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## Russia and the Post-Soviet Space: Partners or Rivals?

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Moldova is a parliamentary republic. So, the February 24, 2019 parliamentary elections were of special importance for Moldova.

Three political parties were elected to Moldova's new parliament:

The Socialist Party, the Democratic Party and the Shor party, plus the ACUM electoral bloc, which has since split into two parliamentary factions. However, none of these political forces got an absolute majority.

Parliamentary parties are currently holding political consultations initiated by Moldovan President Igor Dodon with a view to forming a new ruling coalition. If a coalition is not formed, early parliamentary elections will be held. We hope that Moldova's future government will represent the interests of the country's entire population and follow a constructive course in its relations with the Russian Federation.

We are ready for this. Russia's fundamental interests in relations with Moldova remain immutable. They include strengthening Moldovan statehood, supporting the republic's non-bloc (neutral) status, promoting domestic political stability and interethnic harmony on the basis of democratic principles and ensuring a viable settlement for Transnistria.

In this context, I have to say that during the election campaign in Moldova, the West (with certain Moldovan politicians subserviently playing up to it) repeatedly tried to groundlessly accuse Russia of interfering in the country's domestic political processes and attempting to influence voting results.

Certain shifts in the Transnistrian settlement process have emerged recently. Meetings between Dnestr bank leaders Igor Dodon and V.N. Krasnoselsky have become regular. Agreements have been reached on several practical issues between the Dnestr banks.

A Nagorno-Karabakh peace settlement remains the focus of attention for the parties to the conflict. The priority of a political settlement has been repeatedly stressed in Baku. This issue is on the foreign policy agenda of Armenia's new leadership. Naturally, compromise solutions will require time and the good will of the parties concerned.

We hope that the language reform in Kazakhstan will not infringe on the rights of the Russian-speaking population and that the process as such will not have a negative impact on the use of the Russian language in Kazakhstan. Bilingualism is a precious cultural asset of the people of the Republic of Kazakhstan that opens the way to education and employment in the entire post-Soviet space.

We would really like to see a normalization of relations with Ukraine, our closest neighbor. We have shared historical, spiritual, cultural, and civilizational bonds. Unfortunately, the Poroshenko regime has followed a course toward destroying multidimensional, wide-ranging and mutually beneficial ties with Russia at the expense of his country's interests, as well as the interests of its people.

We hope that Ukraine's new leadership will have a clear grasp of reality and base their actions not on the political situation of the moment but on common sense.

According to various sources, up to 3 million Ukrainian citizens are in Russia on a temporary or permanent basis. However, no one will venture to say exactly how many of them would like to go to the polls. I believe their number would be quite large if they could do that without having to leave Russia, at Ukrainian missions in Russia. However, Kiev decided not to set up polling stations there.

Of course, the deliberate creation of difficulties for the expression of citizens' political preference has

cast a shadow over the entire electoral process. There are inevitable questions for the authorities who are thus trying to influence the outcome of the vote.

Kiev is doing its utmost to politicize the issue of shipping in the AzovKerch water area and artificially exacerbate the situation in that region. Ukraine is less concerned by problems related to freedom and safety of navigation. All of this is being done with one obvious aim – namely, to create yet another seat of tension, as well as a pretext for ramping up sanctions against Russia.

In my opinion, the Georgian president's remarks regarding the impossibility of cooperation with Russia, which is Tbilisi's second largest foreign trade partner and a significant source of revenue for the Georgian budget due to the steady growth of tourism, sound strange, to say the least.

For our part, we are still open for a transparent and constructive dialogue with the Georgian authorities at all levels.

We note with satisfaction that strategic partnership or allied relations with Central Asian countries fully meet the interests of our countries and peoples. In this context, we attach great importance to promoting economic ties. The number of joint ventures confirms that a cooperation mechanism in this area is running smoothly.

The Russian Federation is carrying out practical, concrete measures to protect the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of our compatriots. There are various forms and methods of action.

We see that young people from CIS countries are increasingly interested in studying in Russia: The number of people wishing to take training or internship programs in Russia is growing. Citizens from CIS countries have broad opportunities at higher educational institutions in Russia.

In conclusion, I would like to draw attention to the declaration that the presidents of the member states adopted following the November 2017 session of the Collective Security Council in connection with the 25th anniversary of the Collective Security Treaty and the 15th anniversary of the CSTO. In particular, the declaration notes that the organization is dynamically developing and effectively responding to the rapidly changing situation in the world, and its legal and regulatory framework makes it possible to take cooperation among its participants to a qualitatively new level, consolidate shared strategic goals and transform the CSTO into an effective multifunctional international and regional security organization.

## **“European Problems Unsolvable Without Russian Participation”**

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From time to time, the 22 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Europeans make critical statements about domestic reforms in Ukraine that it needs to carry out to have some European prospects before it. But the EU doesn't do what it should do to ensure the implementation of the Minsk agreements – it should make stricter and more persistent use of various instruments to persuade Kiev that there is no alternative to the Minsk agreements. The only way to achieve lasting peace in Ukraine is the comprehensive implementation of the Minsk agreements, both their security and their political aspects.

Relations between Russia and NATO are a difficult and, for various reasons, rather painful story. Nevertheless, during the summit at Pratica di Mare, it was decided to set up the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), a body with tasks that included the joint addressing of security issues, the early detection of threats to all members of the NRC, and the organization of interaction in fields where the interests of Russia coincided with those of NATO. The NRC has been able to develop a positive agenda, among other things mapping out ways of dealing with new threats and challenges, and has achieved some results –

although some of them purely technical – that bolstered practical guarantees of security for all member states of the council.

NATO went back to its basics. As its first secretary general, Lord Ismay, put it, NATO was created to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.” If we substitute “Germans” for “EU” in this phrase, it will essentially mean a policy that remains in place today. Today, NATO bases its policy toward Russia on Cold War blueprints.

NATO demonizes our country and ascribes some aggressive intentions to it that don’t exist, and can’t exist by definition.

Mind you – it’s not Russia but NATO that refuses to cooperate, restricts channels of communication, cuts down the range of political subjects to discuss. We’ve never done any of that because we go by the principle that it’s better to talk than not to talk.

Russia has a set of options for an effective, clear and inexpensive reaction to any risk that may come from NATO activity. NATO is involved in a whole range of measures. On the Russian flank, there are endless rotations of forces, military exercises in the immediate vicinity of our borders that are increasingly frequent and grow in scale, and infrastructure projects such as building new depots for armaments and expanding seaport and airfield facilities.

The decision made in 2008 in Bucharest that Georgia and Ukraine will become members of NATO is a bomb under the architecture of European security. We’ve always pointed this out both to Europe and to the United States.

The anti-Russian campaigns that we can see in the West constantly need new themes. There are those who think the Arctic has become an issue: it’s being militarized, Russia is taking hold of all its resources, and so NATO should send troops in there. That’s a fantasy pure and simple.

The United States didn’t consult its allies in making its decision about the INF Treaty. That’s a fact. It was only after the United States made that decision that it commanded its allies to support its withdrawal from that treaty.

In thinking about the impacts of that American decision, you come to the conclusion that the Europeans should unanimously express concern because any intermediate-range missiles that might be deployed near the Russian borders would threaten the European strategic balance. It’s not at the Canadian or Mexican border that the Americans are going to station their missiles when they leave the treaty. There are influential countries and political forces in Europe that can speak up against Europe being turned into a site of confrontation.

We, for our part, stand ready to take any symmetric countermeasures to safeguard the balance based on the INF Treaty. We don’t have any plans to station missiles in Europe or anywhere else before the United States deploys any missiles of the same kind there.

Not a single EU member country has abandoned its foreign policy. We can see a queue of visitors to Moscow to keep the political dialogue going and help boost economic, cultural and 26 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS other ties. But we can’t ignore the reality that those states have passed over a whole range of competences to the supranational level.

In the past, there were Russia-EU summits every six months, every two years the European Commission had a meeting with the Russian government, there were more than 15 standing partnership councils at ministerial level, and there were numerous consultations, about 20, on the entire spectrum of international issues. Surely, what we have today is miserable compared to that architecture of political dialogue.

We haven’t used up all our opportunities for cooperation. We’ve worked persistently for a long time building four common spaces: a common economic space; a common space for freedom, security and justice; a common space of cooperation in the field of external security; and a common space on research, education and culture. We’ve made quite a lot of progress in some respects but there have been very serious setbacks in others.

Energy trade has always played a prominent role in our cooperation, at least because it’s more than

half-century old and has proven to be not only viable but also, and more importantly, predictable and reliable.

Many people tell us that there's absolutely no need for the sanctions. The Europeans' total losses as a result of their sanctions and our countermeasures, which are absolutely legitimate, are well known – they're 100 billion euros. On the other hand, the sanctions machine keeps running and would need political will and some time to stop. I think it's the key point whether the Europeans will be able to ignore pressure from across the Atlantic.

There are states that dream of Russia being removed from the Council of Europe while they would remain in that frontline status. Of course, this is not the position of the majority of Council of Europe members, which realize that it's extremely vague what kind of future the organization is going to have if Russia is not a member of it. The Council of Europe would then become a kind of appendage to the EU and cease to be attractive as an organization.

## **U.S. Complicity in the 2014 Coup in Kiev as a Violation of International Law.**

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FIVE YEARS AGO, a coup d'état took place in Kiev. Following demonstrations and arson attacks, a mob seized several government institutions, including the administration building and residence of the constitutionally elected president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich.

The coup in Kiev led primarily to the U.S. assuming a leading role in Ukraine's governance – something it had neither during the period of the Russian Empire nor the Soviet era.

The February 2014 overthrow of the president in Kiev that took place without elections and in violation of the Ukrainian Constitution de facto divided the country into regions that recognized the new authorities in Kiev and those that opposed the coup. This occurred not only because the Ukrainian president was unconstitutionally removed from power but primarily because the "installation" of the putschist government was accompanied by violence, and ethnic and linguistic persecution.

It is not surprising that Moscow considered the U.S.-orchestrated seizure of power from the head of state in Kiev an event affecting its vital interests. Something else is remarkable: The U.S. administration said that the events in Ukraine, far away from the American mainland, "constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."

The clash of various legal and political positions on the 2014 events in Kiev became a "tipping point" in relations between Russia and Western countries that have now degraded to the level of a new Cold War. The U.S. utilized its dominant financial-economic position in the world as well as its powerful institutional clout in the UN and other international organizations to portray Russia as "guilty" of destabilizing the situation in Ukraine. Under U.S. pressure, anti-Russian documents are advanced and adopted at international forums.

Virtually all such allegations lack a comprehensive analysis of the underlying facts constituting the "Ukrainian crisis": Usually only a few facts taken out of context are considered and evaluated, while other circumstances are deliberately overlooked.

In contemporary international law, the cornerstone of which is the UN Charter, noninterference in domestic affairs of state is a fundamental principle. It is closely related to other basic principles of

international law.

The U.S. and other Western countries have been attempting to cast the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs of state as an outdated norm. In this regard, mechanisms and concepts are being created and promoted that do not formally contradict international law but allow certain of its rules to be creatively applied when implementing international legal policy.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, to “legitimize” intervention in domestic affairs of state, a “telescopic” interpretation of the UN Charter’s provisions on human rights is being increasingly used.

The U.S.’s actions to impose on Ukrainian head of state Viktor Yanukovich a “Western” path of development (toward the EU and NATO) as the only right path and, accordingly, to force the president of Ukraine to renounce further economic integration with Russia should be considered intrusion on matters pertaining to Ukraine’s domestic affairs.

The U.S.’s actions in Ukraine could have been lawful only if there had been a relevant decision by the UN Security Council: the only body authorized to sanction enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. But then, of course, it would have been a very different type of action in terms of both substance and actors. The UN Security Council did not approve such a decision in Ukraine.

Some of the facts we have presented of illegal U.S. interference in the domestic affairs of Ukraine in 2013-2014 have already been expounded by Russian experts at international venues, including by one of the authors of this article: in 2018 at European-based UN agencies in Geneva, as well as in Brussels, before ambassadors of NATO member states. And yet it would seem advisable to consider forming a broad international investigative commission to establish all the circumstances of the coup in Kiev, especially the Obama administration’s interference in Ukrainian domestic affairs in 2013-2014.

Of course, neither the U.S. nor its NATO allies would agree to participate in such an international investigative commission. But it could be established by international associations such as the SCO, CIS, CSTO or BRICS: The member states of those organizations are not interested in U.S. intelligence services orchestrating new coups – especially in their countries – based on the formula the U.S. successfully used when it replaced constitutionally elected Viktor Yanukovich with Turchinov.

International law does not operate on the concepts of a “bad” or “good” head of state; what is significant in terms of law is whether a leader is legitimate or not. The election of Pyotr Poroshenko that Turchinov and his accomplices subsequently organized in some parts of Ukraine did not automatically legitimize the post-coup regime in Kiev: Under the general principle of law, *jus ex injuria non oritur* (unjust acts cannot create law).

