible. This is a well-timed warning: today, the world has found itself in a situation in which impossible is possible and in which there are no guarantees that the obvious will ever happen.

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THE YEAR 2016 showed ever more graphically and forcefully the depth of the value crisis of the Western political system led by the United States and its allies, regional and European. The remaining community of non-Western states increasingly distrust and even reject the West-imposed "gifts" of neoliberalism, which, according to prominent U.S. philosopher Noam Chomsky, has changed since Adam Smith's days only in terms of the scope of its expansion. Previously, these "gifts" were touted by traders and industrialists who used state power to serve their interests despite the painful consequences for others, including the British people ("others" are colonies, mandated territories and so on); now the goals are more wide-ranging and ambitious: entire countries and regions of the world, as well as the entire world itself.

THE WEST'S DISHONEST POLICY laid itself bare, showing its inherent duplicity to the maximum degree possible in 2016, amid the Syria crisis. Manipulating the slogans of democracy, human rights and freedom of expression, and playing on the problems and aspirations of ordinary people, the greater part of the U.S. ruling elite and their European and regional allies demonstrated that the Middle East region is nothing but an arena and method of serving their own selfish, egoistic and cynical interests. Directly encouraging the escalation and proliferation of conflicts, they have brazenly and shamelessly appropriated the right to act as judges determining the fates of nations, deceiving them with false promises about the bright future under Western skies.

There is no getting away from the fact that the West sponsors terrorist and extremist forces in order to destabilize and overthrow uncooperative regimes. In recent decades, the stage-managed coups and "color revolutions" in the Middle East, the Balkans and East European countries show quite clearly what kind of forces Western politicians, with support from their ruling elites and multinational corporations, nurture in foreign political and economic communities.

The key point of the new concept is that "violent extremists" should not necessarily be subjected to criminal justice, especially given the high costs involved in collecting evidence and eyewitnesses. HELPLESS in the face of millions of refugees fleeing from conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, provoked by Western countries, our partners should realize that today they are losing all high moral ground for lecturing to others.

If our Western colleagues are unable to cope with the threats of terrorism and extremism at home, where civil society is supposed to play a crucial role, then what kind of prevention of terrorism and extremism can they talk about in more complex societies in the space east of European civiliza-

tion?

Russia, as well as many other countries with a millennium-old history, has its own, hard-gained experience in the fight against terrorism. This experience shows that states and their relevant agencies play a leading role in ensuring any kind of security.

In the upcoming period, painstaking work lies ahead in the key areas of international antiterrorism cooperation, including in cementing the legal foundation to strengthen mutual trust between states and consolidating the ranks of the international community in meeting the global threats of terrorism and extremism. Our position is being cemented through active cooperation with the relevant agencies, as well as by getting constructively minded elements of civil society closely involved within the framework of their advisory and preventive functions. These consistent multilateral efforts, based on the rules that are understandable and equal for all, will enable the international community to unite on a single counterterrorist platform without any double standards or ulterior geopolitical goals.

The Western Dimension of Russia's Military-Technical Cooperation: From Crisis to Regrouping

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THE POLITICAL CRISIS in Ukraine that erupted in March 2014 sparked tensions between Russia and its Western partners, with the United States and then the European Union imposing sanctions on Russia that year.

Similar sanctions were imposed on Russia by allies of the United States. These included Canada and Japan, which are members of the Group of Seven (G7), Australia, New Zealand, and even the poorest European country, Moldova. Ukraine also completely banned its defense sector from having any dealings with Russia.

As a result, practically all of Russia's earlier defense and dual-use technology contracts with European and American companies were frozen and then severed.

The sanctions are unlikely to be lifted either in the short or in the medium term, because that would run against the strategic interests of both the United States and the EU.

The sanctions brought to naught most of what had been achieved in the Russian defense industry's cooperation with the defense sectors of Ukraine and NATO countries. Only individual agreements survived. They had been signed long before the sanctions and included contracts with the United States that remained in place as their annulment would have run very much against U.S. interests.

India sometimes accuses Russian companies of failing to properly meet their contractual commitments. Moreover, Russian manufacturers face increasing competition in the Indian market because of India's policy of diversifying its geography of weapons imports. Russia's military-technical cooperation with India and China has reached the limit of its potential.

Russia also has obstacles to cooperating with Japan and South Korea, but those are obstacles of a different kind - political. Both Japan and South Korea are strategic political and military partners of the United States.

But even if the sanctions against the Russian defense industry are not lifted within the next few years, they cannot close opportunities for limited or selective military-technical cooperation between Western countries and Russia. Neither the United States nor the EU rules out that this scenario might be realized. Even in 2014, the United States and some EU countries continued to meet their commitments under some earlier contracts.

EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini has made statements in support of the selective cooperation idea. After an EU foreign ministers' meeting in March 2016, she said that the EU should take a tough line on Russia and keep the sanctions in force but that the foreign ministers "backed selective engagement with Russia on foreign policy and other areas where there is a clear EU inter-

est." Apparently, the selectivity principle should also underlie Russia's military-technical cooperation with Asian countries, and potentially fruitful projects should be looked for continuously.

