On the whole, it was not a bad year - there is no cause to complain. However, there are some "left-overs" that are carried over into the new year. This includes, above all, the missile defense issue. We will not get rid of that problem until we either reach agreement or carry out a set of military-technical measures that were announced by President D.A. Medvedev on November 23.

It should be said that we had no illusions about our relations with the United States: At some stage difficulties would arise.

Generally speaking, and putting it briefly, we calibrate our military measures depending on what the Americans will be doing. We are not stepping up the arms race - we are reacting to what is going on.

Confidence is a major problem in relations. In recent years, confidence has improved and some results have been achieved, but we do not know yet whether this level of confidence is enough and whether the positive dynamics are enough to ensure there is no return to the past. The situation in a number of Pakistani provinces is rather complicated. We know what importance the U.S. attaches to these matters. We would not like the issues pertaining to U.S.-Pakistani relations to have negative implications outside the area.

We do not see that the CFE has any prospect at all. We believe that this treaty is hopelessly outdated and that it should be replaced by a completely new conventional arms control regime in Europe.

Analysis of the international situation shows that the BRICS countries objectively have similar positions on the ongoing processes. That includes North Africa and the Middle East.

We believe that both Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should pool their efforts and do much more to try and resolve all the outstanding issues.

We are against bloc mentality. "Against" is not a diplomatic word, but I used it because it best reflects the essence of that approach. We believe that the time for blocs is gone. There is a U.S.-Japanese alliance, a special relationship between the United States and Australia, and the United States and South Korea. The U.S. says it is determined to develop these allied relations, including in the security sphere.
I returned from Cairo in June and prior to that I had been the ambassador to Egypt for six and a half years. I witnessed the events in the region. As you know, they started with a Tunisian street vendor setting himself ablaze. That triggered the events that acquired a domino effect. Socio-economic problems there had been building up for decades. The leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, who had been in power for many years, were faced with political issues. It could have been predicted that a socio-economic upheaval could occur at a certain moment. But it was difficult to predict the moment when such events could start, as they were spontaneous.

We want to see the states in the region stable, sovereign, and independent with good opportunities for development in the interest of all citizens regardless of faith or ethnic background. Our wishes are also related to the fact that Russia has traditional longstanding friendly relations with the Arab countries. We are linked by the bonds of long-running mutually beneficial partnership. We respect these countries' traditions and culture. The majority of the population in the Arab countries is constituted by young people who often see no future for themselves; there are no social lifts for them and they have a strong sense of social injustice. All of that encourages them to demonstrate and take protest action in rather aggressive forms.

Without Security Council sanction there will be no military action against Syria or any other country, for example, Iran. This is why we blocked the Syria resolution that was proposed by our Western partners.

I personally think that after socialist ideas and Arab nationalism retreated to the background and following disenchantment with many of the Western approaches a kind of an ideological vacuum has emerged.

We have very well developed ties and cooperation in different areas with Turkey. We are in active political dialog and consultations, including consultations between our foreign ministries on the Middle East and North Africa among other matters.

I should say that as of late we have been working under the slogan "Russia's return to Africa." Our large companies - oil, gas, Rusal and others have operations in Africa. The African continent is rich in mineral resources. Here is a case in point: The president of Equatorial Guinea, who is now the chairperson of the African Union, visited Moscow recently. We decided to reestablish our embassy there. A new state has been formed - the Republic of South Sudan and we were one of the first countries to recognize the new African independent state, and there are plans to open an embassy there. There are plenty of opportunities for the mutually beneficial development of our trade and economic ties.
Author: Tibor Toth
Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

The philosopher, essayist, poet and novelist George Santayana once said: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." The past has three lessons to offer from events that occurred 50, 15 and 5 years ago.

Lesson Number One: 50 Years Ago - Nuclear Testing Madness
Lesson Number Two: 15 Years Ago - Perseverance Pays
Lesson Number Three: 5 Years Ago - Yes, We Can (Detect)

The message of this five year "anniversary" is that we now have the means to verify the test ban with confidence - and beyond.

WE'VE COME A LONG WAY. There used to be 400 to 500 nuclear tests per decade in the years preceding the CTBT. In the last 10 years, there were two nuclear tests - still two too many in my view; and this is why we need to close the door on nuclear testing once and for all.

To achieve this goal, perseverance continues to be necessary because the CTBT has yet to enter into force.

For me, these are the lessons from the 50, 15 and 5 years of fighting against nuclear testing. The CTBT will enter into force. Maybe not in the next couple of years. But in the end, we will prevail.

Iran is participating in our work. We have stations which could contribute to the monitoring operations. We are working with Iran to put in place monitoring stations.

Israel is now opening up to international monitoring. There are intentions to expand the system of monitoring and permit on-site inspections to detect violations and include Israel among the regional group. I visited Israel last year and had very serious discussions at a very high level where I didn't hear either absolute "yes" or absolute "no." As a private citizen, I know that countries have to rely on military force to protect their security but it should mix with "softer" means like diplomacy, transparency and cooperation.
NEARLY A YEAR HAS ELAPSED since the beginning of the Arab Spring; time has come to assess the preliminary results of the massive landslide started on a December day in 2010 by Mohamed Bouazizi, street vendor, who set himself on fire in a Tunis suburb to protest against police harassment and unemployment. This small stone set events in motion. Events of a similar scope took place in the Arab world some 40-50 years ago, in the mid-20th century when new leaders brought to power by the wave of the national liberation movements hoisted the banner of Arab nationalism tinged in socialist hues. At that time, these movements could rely on the Soviet Union. Today, an unbiased analyst can point to a long range of phenomeno-logical traits that set the current processes apart from everything which happened in the Middle East in the 20th century.

First, we are witnessing the seemingly haphazard mass protests against the state of things which took shape in the region in recent years and even decades. Second, what is going on follows a single pattern: a key event (like Bouazizi's suicide) ignites mass protest rallies which start with demands of reforms to switch, practically immediately, to radical demands with identical slogans: "Down with the tyrant" and "The people want to bring down the regime."

Third, as distinct from the political coups of the 1950s-1960s staged and carried out by the army, in 2010-2011, the armed forces either remained passive observers (in Tunisia and Egypt; on the whole, however, the army followed the main course.

Fourth, religious circles, parties and movements were actively involved in the 2011 developments.

Fifth, the form of external pressure on the unfolding processes differed greatly from what had happened in the past; the same can be said about the actors. Today it has become clear that at the earliest stage, until April 2011, this interference was not intrusive but suggestive; radical slogans were encouraged while public attention was geared at protest riots.

TODAY, THE PRELIMINARY RESULTS of the Arab Spring look as following: two world ideologies - the ideology of human rights and Islam - clashed in the struggle for the region's political future. We are watching a classical drama: Two different forces, the vehicles of these ideologies - external (the West) and internal (Islamic movements of all sorts) – have moved to the fore (very much according to Ortega y Gasset) to capitalize on the results of mass riots against tyranny.
As in Africa, in the 1960s, colonial empires started crumbling one after another, so today authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, which only recently had seemed quite stable, began to collapse. I would like to recall that the revolutionary wave of demonstrations and uprisings that swept through the Middle East and North Africa and came to be known as the "Arab spring" began in Tunisia on December 18, 2010 following Mohammed Bouazizi's self-immolation in protest against police corruption and brutality. Then revolutions took place in Tunisia and Egypt, and there were civil uprisings in Bahrain and Yemen. Mass protests swept across Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman. Less significant protests occurred in Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Western Sahara. However, the events in Libya probably drew the most attention and caused concern among the public, career diplomats and the media.