On the basis of that principle, the legitimacy of the next president of Ukraine is also questionable. This election is also being organized by the illegal, “post-coup” regime.

## **The Brexit Ordeal: A Case Against the “End of History”.**

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The British want to leave the European Union, which is becoming suspiciously like a German order in Europe because of Germany’s economic dominance. But in both cases, albeit differently, the question was/is about independence, which a country with a history like Britain’s can’t have too much of. This was convincingly demonstrated by the campaign that EU “leave” supporters carried out under the slogan of independence, ahead of the referendum on leaving the EU. As Churchill once noted, the English Channel turned out to be wider than the Atlantic Ocean.

The drama and anguish of Brexit are stressing out not only the British but onlookers. Nevertheless, everyone will have to keep watching what is happening until the end, even though this has long gone beyond all the bounds of common sense and does no credit to the establishment, which has turned the

country into a laughingstock.

The situation has entered the endgame, and there is growing indication that Theresa May is already acting on her own, against the wishes of her cabinet and her party, against the will of the majority of the electorate who voted to leave the EU despite the daunting economic consequences of this step. And that she is acting in tandem (colluding) with EU leaders in an apparent attempt to either roll back Brexit or virtualize it by means of an agreement that would deprive Great Britain of its beloved free trade, making withdrawal from the European project nonsensical.

The backstop is real step toward unification of the island that has even geopolitical consequences, considering that the name of the country, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, would have to be changed.

On March 26, Parliament again took Brexit into its own hands by launching the so-called indicative voting process to determine what course of action enjoys the greatest support among parliamentarians. May and senior ministers did not participate in it, so as not to tie the hands of the cabinet. Voting took place on March 27 on eight draft resolutions selected by the speaker – from withdrawing from the EU without a prior agreement (a “hard Brexit”) and canceling Brexit (London can do so unilaterally) to a new referendum on any agreement to withdraw from the EU, and leaving the EU itself while remaining in the EU Customs Union.

No bill garnered a majority of votes. The speaker suggested to continue voting, eliminating those bills that garnered the least support.

It is clear that Brexiteers would prefer to break the deadlock with no obligations to the Labour Party in order to try to oust May and take control of subsequent developments.

Brussels would be in a difficult situation. It would be easier for it to extend London’s stay in the EU in connection with a referendum (which would take as long as 18 months) or a choice in favor of membership in the Customs Union, which would require new, simpler negotiations. It would not be clear, however, what would happen in Great Britain in either case. The simplest and most intelligible – and even practical, in these unprecedented circumstances, when May’s improvisations have brought everything into a multidimensional stalemate – option for both parties would be for Great Britain to leave without an agreement and with mutual accusations, especially given that life in Europe would be a lot simpler without the British.

What Euroskeptics find most objectionable is that any agreement with the EU will not allow London to spread its wings as part of May’s Global Britain concept, widely marching around the world – be it the freedom to conclude bilateral trade agreements or drastically cut taxes on businesses, following Trump’s example. Divorce could be a mobilization project of the elites in the face of growing uncertainty in the world, dictating, it would seem, the need to take cues from America.

Brexit advocates have serious questions for May, who put off starting the negotiating process for a long time (it was launched seven months after the referendum) and then could not decide on a strategy (she hoped that the EU would offer her something acceptable). In the end, the EU offered her only what it could, guided by its own interests. It was naïve to think that London would get something that was not openly hostile and humiliating in response to its *démarche* that undermined one of the foundations of the Western alliance forged in the Cold War era.

London has found itself at the forefront of a renewed Western conflict between the Anglo-Saxons and Germany/the EU (a new Battle for Britain?). Lacking a sense of national dignity, May does not want to or might not even be able to understand this because of the singularity of what is happening, and is therefore risking “special relations” with Washington; in this case, there is a possibility that the country will for some time “sag” over the Atlantic “between two chairs.”

As for the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical structure inherited from the Cold War era, Brexit and the sentiments it generates could help make it more like a “puff pastry.” The revival of the former antagonism between the Anglo-Saxons and the Germans; the U.S.’s bet on Eastern Europe (primarily Poland and Romania) as part of the “dual containment” of Russia and Germany; the formation of

conditions for normalizing Russia's relations with Western Europe, primarily Germany – all this will create tension in NATO and intensify conflicts in the EU, where Poland will be seeking to lay claim to the place of the British. It is difficult to say how long such trends that retrace the course of European history, particularly the interwar period, might last in a qualitatively new environment. In any event, Franco-German and Russo-German reconciliation will remain the largest stabilizing factor, the flip side of which will be greater freedom for the geopolitical and historical fantasies/hallucinations of all other players.

## **Germany's Experience of Overcoming the Migration Crisis in Europe.**

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AT A CDU/CSU PARTY CONGRESS in late 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said her decision to allow all those who wished to cross the German border to do so freely was a “humanitarian imperative.” On one hand, Germany is facing a labor shortage, which it planned to address by attracting foreigners. On the other hand, German society, considering its prevailing “guilt complex” for the suffering inflicted on other nationalities during the Second World War and a long-established policy of tolerance and rejecting a dominant national culture, is fixated on helping the needy and accepting all foreigners with the prospect of integrating them into society with equal rights.

Of course, the current migration crisis and associated events are gradually shifting German moral attitudes toward abandoning such a “lopsided” approach that diminishes the rights of the titular majority in favor of the rights of the alien minority. When refugees who come to Germany supposedly fleeing war and needing protection systematically commit crimes against local citizens or the public learns about the number of refugees receiving social benefits, even the most peaceful and liberalminded Germans gradually start thinking about what is happening and looking for the people responsible for this situation.

The authorities of Eastern European countries are willing to accept only a limited number of refugees, offering varying explanations for this: a weak economy compared to Western Europe, the Two groups have formed in Europe: The first, led by Germany, is a proponent of a borderless Europe. The second group comprises states that are protecting their national interests and cultural identity. risk of the spread of terrorism, or simply a lack of experience dealing with migration issues.

As a result, two groups have formed in Europe: The first, led by Germany, a proponent of a borderless Europe, is promoting the concept of “equal burden-sharing.” The second group comprises European states that oppose Brussels' system of refugee quotas and are protecting their national interests and cultural identity.

Over the past three years, EU summits and meetings at various levels have regularly addressed the issue of accepting and accommodating migrants in the territory of member countries based on four criteria: a country's population size, unemployment rate, gross domestic product, and number of refugees it has previously accepted. The formula proposed by Brussels is similar to Germany's “Königstein key”\* system. That approach does not sit well with a large group of EU members (the Visegrad Group and the Baltic states) that believes that the indigenous population should choose the people with whom they want to live.

In our opinion, there is no reason to say that the German migration policy is universal or has the potential to be applied in other countries. National security threats like the rise in crime, Islamization,

additional financial burden, and the increased terrorist threat that Germany has faced are in no small measure a consequence of the crisis events of 2015-2016. Realistically assessing the state of affairs and fearing the repetition of a similar situation, the leaders of neighboring states violated one of the basic principles of the EU on freedom of movement and closed the borders, leaving only the possibility of transit toward Germany without the right to apply for refugee status and social benefits. Germany has made statements about the humanitarian nature of the commitments “regarding a historical test that has fallen on our time and that must be met.”<sup>6</sup> Those slogans have not resonated with Europeans who are dealing with their own domestic problems, forcing official Berlin to find a way out of the situation virtually on its own.

It would seemingly be difficult for the Germans to break the consolidated position of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, and, as of late, Austria and Italy. The main reason is the countries’ unwillingness to financially support people with qualitatively different cultural and religious attitudes and ideas about morality and ethics who are supposedly fleeing persecution in their home country but are in fact potential criminals or organizers of terrorist acts.

The migration policy of the EU countries cannot be uniform and unified. The issues of preserving cultural identity and ensuring national security that the current migration crisis have exposed have become a problem that needs to be addressed jointly on the basis of equal dialogue between sovereign states and supranational institutions, rather than rigid orders from pan-European institutions.

Germany’s migration policy clearly demonstrates a course toward establishing a vertical administration of migration flows, which it is trying to integrate into EU mechanisms. The migration crisis in Europe is marked by losses that are very hard to cover even for the strong German economy. Among other things, there is a growing number of terrorist acts carried out by Arab nationals, which increasingly turns locals against refugees. The failure of many immigrants from Syria, Africa and Afghanistan to adopt common European values, moral attitudes and culture also entails consequences.

However, the German experience of adapting and integrating refugees and migrants into society could prove very useful to Russia for developing its own approaches and mechanisms for managing migration. Of the greatest practical interest are the mechanisms used in special integration courses for migrants and the “list of safe countries of origin” that has generally proved to be effective.

## **Chinese Diplomacy in the Era of Xi Jinping.**

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THE 19TH CONGRESS of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was held on October 18-24, 2017. Chinese media noted that the Congress took place was open and global in nature: It was covered by more than 3,600 journalists, including 1,818 correspondents from Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and 134 countries. In addition, the idea of “comprehensively covering an event of global significance” was presented as broadcasting China’s voice to the world and explaining the country’s plan for future development.

A little more than four months later, in early March 2018, the Two Sessions\* were held, where participants discussed China’s entry into a new era: the era of “becoming a powerful nation.” An active diplomacy befitting China’s new status is becoming a hallmark of this era.

IN THE FIVE YEARS since the 18th Congress of the CPC, the term “Chinese diplomacy” has markedly expanded. It is now called “great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in the new era.” It should be noted that diplomacy long remained the most conservative field of the CPC’s activity and



was not directly impacted by theoretical innovations.

In late October 2013, in Beijing, the first working session on foreign relations with neighboring countries was held in the history of the PRC. During the meeting, Xi Jinping stressed that the strategic goal of Chinese diplomacy is to promote national rejuvenation. To that end, China must strengthen friendly relations with neighboring countries and make the best use of existing strategic opportunities. Chinese propagandists called “diplomacy with neighboring countries” the most important component of Chinese diplomacy in the “Xi Jinping era.”<sup>4</sup> Perhaps it was then that the term “Xi Jinping era,” which after the 19th Congress would become the “new era,” the era of “becoming a powerful nation,” first appeared.

According to the Chinese leadership, such a close relationship between Chinese and global development demonstrates China’s growing responsibility. The Chinese foreign minister for the first time said that building a new type of international relations based on win-win cooperation is a fundamental foreign policy principle.

AN IMPORTANT ASPECT of the formation of the new foreign policy doctrine is its targeted nature. For each region of the world, China has its own foreign policy strategy, presented in the form of policy documents adopted by the Chinese Foreign Ministry.

In the new program, Beijing intends to develop comprehensive strategic cooperation and partnership relations, as well as strengthen the Chinese-African community. China maintains that the entire African continent is a priority of its foreign policy.

MILITARY DIPLOMACY is becoming an increasingly important focus of China’s foreign policy. For decades, China has severely criticized the arms race and military activity of other states, but changes are occurring in this area, too. After the 19th Congress, an article by PLA Rear Admiral Yang Yi in which he closely linked a rich state and a powerful army with peaceful development appeared on the website Huanqiu shibao. China has for many years ranked second in the world in terms of military spending and is developing fundamentally new types of weapons that are setting global standards in some areas.

China has joined the UN’s new Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System and has made efforts to establish a permanent contingent of peacekeeping police forces, giving it a reserve strength of 8,000 people. China also intends in the next five years to allocate \$100 million in military aid grants for establishing an African standby force and an African rapid reaction force for crisis situations.

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL and military power are necessary but not 86 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS enough for becoming a global power in the modern era and returning China to the center of the world stage. An important emerging aspect of Chinese diplomacy is the active use of “soft power” resources: creating an attractive image of the country abroad. China began talking about “soft power” and actively developing it after the value of the Chinese experience was recognized by the international community. A formal indicator of this was the emergence of the concept of the “Beijing consensus,” which transformed the Chinese model into “soft power” and created a positive image that could be used to strengthen China’s political influence in the world.

THE 19TH CONGRESS proclaimed the concept of “great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics in the new era” or the “Xi Jinping era,” which will be enriched in both theory and practice. In other words, China will be “more active and deeply involved in reforming the system of global governance, nominate more new concepts, initiatives and projects, and contribute more Chinese wisdom and strength to the international community.

China’s rising confidence after the 19th Congress raises questions: How ready is the world for Pax Sinica (Lat. “the Chinese World”)? What chances and challenges will accompany China’s rapid growth? It is obvious that the growth of China’s ambitions “in all azimuths” is sparked by Beijing’s desire to protect what it has attained and look ahead to what was previously unattainable.<sup>36</sup> By building its own world order (“tianxia”) through a system of a new type of international relations and a community of

common destiny, China is implementing, according to Yang Jiechi, the “diplomatic ideas of Xi Jinping,” who believes “global development is his specific task.”