How to Build a Law-Governed World: The Russian Perspective

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THE NEW (2016) FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT of the Russian Federation is based on fundamental trends in the international system of the 21st century. This, without any doubt, predetermines the axiology and applied orientation of the document approved by Russian President V.V. Putin. Its adoption reflects Russia's geopolitical responsibility for the progressive development of the world order. Russia's international legal position is an essential component of this intellectual, conceptual approach, ensuring the harmony and dialectics of international and national sovereign interests. Its presence is logical and objective, proceeding from the premise that the international agenda includes a wide range of strategic problems that can be effectively resolved only on the basis of the principles and institutions of law and democracy.

Russia's new Foreign Policy Concept is a code of relevant and strategically important ideas and proposals about reforming international relations in the 21st century.

The general declarations and goals, which are in line with the spirit and letter of the Russian Constitution, are spelled out in the specific provisions of the Foreign Policy Concept. They encompass a significant portion of Russia's intentions and objectives in the international arena as a democratic and legal entity.

In stressing the relevance and importance of Russia's new Foreign Policy Concept, it is essential to take note of the document's new element such as the inclusion of issues related to the international legal entity status of states and international organizations.

Naturally, the Russian document was bound to respond to these trends. As a result, very important provisions appeared in it, including the identification of essential factors in the impact of states on international politics; the identification of ideological values and recipes for modernizing state political systems that are imposed from the outside and strengthen the negative reaction of societies to contemporary challenges; the recognition of the role of the UN, endowed with international legitimacy, as a center for regulating international relations and coordinating world politics in the 21st century; setting the goal of further strengthening the UN capability to ensure its effective adaptation to new world realities while preserving its interstate nature; prohibition of support for nongovernmental entities, including terrorist and extremist organizations; a call to counter any attempts to use human rights concepts as a tool of political pressure and interference in the internal affairs of states, among other things, for the purpose of their destabilization and changing legitimate governments.

From a practical and image perspective, it is advisable to hold presentations of the Russian Foreign Policy Concept through the efforts of the Foreign Ministry, Russian missions abroad, Russian media outlets (RT, RIA Novosti, ITAR-TASS, Interfax and Sputnik, among others), as well as the organizations of compatriots living abroad, with a focus on Russia's strategy and practice in the legal regulation of international relations.

Exports of Goods and Services from Cultural and Creative Industries

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CULTURAL AND CREATIVE INDUSTRIES (CCIs) are increasingly seen as an important driver of economic growth as they enable many countries and companies to become integrated into global value chains and help solve social problems such as unemployment.

UNESCO, a major international organization, which studies and monitors CCIs, defines them as sectors specializing in the production of goods and services of a cultural or innovative nature. The term "creativity" was put into use in its economic meaning in the mid-1990s and implies generation and commercialization of new ideas.

UNESCO also uses multi-tier classification, dividing CCIs into core industries that actually produce goods or services and several tiers of

related, mainly auxiliary sectors that bring such goods or services to the market.

It is a very hard task, however, to identify and classify creative services as creativity in a broader sense as generation and commercialization of ideas is a feature of practically all modern services. Obviously, all these sectors involve not only creativity but also mechanical reproduction of services, and their categorization remains a moot point, which means that more accurate classification of creative services is needed.

Asian countries, especially China and partly India, offer excellent illustrations of the role of a growing middle class as the main source of CCI progress.

GLOBAL TRADE in cultural and creative goods and services is mostly trade between developed countries and exports from some developing nations, primarily China. CCI imports by developing countries are mostly services, including architectural design and advertising. Russia controls only a tiny fraction of the world CCI market, and can apparently boost its presence there rather quickly if its CCIs have more customers among foreign tourists visiting the country and build up their exports. By achieving a more prominent role for itself in world CCI trade, Russia would also be able to enhance its human capital.

Meanwhile, China, despite the serious cultural barriers to its CCI exports, has been able to seriously expand its share of the world CCI market largely by buying out or cooperating with Western companies.

South Korean Policy on Regional Trade Agreements

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SOUTH KOREA is one of the world's top ten exporters. As of 2015, it was the world's sixth-largest exporter and ninth-largest importer. That year, South Korean products accounted for 3.2% of global exports and for 2.6% of world imports compared with 0.85% and 1.07% respectively in 1980. Hence the country has played an increasing role in the international division of labor.

BY 2000, SOUTH KOREA was one of the few members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to have

no RTA with any country.

In the first decade of the 21st century, South Korea embarked on a policy of moving from multilateral trade (except for trade based on its WTO and APEC membership) to regional and bilateral deals. The key objectives of this policy were to boost trade with key trading partners, minimize exceptions from the nation's trade and investment liberalization, and remove nontariff barriers. South Korea began to use nontariff barriers as mechanisms for insurance against risks to its economy, for making its industry more competitive, and for stimulating its economic growth.

The country now based its trade policy on WTO principles such as nondiscrimination, most favored nation clauses, national treatment, market openness, and transparency.