Gromyko also gave me some important practical advice: "Be frank with Qaddafi to the degree possible, never deceive him; if you cannot tell the truth, do not tell it; do not ever give him a cause to think that you are telling him a lie."

Qaddafi considered himself a disciple of Egyptian President G.A. Nasser; like Nasser, he had led a group of free officers that staged a revolution and came to power. At that time, the Soviet Union was Libya's principal support.

Syria was also our partner, but Syria did not allow our warships to call at any port at any time.

The USSR also had serious interests in Libya's oil sector. We were sending oil from Siberia to Europe.

Today, there is talk to the effect that Qaddafi was a terrorist, a madman, unpredictable, a dictator. Based on my personal experience, my meetings with him, I doubt, if not reject such epithets.

I believe that the events in Libya today are far from complete, that this is the third stage of a complex, difficult drama.

Tribal differences - the struggle for power, especially between different Islamist groups in general - will be taking center stage.

I think that what has happened in Libya is a terrible precedent, especially for "third world" countries, for Africa, for Asia.

It seems that journalists have played a significant role in the Libyan events. U.S.-sponsored channels acted efficiently, telling lies very cleverly. Unfortunately, our media journalism was weak, making no attempt to understand the problem but simply following in the U.S. tracks. And that is lamentable.
"MUAMMAR QADDAFI'S GRUESOME DEATH sent a message to dictators around the world." These words by U.S. President Obama sent waves of enthusiasm in the West European media. The question is: What sort of a message?

If the message is intended for Assad and Saleh it will hardly produce the desired effect. Washington did not hesitate to hand over Hosni Mubarak, its loyal ally of many years, to the opposition. This and lynching of Qaddafi will make those who are called dictators even more determined to suppress the opposition. In Syria this will lead to an even greater bloodshed.

As soon as the UN had passed a corresponding resolution Qaddafi was compared with Milosevic, not in favor of the latter. Qaddafi's oratorical skills had nothing to do with it: Unlike Libya which is rich in high-grade oil, Serbia has no "black gravy." Today access to oil means an intimate involvement in world politics; an intimate knowledge of secret springs which move the world; an incomparably wider circle of contacts in the upper echelons of power and business and a superior quality of communication.

Economy was not the only field of the Western, American in the first place, interests in Libya: political haggling with Qaddafi was no less intensive. He used the huge money at his disposal to address the social problems.

He loved to put on multicolored ethnic garbs to be photographed at the map of Africa: Toward the end of his life he became increasingly aware of his mission as the continent's leader and spokesman. It was at that time that he devised a bold plan of setting up an all-Africa system of easy (or even gift) loans which could have buried the IMF economic and political influence.

Washington was no less concerned with another of the Libyan leader's ambitious plans to set up the gold dinar as a single African currency to undermine the position of the dollar.

Under Qaddafi corruption was a family (clan) business and was absolutely systemic: The country could well be described as Qaddafi & Sons Inc. Corruption spread far beyond the Libyan borders.

The so far unknown facts of corruption and bribery could have proved destructive for many reputations. This explains why the Russian ambassadors are convinced that Qaddafi had no chance to live long enough to be brought to The Hague.

The fierceness with which the mob treated the dead body of Qaddafi; the ferocious cruelty and the fact that the disgusting scenes were offered to the public should be contemned. President Obama did precisely this. The savage reprisal and the way Qaddafi's dead body was treated is a serious lesson and a warning not only to the dictators and tyrants but also to all those who believe themselves to be human beings.
EARLY IN SEPTEMBER 2011, the forces of the National Transitional Council (NTC) of Libya backed, on a mass scale, by NATO assumed control over the larger part of the country and captured Tripoli. The regime change became a fact yet the country will have to tread a long and arduous road of rehabilitation of its now practically non-existent infrastructure and address a more important and even more challenging task of national reconciliation and revival of national unity. It seems that external military interference (far beyond the limits outlined by UN Resolution 1973) has made this dual task even harder to achieve. It caused unnecessary loss of civilian lives, stirred up hard feelings which pushed the east and west of the country apart, destroyed civilian objects and started uncontrolled proliferation of all sorts of weaponry.

At the 275th PSC Session, some of the African politicians criticized the African Union and its role in dealing with the problems of the continent, Libya in particular. Foreign Minister of Rwanda Louise Mushikiwabo who opened the session was one of them. She said that the events in Libya had shown that the AU should act faster to outstrip the events in case of a crisis. Otherwise, said the foreign minister, it risked of being ousted from crisis settlement.

At the talks with representatives of Tripoli on May 17 and Benghazi on May 23 Foreign Minister of Russia Lavrov stressed that "at this stage, the top priority is to swiftly end the fratricidal war and all violence entailing the death and suffering of innocent civilians and further aggravating the already difficult humanitarian situation."

The final document of the AU extraordinary summit drafted by the AU PSC and the High Level ad hoc Committee on Libya registered the key points: immediate ceasefire under international control; all UN members' obligation to obey the spirit and letter of UN SC Resolutions 1970 and 1973. The Foreign Ministry of Russia commented on the results of the summit by pointing out that Moscow had several times confirmed that the African Union's mediatory role should be extended and that it supported the decisions of the Addis Ababa summit as being in line with Russia's approaches.

Moscow's diplomatic efforts, two trips of Mikhail Margelov, special representative of the President of Russia to Tripoli and Benghazi early in June, were intended to achieve an agreement between the sides in the Libyan conflict with the African Union playing the leading role. The Russia's special representative specified that Moscow would like to promote reconciliation but did not intend to impose its own solutions.

The Libyan tragedy revealed that Russia and the African Union had similar ideas of how conflicts on the African continent should be resolved. They proceed from humanitarian principles common to all mankind and registered in the UN Charter and from their shared understanding that effective solutions and sustainable reconciliation can be achieved without outside interference and the use of force; that the African nations can deal with the crises of this type on their own. Russia has demonstrated that it respects the AU decisions and is ready to take opinions of this influential regional structure into account when formulating its own approaches.
"THE FUTURE OF POLITICS will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action," U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated in her article which appeared in the November 2011 issue of Foreign Policy under a powerful title "America's Pacific Century." The Editors were even more explicit when they put "Our Pacific Century" on the cover.

China responded to ambiguity with scything rebuffs in People's Daily: "The Asia-Pacific Region belongs to all people of the region, and it is impossible that a top U.S. official who uses the term 'diplomacy' everywhere does not understand this. Even if there were really a 'Pacific Century,' it would be the 'Pacific Century' of all Asia-Pacific countries."

Beijing refused to accept Washington's critical statements about "unfair discrimination against U.S. and other foreign companies or against their innovative technologies" and puts its own arguments on the table.

The response is highly important: Secretary Clinton has geared her article at Beijing which is rapidly widening its involvement in regional and global governance. Previously, the United States did not specify its strategic goals in the APR, at least at the official level.