## **Territorial Integrity of States and the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination: Why They Do Not Contradict Each Other.**

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BOTH PRINCIPLES mentioned in the title of this article were included in the UN Charter for good reason, despite their seeming contradiction. They concern not only the generally accepted conditions for settling international conflicts but also the very existence of multinational states, their internal homogeneity and interethnic contradictions that periodically arise.

Controversy over this issue intensified in connection with the secession of Kosovo from Serbia against the will of the latter, which called this a clear violation of its territorial integrity.

Recent events have revived the question of the relationship between the principles of territorial integrity and the right of peoples to self-determination.

It became most acute in connection with the reunification of Crimea with Russia that received diametrically opposed assessments from the collective West and the Russian Federation.

The topic was also made relevant by referendums on Scotland’s independence from Great Britain and Catalonia’s independence from Spain that were held by the local population and deemed failed by the central authorities due to a lack of votes in the case of the former and because it was considered unconstitutional in the case of the latter. These events, and especially the separation of Crimea from Ukraine, heightens the controversy over which of the two international principles should be preferred in cases where they supposedly come into mutual contradiction.

THE DISCREPANCIES in the understanding of the aforesaid principles were amplified by the fact that the disputing sides applied double standards to similar cases when defending the correctness of their position.

Vladimir Putin in a speech at the Valdai Forum in Sochi raised a vital issue for the modern time of streamlining the rules of interstate communication, of not tolerating their arbitrary interpretation by the powerful, of abolishing double standards and of ensuring liability for the consequences of acts that violate international law.

Territorial integrity is violated only in the case of an armed incursion by one state into the territory of another. This principle, therefore, regulates interstate relations. The question of the right of peoples to self-determination arises when a dispute emerges between peoples within one state. So, one principle relates to the implementation of a state’s foreign policy while the other relates to its domestic policy and the opposing attitude of other states toward a specific domestic issue. The clear distinction between the external and internal causes of the emergence of international disputes fundamentally removes the seemingly contradictory nature of the two principles.

OF COURSE, while recognizing the right of peoples to self-determination in any form suitable to them, it is impossible to remain indifferent to the plight of large multicultural states. These states exist in the world because they meet the interests of many ethnic groups advocating for the preservation of those states. But this does not undo the internal separatist Territorial Integrity of States and the Right to Self-Determination 99 tendencies that lead not only to the weakening but sometimes to the collapse of these states.

Separatist sentiments are oftentimes motivated by fears about the well-being of national languages or an unwillingness to tolerate harassment based on the deliberate restriction of the use of a native language

and instruction in it in schools and universities. The most obvious example is Ukraine, where both motives are manifest.

The Crimean issue served as a trigger for the West to unleash a new Cold War against the Russian state waged by all possible means except armed force. Its causes and methods differ from the well-known Cold War against the USSR and world socialism, but the focus and goals remain the same.

The new Cold War, dubbed a hybrid one, is being waged in several spheres: political, economic, ideological, and informational. What sets it apart from the previous Cold War is the greater cruelty and intransigence of its initiators, as well as the indiscriminate choice of means for combating the opponent to bring about its ultimate defeat.

The American establishment and Obama personally decided to harshly punish Russia and its president for disobedience – for refusing to follow the established rules of the unipolar world that do not permit the free will of individual states. It was necessary only to find the most suitable occasion, which soon emerged after the coup d'état in Ukraine and the subsequent reunification of Crimea with Russia.

We need to take not a defensive and apologetic stance but an assertive and principled position on this issue to prove our rightness based on the norms of international law and the need to observe the world order despite the desire of destructive forces to undermine it in their own selfish interests. Then the actions and motives of Russia will receive greater understanding and support from the broad international community.

## **Does Russian Federalism Need Modernization? If So, What Kind?**

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We cannot and should not ignore the very special dynamics of changes in the political-territorial structures in many countries and regions that have become obvious in recent decades and caused deep-cutting and comprehensive changes in the field of federalism and new and highly varied forms of its outcrops.

In a very short historical period, Russia lived through a crisis of Soviet federalism and disintegration of the Soviet Union; it became an independent state; suppressed the threats of further disintegration and adopted a fundamentally new Constitution. It was a highly important choice: Russia connected its future with democratic federalism and is looking for the ways of its further perfection.

It is hardly correct to say that federalism and the level of democracy, political regime and the form of governance are interconnected. World experience has demonstrated that there are truly democratic and totalitarian countries, republics and monarchies among the federations (even if in the formal-legal sense).

On the other hand, we cannot ignore the more or less close ties between federalism and the ethnic factor. Indeed, over a third of the federations is based on the national-territorial principle or, at least, takes this factor into account.

Today, the level of economic development of the RF subjects, the volume and profitability, population strength and territories are very different. This is not logical; more than that – this negatively affects the relationships between the federal center and its subjects. The center's role in distributing budget money and leveling the subjects by social-economic and other parameters is disproportionately big. This might ignite disagreements and conflicts between the subjects and the federal center.

We should say that today Russian federalism does not fully perform its role of a unifier and integrator: this is a problem with possible negative repercussions.

It goes without saying that the model of supra-national federalism is the democratic civilizational maximum for any multinational state: it ensures the rights and freedoms of its citizens irrespective of national, racial, gender, ideological, etc. specifics that separates any individual from the rest of the nation. It is commonly believed that the United States has moved closer than others to this ideal. The recent radical-liberal years of its development have stirred doubts in the absolute universality of federalism. Complete equality of all population groups in any country when it comes to the realization of their civil and political rights is attainable, yet not all people can integrate equally successfully in a society because of different intellectual, spiritual and moral qualities. This needs no arguments. It is for this reason that the level of well-being and GDP per capita of different population groups in the United States are very different despite the state's considerable efforts to bring them closer.

The Soviet Union's disintegration, as well as the disappearance of the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak federations, confirmed that multinational and multi-confessional federative states are less stable; they find it much harder to retain their state-legal unity.

The example of the last 20 to 30 years has demonstrated that no compact Christian enclaves (the Copts in Egypt being the only exception) have survived in Islamic countries (Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt) and on the African continent. Their populations moved to Europe or Russia (from Central Asia, Azerbaijan and the Northern Caucasus) or even further, to the United States and Australia. In Russia, we cannot and should not expect a miracle: the Russian Christian part of its population will not sharply increase its demographic activity nor the Islamic population will restrict, for some reason and on its own initiative, the birth rate in its republics. Islamic mentality, socio-cultural criteria, organization of everyday life and the future of their children greatly differ from Russian characteristics. Russia is facing a danger of disintegration or a new self-identification by contracting its territory to the space with the purely Russian-Christian population. There is no other option...

It seems that federalization of the world will go on and will spread to new states and new territories. In Europe, this is possible for the UK, Spain and, probably, Italy.

Countries of similar civilizations will move toward cooperation and visa-free regimes within their spaces. I regret to say that geometric demography of Islamic peoples and African population will cause all kinds of cataclysms. Hundreds of millions of new socially deprived poor and hungry people whom nobody needs will try to move into better-off regions of the world under the slogan of globalization, freedom of movement and migration. Those who are able to protect themselves will survive. Others will be plunged back into the Middle Ages, Asian-Islamic style, with inequality, slavery and mud.

## **False Flags as a Method of Information Warfare.**

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TODAY'S international political competition is largely about states and political groups trying to undermine one another's prestige, and they far from always use peaceful means in doing so. The arsenals that are used in such struggles include false flags – attacks, sometimes causing heavy casualties, that are falsely blamed on their adversaries by those who carry them out.

False flags are nothing new in the history of international conflicts. They have been used as a stratagem to provoke armed attacks for quite a while.

All these incidents followed basically the same pattern: a country secretly engineered an attack against its own citizens and blamed it on another country in a bid to justify an aggression against that country.

Traditional warfare methods were unusable in the post-World War II bipolar world order since a clash

between the two poles, the United States and the Soviet Union, would have triggered a global catastrophe. For this reason, false flags ceased to be a means of provoking war and became a means of propaganda, a method of blackening the image of an adversary state or besmirching the reputation of a domestic opposition group and a tactic for demoralization and stirring public fears.

Both of these kinds of false flags – those targeting a foreign state and those targeting a domestic opposition group – are means of information and psychological pressure.

Terrorism isn't the only tactics to stir public hatred and mistrust of a government. "Unknown snipers," a common feature of "color revolutions," have the same mission. Quite often, opposition groups hire snipers for killings that can be blamed on the government, bring public wrath on it, and trigger a coup. This isn't logical – selective gunfire won't help a government disperse demonstrations but is bound to spark public fury. But revolutions, cynical as it may sound, need their martyrs, and if the government doesn't kill any protesters, the opposition may fake martyrdom and win more support.

False flags are, besides, a major tactic in the information war that the West, mainly the United States and Britain, is waging against Russia. Anti-Russian false flags normally aim to spoil Russia's global image rather bringing about a change of government in our country. While in some other countries, false flags have succeeded in stirring anti-government feelings, this has never been the case in Russia, even though many allegedly liberal Russian public figures and human rights defenders falsely accuse the Russian government of unlawful actions. To sum up, anti-Russian false flags are designed to discredit rather than to destabilize. The former Soviet Union practically never was a false flag target because it enjoyed a tremendous international prestige and was an equal adversary to the West in information and ideological affairs.

The poisoning in the British city of Salisbury in March 2018 of another Russian turncoat, Sergey Skripal, a former colonel in Russia's GRU military intelligence agency, and his daughter Yulia Skripal can also be considered a false flag. The fact that Russia was blamed for this crime just a day after it was committed suggests that the poisoning had been planned well in advance.

Skripal's poisoning was in the interest of those who sought to blacken the reputation of our country and to raise obstacles to its cooperation with the EU, including its energy trade. The United States is up in arms against the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline project, claiming that Russia uses it as a means of political pressure on European countries. Meanwhile, the United States makes no secret of plans to boost its exports of liquefied natural gas to Europe, a market where Russia is a strong competitor. Russia can successfully combat false flags and eliminate their effects if it follows a few simple rules. First, Russian intelligence and law enforcement services should take effective measures to prevent foreign secret services, extremists or terrorists from carrying out any attacks that could be blamed on the Russian government. If such attacks happen outside Russia and are unpreventable, diplomats and media should get False Flags as a Method of Information Warfare 131 involved. Being on the defensive and try to prove its innocence would be the wrong tactic for Russia to use. Russia should go on the counteroffensive. It should prove the adversary's points to be untenable, and even level accusations at the presumed beneficiary of a false flag.

This was, in fact, the position Russia took in the Skripal affair. Moscow didn't try to prove its innocence but openly condemned Britain, the United States and the EU for slapping unfounded accusations on our country, and even hinted that they had vested interest in that crime. This position meant not only refusal to discuss false accusations but also an attempt to inflict public relations damage on Western countries.

And finally, false flags should be prevented from sowing panic among Russia's population, causing mistrust of the state, and creating a general atmosphere of fear or apathy. The government should use sanctions against panic inciters.

## **Cross-Border Context of Maritime Spatial Planning in the European Union.**

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USE OF THE SEA in the modern era is marked by the widespread use by coastal states of maritime spatial planning (MSP). In 2014, almost 40 countries developed or implemented territorial plans for delimiting offshore zones within national EEZs (exclusive economic zones\*) and determining their industrial purpose. This practice is employed by states all over the world, including Australia, Israel, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, China, the U.S., the EU member states, as well as several other countries in Africa, Asia, Oceania, North and Central America.

It is projected that by 2024, maritime spatial plans in the world could reach 100 [8, p. 7]. Thus, their number will increase two and a half times compared to 2014. If those predictions come true, by 2024, more countries with access to the sea could join the process of demarcating maritime areas. If offshore zones continue to expand as projected, the total area of EEZs subject to planning will increase 25% to 30% by 2025.

Large-scale planning of offshore zones to a certain extent impacts the development of international maritime activities. The use of territorial plans and fixed rules regarding the zoning of specific waters benefits littoral states and gives them the ability to regulate the use of waters in their EEZs and, in particular, to achieve economic, environmental and in some cases political goals.

FOREIGN RESEARCHERS consider MSP a “future-oriented” process that will serve to minimize conflicts stemming from the use of maritime areas and ease pressure on the marine environment [10, p. 12]. Its fundamental principle is the ecosystem-based approach to maritime activity. The concept of this approach is associated with governance based on the “best understanding of the ecological interactions and processes necessary to sustain ecosystem structure and function” and aims to promote the sustainable development of oceans and their resources [5, p. 60].

The European Union is among other national and international organizations and integration associations actively advocating the introduction and expansion of MSP.

The directive defines MSP as an instrument that works across sectors to implement the integrated maritime policy of the European Union (2007) and stipulates obligations for EU member states regarding organizing maritime planning processes.