South Korea set itself the goal of becoming an East Asian trade, transportation and logistical hub based on principles of transparency and inclusiveness in the anticipation that this would provide support for its less developed industries.

Most of South Korea's RTAs have a high utilization ratio, which was between 40% and 80% as of 2014. For comparison's sake, in 2008 the average utilization ratio was 5%. It mainly owes its increase to the government's trade strategy and to state support mechanisms such as compensations to less developed industries and less successful companies.

It is worth pointing out South Korea's FTA with ASEAN as one of the country's RTAs with relatively low utilization ratios.

Export orientation has been the main factor in South Korea's dynamic economic development in the last five decades.

In proportion to its total exports, South Korea's exports to its FTA partners such as Vietnam, EFTA and ASEAN members, Peru, Australia, and China showed the fastest growth with a clear effect of trade creation. South Korea's exports to the United States grew by the same percentage as its total exports, while its exports to Canada, Singapore and Chile showed increases that were below the rise in its total exports. Summing up, different South Korean FTAs show different degrees of trade creation. The reasons are ongoing trade liberalization and differing customs duties for South Korean goods in importer countries. South Korea's trade record proves economic growth stimuli used by its government to have been effective.

Modern Diplomacy as Part of the Networked World

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THE SCIENTIFIC and technological revolution (information revolution) that started in the 1960s became a catalyst for globalization with its concomitant processes, which continue today and involve practically all spheres of public life, including diplomacy.

It is gradually resulting in network-based interaction between actors, with increasing use of new types of diplomacy - public diplomacy, paradiplomacy, e-diplomacy, and "net diplomacy." To better understand the degree of influence of network interaction on diplomacy, let us dwell on each of these types in some detail.

Today, this form of diplomacy has entered a new phase known as "new public diplomacy." Dutch scholar Jan Melissen, in the book entitled *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International*

Relations, argues that public diplomacy "is operative in a network environment," where there are numerous actors in addition to states, "rather than the hierarchical state-centric model of international relations." This reflects important structural changes in international relations, which are examined below in this article.

Paradiplomacy or regional diplomacy is participation of individual regions of countries in international organizations and in near-border, interregional and transregional cooperation.

Paradiplomacy is a product of integration processes, namely either closer cooperation between regions lying at intersections of transportation or trade routes or between regions bordering foreign countries or having stable contacts with foreign states or with individual regions in them. Paradiplomacy is normally based on geographical or economic similarities, on the possibility of exchange of technologies, experience or skilled labor, etc.

E-diplomacy comprises a great diversity of subtypes, including twiplomacy, social media diplomacy and Internet diplomacy. Increasing use is made of video conferences and e-negotiations. The Russian Foreign Ministry, for instance, has an official website and accounts on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr, as well as in VKontakte, Russia's main social network. In effect, the websites and accounts of diplomatic services may be regarded as their countries' diplomatic missions in virtual space.

Due to modern technology, neither spatial distances nor temporal differences are serious obstacles to communication. One can, in fact, make one addition to Latour's list - the values and interests of each actor, which explain their desire for communication, determine their choice of the actor to communicate with and affect the process of communication in one way or another. The main values of what is defined as net diplomacy in Russian political discourse are flexibility, transparency, minimal roles of formal and hierarchical aspects, enlargement of ranges of par-

ticipants in diplomatic activities at various levels of government, and intensive dialogue between nations.

Hence, the emergence of new types of diplomacy reflects its internal transformation toward more extensive and diverse interaction and greater openness and represents the emergence of a networked structure of international relations that will gradually extend to more and more countries and regions despite political, economic and other differences between them. This structure is a direct product of globalization, which has taken place for several centuries and speeded up sharply toward the end of the 20th century.

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IN 2016, Russian expert and scientific communities continued research focused, as before, on elucidating processes going in the Baltic countries, primarily concerning Russian-Baltic bilateral relations. The researchers concentrated on defining the influence of internal and external factors which form the policies of the Baltic countries and determine the trends of their economic development.

Among the most significant projects of 2016 special mention should be made of events organized by MGIMO University, IMEMO RAS, as well as the establishment of the Russian Association of the Baltic Studies (RABS), which has united researchers of various scientific and educational institutions mainly located in the Northwestern Federal District (NFD).

In April 2016, RABS initiated, with the support of the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, the holding of an international research and practical conference "The Baltic Studies in Russia" at Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University. Sixty-six Russian researchers from Kaliningrad, Moscow, St. Petersburg, Murmansk, Voronezh, Pskov, and 13 experts from Germany, Hungary, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, and Poland participated in the work of the three sections, providing for a multifaceted and highly motivated exchange of opinions.

The Center for North European and Baltic Studies (CNEBS), operating within the framework of MGIMO University, has also been involved in organizing the relevant activities.

Elaborating a new concept of the further development of Russian-Baltic relations obviously presents a major academic and practical interest.

It was noted that the present-day leaders of the Baltic countries have continued to follow a course aimed at maintaining confrontation in their relations with Russia. The confrontation is being generated in a few areas listed below: planting Russophobia.

At the same time, experts underlined that such a line of conduct has not been formed by the Baltic countries themselves.