Secretary Clinton has made no secret of the plans of a wider American military presence in the region and stronger military might of its allies. This means that mini-NATO strengthened with the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand might develop into a fully-fledged Asian NATO.

On the whole, the historical parallels with the Cold War era are not absolutely correct. Indeed, at no time American economy depended on the Soviet Union and the Soviet market to the extent it depends on China; at no time the Soviet Union was a steadily growing trade and economic power which sold its products far and wide and cluttered the American market. At no time Moscow had dollar reserves comparable to those now available to Beijing, Europe and Russia have found themselves outside the U.S. Pacific concept; it seems that as soon as the ABM system has been put in place the American military band will play the finale of the Farewell, Europe!march. The EU and U.S. are rivals on the Asian markets.

No matter what, Russia cannot remain a passive onlooker while the global political and economic center shifts from the West to the East.

Russia should be ready with an asymmetric response in the economic sphere which belongs not so much to the external as to the domestic sphere. Today, there are no alternatives to the economic development of Siberia and the Far East which can be described as Russia's most relevant stratagem and which might attract new allies.
Roughly one half of the people see December 8 as a sad day marking the disintegration of a great power - the Soviet Union. The other half sees it as a positive development, as the gaining of independence and the creation of new opportunities for the development of independent states. Yet, December 8, the day the Belavezha Accords were signed, is after all a sad rather than happy occasion.

The first decade was very hard for all CIS members.

There came a turn of the tide when people realized that sovereignty was a fine thing but it would be much simpler to tackle the various emerging problems together. And that realization got under way more active cooperative efforts. By now most people see the creation of the CIS as a positive development after all.

Economic cooperation is of top priority for the CIS. This is precisely why it formed its Economic Council consisting of the deputy heads of governments. It discusses very important issues, including cooperation in transport, energy and communications essential for maintaining economic stability in the former Soviet states.

In fact it is through the CIS peacekeeping efforts that it was possible to stop civil war in Tajikistan. In Abkhazia, the CIS peacekeeping mission that remained active until 2008 effectively prevented yet another military confrontation.

I had no idea, before I joined the Executive Committee, how intensively CIS members were cooperating. Every week my schedule is full of meetings between members of the ministries, departments, public, between academics and cultural figures. If you visit CIS e-cis.info portal, you'll see five or six such meetings or sessions of specialized councils taking place inside just one week. All this work produces tangible results.

Very important documents on long-term cooperation have been signed. Many of our documents provide for cooperation that will last longer than one year, between five and ten years.

On November 22, we held in Moscow a meeting of the heads of four international organizations - the CIS, SCO, EurAsEC, and CSTO. They ruled that their meetings should be held every year. We meet to tell each other on our activities, agree our plans and exchange invitations to each other’s meetings and conferences.

To answer briefly to your question about the role of the Commonwealth, I would like to say that it has grown over the past years. Despite criticism and attempts to play down its role, the CIS is developing consistently. My strong belief is that our successful activities are a promise that the prestige of the CIS will go on growing.
RUSSIAN PRIME MINISTER Vladimir Putin's working visit to China on 11-12 October, 2011 was in many respects different than routine meetings between leaders of our two countries. The general implication of the talks made political scientists and experts ponder over the main subjects of the one-on-one discussions, what the two sides arrived at and what would happen next in the Russia-China relations.

A number of experts attributed the absence of progress in the talks on Russian gas for China to what they saw as the onset of a period of cooling in strategic friendship.

Quite reasonably, both the Chinese and Russian side decided against discussing gas during Putin's visit. The 16 documents they signed deal with cooperation in banking, finance and other areas.

It is also important that the talks finally resolved the issue of China's oil debt to Russia that had cast a shadow on bilateral contacts. The countries will continue cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a joint oil refinery project in Tianjin (a short way from Beijing), in agriculture and other sectors. The deal on delivering to China of 70 billion cubic meters of gas each year during 30 years was not sealed after all, however.

The consultant categorically dismissed speculations over negative impacts on bilateral contacts of the fact that the gas talks are going nowhere. "Russia and China have reached a level of understanding and mutual trust where such details do not matter.

The Russia-China dialogue offers plentiful positive examples with regard to other aspects of the international agenda like the stance of Moscow and Beijing in voting at the UN Security Council on the draft resolution on Syria proposed by the U.S. and its allies. The joint vetoing by Russia and China of this document, local analysts think, evinced similarity of views on the "Arab Spring" issue.

I should stress that Beijing, while scoring high among the world's economies, has ended up with an entire set of geopolitical problems. The list of the usual difficulties in relations with Western powers has been supplemented recently by a new challenge - the American plans to return to the Asia-Pacific region announced not so long ago.

To sum up, the visit has once again shown that our two countries have, as they had before, a sufficient number of common objectives; they have converging positions on many issues and a serious potential for boosting cooperation. At the same time, one should hardly describe bilateral dialogue in glowing colors alone. Yes, China is growing, going strong and as it does so, it is becoming despite its own will more prominent and consequently runs into new problems it is hoping to solve with external help, including Russia.

http://interaffairs.ru
THE SIXTH MEETING of the leaders of the Group of Twenty (G20) held in the city of Cannes (France) on November 3-4, 2011 effectively opened a new page in the history of international economic relations. Now the global economy and primarily its financial flows will be more transparent, informationally open, manageable and subordinated to the interests of the world community. This will be ensured by the Financial Stability Board (FSB), a body well known to the world community but with broader powers.

In the area of banking supervision, a fundamentally new step was the introduction of the concept of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). These include institutions whose distress can have a significant negative effect on the entire world financial system. By the end of 2012, the supervisory requirements for such financial institutions, primarily banks, will be enhanced, and the rules for the recapitalization and restructuring of SIFIs on the verge of collapse will be changed.

The problem of the "shadow banking system," which is directly related to the effectiveness of financial and banking supervision, was raised earlier at the G20 summit in Seoul. To prevent shadow banks from playing a negative role, it is planned to develop a number of measures in 2012.

To ensure that the initiatives do not remain on paper, the G20 has provided for an executive agency.

In order to turn into an effective tool for regulating global finance and be able to carry out the decisions of the Cannes Summit, which are concrete and practical in nature, the implementing agency had to get a stronger mandate.

Innovations in the rules governing financial market operations give reason to believe that the FSB will be able to perform its supervisory and regulatory functions.

To tackle global problems, as was repeatedly emphasized at the Summit, the G20 countries should coordinate their efforts. The G20 retains the status of an informal group but intends to develop and maintain relations with non-members and international organizations. The world has changed, and there can be no return to the past, the Summit participants declared. And there is reason to believe that this is not a slogan but a statement of fact.
JULY 18 marks the 20th anniversary of the Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy. Through this agreement, Argentina and Brazil jointly renounced the development, possession and use of nuclear weapons, affirmed their unequivocal commitment to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy and created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in order to monitor the commitments made.

The nuclear issue ceased definitively to be a point of possible suspicion and became a central pillar of confidence and cooperation in the strategic relationship between the two South American states, through a negotiation process and a legal structure unprecedented in any other region.

Brazil and Argentina were also among the first countries to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Equally important is the confidence that the IAEA has in the work of ABACC. The two agencies operate independently but in a complementary way, seeking synergies and avoiding duplication of efforts.