The efforts of the EU to advance MSP demonstrate its interest in using and developing this mechanism. In conjunction with the establishment by the directive of a deadline for implementing its individual requirements in 2021 (maritime spatial plans, see above), this involves further development of relevant EU legislation and the development of subsequent documents after 2021.

ONE DIRECTION of MSP development in the EU is promoting crossborder cooperation to ensure the coordination of territorial plans and development of common standards. The EU’s 2014 MSP Directive among other things aims to implement a cross-border approach to planning processes in certain maritime areas – the Northern, Baltic, Mediterranean and Black Seas. A list of regions is provided in the EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive (2008).

IT IS OBVIOUS that MSP is generally shifting from cross-border cooperation in certain marine basins (maritime regions) to multilateral international cooperation throughout the world’s oceans. Thus, MSP process- Cross-Border Context of Maritime Special Planning in the EU 139 es are gradually becoming international (global), in particular, to achieve the goals of the global governance of the world’s oceans [3, p. 207].

The European Union sees MSP as one tool that it plans to use to develop international ocean governance and enhance the EU’s role as a strong global actor. The EU assigns itself a leading role in

establishing a worldwide system of ocean governance/ocean governance framework; it sees itself as a global actor, as well as a “champion for sustainable development” and “user of ocean resources”.

MARITIME spatial planning is increasingly being used in the development of the maritime activity of coastal countries. Increased activity in this area to a certain extent benefits coastal states, as it allows them to regulate the use of maritime spaces in their EEZs in order to achieve economic, environmental and political goals.

Regulatory documents developed by the EU make it possible to regulate the promotion of maritime spatial planning among EU littoral states, as well as to encourage international MSP cooperation in specific marine areas

The EU’s emphasis on cross-border cooperation in the field of maritime spatial planning is a stepping stone to the next stage of MSP development and a transition to ocean governance on an international (global) level. The EU is focusing on international documents such as the 2015 UN General Assembly resolution on “Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”

A communication approved by the EU in 2016 on international ocean governance and a Road Map approved in 2017 on accelerating MSP Cross-Border Context of Maritime Special Planning in the EU 141 development identify specific areas of interest to the EU, list tasks for achieving the goals, as well as implementation deadlines. Based on these documents, we can conclude that for the EU, maritime spatial planning is one tool the EU is contemplating using to develop cross-border cooperation and strengthen its regional and global positions when it comes to forming international ocean governance mechanisms.

## **How American Presidential Contenders Talk About Russia.**

**Author: David Foglesong, *Professor of History at Rutgers University (USA)***

CAN AMERICAN POLITICIANS talk sensibly about Russia? Major statements in the last year by leading contenders for the next presidential election in 2020 are not encouraging: they have presented severely distorted views of Russia and grossly exaggerated threats from the Kremlin. However, some influential politicians in the United States do have more realistic and balanced perspectives on Russia. Observers who wish for improved American-Russian relations should therefore be patient and not abandon all hope.

The stereotypical notion of Russia as a backward land of totalitarian repression was contradicted in June, when more than 80,000 Americans who visited for the World Cup saw for themselves Russian cities that are clean, modern, friendly, and lively.

As former Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul’s vivid recent memoir, *From Cold War to Hot Peace*, amply shows, his confrontational championing of democracy failed: While antagonizing Putin, it made it easier for the Kremlin to depict the small minority of Russian liberals as clients of America and led some prominent Russian democrats to distance themselves from the emotional and ideological ambassador. (During McFaul’s 2012-2014 ambassadorship, the percentage of Russians with positive views of America fell from 52 to 23.)

The most effective way to advance democracy around the world is not to grandstand about support for democrats in countries where the U.S. has very little credibility but to make American democracy at home truly a model that others will want to emulate. That will require facing problems such as racism, inequality, police brutality, and paralyzing partisanship that plagued America long before the 2016 election. Pugnacious preoccupation with Putin is a distraction from that goal, not a way to pursue it.

Although Sanders recognizes that “the global war on terror has been a disaster for the American people and for American leadership,” he champions a different kind of war, a global battle against “oligarchy and authoritarianism.” To mobilize support for that fight, Sanders makes Putin a symbol of all

the “demagogues” and “kleptocrats” who “use divisiveness and abuse as a tool for enriching themselves and those loyal to them.”

The truth is that Russia gradually reacted to U.S. policies that repeatedly threatened its interests and security, including the war against Iraq in 2003, the drive to incorporate Georgia and Ukraine into NATO, and the placement of missile defense systems in Eastern Europe. If Warren and other prospective presidential candidates are to develop a sound strategy toward Russia they must first have an accurate understanding of the origins of contemporary Russian foreign policies and attitudes toward the United States, which have been strongly affected by U.S. military interventions from Kosovo and Iraq to Syria and Libya.

Even some of the younger presidential aspirants have been unable to 148 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS resist the temptation to attack President Donald Trump by linking him to Russia. When Senator Kamala Harris of California announced her campaign for the presidency at the beginning of February, she claimed that foreign powers are “infecting the White House like malware.” She also asserted that in 2016 Russia not only interfered in the presidential election but also attacked “our very American identity.”

Although it will therefore be difficult for presidential candidates to talk reasonably about Russia, some prominent American politicians do realize the need for better relations between the two countries. For example, California Governor Jerry Brown recognized that common interests, such as avoiding nuclear war, addressing climate change and promoting mutually beneficial economic development, are much more important for the long term than the political conflicts that have marred relations in the last few years. Other politicians with sober and thoughtful perspectives on Russia include Democratic Representative Ro Khanna of California and Republican Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky.

If major incidents that inflame hostilities can be avoided in the next two years, there is reason to hope that eventually more American political leaders will recognize the need to move beyond the recent futile efforts to isolate, punish, and demonize Russia.

### **Informational Confrontation in the Military-Technical Sphere.**

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INFORMATIONAL WORK is among the most important elements of a state’s modern military-technical policy. The tasks, target audience and specific nature of sources would seemingly set the methods of information work in the military-technical field far apart from this work in other areas – for example, in domestic policy, the economy or culture and ideology.

Technical articles in the media are still oriented toward the public, but indirectly, since military-political decisions are not made by the public. They shape the agenda – i.e., the narrative about the significance of a specific military-technical topic – and then the topic is subsequently inserted into the overall informational context as needed

The military-technical positioning of Russia and any country in the media is just one element of foreign policy informational work, and its objectives are the same as general foreign policy objectives (building an international reputation, influencing international cooperation) and economic objectives (undermining an adversary’s competitiveness, weakening this adversary’s military-industrial enterprises and its ties with foreign partners).

With that in mind, Western countries are very active in the militarytechnical sector of the information space. The overall volume of articles, reporting and analytical materials in the foreign media does not



compare with the volume of materials in the Russian mass media (both domestically and abroad). Also disproportionate is the number of specific texts devoted to narrow military-technical topics and the frequency with which important issues are mentioned. On the contrary, the Russian press frequently utilizes translations of foreign materials, which only increases the influence of outside concepts and views. An analysis of military-technical articles in the foreign media suggests that this informational work in Western countries is built on a systemic approach and the use of standard methods that have proven effective in other areas.

At the theoretical level, we can talk about a unified methodology of information work that authors use even in the specific military-technical field that amounts to specific techniques for composing and structuring texts, speculative logic and reasoning, use of expressive means and stylistic techniques, rhetorical forms and images.

The problem for the military-technical field is that for the Western media, it is just like any other topic, so the content, truthful or not, does not matter: Foreign experts write military-technical articles just as they would write articles in any other field, armed with their traditional tools. This is similar to the laws of formal logic that can be used in any domain without specifying the substance of the assertions that are used in a logical formulation.

However, a different attitude prevails in Russian media and political circles toward the military-technical sphere because of its closed nature, “sensitivity” and certain exclusivity. Very often, Russian political structures (including military ones) proceed from the need to show and establish the truth. This is contrary to the principles established by the leadership and media in Western countries that consider truth and the actual content of events irrelevant.

For this reason, the Russian side is constantly playing catch-up. It is forced to respond to provocative falsifications. And this has extremely negative consequences, because in the information sphere, the first to speak is right. And the pretext for another information wave could be any statement by any person, unreasonable assumptions, or dubious photographs: The actual content does not matter.

The Russian side must pursue a more aggressive policy, keep a close watch for any potential occasion (formal and informal statements, assumptions, expert reports, and other analytical materials, regardless of the reliability of sources) and any material that could be used to advance its position and for its own purposes. Countering foreign professionals in the field of military-technical propaganda will be impossible unless objectives are conceptualized differently: moving from the search for truth to persuasive self-positioning and the concept of launching the first information attack while at the same time continuing to pursue the concept of responding to attacks. The techniques for successfully meeting these challenges are already known: They are clearly reflected in the Western media. They are the most effective instruments in information warfare today.

## **Digital Technology in the Foreign Policy Information Support Systems of the United States, Great Britain and Germany.**

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THE DYNAMISM of the modern world, the growing interdependence of its subjects, and the rapid development of information and communication technologies (ICT) contribute to a significant intensification of interstate dialogue, as well as the emergence of new forms and methods of influencing

international audiences. In these conditions, the role diplomatic agencies play in providing information support of foreign policy activity (ISFPA) and how they do so is changing.

The aforementioned role of diplomatic agencies traditionally involves three aspects: informing foreign partners about the official position of their state, obtaining similar information from other countries and exchanging views. The work of all representative agencies abroad includes such important tasks as informing the leadership of their country about the political and economic situation in the host country, directly participating in providing information support for the foreign policy of their state in countries of accreditation and strengthening the positive image of their country internationally. This activity is carried out primarily through traditional (print, radio and television) and electronic media outlets.

However, under the influence of ICT, the very essence of the informational-communicative function of modern diplomacy is transforming; its content is changing. These days, when establishing dialogue with various states, diplomats are becoming “strategically motivated handlers of public opinion” [19, pp. 655-656] that must be able to not only observe but also independently generate the flow of information they need.

ONE OF RUSSIA’S most active and aggressive adversaries in the information field is the United States of America, which experts say has “overwhelming superiority over other participants in the international system when it comes to exerting broad, extraterritorial informational influence”.

Official and public diplomacy have gradually been merging in U.S. diplomatic practice, implying that diplomats abroad must act as lobbyists, consultants and experts on humanitarian issues. This approach was piloted by U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, who from his very first days in Russia sought to establish “cooperation with public associations and other civil society entities, mostly opposition-oriented”. As a result, communication channels with official Russian agencies were largely lost.

WASHINGTON’S main method of countering Internet content that it does not like is to cram the information space with pro-American information.

In the context of information security, the “dominance” of American content on the Internet worries not only Russia and China, but also the countries of the EU. Hence the complaints against the U.S. regarding the liberal use of Europeans’ personal data, conflicts over international companies not paying taxes in the countries where they generate their basic revenue, and the resentment over the persistent and blatant refusal by American site holders to comply with the standards of European legislation.

WE WILL turn now to the ISFPA practice of Great Britain. “Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service,” whose central agency is the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (aka, the Foreign Office), has 270 agencies worldwide: embassies and consulates-general (British diplomatic missions, permanent representatives to international organizations) that employ more than 14,000 people promoting British national interests.

Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in the flow of information to the Foreign Office. Daily messages and telegrams from embassies alone number in the several thousands. In addition to these data, the staff of Foreign Office departments also use other information sources: reports from British correspondents abroad, material received through mutual agreement from the UK’s NATO and EU partners, and briefs and analyses prepared by research institutes and universities.

Diplomats have become more involved in foreign trade and information and propaganda efforts, as well as in international scientific and technical cooperation.

British diplomats are to use the Internet to “monitor events abroad, gather information, identify key persons of influence, gauge foreign public opinion on social networks, possibly incorporate ideas disseminated in local circles into foreign policy, monitor elections abroad, determine influential Internet users in the host country during crisis situations, and organize forums of developers of software for certain events” [5, p. 38]. The British actively used social networks during the “Arab Spring” to reach out to the population of countries in the region

A FEW WORDS must also be said about the organization of ISFPA in the Federal Republic of

Germany (FRG), which liaises with other states and international intergovernmental organizations through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a network of nearly 230 foreign diplomatic offices. The main functions of Germany's central foreign policy agency include representing the interests of the state in the international arena, promoting international exchange, and providing protection and assistance to German citizens abroad.

Because the German Foreign Ministry is directly responsible for fostering a positive image of the country in the world, it is tasked with developing a wide variety of cultural programs and projects for promoting the German language abroad.

Assertive German media policies are also promoted in social net- Foreign Policy Information Support Systems 169 works, where Twitter and Facebook again have priority. For example, Russian Twitter users have repeatedly drawn the attention of Russian diplomats to the intrusive promotion of the Russian-language edition of German broadcaster Deutsche Welle: "Is Russia surrounded only by enemies? Then come here: News without embellishment and without hysterics." Such is the "German propaganda pure and simple".

