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Электронное приложение к журналу «Международная жизнь»
Author : I. Maximychev
Doctor of Science (Political Science), Senior Research Associate, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy
of Sciences
THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY of the incorporation of
the German Democratic Republic into the Federal Re-
public of Germany fell at the year of the 70th anniversary
of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II, which
saved the world from Nazism. This is an extra reason to
try to see what conclusions the Germans drew from
events that had become turning points not only in their
own but in world history.
The "national problem of the Germans" arose after
World War II mainly because of the rejection by West
Germany, which was under external rule, of a plan to create a single state taking account of the
interests of all Germans.
The nature of West Germany's European politics after the defeat in the war meant that the West
Germans had neither forgotten anything not learned any lessons. Not only did they pursue sub-
versive activities in the Soviet occupation zone and then in East Germany.
We have to admit that we left our socialist allies in the lurch, abandoning them to the tender
mercies of the political elites of the United States, West Germany and other citadels of the West.
The threat of riots in bigger East German cities made the Soviet military authorities to send
tanks to city streets. The first order to that effect was given by the commandant of East Berlin.
The tanks never opened fire or crushed anyone under their tracks, nor were there any registered
instances of clashes between tanks and demonstrators. The sight of armored vehicles proved
enough for the situation to normalize. Order was eventually restored by the East German police
after they had recovered from a shock the unrest had left them in.
Needless to say, the wall wasn't something East Germany could be unambiguously prideful about,
though it surely was a masterpiece of engineering. It wouldn't ever have come into existence in
the first place had the West at least a minimal desire for normal relations with the East. And yet
the wall did play a serious role in defusing international tension.
As long as Soviet foreign policy was chiefly under the personal control of Andrei Gromyko
(nicknamed Mr. Nyet, "Mr. No," in the West), the outward appearance of its achievements did
not differ significantly from their essence.
THERE WERE two main reasons why the incorporation of the German Democratic Republic
into the Federal Republic of Germany in 1989-1990 was such a quick process - the weakness of
the post-Honecker leadership of the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany and shameless in-
terference from West Germany. That process was based on a minor update of the 1953 scenario,
A Quarter-Century of the "Greater Federal Republic of Ger-
many": The Germans and the Lessons of History