In this context, according to the conference participants, a major role was played by the Baltic countries' natives, who can conventionally be termed Western Balts.

It should be taken into account that proposals on incorporating the Baltic studies in the body of the research on Northern Europe compete with the widespread ideas on an interrelation of the Baltic states and the East European countries. Specifically, some experts believe that it would

be preferable to consider the developments in the Baltic states mainly in the East European context.

In general, it seems that the time is ripe to stop imitating a confrontational style of the present Baltic political leadership and not to be overcome by accusations and denials, but rather start developing concrete technologies and schemes aimed at rendering conceptual aid to the Baltic states in order to overcome their growth pains. A continuous work by the Russian side to introduce into the international scientific discourse new concepts and views on bilateral relations will prevent the anti-Russian part of the Baltic elites from confining the local population to the discussion of their confrontation with Russia and carrying on the relevant propaganda.

Russia's active practical work on generating different ideas in the field of bilateral relations will objectively motivate the Baltic elites to seek answers to the challenges of the future and get into a discussion using well-founded arguments, which will inevitably lead to facilitation of a dialog on normalizing bilateral relations.

"People Simply Want to Vote for an Honest Person"

Author: François Asselineau

President of the Union Populaire Républicaine (France)



I have great respect for M. Lavrov, whom I consider to be a major Russian statesman and one of the best foreign ministers in the world. It is also very important for me that the Russian foreign minister always cites norms of international law. For my part, since I created my own political movement, I have always prioritized the need to follow these norms. As far as I am concerned, the very concept of law is what separates barbarism from civilization.

As you probably know, my presidential program includes [France's] withdrawal from the European Union and NATO. To put it bluntly, Washington has used these organizations to

put Paris into a dependent position. My public presentations usually take place against the backdrop of three flags: French, UN and "Francophonic."

Now regarding the relations between France and Russia. De Gaulle unexpectedly told Peyrefitte this: Every time France had good relations with Russia, France was on a roll. However, every time our relations with Russia soured, we had a bad period in our history.

It should be noted that these remarks were made half a century ago but they are still relevant. I am a loyal adherent of the ideas that he put forward at that time and I believe that France today is suffering because it has lost itself. After all, France literally means a "country of free people." However, today, it has turned into a country that is Washington's satellite as a result of European agreements.

I believe in balance, but today's world is unbalanced. I therefore believe that France should have good relations with Russia. I am not saying this just to please you. I advocate good-neighborly relations with strong countries, as well as an alliance with China. By the way, here, too, General de Gaulle was the first to acknowledge the importance of China.

In reality, there are two sides in Ukraine - pro-Western and pro-Russian. I believe that the Ukrainian people themselves should decide whether to establish a certain federal structure or to consider the possibility of dividing the country. I do not know what they will decide but France should stop fueling the fire - importantly, both in Ukraine and in Syria.

For many years, the French people have been told that the European Union is absolutely indispensable, because it means peace; that the euro zone is a sign of prosperity and new jobs, and that if we abandon the euro, the Apocalypse will begin. However, I am not at all sure that these statements are in sync with the worldview of the French people themselves. Nevertheless, the fundamental principle of conducting an election campaign in a truly democratic society is to explain to the public what is going on. It is simply that people are not informed well enough.

It seems to me that the French political class has not measured up to the occasion. For many

years, it has allowed itself to be intimidated and, possibly, has also been subjected to corruption. Gradually, our leaders have lost the notion of what the president's role should be. I am the only one who has a clear-cut position on this issue. It seems to me that many politicians are simply afraid of being blacklisted. For my part, I am afraid of nothing and I often repeat that you cannot represent your nation and be afraid of reporters.

The Fiery Voyage Around the World

Author: S. Brilev

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IN JULY OF LAST YEAR, people living in apartments in Vladivostok that face Amur Bay could have witnessed a whole chain of strange events.

Looking at the navy boat through a pair of binoculars, you would have seen smoke coming out of smoke bombs and stretchers being laid on the deck. If your binoculars were very powerful, you could have seen that, for some reason, the navy boat sailors had not "Pacific Fleet" but "Black Sea Fleet" written on their caps.

Those two people were Ella Tukhareli, the director of a new documentary film on unknown foreign voyages by the Soviet Navy during World War II, and myself, the author of the script and narrator. The movie had been commissioned by the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK).

In Vladivostok, London, Moscow, Edinburgh, and even in Montevideo (especially in Montevideo, in fact), we filmed scenes based on unique archival records of what de facto was the first around-the-world voyage in Soviet history, an unprecedented trip by Soviet cruiser-icebreaker Anastas Mikoyan 75 years ago, during the severest wartime winter of 1941/42. Soviet and Russian historians and journalists have got interested in that voyage ever since information about it was partially declassified in the 1950s.

Because of the format of a TV documentary, much of what we found out will inevitably remain outside the film, but it seemed to me that some of it would be of interest to readers of International Affairs.

The purpose of disarming Anastas Mikoyan was to enable it to pass through the straits of neutral Turkey. After that, the cruiser was to set off on a journey to the Northern Sea Route past the Tokarevsky Lighthouse in Vladivostok.