In terms of the positive experience of the diplomatic agencies of other states, mention should be made of the robust training of ambassadors for "direct" work with the media that, for example, the Swedish Foreign Ministry conducts. All newly appointed heads of diplomatic missions undergo mandatory training organized by the ministry's press service to develop skills for conducting "open mic" conversations with reporters, as well as learn techniques for holding press conferences and briefings, and how to act in front of TV cameras.

"Digital diplomacy" (cyber diplomacy) is a new concept in the lexicon of foreign policy departments and is considered the most important channel for working with foreign audiences, providing an opportunity to directly relay official state positions and shape public opinion. The use by official diplomatic offices and their employees of social networks to establish direct contact with foreign audiences should be viewed as a sign of the times that reflects the specificity of the current stage of evolution of the ISFPA systems of foreign countries. This type of communication is most widely implemented by staff at U.S. diplomatic missions.

## **The Yugoslav Crisis: Lessons and Repercussions.**

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TWENTY YEARS AGO, NATO unleashed a war in the very heart of Europe against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) that left bloodchilling memories on the continent. It brought destruction, loss of numerous civilian lives, serious social and political problems in Europe and elsewhere in the world, juridical disagreements, conflicts and crises not yet resolved by either the European or world community.

The FRY did not and could not threaten the United States or NATO either militarily or economically. Seen from America, the country was neither fish nor fowl: it never wanted to join either NATO or the EU since its policy did not harmonize with these institutions; it betrayed no intention to join the newly born Eurozone; it had its own currency and pursued its own monetary policy. The West, on its side, preferred to deal with small dependent countries. Yugoslavia that wanted to preserve at least its trimmed federation threatened the West by its disobedience and, therefore, should be punished.

For over a decade, the NATO countries had not been threatened either practically or even theoretically; nobody claimed their territories. They should be awakened and inspired. The Yugoslav crisis, Yugoslavia proved to be the best choice.

It was necessary to inspire the weakly motivated American military industrial complex with new orders and new targets that could be specified only in the course of a real war. It was necessary, in particular, to test the latest achievements of military technologies including such masterpieces of military industry as B-1B bombers, the F-117 Nighthawk, the first operational aircraft to be designed on the basis of stealth technology, etc.

Some experts pointed to the interconnection between the sexual scandal associated with Bill Clinton and the events unfolding in Yugoslavia. "It seems that the huge attention to the scandal was an instrument of diverting attention of the media from the intervention of NATO." This is not totally correct: Bill Clinton and the Democrats were building up tension around Yugoslavia that ended in a war to suppress an interest in the sexual scandal and detract public attention from it.

Aggression against Yugoslavia meant that NATO went outside the limits of its territory and its responsibilities as defined by Article 5 of the Charter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which says that the use of armed force is possible in cases of "an armed attack against one or more [members] in Europe or North America." Yugoslavia did not attack any of the Alliance's members and did not invade their territories. The fact that Yugoslavia was a European country was the only (geographical) association with the Charter.

The United States (very much as earlier in case of Korea and Vietnam) acted without a mandate of the UN Security Council for the simple reason that it would have been vetoed by the Russian Federation. Washington began bombing without informing the UN SC: it obviously placed its interests above international law.

WHEN preparing for the use of force in Yugoslavia, the United States had to take Russia into account as the only state that could stand up against its plans. American assessments of Russia's military forces did not stir up any apprehensions: after the Chechen campaign of 1994-1995, the Russian army was in dubious state.

On the whole, in Russia, NATO bombings were denounced; protest actions were held outside the American embassy in Moscow; one of the protestors used an RPG-18 Mukha to fire at the embassy building. Everybody knows about Primakov's Loop over the Atlantic when chairman of the government of the Russian Federation who flew to the United States turned his plane back as soon as he learned that the war had begun. On March 24, President Yeltsin called on the NATO countries to stop the military adventure.

At that time, American leaders did not want to rupture all relations with Moscow: a mediation mission of sorts was offered as an alternative.

The leaders of the Alliance that had been relaxing far too long were not sure of a cakewalk in the Balkans. A stubborn resistance of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) was fraught with complete loss of face for NATO. Russia was needed as an alternative airfield of sorts hence a carrot of mediation.

IT WAS AFTER THE WAR in Yugoslavia that the principled disagreement emerged between Russia and the West on the methods of dealing with international problems. The gap continued widening even if certain positions were drawn closer for tactical reasons.

Europeans have finally realized that they should think about their security rather than wait for what they will be offered from across the ocean. The recently announced course at a European army is an evidence of this.

Once violated, international law is no longer respected as unassailable; state sovereignty no longer protects against aggression; the legitimacy of any regime can be doubted at the whim of external actors. The world after Yugoslavia became less safe; today, the world community should pool forces to improve the situation and return the world to the norms of international law.

## **78 Days of War That Cannot Be Forgotten or Forgiven.**

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**Mikhail Kurakin, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs; [mkurakin@mail.ru](mailto:mkurakin@mail.ru)**

IT WAS WEDNESDAY, March 24, 1999. At eight o'clock in the evening, the first NATO shells fell on military and civilian facilities in Belgrade, Pristina, and Nis. The NATO operation against Yugoslavia, officially codenamed "Allied Force," had begun. Meanwhile, the U.S. Armed Forces' involvement in the NATO operation was codenamed "Noble Anvil," commonly called "Merciful Angel" in Serbia.

rbia and Montenegro. The attacks involved aircraft from the U.S., Great Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada, Turkey, Italy, and Germany. They represented almost the entire NATO alliance, except for Iceland and Luxembourg, which had no military aircraft, and Greece, which declined to participate in the bombing of Serbia. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, which had just joined the alliance, did not have enough time to prepare to participate in the attack.

Even though the NATO-led criminals publicly claimed to be using high-precision weapons, more missiles and bombs hit civilian targets than military ones. They bombed everything: administrative buildings, houses, schools, the residence of the head of state, government buildings, hospitals, maternity homes, kindergartens, industrial facilities, the editorial offices of newspapers and magazines, cultural monuments, churches, monasteries.

The crimes of NATO aircraft against the civilian population of Serbia and Montenegro are recorded in black letters in the history of Europe.

The destruction of the Chinese Embassy building in Belgrade on May 7 that left three Chinese diplomats dead and several of the mission's staff injured stirred international controversy.

It was proved that the aggressors used depleted uranium shells, which have enormous lethal and destructive force. And the consequences of their use will be manifest for many decades.

Because the opponent had technical and numerical superiority, it could be opposed only using a creative approach. For example, equipment and military infrastructure were carefully disguised. The Air Force and Air Defense Forces redeployed mobile elements 689 times without once being discovered. Military cunning made it possible to avoid large losses of human life and military equipment.

Despite the almost round-the-clock presence of enemy aircraft in the air, transport helicopters carried out 104 flights carrying 94 wounded soldiers from the frontier of Kobar and Djeravica, and evacuated the bodies of dead soldiers. And on the return trip, they ferried reinforcements, ammunition and goods. The helicopters used the "small step" tactic (the helicopters flew directly over roads, constantly changing speed from 40- 50 km per hour to 100 km/h) and simulated the movement of cars so that enemy AEW aircraft would not identify them as helicopters. Sometimes the enemy did detect them, but the pilots were warned in time, and they managed to land their helicopters at the first suitable site. After waiting a while, the helicopters would again take to the air. The "small step" tactic made it possible to minimize losses in the struggle with an overwhelmingly superior opponent.

"Civilized" Europe caused a lot of grief for the Serbian people. And today, some in Serbia are ready to extend a hand of friendship to those who two decades ago killed their relatives, friends and neighbors. But those who defended their country like Col. Gvozden Urosevic will never extend them a hand. He said he was invited to meet with Dale Zelko, the pilot of the downed F 117A, who traveled to Serbia in 2012. He refused: "Many of our children have died, and I will never forget and forgive NATO."

## **Back to the Future.**

**Author: Pyotr Frolov, Minister Counselor, Embassy of the Russian Federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2015-2018); [ioselezneva@gmail.com](mailto:ioselezneva@gmail.com)**

TWENTY YEARS AGO, in March 1999, NATO launched aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It ended 78 days later with the so-called Kumanovo Agreement and the de facto separation of Kosovo and Metohija from Yugoslavia. Practically all NATO members sent their air forces to bomb peaceful cities and villages, causing huge losses to the national economy, destroying infrastructure and claiming over 1700 civilian lives, about 400 of them children, commemorated by the heart-piercing monument in the very center of Belgrade in Tašmajdan Park.

Four years later, in 2003, the country that in the 20th century had reached unimaginable heights of social prosperity and played an active role in building the postwar world, perished at the turn of the 21st century; unable to cope with the challenges of the new post-socialist epoch, it disappeared from the political maps of Europe. This country was Yugoslavia.

For a fairly long time, Russia had been supporting the national-liberation movement of the Orthodox Slavs of the Balkans, even if with a certain apprehension lest it developed into a powerful federation of Southern Slavs. Russia hoped that it would be able to control the Balkan peoples by pulling secret diplomatic strings to pursue its own not always noble aims.

Having fallen under Turkey's domination, a certain part of the South Slavs (there were quite a few of them) who live now in the territory of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina embraced Islam. To disentangle themselves from the Turkish rule, part of the Orthodox Serbs moved to the territories ruled by the Hapsburgs where they formed regions of compact settlement (krajina) in the territory of contemporary Croatia.

This religious panoply made it much easier for practically all participants in the Balkan political process to rely on the "divide and rule" principle.

During the Cold War, it was the turn of the Soviet Union and the United States to play the Yugoslavian card to settle the problems of global standoff.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall,\* ideology was promptly squeezed out by ethnocultural confrontation, an inevitable product of the country's national and ethnic patchiness. Actively encouraged from abroad, this confrontation created an idea of an exclusiveness of one social-religious group and fanned aggressive intolerance of other nationalities and religions. The country was divided into ethnic groups; the influence of the so-called fraternal countries became even greater than before. At the early stages of the political crisis in Yugoslavia, united Germany chose an incredibly harsh line and persuaded the other EU members to recognize Croatia and Slovenia as independent states.

It was expected that in the age of globalization and multipolarity national features of world politics will gradually become a thing of the past yet in our relationships with the West or, rather, in its approaches to us this subject has acquired new overtones.

In its attitude to the Slavic world, the "civilized" Western community acted from the positions of absolute superiority, moral, intellectual and cultural exclusiveness that brings "light" and "joy" to undeveloped, coarse, ill-mannered, unsophisticated Slavs who know nothing of democracy and freedom; whose slavish nature stems from their lifestyle and the world outlook.

The civilizational conflict is bloody and cruel; it develops according to the logic of a total war, a war of extermination.\* Theoreticians and practitioners of the "golden billion" betray no haste; they act competently, thoroughly and consistently, something that our style often lacks. They shatter the post-Soviet states and blow them up from inside to encircle Russia, put pressure on it and create a belt of chaos and instability along its borders so that to prevent Russia's continuous development. In this context, the set of actions used for the destruction of Yugoslavia was a logical and continuous line to deal with the entire Slavic world. Yugoslavia of the past suited the interests of Russia rather than those of the collective West.

So far, those of the politicians who built their careers on the ruins of a united state are wrangling with the concept of Yugoslavenstvo: they have nothing to show to the world except aggressive nationalist rhetoric. The programs of practically all political movements in the Balkans reveal their Euro-integrating ambitions and... nothing else. It seems that irritation in Brussels is gradually building up.

The Balkan states should become masters in their home; this is an old idea. Today, however, it has become much more important to tune up economic, cultural and, later, political cooperation. It can be deepened if the integration initiatives of President of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic that have much in common with the German-British Berlin Process are realized.

In this context the importance of a profound comprehensive and consistent analysis of the processes unfolding in the Balkans becomes obvious. It is equally obvious that in the Balkans our country should practice proactive rather than reactive policies.

## **Contemporary Integration Processes in the Post-Soviet Space.**

**Yalta, March 20, 2019**

**Armen Oganessian**, *Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs.*

COLLEAGUES, FRIENDS, we are grateful to you for your participation in our regular conference, which has already become traditional, on the distinctive features of modern processes in the post-Soviet space. This is our ninth conference. We will discuss regional security issues in the post-Soviet space; the advantages and benefits of the Silk Road running from China to Russia's northern shores via Central Asia; the issue of federalization; engagement with the Russian diaspora in the former Soviet republics, and the media component of modern politics. I wish you an interesting and meaningful discussion. And now, again in keeping with tradition, I give the floor to Russian Foreign Ministry representative, Alexey Drobinin, deputy director of the Foreign Policy Planning Department, who will read a message of greetings from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to the participants of our conference.

**Alexey Drobinin**, *deputy director of the Foreign Policy Planning Department.*

IT GIVES ME great pleasure on behalf of the Russian Foreign Ministry leadership to read out a message of greetings from Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

"I cordially welcome the participants in the conference organized by the journal International Affairs with support from the Russian Foreign Ministry.