From this standpoint we have adopted joint positions on the different issues related to nuclear matters. For us, it is clear that the international community should attach the highest priority to nuclear disarmament, as part of the efforts to prevent proliferation and to build a more peaceful and safer world, free from the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

The recent Joint Statements on Nuclear Cooperation adopted on Aug. 3, 2010 and Jan. 31, 2011 demonstrate the scope and depth that such a relationship has reached and confirm the commitment of Argentina and Brazil to tread a common path.

The meaning of the Argentine-Brazilian experience in promoting transparency and mutual confidence in the nuclear field was also acknowledged in various IAEA and NPT Conference documents.

It is, therefore, an example and a source of inspiration for other regions of the world, where the presence of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is unfortunately still a reality.
IN THE CONTEXT of an analysis of the prospects and priorities of Russia's foreign economic policy, there has recently been an increased discussion of economic cooperation within. It should be emphasized that the BRICS cooperation problem itself is not new, but until now all questions have been viewed through the prism of political cooperation and the development of a common platform on the key issues of the world order. The economic aspects of cooperation among the BRICS countries have become a subject of investigation relatively recently and there are still no clear assessments.

In this article, we try to outline the problems that have arisen in this area and to consider cooperation among the BRICS countries in terms of alternatives to the current priorities of Russia's foreign economic strategy.

Today Russia's potential in the foreign economic sphere remains untapped, and its participation in world trade as a supplier of raw materials does not promote economic growth and prevents the modernization of the national economy as a whole.

One of the priorities of our foreign economic policy over the past 19 years or so is Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization.

Of course, WTO membership is not an absolute good and, like membership in any other organization, imposes certain obligations on Russia.

Nevertheless, the development of the Customs Union and the creation of a common economic space remain a priority area of Russia's foreign economic policy.

It is also believed that the BRICS countries can become engines of global consumer demand, although its structure is extremely diverse. The Russian market is interesting in this respect: it is the most segmented market and is characterized by the highest rates of growth in consumption. These markets should become leaders in global consumption, but only if GDP growth rates remain as high as they are today.

In summary, it should be emphasized that the process of Russia's integration into the global economy is still incomplete. There are many ways and opportunities to develop economic relations, deepen trade and investment cooperation, and form regional blocs. All these potentials can be realized only provided there is stable development in the country and an improvement of foreign economic policy as an integral part of Russia's general economic policy and modernization of the national economy. At the same time, economic cooperation with foreign countries should not become hostage to political goals and ambitions but should provide a solid basis for political dialogue.
Recently foreign and even some of the Russian experts have come to a conclusion that the relations between Russia and the former socialist countries of Europe ran into a dead end. The questions are: Are the Central and East European states not interested in developing relations with their eastern neighbors? Has Russia excluded them from the system of its political and economic priorities? The answer is "No" to both: Russia intends to develop its relations with all CEE countries.

Today, with another army stationed on its territory, Eastern Europe has realized that the Soviet Army was not the main threat to its prosperity.

With the CEE countries gaining confidence as EU members, the European geopolitical picture has become much more ambiguous than before. Today, these problems cannot be ignored or drowned in the new wave of rehabilitation of some and condemnation of others.

The relations between Russia and the region deserve special mention: The CEE countries obviously have second thoughts about Russia because, on the one hand, in the last two decades they have gained enough experience of living without the Soviet Union; on the other, therevived awareness of their roots suggests a more balanced foreign policy course. The United States still thinks about the CEE as the main safeguard against the practical realization of the Greater Europe idea; they should remain highly mobilized and always ready to widen the gap.

So far NATO and CEE do not need a European security treaty; in the course of time, however, when the cost of one-sidedly interpreted security becomes too high the need for the treaty will become more obvious.

The Albanian factor which Europe refuses to take into account cannot and should not be dismissed: there is Kosovo and potential Albanian riots in Macedonia. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is no less complicated.

The countries of the Euro zone are fairly disunited; there is an obvious lack of political will. France and Germany, two locomotives of economic development, do not always see eye to eye. The CEE countries are forced to look around in search of ways out of their own economic traps.

We are quite open when we say to Brussels that our integration vectors should not conflict with other vectors but should be mutually complementing.

Russia's involvement depends on whether the EaP will play according to the rules. We are prepared to discuss everything openly depending on the integrating potential of EaP projects.
There were two memorable events this autumn whose importance for today's international relations and foreign policy of the future can hardly be overestimated. The whole world was remembering with sorrow this past September 11 the terrorist attacks on New York City, Washington D.C. and Pennsylvania ten years ago. On October 1, without exaggeration, the entire part of humanity sober-minded and caring to remember marked 65 years of the sentences meted out to the Nazi criminals at Nuremberg. Both these memorable events symbolizing as it were "old" and "new" threats to international peace and security have acquired an added tragic perception in light of what happened in Norway this past summer.

The International Nuremberg Tribunal was the first international criminal trial formalized to such a high degree. A significant part of international criminal law codified so far incorporated the groundwork laid by lawyers and diplomats of 24 countries which acceded to the accord on convening the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg.

The historic importance of Nuremberg is not limited to the formulation of rules of international law which did not exist 65 years ago. It is equally important that the tribunal had an unprecedented impact on the convergence of different national legal traditions.

There is much in common between the condemnation of Nazism by the International Military Tribunal and the current struggle of the UN Security Council against terrorism.

It is something else again that corporate responsibility, which catches up with organizations and groups associated with terrorism, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, is extrajudicial in international terms.

This seems to be casuistry because common sense already points to the illegal and anti-humanist nature of activities of any group of terrorists. Back then, 65 years ago, no one doubted that fascist organizations and Nazi leaders were criminal.

The international community has developed a whole series of tools to oppose the apology of terrorism. The UN and a number of regional organizations are adopting important decisions on combating the glorification of terrorist acts and this is supposed to help debunk the false image of "terrorist fighters" especially among the younger people.

I believe that the enduring importance of the Nuremberg Tribunal does not consist solely in the unprecedented scale of the outrages that were outlawed thanks to it, but also in the whole range of historical, political, legal and diplomatic lessons offered to succeeding generations. Letting this potential remain unused would be unwarranted.
ENERGY IS ONE of the most important areas of cooperation between Russia and the European Union. The fact that their economies are mutually complementary by nature and that they cooperate on a big scale is the key to energy security of Greater Europe.

The proposed EU energy security policy aims to reduce vulnerability to fuel supply interruptions and focuses on the rising import dependency and political pressures the EU may face owing to its dependency on imports. Security of supply is of course of great importance also for energy suppliers with respect to meeting their internal market demands.

ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL Energy Agency (IEA), the long-term demand for primary fuels will continue to grow. With the world's largest natural gas resources and being one of the world's leaders in oil resources, Russia is ready for a major contribution to meeting the demand of the world economy, and above all the demand of the economies of Greater Europe.

The need for long-term investments in the fuel and energy sector poses the question of foreign investments and various forms of asset swap. All over the world the countries which possess fuel and energy resources and national companies are tightening control over these resources.