Something else was a problem, though. The purpose of disarming Anastas Mikoyan was to have it comply with the rules of passing through neutral Turkey. But beyond the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles was the Mediterranean, which was literally swarming with fascist (Italian) ships and seaplanes.

Anastas Mikoyan wasn't the first Russian ship to reach the Rio de la Plata. It's well known that Soviet merchant ship Tbilisi was in Argentina, next door to Uruguay, when Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.

But what were Soviet merchant ships doing in South America in the early stages of World War II? That is a special and undoubtedly very controversial page in our history. Surely our sailors weren't doing more than obeying orders, but the latter included orders to pick up Latin American goods

for Germany.

As for Anastas Mikoyan, it was, mind you, British envoy Stevenson of all people who surmised that the ship's visit would pave the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Uruguay and the Soviet Union. Which is what happened.

Anastas Mikoyan's unbelievable odyssey included several episodes that this article doesn't mention. Some of them had been unknown before we started scripting our documentary, and we succeeded in recovering them. Others had been known but we found out significant new details about them. For instance, Captain Sergeyevev had amazing encounters with remarkable people in the middle of a fire at the port of Haifa at the end of 1941 and during the Battle of Madagascar in 1942.

If International Affairs readers don't mind, I won't go into these episodes in this article to save them for our film, which has the working title Ognennaya krugosvetka (The Fiery Voyage Around the World) and will be first shown on the Rossiya TV channel this year.

Finland: 100 Years of Independence

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THE CENTURY-LONG HISTORY of Finland's independence and its relations with the Soviet Union/Russian Federation can be conventionally divided into four periods: the beginning (early 20th century to 1917); formal sovereignty and de facto dependence on Germany (1918-1944); cooperation with the Soviet Union as a guarantee of independence, "Eastern Trade," Finnish Initiatives (1945-1991); good-neighborly relations with Russia, integration with the West (since 1992).

The works by Finnish historians published in Russia early in the twenty-first century - *Keisarin Suomi* (Imperial Finland), *Suomen Suuriruhtinaskunta, 1809-1917* (The Grand Duchy of Finland), *Suomen poliittinen historia 1809-2009* (From Grand Duchy to a

Modern State: A Political History of Finland Since 1809), *Lohen sukua: Urho Kekkonen - poliitikko ja valtiomies* (From the Kin of Salmon: Urho Kekkonen, Politician and President) - of the total volume of 2.5 thousand pages are an obvious evidence of a great interest in our common past that should be comprehended for the sake of the future.

Summing up what Finnish academics think about the history of their country's independence, I will quote here what Alexander Rumyantsev, RF Ambassador to the Republic of Finland and Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, wrote in his introduction to Osmo Jussila's *Suomen Suuriruhtinaskunta, 1809-1917*: "Finland's wide autonomy within the Russian Empire allowed it to acquire the still functioning Finnish structures of governance." This fully corresponds to what Professor Jussila of Helsinki University said in his voluminous book: "As distinct from many other smaller states that became independent, Finland did not have to build up its state structures"³ and ended it with: "When during World War II, President of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt asked J.V. Stalin why he was insisting on adding the Baltic states to the USSR as Soviet republics, the former Commissar of Nationalities answered that under the last czar the Baltic gubernias had already lost their autonomy."

"The paradox for Finland was that the better Finland succeeded in achieving the Soviet Union's trust, the better were her possibilities for cooperation with the West" (Urho Kekkonen).

Summing up the Soviet period (the 1970s-1980s) known in Finland as "the golden time of Eastern trade" we should point to the role of two outstanding statesmen that dominated the two countries' relations for over 20 years. They were President Urho Kaleva Kekkonen and Minister of Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union Nikolai Patolichev, affectionately called Pato in the Finnish business community.

The present author who was actively involved in what was going on at that time has repeatedly pointed out that none of the state figures of Finland of the latter half of the twentieth century had

done more for its independence, development and high international rating than Urho Kekkonen. Today, in the present context of East-West relations, Finland would have profited from his enthusiasm and "drive."

The authors of Suomen Poliittinen historia 1809-1995 completed it with a section they called "A New Stage." At that time, they imagined that the future of their country could be tied exclusively to the European Union. Time and life have shown that "an opening to Europe" as an unbeatable argument that would finally help Finland get out of its geopolitical and economic location "at the back of beyond"²⁹ turned out to be highly contradictory. In 1985, I wrote about the "back of beyond" that "Finland that kept away from the useless trade wars and embargoes became a 'trade giant' in the context of East-West relations."³

Nowadays, Russia is trying to offer more objective opinions about the history of its relations with Finland.

In conclusion, let me quote Urho Kekkonen: "The paradox for Finland was that the better Finland succeeded in achieving the Soviet Union's trust, the better were her possibilities for cooperation with the West."

Emperor Nicholas II and His Foreign Policy

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Candidate of Science (History)



DESPITE 100 YEARS that separate us from the time of Nicholas II, his role as the autocratic ruler of Russia's foreign policy remains practically ignored, let alone studied in any detail, by Russian and foreign historiography. In Russia, meanwhile, foreign policy was invariably the prerogative of the man on the throne, Nicholas II being no exception.