"Your intellectual rally is always distinguished by a comprehensive, wide-ranging agenda and an authoritative makeup of participants representing political, social, business, and academic circles from Russia and other countries. In the current international situation, a depoliticized exchange of views on an array of pressing international and regional issues deserves respect and support.

"I am convinced that this conference will be held in a friendly and informal atmosphere, allowing its participants to establish mutually beneficial contacts, as well as duly appreciate the unique identity of the Crimean Peninsula.

"I wish you a productive discussion and all the very best.

Sergey Lavrov

**Georgy Muradov**, *Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Republic of Crimea, RC Permanent Representative to the President of the Russian Federation.*

ON BEHALF OF S.V. Aksyonov, the head of the Republic of Crimea, I cordially welcome all participants in this forum. The RC Council of Ministers is well aware that the Yalta forum, organized by the journal International Affairs, is a very important event where approaches, assessments and solutions to current international problems in general and in the Eurasian space in particular are worked out.

Unfortunately, there is little hope that our civilizational development will be favorable in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, there is every reason for concern. Crimea has to overcome numerous long-running difficulties, primarily economic difficulties.

S.V. Aksyonov's visit to Syria was practically the only official visit abroad by the RC head in four and a half years. In the international arena, we seek to follow paths that are not off limits to us. We would like to meet with the leaders of our closest allies.

We can see how the situation has been developing in recent years: the escalation of aggression around Russia and its civilizational foundations. We are currently going through an extremely difficult stage, when a blow is being struck at Orthodox Christianity, which has shaped our national consciousness and is a binding idea for many ethnic groups in Russia. It is a multidimensional blow, one that is closely linked to the international situation. It is being struck at our country in conjunction with the Ukrainian nationalist and largely Nazi ruling clique.

## **Session 1**

### **International Security Systems in the Post-Soviet Space: Ways, Methods and Prospects of Conflict Resolution.**

**Alexey Drobinin** *Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.*

To discuss challenges and threats to international security, I believe it is important to say a few words about where we are in terms of global development. The main trend of global development for over a decade now has been transition to a new world order, which is characterized by the existence of several independent, full-fledged, self-sufficient centers of economic development and political influence. There is a clear-cut and solid economic basis for that.

We believe that the globalization processes, which have accelerated since the beginning of this millennium, have provided a basis for a new polycentric system.

I would like to draw your attention to the fact that there are four BRICS members among the seven new centers: China, India, Brazil, and Russia, plus major regional powers such as Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey. Turkey is also a NATO member.

Right now, perhaps the most important global process is the current U.S. administration's attempts to destroy the institutions and relations that have been the core of globalization and the legal institutional fabric of international relations in recent decades.

I would also like to mention that one consequence of such policy would be weakening or putting at risk strategic stability, which since the 1960s has traditionally been the core of relations between the USSR and the U.S. and now Russia and the U.S. as two major nuclear powers.

In Europe, we are seeing a sharp increase in the military activity of the North Atlantic alliance, the expansion of NATO's military infrastructure and its approach toward the Russian borders. The alliance continues to pursue its "open doors" policy. All this escalates tension in Europe and creates security risks for European countries.

The situation in Ukraine will, without a doubt, remain the focus of our attention. I would just like to point out that right now the crisis could be effectively resolved through the consistent implementation of the Minsk agreements. To reiterate, so far, we believe that this is possible.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that, of course, Russia does not look for confrontation with anyone; it does not seek revenge or revisionism, as it stands accused of; it is not interested in starting a new arms race and does not want to impose its views on anyone. Russia's main foreign policy priority is to create a favorable environment for dynamic domestic development. As an independent center of global



politics and a guarantor of global stability, Russia is open to honest and mutually beneficial cooperation with all countries that demonstrate their readiness to improve the atmosphere of interstate dialogue and strengthen the international security system.

**Natalia Nikonorova**, *Acting Foreign Minister of the Donetsk People's Republic (Ukraine)*.

The Ukrainian leadership, which illegally came to power and was not entirely independent in their actions, decided to use military force to resolve the conflict, launching an “antiterrorist operation” in Donetsk and Lugansk Provinces. So, we see that the current conflict was caused by purely political factors, which are still at work.

The Ukrainian authorities' inability to achieve their goals by force, as well as numerous military setbacks suffered in the confrontation with the republics' militia, compelled them to sign peace agreements.

The government of Ukraine sabotaged the agreements and made another attempt to carry out an offensive operation in the Donbass, which further escalated violence, subsequently leading to the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the signing of the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements (February 12, 2015).

Numerous international doctrinal sources note the need for direct dialogue between conflicting parties regardless of their legal status. Peace talks between a national government and insurgents are also a practice that is widely and successfully used in resolving national conflicts.

Right now, the Ukrainian government is not independent in its domestic or foreign policy, and this also applies to its obligations under the Package of Measures. The activities of Ukraine's current ruling authorities are aimed at pushing the people of the Donbass republics from the single legal and sociocultural space, and therefore the likelihood of the country preserving its integrity within the existing borders is decreasing.

As for the Minsk negotiation process, it should not be forgotten that it helped stop the active phase of bloodshed and gave hope for a lasting peace. However, right now, there are no effective levers to ensure the complete implementation of this mechanism, which is due to a lack of constructive dialogue between the parties to the conflict.

Work on the implementation of these agreements is proceeding at two levels. These are the Normandy format, involving guarantor countries, and the Minsk format, with the participation of OSCE coordinators. I can tell you quite frankly that the situation has changed greatly since the negotiations began, compared to the Minsk negotiation platform. We would like to believe that this is due to the republics' firm position on the bona fide implementation of existing agreements. At the same time, the Ukrainian side is always trying to find excuses to avoid clearly stating its position on a specific issue, carrying out its obligations or following established procedure or explaining why this happens.

We believe that even OSCE representatives, who were initially biased and always defended the Ukrainian side, have become tired, and it is increasingly difficult for them to hide the fact that the Ukrainian side is doing nothing.

Unfortunately, the political and legal situation in Ukraine continues to deteriorate. We are closely watching everything that is happening there and monitoring all the legal acts that are adopted in Ukraine, because most of them affect the rights of Donbass residents. We can see no improvement and do not expect any positive changes in Ukraine's position in the foreseeable future.

### **The Situation in the South Caucasus and Its Effects on International and Regional Security.**

**Stanislav Ivanov**, *senior research associate, Center for International Security at the Ye.M. Primakov*

*National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Candidate of Science (History).*

THE SOUTH CAUCASUS, which is also referred to as Transcaucasia or the Transcaucasus, is a vast region south of the Greater Caucasus range. It is home to five states – Abkhazia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and South Ossetia – and one self-proclaimed republic, Nagorno-Karabakh. Despite conflicts in it that remain unresolved, the South Caucasus retains an important role that it has traditionally played in global politics and in the world economy due to its geographical position of bordering Russia, Turkey and Iran, its access to the Black and Caspian seas, its rich natural resources, and its opportunities for the transit of oil, natural gas and other strategic commodities from Central Asia, China, India and other countries to Europe. In the long term, the South Caucasus and the Black Sea-Caspian region may become key elements of two planned transportation arteries, East-West (part of the Belt and Road Initiative, also known as the Silk Road Economic Belt) and North-South.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan, under pressure from nationalist and radical extremist groups, used armed force to maintain control of what had been autonomous republics in the two countries in the Soviet era. Instead of respectful negotiations and proposals for cooperation on equal terms in building new statehood, the Georgian and Azerbaijani leaders sent tanks, artillery and warplanes to pacify their national minorities – the Abkhaz, Ossetians and Armenians. Predictably, all that this achieved was to give a boost to the minorities' drive for independence.

It is increasingly obvious that the territorial integrity principle and the right of peoples to self-determination, which are among the pillars of the postwar world order approved by the United Nations, conflict with each other when governments ignore the legitimate rights and freedoms of national minorities. Some smaller ethnic groups have preferred to form independent states to avoid definitive assimilation with the loss of their ethnic identity.

The Georgian government unleashed a large-scale war of sabotage against Abkhazia and afterward attempted a new military invasion of South Ossetia with hundreds of Ossetian civilians and militiamen and Russian peacekeepers being killed or injured as a result. All this forced Russia to recognize those republics as independent states and sign treaties on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance with them.

And yet the greatest source of danger is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. There can be no alternative to negotiations as the means of settling this conflict, and it is in Stepanakert, not in the capitals of foreign countries, that the solution should be looked for.

Apparently, neither the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict nor other similar conflicts in the South Caucasus have ethnic or religious roots as some pseudo-experts and politicians claim but have been caused by the arrogance and shortsighted sectarian, chauvinism-tinged policies of the postSoviet governments of the region's countries. The collapse of the Soviet Union motivated those governments to seek to turn their countries into unitary states, disregard the interests of their national or religious minorities, and sometimes take a negative attitude to Russia and to the ethnic Russian communities of the South Caucasus.

The soured relations between the West and Russia and the United States' unilateral withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal negatively affect the situation in the South Caucasus and nearby regions.

Iran and Turkey, countries that border each other, play important roles in South Caucasus politics.

The arms race in the South Caucasus is undoubtedly a heavy burden on the budgets of its countries. It affects the economy of Azerbaijan, for instance, despite large amounts of foreign currency the country raises by selling its own hydrocarbons and by being a transit stage for Central Asian hydrocarbons on their way to Europe. Russia tries to keep its weapons exports to Azerbaijan balanced with its arms sales to Armenia and stands ready to limit its weapons exports to both countries if Turkey, Israel and other weapons-exporting nations do the same. It would be sensible to freeze arms exports to the South

Caucasus before its conflicts are settled politically.

## **The Information Component of Security in the Post-Soviet Space.**

**Inna Tarasova**, *member of the Expert Council of the Committee on Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Eurasian Integration, and Relations with Compatriots of the 7th State Duma.*

Information is an important instrument of soft power. Modern information technologies (ITs) offer unprecedented opportunities for psychological, political, social, and other influence on the population of the entire planet.

In the post-Soviet space, Russia is the natural integrating center and plays the determining role in building a single Eurasian information space. However, the Russian government is not getting down to developing an information strategy for the post-Soviet space, although it does pay quite a lot of attention to information confrontations with countries such as the United States, Britain, Germany, or France. Ukraine may be the only exception.

All the time we watch talk shows on all our TV channels during which it's discussed what Donald Trump, Theresa May or Angela Merkel have said about Russia. But we are practically never told how media in CIS countries react to various Russian foreign policy moves, although, of course, the post-Soviet space is the number one target audience for Russian media.

However, it's practically impossible to develop any effective information strategy for the CIS without knowing what kind of information is provided by media in CIS countries and without knowing how the population of those countries reacts to what happens in Russia.

The bulk of Russian news about CIS countries is about military or political cooperation between our states or about business projects by transnational corporations. In other words, the CIS media don't come within the range of interests of the Russian media. News agencies based in some CIS countries have branches in other CIS countries but those are less popular than branches of other foreign media groups.

For contrast's sake, let me give you an example of Chinese use of information as a soft power method. China tries to exercise its influence on the neighboring states of Central Asia – which some people call cultural invasion – through channels such as information, education, and tourism. China has practically had to start from scratch as it had an extremely negative image in nearly all Central Asian countries because of current conflicts with the Chinese. Today, this situation is largely a thing of the past. This partly goes to the credit of the Chinese media. For example, Chinese journalists write numerous reports and make television programs specially for Kyrgyzstan in which they describe Chinese achievements.

Remarkably, much of the Chinese media content for Kyrgyzstan is in Russian. Chinese content targeting Central Asia mainly focuses on art, geography, technology, Chinese customs, and Chinese achievements. This range of subjects wins large young audiences in member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union.

In some of the CIS countries, the lack of state support drives media companies into dependence on some businesses or crime rings, provokes inflows of foreign capital into the media of those nations, or leads to foreign media establishing their presence in those countries.

Russian-language media are in the worst situation. Russian television has its air time reduced or gets ousted from its frequencies by local or third-country channels. One of the reasons given for this are Russian arrears of payment for rebroadcasting Russian programs. Meanwhile, decreases in information from Russia entail heavier media pressure from the West.

Surely there have been positive developments, for example the SputnikPro educational project for journalists in CIS countries, which teaches standards and technologies to be used by a multimedia news agency. There have been masterclasses in Minsk, Tbilisi, and Yerevan. Journalists from the Sputnik and Rossiya Segodnya news agencies have been sharing experience that may be of interest to fellow

journalists who write or broadcast in Russian.

We need to pay extremely close attention to what happens in the CIS and that Russia should develop an information strategy for the CIS that should be one of our soft power priorities.

## **Session Two**

### **Ethnicity Issues in Former Soviet Republics**

**Yevgeniya Pyadysheva**, *Deputy Editor-in-Chief and Executive Secretary, International Affairs, Candidate of Science (History)*.