Russia and the EC have government control over foreign investments in strategic sectors, one of which is the energy sector. Russia's strategy does not aim to restrict but rather to attract foreign investors provided they take into account the interests of their hosts.

Gazprom took a very flexible approach to the gas consumption slump caused by the 2008-2009 economic crisis. The company decided against fining European buyers for their failure to take contracted volumes under take-or-pay arrangements, recognizing that the consumption slump was due to objective reasons.

A matter of even greater importance is the extent to which the new liberal rules being introduced in the EU encourage the development of network infrastructure. The answer is given in the directives of the Third Energy Package.

Interaction between Russia and the EU is a striking instance of this tendency. The multitier system of Russia-EU energy dialogue has been effective for more than a decade now. Under way are efforts to harmonize long-term strategies, balances and regulatory systems under the Roadmap of the EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050. There is an efficient mechanism of prompt contacts in emergencies. It is the keystone of progress towards the goal defined by the joint team of experts: "Energy security in the relations between countries on this continent should no longer to be a divisive issue."
RUSSIA'S ACCESSION to the World Trade Organization (WTO) began as early as 1993, in the form of the Russian application to become a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The organization develops through a series of "negotiation rounds," which allow it to address ever more issues dealing with trade and related spheres. After Vladimir Putin ascended to the Russian presidency in January 2000, the WTO process gained momentum. It fit well into the program of internal reforms Putin initiated, as well as into Russia's growing integration into the international political and economic environment. In addition, the fact that China became a WTO member in 2001 appears to have increased Russian motivation to join the organization's ranks. However, during Putin's second term in office (2004-2008), the trend reversed. Instead of opening up Russia's economy further, Putin pursued a more protectionist policy and appointed a less reform-oriented government. These actions had the effect of slowing Russia's progress towards WTO accession.

On the whole, the crisis seemed to many outside observers to have increased awareness in Russia of the interconnectedness of the Russian and other economies, and of the need to open up further to foreign investment and create opportunities for technology transfer to encourage innovation in the Russian context.

There are at least four important political consequences for the EU if Russia should become a WTO member. Some of them are located at the interface of the political and economic realms.

It is clear that both economic and political aspects enter into the EU's calculations of the benefits which will accrue to the EU as a whole and member states individually should Russia join the WTO. There are at least four important political consequences for the EU if Russia should become a WTO member. Some of them are located at the interface of the political and economic realms.

The EU mandate for negotiating the new agreement with the Russian Federation was drafted on the premise that Russia would enter the WTO prior to conclusion of the EU-Russia document, which would imply that WTO rules could be taken for granted. Also, and perhaps even more important, such an extension of the process would be interpreted as a sign that EU-Russia relations continue to stagnate.

Thus the question of Russia's WTO accession goes far beyond the realm of economics and trade to include issues in the political and security spheres, as well as expectations connected with multilateralism and possibilities for dispute settlement.
On November 5, 1921, a Treaty Establishing Friendly Relations between Russia and Mongolia was signed in Moscow. This historic document provided the basis for mutual relations between the two countries. For nine decades now, Russia and Mongolia have been connected by ties of neighborliness and trust, equality and mutual respect. Mongolia gives priority to relations with Russia.

In recent years, political relations between our countries have intensified. On this anniversary, I would like to say that the Embassy of Mongolia in the Russian Federation fully supports further development and expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia and its Federal subjects in different fields. As for our main efforts, they should focus on ensuring the growth of mutual trade and development of investment activity. Mongolia and Russia pay special attention to intensifying trade and economic cooperation. An important mechanism is the Mongolian-Russian Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Within its framework, the two countries have determined the priority sectors of bilateral cooperation: mining, geological exploration, construction, building materials, agro-industrial complex, housing and public utilities, and medicine.

Mongolia is interested in larger Russian investments in the national economy, in attracting major Russian companies to the Mongolian market and implementing joint projects. Cooperation between Mongolia and Russia has a very large potential for the future associated with the implementation of major projects in energy and mining. Today, cross-border interregional cooperation is developing in such areas as foreign trade, agriculture and protection of the environment. The fields of tourism, scientific and educational contacts, cultural exchanges and joint fire protection are expanding rapidly.

A: Mongolia is implementing an active foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific Region, and this area is one of our top priorities. Although our country has not yet acceded to any regional or bilateral agreement granting trade preferences, we aim at long-term trade and economic integration in the Asia-Pacific Region. At present, we are exploring the issue of Mongolia's accession to the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement. We are also preparing to conclude an economic partnership agreement with Japan and are studying the possibilities for concluding a free trade agreement with the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus.
Assisting in the voluntary resettlement to Russia of compatriots living abroad is an important area of our work.
In 2006, the World Congress of Compatriots took place in St. Petersburg. This policy is based on four key principles.
The first is the consolidation of the Russian diaspora.
The second principle is the support of Russian culture and language in the Russian diaspora.
The third principle is the protection of the rights of compatriots.
The fourth principle is the State Program on Assisting Voluntary Resettlement to the Russian Federation of Compatriots Living Abroad. It was launched in mid-2007.
It is normal to give a priority to those who would like to return for various reasons to Russia as their historic homeland. Such reasons may include discrimination against Russians abroad, economic difficulties, or unemployment. The striving to give their children a good future here is also important.
A key aspect is work. In Russia, people can find work according to their occupation. Russia is interested in this, too, because many of the migrants are doctors, engineers, teachers, etc. People feel needed here. Nevertheless, many of them are to be retrained, which is not always available.
Virtually all Russian diplomatic and consular services work on resettlement. Compact yet highly qualified temporary groups of staff from the Federal Migration Service and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are active in a number of countries with high migratory potential. As the number of migrants grows, these bodies will be expanded to make the processes of application and document processing as convenient as possible.
AT ALL TIMES, the Cossacks have been and remain an inalienable part of the Russian state, its history, culture and spiritual values. Since time immemorial, the Cossacks preserved and multiplied their glorious traditions: patriotism, courage, and faith in God and the Russian people.

The World Congress of Cossacks (VKK), traditionally held in Novocherkassk, the world capital of Cossacks, is one of the main instruments of establishing and maintaining dialogue between the Cossacks in Russia and abroad.

The Russian leaders pay special attention to the revival and development of the Cossacks as a social group; in the last two years, they acquired a much stronger legal and social basis. In May 2011, the President of the Russian Federation signed the law under which the All-Russia Cossacks Society would be restored to unite 11 registered Cossack Hosts of Russia.

The state pursues a multisided policy: It not merely seeks to improve the ways military service for the Cossacks is organized inside the country but also to better organize the VKOs activities abroad.

Cossack compatriots abroad are doing a lot to promote the knowledge of Cossack history and culture and oppose falsifications of history.

Some of the Russian VKOs have already organized Cossack villages or missions in other countries; this is true, in the first place, of the countries with strong Cossack diasporas (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the U.S., Ukraine, France, Germany, and the Czech Republic).

The Russian VKOs believe it their main duty to locate, restore and maintain in good repair Orthodox churches, cemeteries and monuments directly related to the history of the Cossack community scattered in great numbers across the world.

The Russian Cossacks pay particular attention to military and patriotic education of young people and children; the importance of such programs cannot be overestimated.