He ascended the throne without any clear foreign policy program, partly because his father Emperor Alexander III had never introduced him into the

details of his foreign policy course. Meanwhile, contrary to the common opinion, Nicholas II had inherited a far from simple foreign policy from his father and had, therefore, to develop his own opinion about many foreign policy issues based on their detailed studies.

The last Russian emperor was the first among the state figures of the twentieth century to place world politics on spiritual and moral foundation.

Alexander III left his country semi-isolated "partly because of the anti-Russian policy of the West and the Great Power course of Petersburg." The relations with Germany and especially with Austria-Hungary were short of hostile.

In this new context, the course for peace on the continent combine with aggressive protection of Russia's far-flung interests that Alexander III had been pursuing throughout his rule was no longer effective: the contradictions between the great powers were too obvious and too dangerous.

Having ascended the throne, Nicholas II announced that the foreign policy course would remain, on the whole, the same and outlined his two priorities: peace in Europe and Russia's Great Power status. He was talking about peace not only due to moral and religious considerations; there were political and economic reasons as well: Russia needed industrialization and modernization of its economy as well as foreign investments; these aims demanded peace and harmony in Europe achievable only through a dialogue with the governments of all great powers.

Nicholas II believed that Russia should not assume new responsibilities but should remain the link between the great powers.

Nicholas II, even as a young man, perceived Britain, Russia's main geopolitical rival in the early twentieth century, as an enemy.

The Russian emperor's active support of the idea of a Balkan League was, to a great degree, a product of this policy. Not spearheaded against any of the powers, the Balkan League could have become a high obstacle to the Austro-Hungarian expansion in the Balkans and could have

put an end to the Ottoman domination in the region.

There are many historical sources that convincingly testify that Emperor Nicholas II spared no effort to keep Russia away from a European war.

The alliance of Russia, France and Great Britain known as The Entente is largely a product of Nicholas II's persistent diplomatic efforts. This means that the Russian Empire could rely on the strong support of the Western Front and of the world's strongest British Navy.


The moral foundations of foreign policy laid by Emperor Nicholas II proved to be viable to the extent that the Soviet government turned to them when the international political course of Lenin and Trotsky failed. To preserve the Soviet state, Stalin had no choice but to borrow some of the foreign policy traditions of the Russian Empire.

It should be said that today Russia is the only country that relies on the principles of morality in its foreign policies. For example, during NATO's aggression in Libya, Vladimir Putin was the only world leader to call on the leaders of the United States, Britain and France to repent of the lost lives of Libyan women and children. This indicates the continuity between the policy that Russia is pursuing today and the policy that was pursued under Emperor Nicholas II.

Foreign Policy Documents of the USSR (1943)

Author: V. Pechatnov

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The publication of the latest volume (No. 26) in the fundamental series "Foreign Policy Documents of the USSR" has been a long-awaited event for experts and all those interested in the diplomatic history of World War II. The previous volume was published six years ago, and the readers were looking forward to the new publications in the above series, which has long become the main source of documents on the foreign policy history of our country. And their expectations have been fully justified. The History and Records Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in cooperation with some leading Russian researchers, has presented in two omnibus volumes a noteworthy continuation of a high-profile series.

Therefore, it is not an easy job to find new documentary sources relating to that period. However, a team of authors working on the collection have managed to solve the above problem by using some newly declassified documents (primarily, encoded telegrams), as well as by raking through the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation in the search of materials which have never been available in print before. Also, the compilers, not without reason, have included in the collection many materials which have already been published - to give a full account of the then development of international relations. In addition to encoded telegrams, the collection includes various compacts, correspondence between heads of state and diplomatic missions, official statements, memos and notes, and transcripts of conversations and negotiations.

The publication focuses on the Soviet foreign policy in the context of the multilateral diplomacy of all coalition members aimed at an early defeat of their common enemy and the formation of the post-war world order. The published documents have brought into sharp relief serious difficulties and problems on the way to establishing interaction within the coalition, where each country was steadfastly defending its own national interests. However, the documents also clearly demonstrate that Soviet diplomats, together with other coalition members, were able to achieve win-win results for the most complicated problems and contradictory issues, thus overcoming crises and cooldowns in relations among the Coalition members.

The collection lays a special emphasis on the "Polish issue," which became one of the most complicated and sensitive matters for members of the anti-Hitler coalition.

Extremely valuable is a package of documents on Soviet-Czechoslovak relations, revealing the political underpinning of the preparations for the signing of a treaty of alliance between the

two countries.

The collection naturally lays a major emphasis on the two most important diplomatic forums of 1943, i.e., the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers and the Tehran Conference of the heads of state of the Big Three.

The readers will also find in the collection a lot of new documents on the USSR's relations with other countries - Japan, China, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan - records of conversations, ambassadors' reports, diplomatic notes, etc.