THERE IS A COUNTRY where various ethnic and religious groups have for centuries lived together in harmony, some of which profess Orthodox Christianity, some Islam, some Judaism, and some Buddhism. That country is Russia. Ethnic (and religious) relations have always been on public agendas here. This issue was considered an aspect of national security by the political elites in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, as well as by the political elite of post-Soviet Russia.

The ethnic relations issues of Russia are different from those of Europe, one reason being that the ethnic communities of Russia have lived in the country for centuries and are to a significant extent integrated into Russian society culturally and politically. One more reason is that practically every ethnic group in Russia lives on its indigenous land, and such territories are administrative units.

### **Some Comments on the Federal Structure of Russia at the End of the 20th and Beginning of the 21st Centuries.**

**Yury Bulatov**, *Dean of the School of International Relations, Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*.

SHORTLY BEFORE the disbandment of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin, the first president of Russia, urged his fellow citizens to start with a clean slate in building a new federation. Take as much sovereignty as you can carry, he said during a visit to Kazan in the summer of 1990. Autonomous territories that had been units of the former Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) responded with an uncontrolled drive for more autonomy.

However, the “parade of sovereignties” was going on and took a new form – legal nihilism. It became fashionable for a federal region to adopt a constitution for itself with provisions that contradicted the 1993 Russian constitution. The constitutions of the majority of constituent republics declared them sovereign states. The republics reserved the right to suspend federal laws if the latter ran against their constitutions.

Russia had begun to balance on the dangerous brink of transforming into an amorphous confederation. Vladimir Putin, during his first year of presidency, made a critical assessment of the nature of Russian federalism. In his address to parliament in 2000, he said directly that Russia was a decentralized state and not a proper federation. Federal relations in the country were not properly developed, he complained.

It is essential to take Soviet federal experience into account in making potential amendments to Russia’s federal structure. The main point is that the collapse of the Soviet Union was not only the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century but also confirmed a serious lesson of world history: practically any federation based on the ethnic principle will be relatively short-lived. It is only the territorial principle that can be a reliable guarantee of the viability of a federation.

It goes to the credit of Putin that, by exercising his powers, he was able to stop disintegration

processes in Russia during his first presidential term. The majority of regional laws that contradicted the 1993 constitution were repealed.

There are hotheads who insist on bringing out a new constitution – the sixth one for the past 100 years – in order to formalize the proposed restructuring of the federation. However, those initiatives, if put into practice, could upset the current balance of power in Russia and have unpredictable consequences. None of Russia's ethnic groups is prepared to renounce its identity. Ethnocratic regimes in Russia's ethnic regions are intensively promoting local ethnic cultures. This is a trend that is on the ascent. What should be done to reverse it? Where does one start?

One thing is clear: administrative measures wouldn't be sufficient. Economic forums are held in various parts of Russia whose participants, among them senior Russian officials, discuss which form of innovation – nano technology, digital economy, or anything else – would be the best motive force of Russia's economic development. This reflects a desire to put the country's federal structure on a solid economic basis. Obviously, changing the federation model is not on the agenda.

### **The Eurasian Peoples' Assembly as a New Format of Public Diplomacy.**

**Igor Khalevinsky**, *Chairman of the Council of the Association of Russian Diplomats.*

On May 27, 2017, an association was established that was named the Eurasian Peoples' Assembly. About 2,500 delegates came from 62 countries to its first congress, which was held in Moscow. You'll know that being at a congress is like being in a fourth dimension: people of common sense talk about unity, friendship, the interpenetration of cultures, music, poetry, science. It was an atmosphere that gave you a feeling that that was what our future would be like.

The Eurasian Peoples' Assembly is an important instrument for public diplomacy, and public diplomacy is acquiring a special meaning. It is an extensive channel for interaction between civil society and governments, for the unification of people regardless of gender, race and ethnicity, for supporting public and governmental initiatives to provide peace guarantees and build harmony, for the strengthening of good-neighborly relations and friendship between nations, for joining forces to safeguard the Eurasian continent with its entire natural, cultural and historical diversity, and for providing conditions for secure and comfortable life. Care for young generations is one of today's priorities, and therefore the assembly has a youth wing. The assembly also uses new formats for interaction with civil society institutions and governments in Eurasian countries.

The main instruments are peacemaking dialogue, public diplomacy, integration projects, and forms of interethnic communication. The assembly is open to a broad dialogue with anyone who shares the idea of harmonious, coordinated and mutually supplementary efforts by governments and NGOs to safeguard peace and strengthen friendship among Eurasian countries. The assembly is an international association of NGOs.

This Eurasian movement brings together all kinds of groups. There were even representatives of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta at the congress. There were Americans there as well, although they live in another continent but were attracted by the humanitarian nature of our congress.

The Eurasian Peoples' Assembly plays an immense role. Anyone is free to join the assembly, I invite everybody, primarily people from Donetsk and Lugansk.

### **Multilingualism in the Education Systems of Central Asian Countries.**

**Maria Mokhovichova**, *senior lecturer, Department of Regional Studies, Institute of International Relations and Social and Political Sciences, Moscow State Linguistic University, Candidate of Science (Political Science).*

IN DISCUSSING MULTILINGUALISM in the education systems of Central Asian countries, foreign experts primarily suggest instruction simultaneously in two or more languages and the legalization of systems of this kind. This is important, but for us the main point is what role the Russian language will play in Central Asia's changing polyethnic societies.

The language situation in the Central Asian countries is the product of 20th-century political processes. The multiethnic character of Central Asian societies, the marking of borders that gave rise to the problem of ethnic enclaves, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the consequent independence of its Central Asian republics with their languages receiving full-scale official status and the Russian language losing its prominent role triggered serious changes in those countries' education systems. This means that the assertion of multilingualism and multiculturalism via education can be, among other things, an instrument for conflict prevention.

Arguably, the Central Asian countries have completed an initial and very important stage in building their national education systems, although undoubtedly some of them have achieved more than others in terms of organization, logistics and effectiveness.

There is much that the Central Asian countries, and accordingly their education systems, have in common. Their education systems are all based on the education system of the former Soviet Union, which has undergone some changes during the independence era but can underlie future educational reforms.

Multilingual education is an area that involves a range of problems. Graduates of school with teaching in minority languages often have an inadequate command of the official language, something that can bar them from higher education and from involvement in public affairs.

Russia attaches special importance to regional organizations as formats for its cooperation with Central Asian countries. One such organization is the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), an association with plans that include forming a common education space. It is impossible to safeguard close cultural contacts and maintain high standards for teaching Russian and for teaching in Russian without cooperation between national education systems.

In recent years, the use of Russian in the education systems of all Central Asian countries has been declining. Today, there are fewer secondary schools and classes at higher education institutions where instruction is in Russian than several years ago. Because of the emigration of Russian speakers, the rising average age of teachers of Russian, and decreasing enrollments in undergraduate and postgraduate Russian language programs, often there is simply no one to teach the Russian language or curriculum courses in Russian, or otherwise the teaching is done by people for whom Russian is practically a foreign language. Due to demographic developments, there are children at schools with Russian as the language of instruction who are not native Russian speakers, children who do not speak Russian at home. There is an obvious need for Russian to remain in use in the Central Asian countries. It is an official policy in all those countries to keep Russian in use.

Russian soft power experts should pay special attention to impacts of language policies on education. Legislation on languages brought out in the Central Asian republics three decades ago bolstered the role of their own languages and Russian and served to increase the scale of their use in all spheres of society, including schools. Guidelines for language policies that are being developed in Central Asian countries make it increasingly obvious that such policies would aim to strengthen the positions of their national official languages.

As regards the Russian language, it is vital to maintain its status in Central Asia as a means of interethnic communication; to continue to promote the teaching of Russian at all levels of the education systems; to improve the training and retraining of Russian language teachers; to update methods of teaching Russian; and to launch programs to raise motivation to learn Russian.

### **Broadcasting in Russian in the Near Abroad.**

**Alexander Sharikov**, *Professor, National Research University-Higher School of Economics.*

Our comparison of these results of 2018 with the results obtained in 2010 by the Federal Agency for Mass Media and Communication of the RF in the course of a similar investigation revealed the following trends. First, the number of Russian-language broadcasting radio stations abroad jumped from 175 to 448 in the near and far abroad (for example, they appeared in the UAE, Madagascar and Thailand). Second, the number of countries with international government broadcasting in Russian decreased (that happened in Hungary, Italy, Canada, the U.S., Sweden and others). Third, the number of Russian-language local-level radio stations increased. In the last eight years, the number of Russian-language FM broadcasting stations in Great Britain, Germany, the U.S., and some other countries increased partly due to an expansion of Russia's commercial, mostly music, stations such as Avtoradio, Russkoe Radio, Evropa Plus, and Retro FM.

The biggest number (59) of the Russian-language radio stations was registered in Kazakhstan; Belarus with 48 radio stations comes second followed by Ukraine (28).

If we push aside commercial broadcasters and local radio stations and analyze the presence in the post-Soviet territories of propagandistic Russian-language broadcasters from third countries, on the one hand, and Russian state radio stations, on the other, we will get the following picture of the West-Russia standoff.

Some of the countries of the near abroad have closed their territories to Russian-language Western broadcasters and keep them open to Russian state broadcasters. They are the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, the Republic of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic as well as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Some other countries, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic among them, allow both sides to broadcast within their borders, and Russia's state radio stations are represented there in bigger numbers.

Georgia, Lithuania and Estonia with not a single Russian state station and a wide range of Western broadcasters are on the opposite pole.

In this way, we have identified the following development trends of Russian-language broadcasting in the near abroad:

- the number of Russian-language radio stations increased between 2010 and 2018; - their greatest number is found in Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine; the smallest, in Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. There is no Russian-language broadcasting in Turkmenistan;
- most of the Russian-language radio stations is local. There are broadcasting stations of some of the Russian state and commercial radio stations in their territories as well as Russian-language radio stations of third countries (state broadcasters of Poland, France, Japan, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and religious broadcasters);
- post-Soviet space has become an arena of informational confrontation between the Russian state radio stations and Russian-language Western propagandistic broadcasters. The balance between them in any given country reflects its attitude to Russia.

### **Session III**

#### **The Silk Road in the Post-Soviet Space: Reality or Utopia?**

**“The New Silk Road” – Hallucinations of Meanings.**

**Alexander Stoppe**, *Head, Analytical Department, Standing Committee of the Union State.*

DEAR PARTICIPANTS of the conference, It seems that the question that serves the title of our session, The Silk Road in the Post-Soviet Space: Reality or Utopia? can be answered as follows. The post-Soviet space needs transborder transport corridors yet currently their realization is a utopia. The declared intentions can be described, to a certain extent, as hallucinations of meanings.

Today, in the conditions of uncompromising competition unfolding in the world, the CIS countries rely on the Single Economic Space and the EAEU as instruments of their economic development.

Today, the Union State sees the formation of a Single Economic Space, of which a united transport system is an inalienable part, as one of its major tasks. We should admit that so far, the transport infrastructure in Belarus and Russia leaves much to be desired.

Here are certain comments. First, the slogan One Belt – One Road used in relation to the New Silk Road is slightly ambiguous. Indeed, there is one belt yet there can be many roads, not all of them crossing Belarus and Russia. This is a highly competitive milieu which means that if we are seriously interested in the development of transit transport potential as an instrument of economic development we should fight for it. Our plans should include high-speed railways that will connect us with China and Western Europe, China-Europe highways of international class as well as joint transport logistic companies.

This project and solution of numerous economic and social tasks in the regions crossed by the highway can be described as an important practical step toward coordinating the processes of forming the EAEU and China's One Belt-One Road project.

At the same time, this issue is much wider: joint development of international and national transport corridors will affect the industrial, food and demographic aspects, promote inter-regional transborder cooperation and create even more links in the common space of the Union State and EAEU.

Today, the question of increasing the transit capacity of the Baikal-Amur and Trans-Siberian railways are being discussed. Not only Russia but also Belarus, Kazakhstan and China need Trans-Siberian Railway for freight moving to/from the regions that border on Europe, Far East and the Asian-Pacific countries. Railway transit from Germany to China is about 20 days shorter than the sea route. Both projects (the Baikal-Amur and Trans-Siberian railways) will considerably increase the international freight traffic, container traffic in the first place.

I would like to point out in conclusion that the world is gradually acquiring a unified market and transport-communication infrastructure that makes the relationships between regional and world leaders (both state and non-state actors) more competitive. In the mid- and long-term perspective, control over markets and transport routes will increase under pressure of the dynamic economic development of the Asia-Pacific countries. Competition for the involvement in projects of international transport corridors will intensify because they will create united economic space, lower tariff and customs barriers and will make it much easier to reach commodity markets, achieve economic integration and gain political influence.

