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Электронное приложение к журналу «
Международная жизнь
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Author : O. Ilyshev
Third Secretary, Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Democratic Republic of Congo
APRIL 2014 marked twenty years since the beginning of the geno-
cide of the Tutsi of Rwanda; organized by the Hutu and practically
ignored by the key international actors and the UN it went on for
three months to shape the future of Rwanda and echoed across
the vast Great Lakes region, first and foremost in the Republic of
Zaire (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC, since May
1997). Hundreds of thousands of refugees, both Tutsi and Hutu,
created a big seat of tension in the country's east; in 1997, the
Mobutu regime fell victim to this tension fanned by inner ethnic
and political contradictions which in 1996 had developed into an
armed conflict still going on in the east of the DR Congo.
In the number of deaths this conflict is second to World War II:
5.4 million dead between 1998 and 2007. It is responsible for the
present state of affairs in the DR Congo: the last place in the world
by per capita GDP and the Human Development Index; the last but one where access to electric power is concerned.
In this spirit-dampening context the republic is moving toward the presidential elections of 2016 which will determine its devel-
opment course for the next five years. The main intrigue is absolutely clear: under the Constitution, which limits presidency for any
person by two consecutive terms, the incumbent Joseph Kabila cannot run. His first presidential term is usually counted from 2006
when he won his first presidential elections though he became president in 2001 when his father, President Laurent-Désiré Kabila
had been assassinated. The president and his closest political circle have repeatedly demonstrated that they preferred status quo to
the Fundamental Law which seemed to them quite amendable.
The debates on his possible nomination for the third term have been going on and on for several years now. Aubin Minaku, the
Alliance's secretary general and speaker of the lower chamber of the Congolese parliament, limited himself to a comment that
Joseph Kabila had respected and would respect the Constitution without specifying whether amended or not. The local analysts
agree that the meeting in Kingakati discussed the coming elections and Kabila's possible run for presidency and accepted this pos-
sibility.
The position taken by the DR Congo government on funding the National Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
Program can serve an even clearer example. It was set up to help several thousand militants, who had surrendered to the Armed
Forces of the DRC and MONUSCO DRC and for several months were kept in temporary camps to resume peaceful occupations.
Unwilling to risk their return to illegal armed activities the government treats the program as a national security priority. The
country's defense ministry, which produced the document, proceeds from the fact that the DR Congo can shoulder only 10% of
the cost; the rest (as expected) will come from the donor countries.
This forces the Western donors to insist on harsh conditions which go far beyond the demands for stricter accountability and fi-
nancial discipline to become political pressure. This means that Secretary Kerry could have directly connected the $1.2 bln package
and other American aid with Kabila's keeping away from the 2016 presidential race.
The situation became even worse when Development Cooperation Minister Jean Pascal Labille of Belgium, one of the largest Eu-
ropean donors of Kinshasa, said that the DR Congo Constitution should be preserved and respected.
According to available information, Joseph Kabila tried to remedy the situation during his visit to Paris on May 21, 2014. In Paris,
however, President Kabila failed to ensure any more or less tangible support for his plans to run for the third term.
THE CHOICE is not a simple one: if Kabila obeys the demand of the West he will lose his political weight with nothing in return;
the same will happen to his closest political allies.
If he decides to amend the Constitution and run for the third term he risks ruining his relations with the West. The U.S. and the
EU will probably refuse to accept the results and will use the entire range of political instruments to put pressure on Kabila and
his supporters. Political sanctions, recently one of the favorite instruments of the West, will hardly strongly affect the Congolese
leader.
To avoid this, Kabila will seek political and financial support of other large economic partners, China and South Africa in the first
place, with considerable economic interests in the republic and will probably start looking for new allies.
The External Factor in the 2016 Presidential Election