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Author : V. Kozin
Professor, Chief Adviser to the Director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies
U.S. PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP has inherited
large strategic and tactical nuclear arsenals from his
predecessor, Barack Obama, and a strategy of "uncon-
ditional offensive nuclear deterrence," which allows for
the possibility of a preemptive nuclear strike against
practically any country that is not an ally, friend or part-
ner of the United States.
The Obama administration drew up and launched a pro-
gram to create a qualitatively new strategic triad. This
program was to be started by building heavy bombers.
Within the next 15 years, the United States is going to manufacture new heavy bombers of the
Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider type, which is sometimes unofficially called B-3. The B-21s
are due to be in service from 2025 to between 2075 and 2080. Altogether between 80 and 100
B-21s are to be built. There will also be new ICBMs of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
(GBSD) class, which is referred to as Minuteman IV for simplicity's sake. GBSDs would be in
service from 2029 to 2080 and increase in number to between 400 and 420.
Intensive design work is underway on Columbia-class "experimental" nuclear submarines, which
would be armed with nuclear missiles and begin to be put in service in 2028. Altogether 12 sub-
marines of this class are to be built. Each would carry 18 SLBMs.
As a result of this overhaul of the triad, the United States may acquire up to 692 essentially new
delivery vehicles by the mid-21st century, excluding long-range air-launched nuclear cruise mis-
siles.
Trump, immediately after taking office, revealed a plan to continue to modernize both the strate-
gic and the tactical nuclear forces.
Russia should by no means cut its strategic nuclear forces any further. Some of these forces have
been designed to overcome the American missile defense system, which is expanding uncon-
trollably; this expansion is dangerous and may set off a missile defense arms race.
RUSSIA should come up with some practical armaments control proposals without waiting for
Trump to clarify his position. Moscow should seek no-first-use treaties with the United States
and other nuclear member countries of NATO or treaties completely banning the use of nuclear
weapons. These should be legally binding documents with no expiration dates. It would, however,
be the wrong decision for Russia to agree to the extension of New START or to signing an up-
dated bilateral START because of the uncontrolled deployment of the global missile defense
and the modernization of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed near Russian borders. New
START is the last bilateral deal that made sense for Russia to enter. All nuclear countries, espe-
cially Britain and France as allies of the United States with mutual commitments concerning
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Donald Trump's Nuclear Strategy: First Outlines