When working with the Cossack organizations abroad, organizing all sorts of events outside Russia or inviting foreign partners to the Russian Federation the Cossacks should always bear in mind that they represent the state and its interests and that everything they do should follow the foreign policy line of the Russian Federation coordinated by the Foreign Ministry of Russia.
ON OCTOBER 17-18, 2011, a World Thematic Conference of Compatriots called "On the Status of Russian Language in Foreign Countries" was held in Moscow under the aegis of the Government Commission on Compatriots Living Abroad (GCCLA). The conference, particularly such an extensive one, with 200 delegates from 91 countries and 80 guests from Russia in attendance, did not arise from scratch.

The welcome message from President Dmitry Medvedev to the conference participants and guests delivered by Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the GCCLA Sergei Lavrov noted that this year the forum was devoted exclusively to the important topic of the status of the Russian language abroad and its place in the global and regional processes.

In his own speech, Sergei Lavrov put the emphasis on the infrastructure created during the four years since the previous conference to reinforce and augment the status of the Russian language abroad.

The Russian President's decree declared June 6 a Russian Language Day, and this year the Day was marked by large-scale cultural and humanitarian undertakings both in Russia and abroad. Assistance from the Russian regions aimed at preserving the ethnocultural identity of compatriots abroad has significantly increased.

During the two-day plenary sessions and at three workshops, the conference participants discussed all the problems relating to the status of the Russian language in separate countries and regions where compatriots reside, as well as in international organizations. They designated the most efficient ways to resolve these problems including application of the provisions of corresponding international conventions, local legislation, and other legal forms, as well as the use of referendums, etc.

Today, only 160-165 million consider Pushkin's language to be their own, while another 120-140 million, depending on their knowledge of Russian, have command of it as a second language. The generation of people with a good command of Russian in the CIS, Baltic countries, and Central and Eastern Europe is gradually disappearing.

In Moldavia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, Russian is the language of cross-national communication, and in Ukraine it is the language of the national minority.

All the conference participants agreed that it created a solid base for strengthening the status of the Russian language and enlarging the Russian-speaking expanse in the world. Coordinated and systematic efforts by all the players in this field are required to further this noble cause.
RETURNING LOST VALUABLES OF ART and history is an extremely relevant topic these days.

The solicitous attitude toward the country's magnificent past expressed through purchasing works of national art at auctions is promoting Russia's positive image. Russia's presence in the international antique market is not only an indication of the country's prestige; it is also instrumental in raising it.

The private collections of Russian citizens' cultural valuables serve the country's interests, since they form the basis of state museums' exhibitions.

In the past decade, the origin of items and their return to their homeland has become an extremely serious problem.

The combination of "art, high commercial cost, and restitution claims" makes for a volatile mixture. The world press quickly picks up on stories in which huge sums of money and big names figure; however, thousands of restitution cases involving ordinary items pass without being noticed.

It is easier to restore the provenance of well-known items or works that have belonged to large collections, featured in exhibitions or salons, or been registered in catalogues or periodicals covering the cultural events of that time. But this mechanism far from always works, while most of the items that enter the market do not belong to this privileged category.

According to Minister of Culture Alexander Avdeev, Russian businessmen are financing around 10% of the share of works of art being returned to Russian museums from abroad.

THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS, as well as changes in public consciousness, have generated an increase in the number of Russian arts patrons. At the beginning of the 1990s, state institutions of culture could not rely on significant financial support from wealthy Russian citizens.

Today, there is increasing talk about the rebirth of patronage traditions. According to Minister of Culture Alexander Avdeev, Russian businessmen are financing around 10% of the share of works of art being returned to Russian museums from abroad. Due to the obvious fact that the state is unable to quickly resolve all museum problems, the involvement of patrons of the arts "is extremely desirable."

Since Russia entered the legal field of international trade, the accumulation of art valuables in the country has dramatically grown. This is also the result of the energetic activity of state organizations and private acquisitions.
"IT WILL LARGELY DEPEND upon the professionalism of journalists and their respect of ethical principles whether mass media will help to consolidate peace and find balanced and mutually acceptable ways of overcoming crisis situations or, in contrast, incite people to confrontation and violence." These were the words of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in his opening address at the international conference "Russia-Europe: Topical Issues in Contemporary International Journalism" that took place in Paris on November 24-25, 2011. Lavrov's address expresses the gist of the discussion that took place at the conference among heads of leading Russian and international media, directors of European institutes in the humanities, Russian and European government officials, and well-known journalists from international media.

"It is clear to me that Russia is subject today to different threats that will subsequently face Europe. Russia is barring the way to Islamic terrorism and protecting Europe, yet we have not realized that so far. Russia is becoming the victim of terrorism, yet no international media are speaking about it. Russian journalists bear the responsibility for making the world's politicians aware of the reality of this situation and the danger of this state of affairs. Russia is in the 'trenches' on the front lines and is playing a containing role. The same is true of the energy industry: Europe is totally ungrateful to Russia for its work in the energy domain. It's very difficult to extract gas that heats all of Europe and the entire European Union. No one is grateful to Russia for this. In any case, one doesn't see this gratitude," sadly noted Mr. Soares.

He also spoke about the problem of the antagonism that is clearly apparent in Western media with regard to Russia. Srđa Trifković supported his thesis with examples from Western media coverage of the terrorist acts in Beslan in 2004. It is difficult to name a Western TV or radio channel, newspaper, weekly magazine, or other publication that did not openly condemn Russia's actions and did not urge it to engage in dialogue with the terrorists.

On the whole, international journalists have forgotten the main commandments of their profession: "Search for facts, tell the truth, don't harm anyone, and allow people to voice different opinions." European polls show that less than 44% trust the press and 53% and 61% believe radio and TV, respectively. This is a lot less than ten years ago.

What is international journalism today? According to the majority of conference participants, this journalism tends to be limited to regional or national studies. If you do not "synchronize your watch" with others, you turn into a professional who is constantly manipulated and who, in turn, misleads his readers, viewers, or listeners.

The speakers also warned that if media continue to resemble commercial companies and fail to protect the national interests of their states, they will lose their main function: expressing the truth and essence of events.
In memory of Colonel of the General Staff of the Imperial Army Stepan Voronin, Military Attaché at the Embassy of Russian Empire in Austria-Hungary.

IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY, the Russian public recognized the great reforms of Prime Minister of Russia Pyotr Stolypin for what they were, viz. a "complete overhaul of everything in Russia." They stretched beyond the limits of the empire's domestic policies yet their foreign policy dimension and its impact on Russia's diplomacy remain little studied so far. History has taught us that none of the European states, including Russia, can pursue successful domestic policies without an efficient and well-substantiated foreign policy geared at the country's national interests. This is doubly important in the periods of reforms when newly established state and social institutions change the country's makeup. Foreign policy can be best described as a time-tested instrument the state has been using and continues to use to harmonize the aims of its domestic and foreign policy and achieve their unity for the sake of state (widened today to national) interests.

As the head of government, Stolypin ensured a more or less favorable political environment absolutely indispensable in the period of deep-cutting, consistent and gradual economic and political reforms which had been long overdue.