### **The Eurasian Economic Community as an Example of Post-Soviet Integration.**

**Arif Asalioglu**, *Director General, International Institute of the Development of Science Cooperation (MIRNaS), Turkey.*

WHILE THEY CEASED to cooperate with one another due to the collapse of Soviet economic and military structures, former Soviet republics came up against a strong need to make their economies elements of the world economy. For this reason, between 1992 and 2000, numerous cooperation and integration initiatives were put forward in the post-Soviet space. However, most of those initiatives never materialized.

Due to its institutional structure and evolutionary processes, EurAsEC holds a special place among organizations that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

POST-SOVIET COUNTRIES made unsuccessful attempts to develop economic strategies, and had



relatively ineffective foreign trade. They usually exported commodities and imported consumer goods. Bureaucratic barriers, customs restrictions, and security measures hampered cooperation among them. Declining production triggered vast-scale and rapidly growing unemployment, and consequently falling living standards. Economic failures and the impoverishment of the majority of the population set off social and political tensions in former Soviet republics. Their governments opted for their mutual integration as a natural way to defuse those tensions, and repeatedly made loud declarations about this.

ECONOMIC and social rehabilitation in Russia in the 2000s made the country the world's center of attention again.

In that period, the main point of the integration strategy was a plan to act in the EurAsEC format and simultaneously seek accession to the World Trade Organization. After Russia joined the WTO, EurAsEC adopted a strategy for WTO accession negotiations. Russia's customs tariffs were accepted by other members of the Customs Union.

Regional leaders who were afraid to be left outside globalization saw integration as an important foreign policy instrument – as a source of power in international affairs. Minor regional players saw integration as a defense against negative effects of globalization. This fact affected integration processes in the post-Soviet space. For example, integration enables Russia and Kazakhstan, the two pillars of the CIS, to control the policy of others and makes it more difficult for China and the United States to influence CIS member countries.

One noteworthy aspect of post-Soviet integration processes is the clout of political elites and bureaucracies in post-Soviet countries. The selection of personnel for the executive apparatus of the CIS is still nationally based, and this means that no supranational institutional culture has been created.

### **Latvia as a Bridge Between East and West.**

**Nikolay Kabanov**, *Chairman of the Board of the DVINA association and a member of the Saeima (parliament of Latvia).*

THE WESTERN DVINA is the main river of Latvia, a river that connects Russia, Belarus and Latvia and flows into the Baltic Sea. In the early 1990s, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were effectively the only Baltic Sea gates of the Soviet Union. In 1996, the port of St. Petersburg handled only 42% of the cargo turnover of Russia on the Baltic coast. Meanwhile, there was no alternative to Riga, Ventspils or Liepaja in many respects. Those ports paid their way and were quite well off. In fact, the Latvian ports are systemic continuations of Russian transit corridors and were systemic continuations of Soviet corridors in the past.

Latvian ports are, in technical terms, the gems of the Baltic transportation infrastructure. They have very good mooring facilities. The maximum depth of the water in Riga, for example, is 18 meters, and that in Ventspils 17.5 meters. Those ports are accessible to Panamax tankers. In the meantime, Russia has built completely new facilities in the Leningrad region and has spent just 20 years on this.

The Russian ports on the Baltic have narrow specializations. UstLuga, for example, is an oil port. These days, crude oil is carried through Latvia by rail. We had a pipeline since the Soviet period, since 1961.

In 2003, it was shut down. For the next 10 years, there just remained some technical oil in it, and eventually 100,000 tons of that oil, about 20 trainloads, was sold off. There was a big court action about who that oil belonged to. Eventually Belarus proved in court that the oil was Belarusian. These days Russia is the only beneficiary of transit from the eastern Baltic. This is logical because Russia carries its own cargo. At the same time, Russia is putting serious political pressure on Belarus to make it move oil products from the Ventspils port to Russian ports.

Recently, the Belarusian foreign minister, Vladimir Makei, visited Latvia. Whereas political relations between Russia and Latvia are frozen, Belarus has a lively dialogue with Latvia.

Of all the ports of the Baltic countries, Riga is the fastest-growing one. Over the past 20 years, its cargo turnover has grown from 7.5 million to 37 million tons. This is largely the result of its immense area – there are more than 100 berths over a stretch of 12 kilometers on the banks of the Daugava River.

I believe in small-scale niche projects. The Russian chocolate company Pobeda has launched a manufacturing site in Ventspils to seek markets in various countries, including the United States. It will use the EU certificate. It has already bought packaging equipment. I believe that projects of between 1 million and 10 million euros can be successful. We need about 100 of them to get things going.

### **International Relations and the New Silk Road Project.**

**Yuri Sayamov**, *UNESCO Chair on Global Problems, Faculty of Global Processes, M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University.*

ONE OF THE QUESTIONS for discussion → whether the New Silk Road (NSR) project is realistic or utopian – deserves a separate analysis, because it is a gigantic undertaking that could significantly change the geopolitical picture and the pattern of international relations in the world.

However, it would be a mistake to regard this huge initiative only as an economic and transportation project. China makes no secret of the fact that it views this project as a tool of soft power and a way to expand its influence. Transport construction should lead to the development of infrastructure, movement of capital, and science and technology transfer. Against the background of the emergence of a new world order, China plans to take a step of great importance that could help it gain leadership in the still nebulous system of international relations that is beginning to take shape.

But the future of the NSR project depends not only on China. The attitude of other states involved and of the world as a whole is also very important. As Xi Jinping said in this context, the Belt and Road project will not be a solo performance by China, but “a real chorus comprising all countries along the routes.”

Between “vibrant East Asia” and “developed Europe” there is a connecting link in the form of Central Asia with huge and largely untapped potential for economic development. The NSR is presented in the document as China’s contribution to the creation of a new world order in a situation where the existing order is crumbling and needs to be replaced with a new model based on good will and peaceful cooperation. At the same time, in order to assume the role of world leader, China needs a strategic partnership with Russia. Thus, in putting forward its economic project, China sees it as an important part of its efforts to shape geopolitical processes that would allow it to achieve world leadership.

As it competes with the United States, China is under pressure from the American geopolitical and geoeconomic strategy in this region, whose purpose is to ensure U.S. leadership in Central and South Asia through cooperation with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

Thus, the “Belt and Road” concept and the U.S. concept of a “return to the Asia-Pacific” and domination in Central and South Asia (the target regions of the Chinese project) lie in the realm of the intensifying geopolitical struggle between China and the United States.

Russia’s position is of special importance in this context. This position was agreed in the Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on Cooperation in Coordinating the Development of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt of May 8, 2015. Russia supported the SREB project and expressed its willingness to engage in close cooperation with China so as to promote the implementation of this initiative. The Chinese side, in turn, supported Russia’s active efforts to promote integration processes within the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

The joining of the two projects – EAEU and SREB – calls for consolidation, and the SCO provides good opportunities for its achievement. Today, the SCO is a full-fledged platform for regional cooperation with a global dimension. Its use to integrate the two projects can help to relieve mutual

anxieties and develop a common strategy on sensitive issues, such as reducing dependence on the dollar and U.S. dictates. Russian-Chinese cooperation on the EAEU and SREB projects is an opportunity for these two emerging giants of the modern world to contribute to economic globalization and political multipolarity, subject to the mutually conditioned *modus vivendi*, *modus operandi*, and *modus procedendi* for these projects.

The United States has ignored China's repeated proposals for comprehensive cooperation. Washington has preferred to hold on to the myth of a "Chinese threat" and to accuse China of shirking its "responsibility" and allegedly not doing enough to "pressure" North Korea over the difficult issue of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Amazingly, Washington politicians refuse to understand that a stable Eurasia with friendly and prosperous Russia and China is geopolitically more advantageous to the West than an area of dangerous and unpredictable recession rapidly increasing its military capabilities.

According to the study, mutual trade between China and the European Union will increase. For Russia, this implies the need to "diversify the product mix of its exports to China to include high technology products" and efforts to "restore and expand normal trade and economic ties with EU countries while actively developing its trade and economic cooperation with China and other APEC countries established in recent years."

**Armen Oganessian**, *Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs*: It is impossible to summarize something that cannot be summarized. I only want to emphasize that we often talk about the difference between the Chinese and Russian mentalities. *Per aspera ad astra*. In Russia, this often means from utopia into an abyss, while the Chinese way is from utopia to the stars, as the Chinese understand it. We can only follow their example. Our idea of the future is a five-year period, while the Chinese plan their future for centuries ahead. Maybe it is really a utopia that leads to the stars. We must understand where and at what stage we fit into the project. On the other hand, our thinking is also right, because "Man proposes, God disposes." This is our favorite proverb, and a very apt one. We don't know how the world will develop. But it is quite right that at each stage we should evaluate the advantages and disadvantages for Russia, regardless of anyone else. This requires sober calculation and an understanding of what we need. All of these papers were very interesting, and I am very grateful to you for that.

## **From Nuclear Monopoly to Nuclear Parity: About V.L. Mal'kov's Book\* and More.**

**Author: Alexey Filitov**, *chief research associate, Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor, Doctor of Science (History); [a\\_filitov@mail.ru](mailto:a_filitov@mail.ru)*

WAY BACK IN 1990, the Washington-based United States Institute of Peace, one of many American "think tanks," held a colloquium with then still Soviet historians on a topic that is still relevant today: How the Cold War began, what kept it from turning "hot," and what lessons are we to draw from it all. Elspeth Rostow made the unexpected remark that the Nobel Peace Prize should be awarded to the atomic bomb.

The discussion, which had been progressing quite sluggishly, immediately perked up. The effect was long-term.

For me personally, a scholar of German history, the aforementioned discussion in 1990 was the starting point for reflection on how the beginning of the "atomic age" influenced the development of the issue of postwar Germany.

This was about more than just the fact that the Soviet nuclear project was in vital need of uranium

from the Soviet zone of occupation, and ensuring its supply required a level of loyalty and cooperation from the German authorities that in the situation could be provided only by the German Communists, and this put severe restrictions on the initial liberal model that was the basis of Soviet planning for postwar Germany and that opened the prospect of preserving its unity.

The achievement of nuclear-missile parity effectively made a Soviet military presence in Central Europe redundant and unnecessary from a security standpoint.

It seems there was no fatal inevitability of a fracturing of Germany and Europe as a whole, even despite the U.S. nuclear monopoly. Europe's refusal to enter a bloc structure under American hegemony would have alleviated Soviet fears about nuclear blackmail by the U.S. The issue is, of course, controversial and goes beyond the scope of the book, the reading of which again prompted recollection of the Washington discussion 30 years ago.

The author of "Entering the Atomic Age: Nuclear Diplomacy From Inception to Parity," V.L. Mal'kov, an acclaimed Russian expert on American history, also participated in that discussion. Perhaps for him (and not just me), it also served as an impetus to study the "nuclear factor" in our fragile but nevertheless saved (so far!) world. There soon appeared a substantial work on this subject based on the study of domestic American realities,<sup>3</sup> and now a new, more expansive work has appeared that draws on more sources and focuses on a philosophical generalization of recent history in its global dimension.

The author mentions the idea of awarding the Nobel Prize to the atomic bomb – granted, without indicating who raised that idea and where – but precedes this mention with a quote from the well-known Soviet and Russian nuclear physicist Yuly Khariton: "Perhaps the main paradox of our time is that the most sophisticated weapon of mass destruction has so far contributed to peace on earth as a powerful deterrent" (pp. 623-624). And while Mal'kov interprets both statements as reflecting "similar sentiments," everything in the book suggests that the viewpoint expressed by Khariton is more accurate in this case than the opinion expressed at the American forum.

Mal'kov thoroughly parses all this reasoning, and his answers are simple and convincing. Of course, there is no reason to downplay the achievements of the scientists involved in the Manhattan Project, but we should remember that many of them were emigrants from Europe who fled Nazi terror, and a significant contribution was made by nuclear specialists from Great Britain (which has been known for a long time) and France (this is known about much less, and Mal'kov's work is greatly complementing our knowledge on this issue).

The most important thing, which Mal'kov convincingly demonstrates, is that the appearance and first use of nuclear weapons did not stabilize, but, on the contrary, destabilized the international system and led to an arms race and everything associated with the concept of the Cold War. Balance was restored when the U.S.'s nuclear monopoly was broken, when both sides of the international conflict possessed nuclear weapons and they began to serve as a deterrent for the potential aggressor. This was achieved at the cost of the incredible efforts of those involved in the Soviet atomic project, and if we talk about who was worthy of a Nobel Peace Prize, they were. This great feat of Soviet scientists and all the Soviet people has already been reflected in the writings of Russian authors.

When reading the final chapters of Mal'kov's book, what is striking is the surprising parallelism of assessments about the "nuclear factor" coming from politicians who were polarized in all other respects.

Nuclear weapons are indeed an instrument of peace when nuclear parity is achieved and maintained; they may threaten a nuclear war if a party takes steps toward disrupting that parity, when a nuclear arms race begins. I think that is the most significant lesson that can be learned from Mal'kov's fundamental study.

