Упрощенная HTML-версия
Author : D. Danilov
Head, European Security Department, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Candidate
of Science (Economics)
The leaders brought to power by the Orange Revolution
of 2004 in Ukraine demonstrated a lot of enthusiasm
about integration in NATO (President Saakashvili was
doing the same in Georgia); some of the Western states,
the George W. Bush Administration in the first place, en-
couraged and reassured them. Appointed prime minister
in August 2006 Viktor Yanukovich preferred to keep away
from the "orange" pro-NATO orientation.
NATO's defense planning is based today, very much as in the past, on collective defense (against
the "Russian threat") and includes deployment of forward-based forces and facilities near the
Russian border - which makes Ukraine a potential theater of war.
Russia spoke of this course of events as a "red line" in its relationships with NATO and the
West and demonstrated its firm resolution to "safeguard our own security" and "do this on the
principle of reasonable sufficiency."
The declaration of the non-aligned status of Ukraine was not suggested by deliberate strategic
choice. It was a product of President Yanukovich's pragmatic interpretation of the political con-
text: a considerable sector of the "anti-NATO/pro-Russian electorate" should be detached from
the "orange" Euroatlantists and Moscow's support should be obtained. Kiev had no choice but
to accept the fact that the NATO membership issue had been removed from the Alliance's
agenda; on the other hand, the West and Russia were engaged in the reset program.
ENCOURAGED by NATO support and willing to tap to the full the Western logic of sanctions
and the energy of containing Russia Kiev decided to revive the NATO membership issue.
NATO membership for Ukraine was restored on the European security agenda.
Programs of direct NATO assistance to Ukraine have been launched through the trust funds
that involve 26 NATO members.
The main focus is likely to be placed at assisting Ukraine's transition to NATO standards and
promoting the interoperability of the armed forces. This, in turn, means that Ukraine will grad-
ually transfer its armed forces to NATO standards in the field of academic and combat training
and technical re-equipment of the armed forces with weaponry and military hardware from
NATO countries.
The West (NATO) will want Ukraine as a partner and ally and will, therefore, help it develop its
defense capability. NATO's defense planning is based today, very much as in the past, on collec-
tive defense (against the "Russian threat") and includes deployment of forward-based forces and
facilities near the Russian border - which makes Ukraine a potential theater.
http://interaffairs.ru
European Security System in Crisis: Ukraine on the Road to
NATO