Finally, we would also like to give credit to a high professional culture of those who worked on this publication. The documents have exemplary scientific annotations, convenient lists of documents grouped according to various types and forms, as well as a detailed name index. The collection's contents are closely integrated with the bulk of documents relating to the Allies' relations during World War II stored at the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation, which have been posted at the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the authors have also provided useful links to the documents not published in this edition, thus allowing the readers to find them on the afore-mentioned site.

This fundamental publication has been a major contribution to studying the diplomatic history of the great war, and it will stay high in demand. The materials in the collection will be of utmost historical interest, but not only that. The military-political alliance of the Big Three during the Great Patriotic War and World War II is, probably, a major asset in our uneasy relationship with the West. The experience and lessons of such cooperation continue to be relevant.

History of Russian Diplomacy: Professionalism and Patriotism

Author: R. Reinhardt

Lecturer, Department of Diplomacy, Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Science (Economics)



TRADITIONALLY, and rightly so, a course of history of Russian diplomacy is offered to first-year students at all higher educational establishments across Russia that train diplomats and experts in international affairs as an introduction to a vast layer of knowledge of international relations.

Notwithstanding the traditions and the place the course of history of Russian diplomacy occupies in the curriculum, there is no textbook which is very much needed to offer comprehensive, rather than fragmentary, knowledge of the history of Russian diplomacy even if there is no shortage of relevant academic and popular writings.

The following classical work deserves special mention: *Istoriya diplomatii* (A History of Diplomacy) in three volumes. The first edition had been issued in 1941-1945,¹ the second (in five volumes) in 1959-1979, and *Ocherki istorii Ministerstva inostrannykh del Rossii* (Essays on the History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia) that appeared in 2002.³ Despite their commonly accepted and time-tested advantages, the dates of their publication and their formats make it harder, to a certain extent, to use them as didactic material.

Young academics engaged in the studies of history of diplomacy and the first-year students fresh from school should learn how to work with encyclopedic publications. Indeed, at the early stage, they might find it hard to grasp the material; they might be lost in the woods of details and miss a general picture.

It took the Department of Diplomacy a long time to move from the idea of a textbook to its realization in the year of the 100th anniversary of the critical turning point in the history of Russia and Russian diplomacy as its part.

The textbook under review covers the main stages in the history of Russia's diplomatic service from the first steps of Russian diplomacy to the year 1917 - and offers characteristics of foreign policy activities of Russia's diplomatic structures - from the Posolsky Prikaz to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire. Much space is dedicated to contributions of prominent Russian diplomats to the realization of foreign policy tasks in accordance with Russia's national interests.

Summing up, I can recommend the book to those who have just entered the road of scholarly studies and students of higher educational establishments as well as to those interested in the history of Russian diplomacy. People on diplomatic service, likewise, will find it highly useful since the knowledge about the history of Russia's diplomacy should be refreshed, so to speak, throughout the diplomatic careers. In expectation of the second volume that will cover the Soviet and post-Soviet periods (1917-2017), I wish the collective of authors creative and professional successes.

Author: E. Pyadysheva

Executive Secretary of International Affairs



RECENTLY, a presentation has been held of the latest issue of Diplomatic Journal (Diplomatičeskij vestnik) for 2016, an annual publication of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. The publication has been prepared by the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Department's staff members have been meticulously working through the mountain of information, collecting and preparing data and analytical materials for the past year in order to capture the essence and dynamics of Russia's foreign policy. Diplomatic Journal (DV) has been designed to publish official information materials on international relations and

world politics, thus reflecting the Russian diplomatic service's contribution to the implementation of the country's foreign policy strategy.

According to the publishing team, publications and photo content have been taken from the official web-site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This yearly periodical is essentially the most complete Russian source of official diplomatic and international information. It provides a wide coverage of practically all aspects of Russia's foreign policy agency's operation.

Leafing through this bulky volume containing almost 1,000 pages, a reader will be impressed with several things: the intense, effective and multi-vector nature of Russian foreign policy; its active dialog at the level of bilateral relations; and its well-founded stance within the framework of multi-lateral diplomacy. The Foreign Minister's statements, press conferences, addresses, interviews, and articles demonstrate in a documentary format his heavy schedule, which will be difficult to handle even for a group of people with good professional skills.

To sum up: having studied this publication, you become aware that our country is a global actor on the world foreign policy stage, in a masterly fashion employing various diplomatic techniques, depending on the set goals and on who is the other party to negotiations.

The ministry's annual has attracted a wide readership. It is in high demand among politicians and diplomats, as well as other target audiences, including representatives of the federal bodies of executive power, financial and economic, diplomatic and academic circles, whose interests are closely bound up with foreign policy, diplomacy, and national security. And, obviously, DV is indispensable for students and researches engaged in studying international affairs. It is one of the main sources used in teaching the history of Russia's foreign policy and writing college textbooks and analytical articles. A limited print circulation does not in any way inhibit access to the publication: first, DV is furnished with an electronic CD-version, and, second, all the relevant texts have been posted on the web-site of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and can easily be found following the link <http://www.mid.ru/ru/dipvestnik>

The Syrian Entanglement: Metastasis of World War I?