A talented and weathered politician and a patriot devoted to the idea of state, Stolypin was leading Russia toward the primacy of law rather than of party and political preferences. The country needed a respite, a period free from conflicts of all sorts. He looked forward to 15 to 20 years of peace, ensured by diplomatic rather than military means of settling European and Eurasian disagreements, to complete his social and economic reforms; he deemed it advisable to drop all excessive political claims to avoid squandering of money and economic resources.

Pyotr Stolypin was determined to guard Russia against foreign policy temptations or, rather, no matter how strange this may sound, against emotional moves: Reforms and It was the crime of September 1, 1911, the day when the great reformer and statesman was assassinated, that deprived Russia and Europe of an alternative: Too many people were convinced that history could have taken a different course and that those who "needed great upheavals" (to borrow an expression from Stolypin) might have lost. The February revolution of 1917 brought a clear realization that the shot by Bogrov had made World War I inevitable.

http://interaffairs.ru
IRINA, YURI, AND IVAN Popov have published a book of reminiscences about their father, Vladimir Popov. The book did not come out in celebration of a special date; its publication was prompted simply by the love these siblings have for their father and their desire to remember him. Vladimir Popov's friends and colleagues, who supported the idea of his children, also contributed their stories about him, turning the book into an interesting, informative, and socially significant memoir. After all, Vladimir Popov’s life is the story of the times in which he lived, the story of the country's destiny in which he took active part, and, finally, the story of the change in the world's attitude toward our state, an attitude that Vladimir Popov largely helped to shape. To use a now popular expression, Popov was an image-maker who created a positive representation of the Soviet Union. And he did this skillfully and intelligently.

Vladimir Popov was born in Moscow. He and his wife Irina Fyodorovna "lived the event-filled social life typical of Moscow with guests, strolls, gatherings, and conversations with their friends, people they knew about theaters and the conservatory, including right in the street as they made their way home from a theater or a concert hall. He had "the mindset and lifestyle of a member of the Russian intelligentsia" (Yu. Popov) despite being at the top of the Soviet state machinery.

Vladimir Popov "openly and intelligently loved culture in the true Russian style and had a professional understanding of the art situation in the world."

What happened next in Ivan Popov's life was as unpredictable as the twists and turns in a good detective story. He ended up in a camp for interns, from which Nadezhda Krupskaya, Lenin's wife, searched him out through the Red Cross and helped to escape. In 1918, he returned to Russia, but he never joined the party, although worked for the People's Commissariat of the Worker-Peasant Red Inspection headed by Stalin. However, soon he began freewheeling and became a writer.

"But he was also very human. He had none of that fake professional charm, although, of course, his experience, decorum, and impeccable manners hid the different feelings he felt inside."

After a long time in the Ministry of Culture, Vladimir Popov was moved to the State Television and Radio Committee where he supervised information coverage of the Moscow Olympic Games.

Readers will learn much about the life, events, and atmosphere in society from "Notes by Irina Popova. 1975-1988," Vladimir Popov's wife. She wrote about Rikhter, Svetlanov, Piotrovsky, and many other artists, musicians, and members of art and theater circles.
THE MONOGRAPH "Russia in a Diversity of Civilizations" represents a broad range of views and opinions concerning the main trends of Russia's socio-economic and political development at the stage of its post-Soviet history. Its appeal lies precisely in its debatability.

The team of authors represents a very successful combination of researchers from different generations - on the one hand, an academic elite that was able to watch up close and in person and analyze all the stages of the evolution of the systemic crisis of Russian statehood in the late 20th century, and on the other, researchers who matured during the post-Soviet period.

Russia is regarded as one of the world's most important centers of force with the ongoing trend toward the restoration of its positions on the international arena. The main challenges and threats of globalization, as well as the opportunities opened by it, are viewed through the prism of the country's national-state interests. As an important theoretical document, the monograph offers a clear vision of globalization processes the understanding of which helps determine Russia's role and place in them.

The book's subject matter is significantly broader than Russia's relations with other parts of the world, mainly because it addresses contacts between civilizations and their impact on the world order.

The objective nature of economic globalization, the authors suggest, leads to a decline in the role of the state and the related erosion of traditional identity. Political globalization carries the threat of "authoritarian, global neo-corporativism."

The view of Russia as "a European country" is characteristic of the majority of the authors but there are two well argued diametric positions here. On the one hand, Russia will either have to "join the future United States of Europe" or it "will be swallowed up by Eastern expansionism"; on the other, an entire subsection is devoted to "Russia's equidistant position in relation to Europe and Asia": "Not the European choice, depriving Russia of room to maneuver but movement forward along all directions - this is what responds to its national interests... Not a waverer but a calculating actor on two native continents - that is the role predetermined by its geopolitical situation."

The monograph ensures the continuity of studies on the threshold of historical eras, despite a host of problems encountered by Russian science. The continuity of the Russian social sciences school is evident in the depth of substance, frankness, boldness, and originality of judgment.
SINCE 2007, the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, has been publishing a series of fundamental studies under the general title "Old World - New Times" dealing with the countries that are developing into the leaders of the Old World, with its regions and the most topical problems for the continent in the 20th and 21st centuries. The project which today includes eleven collective monographs is supervised by Academician Nikolai Shmelev; the book "Social Europe in the 21st Century" * is one of the latest additions.

Today, everything which is done in the world is done by people and for people. Human resources and the intellectual capital are the main force which creates public wealth. Any changes echo in people's lives and their activity or, to put it differently, invite social repercussions.

The state and its social partners ensure social development in the new conditions; it also remains responsible for domestic and external security. Very much like the rest of the world Europe is very much concerned with the threats of terrorism, religious and ethnic conflicts, extremism, and the mounting wave of protests raised by the social reforms. This does nothing good to economics and social stability.

Many of the contemporary problems are global; therefore they call for concerted efforts of the international community.

We should never forget, however, that "social" means "public"; the authors have absolutely correctly extended the term "social politics" to the sphere of social development, labor and production relations, improvement of social infrastructure.

The book consists of three parts: "Europe's Social Pivot", "Unity in Variety" and "The European Social Model as a Factor of the World's Social Development."

Part One reveals how united Europe which has added social integration to its economic integration already underway is developing in the 21st century.

Part Two ("Unity in Variety") offers an analysis of the subject which so far remained little studied in Russian academic writing.

Part Three ("The European Social Model as a Factor of the World's Social Development") concludes the monograph with a discussion of what the rest of the world thinks about the ESM.

The authors offer their analysis of the American model regarded as an alternative to European and the way the Latin American countries perceive the ESM; they have betrayed an active interest in it and are widening international cooperation in this field.
RUSSIA-NATO RELATIONS are given considerable prominence in the domestic press. Should Russia join NATO, as suggested by I. Yurgens, president of the board at the Institute for Contemporary Development, or should it stay away from the bloc and continue to uphold its interests, concentrating on the ideas of Eurasianism - the debate is ongoing.

A book by Vladimir Shtol, a well-known Russian political scientist, entitled "The Army of a New World Order," is notable in this context. The book's angle looks quite logical and is based on the shifts that have occurred recently on the international stage.

The author sees the transfer of authority from the G-7 to the G-20 as an institutional concentration of global power in the hands of the world banking community ("Finintern"). In such conditions, more and more power goes from the government to the private level. The private character of power predetermines the private protection system. "And if this power is also global," V. Shtol writes, "its commitment to the idea of replacing national, government-armed formations, including UN troops ... with a new army, is becoming increasingly evident."

