Упрощенная HTML-версия
Author : A. Lukin
Head of the Department of International Affairs, National Research University-High School of Eco-
nomics, Director, Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies, Moscow State
Institute (University) of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
THE IMPACT of the Ukrainian crisis on the structure of interna-
tional relations as well as accelerated Russia's turn toward Asia as
one of its widely discussed consequences can be hardly overesti-
mated. Reorientation, very much within the concept of the multi-
polar world, began long before the crisis. Before the clashes in
Ukraine, the leading Russian politicians were unanimous in their con-
viction that closer cooperation with Asia would complement rather
than weaken Russia's partner relationships with the U.S. and the EU.
RUSSIA AND CHINA continue drawing closer together as part of
Russia's turn to Asia. The process has already invited all sorts of
comments in Russia and abroad, some of them mutually exclusive.
THE DELIBERATIONS discussed above share one basic fault:
they proceed from the authors' political preferences rather than from
their analysis of the sides' real positions and motivations. This is true, in the first place, of the
motivations that are pushing Moscow and Beijing closer. The process began long before the
Ukrainian crisis: it has been going on for over thirty years now and was set in motion by the
sides' gradual awareness that their fundamental opinions about the international system and
geopolitical situation are very close or even identical.
China, which claims leadership in the developing "South," is especially critical of the concept
of "universal values" as an instrument with which the West is trying to perpetuate its domination
over its former colonies and semi-colonies. Chinese are growing increasingly appreciative of
their traditional morals based on Confucianism. Despite the fact that Confucianism and tradi-
tional Christianity have very little in common Russia and China are driven closer by their unan-
imous rejection of Western ideology.
These common interests are developing into a common ground on which Beijing and Moscow
may move even closer.
By its anti-Russian policies the West has already undermined, to a great extent, the positions of
the pro-Western groups in Russia and supplied their opponents with fresh arguments.
Today, Chinese challenges look less threatening than the threats coming from the West. They
might be diminished through active economic and political cooperation with other Asian states,
including China's neighbors, as well as through sincere exchange of opinions with China which,
guided by the spirit of cooperation, frequently takes Russia's wishes and apprehensions into ac-
count.
On the whole, there are no chances that full-scale cooperation between Russia and the West will
be restored any time soon: there is no understanding between the sides while their ideas about
the world are drifting apart.
http://interaffairs.ru
Consolidation of the Non-Western World During the Ukrainian
Crisis: Russia and China, SCO and BRICS