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Упрощенная HTML-версия

Author : I. Safranchuk
Assistant Professor at the Department of International Political Processes, Moscow State Institute (Uni-
versity) of International Relations, Member of the Council of Foreign and Defense Policy, Candidate of
Science (Political Science)
BY THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, the United
States and China found themselves strategically and econom-
ically interconnected at the global level with elements of mili-
tary-political rivalry.
At first, the strategic dialogue the U.S. initiated with China in
2005 did not look as a retreat from the sides' principled posi-
tions. The administration of Obama, however, stressed the
non-confrontational line in its relations with China. In 2009, a
group of American experts close to the White House formu-
lated the Big Two idea cautiously declined by Hu Jintao.
The changes in American policies and the Chinese-American dialogue on Central Asia (if it de-
velops further) can be interpreted as a pilot project of "joint governance," a regional Big Two
of sorts with Chinese flavor.
These positive assessments of China's role in the region stood in a bolder relief against the very
negative assessments of Russia's role there.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry and the U.S. Department of State did not offer information about
the consultations on their sites, let alone commentaries. The low level of these meetings was
fully compensated for by the fact that this was a new and far from common phenomenon.
The United State makes a good face on a bad game. It accepts China's stronger influence in
Central Asia as a fact rather than for strategic considerations. This portrays the chronology of
events as a chain of American concessions. We cannot and should not fully rely on the simplest
of explanations.
Today, no options should be ruled out because first, Beijing will probably accept American invi-
tation to coordinate their efforts in Central Asia and second, because Washington might remain
positively disposed to China's Central Asian projects even if it rejects America's invitation to co-
operate and coordinate.
The dialogue between the two countries, however, might go on smoothly until the sides reveal
the basic positions on the following.
Today, irrespective of the entire range of opinions in the Obama Administration it has not yet
been decided how Washington will use its dialogue with Beijing - either as a step toward the Big
Two or as a model of the relationships with China in Central Asia or as a project of China's re-
orientation from the APR to Eurasia. The new administration might choose one of the above
or even lay new variants on the table.
http://interaffairs.ru
Evolution of the U.S. Position on China's Role in Central Asia