The author sees this supranational center as a kind of a global Central Committee, a union of the global elite whose power can be exercised in the form not of domination but only control over the extent to which the actions by legislative, executive and judicial bodies on the regional and local level correspond (or do not correspond) to a certain system of values. Citing Z. Brzezinski, V. Shtol writes that the effective activity of such a center can only be ensured by a network organization with the help of which its values and ideology become a common supreme moral imperative while the ideology of "universal human" values, promoted by corresponding network nodes, does not abide competition coming from national-state sovereignty. In other words, a "new world" is being built.

The book analyzes, on a stage-by-stage basis, the bloc's eastward expansion, to which end new forms of getting states involved in the process were devised, such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council or Partnership for Peace programs.

In conclusion, the author justly suggests that Russia's present political leadership is looking for ways of overcoming the effects of the disintegration for the USSR. The list is not limited to the much hyped integration into the global community, which is only part of a general strategy. What is far more important is Russia's stable internal development, which involves not only overcoming the crisis and resolving economic and social issues. The second, more significant part of the task is the formation of the cultural and ideological, as well as technological spheres, closely linked to the restoration and promotion of traditional values. On the whole, V. Shtol's book is an interesting although not indisputable analysis for those who seriously study problems of peace, conflicts and international security.
The book I want to bring to the attention of readers (Yu.A. Raikov, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: The Evolution of Regionalism in the APR. Tutorial, Moscow, Vostok-Zapad Publishing House, 2011) is devoted to the activities of the APEC forum and the development of regionalism in the APR. The author examines the most significant problems of Asia-Pacific economic integration in the light of APEC activities and analyzes the current state and development of the global and regional economy, the interconnections and relations between the leading APEC members.

In assessing APEC activities over more than 20 years of its existence, Yu.A. Raikov characterizes the forum as a leading and authoritative regional economic association whose active integration work has gained international recognition and meets the development needs of the world economy and the needs of ensuring high rates of economic growth in the APR. Along with concrete achievements in liberalizing trade and investment and in developing economic, technical and industrial cooperation, APEC makes a significant contribution to creating an atmosphere of regional community and more favorable economic conditions for the development of countries in the region.

Yu.A. Raikov pays particular attention to an analysis of plans to form a free trade area (FTA) of the Asia-Pacific Region within the APEC framework.

In any case, as Yu.A. Raikov rightly notes, for further progress towards the Bogor Goals the APEC countries need a new consensus on time schedules and ways of creating a regional FTA, which will require serious changes in the nature of relations between them and enhancement of the quality of multilateral cooperation. To achieve this, APEC's emerging and fast growing economies should see the real success of the efforts to narrow the gap in economic development levels and be able to rely on the support of their partners, the major economies of the APR.

The tutorial, which is meant for students of economics and government officials attending specialized courses in preparation for Russia's chairmanship of APEC, will be useful not only to experts in international affairs, but also to specialists in different areas of activity, primarily those involved in preparing the APEC summit in Vladivostok, as well as to a wider readership interested in the history, principles and specifics of economic integration in the APR.
A joint Russian-French publication called "The French in Russian Scientific and Intellectual Life of the 18th-20th Centuries (Institute of World History, RAS, Ed. by Alexander Chubaryan and Francine-Dominique Liechtenhan, Corp. by Olga Okuneva)," has made a significant contribution to this dialogue. The publication and conference were part of an extensive Russian-French research program that focused on the cooperation between the two states, two societies, and two cultures in the changing historical context over three centuries of European history. The special feature of the collection being reviewed is that it examines bilateral relations through the prism of the intellectual presence of the French in Russian life of the 18th-20th centuries and their role in the Russian cultural expanse.

The collection has brought together the studies of two national schools. The authors of the book, Russian and French historians, reweave the fabric of bilateral relations throughout the 18th-20th centuries on the basis of archive documents. This has produced an extensive historical picture that reveals the background, style, and context of the interpenetration of these two great cultures: European and Eurasian. The articles presented in the collection analyze the documents on the history of Russian-French scientific relations kept in Russian and French archives and reveal many unknown or little known pages of the cultural, literary, and humanitarian contacts between the Russians and the French, as well as relations in the natural sciences. In addition to the scrupulous study of all aspects of Russian-French and Soviet-French scientific and cultural cooperation, special attention is also given to the problem of intellectual interaction - the presence of Russian scientists and public figures in France. On the whole, scientific contacts and the friendly relations developed in the context of Francophonie. I will add that this undoubtedly provided a certain humanitarian and even world outlook framework for cooperation: The Russians not only borrowed European scientific innovations and terminology, but also followed the methodologies of scientific thinking and civil understanding of the public and historical processes, as well as the role of science in the development of society characteristic of the French philosophical school, from Enlightenment to positivism.

The collective work presented is certainly a significant contribution to the analysis of French-Russian relations, covering a wide range of diverse and innovative topics. At the same time, the themes, articles, and background ideas that have been voiced but still not fully processed by researchers open up a broad field for further study of the topics, fates, and problems that make up the fabric of bilateral cultural cooperation between Russia and France. There can be no doubt that this collection will attract the attention not only of experts in French studies, but also a wide range of readers pondering Russia's place in the European cultural expanse.
THE RUSSIA'S INSTITUTE for Strategic Studies (RISI) published the third monograph on the history of Latvia. This latest addition to the Institute's book series written by Liudmila Vorobyeva, a prominent expert in the history of foreign policy of Germany and the Baltic countries, complemented her two previous monographs under the same title, "History of Latvia From the Russian Empire to the USSR," issued in 2009 and 2010 by the Historical Memory Foundation.

The very first chapter "The 'Baltic Question' in the Russian Empire" dots the i's: For geographical reasons, the Baltic at all times was a transit territory through which Germans, Poles and Swedes in all possible military-political combinations invaded Russia.

The author who supplies a detailed account of the main political trends during the so-called golden age of Latvian parliamentarism (1920-1934) has placed it within a wide international context to demonstrate that the country remained dependent on the big European powers' political vicissitudes and Polish leader Jozef Pilsudski's anti-Russian machinations around Latvia.

Chapters Five and Six deal with the emergence and final collapse of the pro-fascist Ulmanis regime. The author has concentrated at the pivotal period (1939-1941) of Latvian history. Chapter Six "'The Year of Change': On the June 1940 Events and Soviet Latvia Becoming Part of the U.S.S.R." offers a profound and detailed analysis of the social, economic and military-strategic prerequisites of the downfall of the pro-fascist regime of Ulmanis and restoration of Soviet power in Latvia.

Dr. Vorobyeva relies on documents and independent sources to refute what the Latvian ruling class is saying about the events of the late 1930s when the Soviet Union allegedly imposed its power on Latvia contrary to the will of the republic's majority.

The reader will be deeply impressed by the author's principled and unambiguous position. In her geopolitical assessment of Latvia's international situation Dr. Vorobyeva proceeds from the objective historical fact: At all times, the Baltic republics have been and remain limitrophe states, which means that they have always been and will remain in future objects of the great powers' political games (in Europe and elsewhere).