Author: V. Kuznechevsky
Doctor of Science (History)



THE COLOSSAL HISTORIOGRAPHY of World War I has been augmented by another study by a Russian historian - S.E. Tsvetkov, lecturer at the Moscow International University - entitled "The Last War of the Russian Empire." Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that in terms of coverage and historical outreach, this book does not have many equivalents not only in Russian but also in foreign literature. From all indications, the author

is aware of that, modestly noting in the preface: "I have set the task of creating a memorable image of that war, which is practically unknown in our country."

The book is comprised of five large parts, which play the role of chapters, an epilogue and an impressive bibliographical list of 180 items, including practically all (from 1913 to 2013) main monographs by Russian and foreign researchers and journalistic publications devoted to World War I, as well as the memoirs of the main participants in the events of those years and documentary sources.

Unlike many studies describing this unprecedented worldwide carnage with the participation of 38 states of the world's 59 states at that time, the author of the book under review does not confine himself to the description and analysis of only the main, key events and battles of the war but closely follows the course of hostilities on all the fronts - Western, Eastern, Turkish, and Balkans - from the moment preparations for military actions began until the last day of the war.

The author studies in detail and analyzes not only the development and strategy of major offensive and defensive operations but also the way military actions were perceived by the actual participants: generals, soldiers, logistics specialists, doctors and so on.

Based on documentary analysis, the author makes what I believe is a very interesting conclusion: Contrary to the established perception in world (including Russian) historiography, it was not German Kaiser Wilhelm II who was ultimately responsible for unleashing World War I. The documents cited by the author show that Wilhelm did not believe until the very last moment that the war could break out.

The author does a very interesting analysis of the Kornilov revolt of September 9, 1917, which at first glance had nothing to do with World War I.

The author puts forward some interesting, albeit not new, ideas to the effect that Nicholas II's alliance with Britain and France before the war did not arise from the historical logic of Russia's relations with European states. Russia's alliance with Germany against Britain would have been more natural. However, history is impervious to hypothesizing on what would have been.

The book under review contains a lot of original thoughts of that kind and discoveries that fall out of line with the general trend of works on World War I. Generally, S.E. Tsvetkov's new book suggests that we are still very far away from discovering everything that our modern history owes to the war that Russian poet Valery Bryusov in 1918 hastily described as mankind's "last war." I have no doubt that a reader who becomes acquainted with S.E. Tsvetkov's book will get plenty of food for thought about World War I, and not only about it.

Geopolitical Forecasting and "Flashpoints" of Self-Awareness: World Development Trends as Seen by the Founder of Stratfor

Author: V. Surguladze

Leading methodologist for strategic planning, R.O.S.T.U. Company, Candidate of Science (Philosophy)



George Friedman's book *Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis in Europe* (Anchor Books, 2015) that appeared in Russian in 2016 is as enticing, evidently debatable and interesting as could be expected.

GEORGE FRIEDMAN'S BOOK offers a novel approach to the geopolitical processes seen through the prism of collective psychology and national identities of European nations. They, in their turn, are contemplated through the prism of personal experience of the author's parents who survived the Holocaust and found shelter in the United States. An analysis of global changes made by a member

of a Jewish family that fled Europe is tinged with the pride and enthusiasm of an American, whose country, unlike Europe that for centuries was waging bloody wars and is steeped in contradictions, has been developing peacefully. The author looks at the European political processes in the context of his family history and a crisis of his own identity which he interprets as a confirmation of his Americanism. While Henry Kissinger describes the horrors of European geopolitics in the categories of political and social psychology, Friedman speaks of the same as a history of one family.

As could be expected, this approach to the analysis of political transformations is not free from psychoanalysis in a somewhat inflated or even slightly exaggerated manner.

THE AUTHOR insists that his analysis is necessarily objective: real forecasts require honest and straightforward investigation. His intellect, knowledge and analytical abilities do not cause any doubts but it cannot be said about his conclusions.

A lot of what he has written is true; however, placed in a wider context of international and world development, his arguments sound doubtful. Geopolitical arguments are invariably in the picture yet the world has become too complicated. Today, long-term foreign policy forecasts require a much bigger number of varied factors to justify the reliance on rational and substantiated yet simplified or even roughly hewn schemes of the future George Friedman has offered. Foreign policy analysis can no longer be based on individual and isolated phenomena.

The author is consistently debunking the myth about European unity and exposing the shady sides of European integration and its complicated problems (that the EU leaders prefer to sweep under the carpet), at the same time demonstrating with unhidden pleasure the superiority of those living on the other side of the Atlantic.

The author has offered his highly interesting analysis of the patchwork nature of the united West and the monolithic and multinational yet united mainland Russia.

It is not by chance that the concluding lines of the book written by prominent American political scientist about the fates of Europe are dedicated to Russia. In the context of the complicating

system of international relations and exacerbating contradictions caused by the competing scenarios of a future world order, the Russian Federation needs to look for the answers to the emerging challenges and threats and cannot, therefore, sit on the hands. Our country is burdened with special responsibility for global stability and prevention of conflagration in Europe and elsewhere in the world.

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