Стр. 20 - V

Электронное приложение к журналу «Международная жизнь»
Author : V. Lukin
Member of the Federation Council, Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Doctor of Science (History)
POST-IMPERIAL and post-Soviet Russia has just started its quest
for self-identity. This is neither good nor bad: its new state hypostasis
is only twenty-five years old which makes it not an easy task to send
"urbi et orbi" a clear and convincing message about its essence and
the optimal ways of its realization.
Today, foreign policy successes and failures or, to put it differently,
the efficiency of foreign policy are measured by the greater/smaller
possibilities of the state to, first, ensure security of its territory and
its citizens at the lowest possible cost and, second, create an external
climate conducive to its economic, social and cultural development.
The latter directly depends on whether the state can effectively main-
tain peaceful foreign policy environment close to its borders or at a considerable distance.
During the twenty-five years of the contemporary Russian State as we know it today, the quest
for the so-called national idea was regularly revived, albeit with different acuteness, as the center
of nationwide debates. To my mind, this type of quest is useless. Recently, the President of
Russia offered the following definition: "We don't have and there can't be any other unifying
idea, apart from patriotism." This is true yet the term patriotism belongs to the category of
values rather than meanings and concepts. We all know that values can be interpreted; we all
know that they tolerate different, or even opposite, interpretations.
There are situations in which a strong pan-Slavic self-identification gives rise to pan-Turkic or
other sentiments among other categories of the citizens of Russia. The concept of "eternal his-
torical holy Rus" promoted by certain top figures of the Russian Orthodox Church further com-
plicates the already complicated task of forming Russia's civil state identity. On the one hand,
this concept is intended to form spiritual ties among "all tribes and peoples" that have today or
had in the past any historical connections with any Russian Orthodox state units that existed
long ago. On the other, this concept raises certain doubts.
Obviously, to consolidate Russia's positions in the world for many years to come, we need a solid
internal foundation that should rest on serious structural changes in economy, social and cultural
spheres and in the scientific and educational sector.
In fact, the national mentality that will determine the main trends of Russia's foreign policy will
inevitably rely on the shared conviction that we should work together to adapt the unique wealth
we have inherited from the previous generations - the vast space - to the imperatives of the rap-
idly changing times. This is a challenge fiercer than those with which our ancestors managed to
cope. For Europe, Eurasia and the rest of the world this trend in Russia's national identify is not
confrontational. It does not challenge and should not challenge our far and near abroad. This is
our challenge and we should respond to it with dignity. This is what patriotism is about.
Post-Soviet Russia in Search for Identity: Foreign Policy