

# International Affairs: Summary №2, 2015



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"We Stand for Truth and Justice; They Are the Only Foundation on Which the Emerging Multipolar World Order Can Be Built"

*Author: Sergey Lavrov*

*Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*



*Remarks at a gala for Diplomatic Worker Day, Moscow, February 12, 2015*

WE HAVE GATHERED AGAIN in this room on the occasion of our professional holiday. I would like to warmly welcome to this event all of our current and former employees and our friends and colleagues from sister agencies, such

as the Presidential Executive Office, the Government Staff, the Security Council and other agencies with which we interact on a daily basis.

Our professional holiday has once again clearly demonstrated the Russian leadership's unwavering focus on the diplomatic service. In his message to the current and former employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted on the website of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin stressed the Foreign Ministry's significant contribution to upholding our national interests and strengthening the position of our country in the world arena. We also received congratulatory messages from Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, Chairperson of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly Valentina Matviyenko, Chairman of the State Duma Sergey Naryshkin, committee chairmen, senators, deputies, heads of ministries, departments, and governors of the Russian regions. They all had kind words to say about the Foreign Ministry and wish us well.

Our foreign policy mainly upsets and irritates those who, contrary to the objective trend towards a multipolar world, continue to demonstrate an obsession with the idea of their own exceptionalism.

For many years, our country has consistently called for serious debates to discuss building an indivisible and equal security in the Euro-Atlantic space on the solid foundation of the principles approved by the OSCE, the UN and the Russia-NATO Council.

On a global scale, we are strong supporters of the "new edition" of interdependence. We are pursuing this goal in collaboration with our allies, partners and associates in the CIS,

the Eurasian Economic Union, the CSTO, BRICS, the SCO, the Group of Twenty, and other multilateral forums.

We strongly believe that the observance of the 70th anniversary of victory in World War II should provide new impetus to work together to address our common challenges.

Russian diplomacy must be energetic in all areas of our multidimensional foreign policy, and pursue productive cooperation with our partners in the Asia-Pacific Region and on other continents. Deepening Eurasian integration remains our absolute priority. All of us must show dedication and creativity, and be able to work meticulously and at full capacity in accordance with the best traditions of the Russian diplomatic service.

## "All the Events in Ukraine Are Passing Through Our Hearts and Our Souls"

*Author: Alexey Meshkov*

*Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation*



All the events in Ukraine are passing through our hearts and our souls. We would like the bloodshed to end as soon as possible and our brotherly Ukrainian people to start living a normal life.

As for our relations with the European Union, with our European colleagues, the situation there varies significantly. Because official statements and publications in the media are one thing but communication with ordinary Europeans is something different.

Titanic transformations have been ongoing in the world over the past two decades. Every time someone announces the end of history or somebody's victory, these statements prove to be only wishful thinking, not reality.

There is always the wish and hope for politicians' wisdom. In any event, this wisdom is present on the Russian side.

Of course, the European Union is not monolithic. There is a large group of countries that believe in a search for mutually acceptable solutions in Russian-EU relations. These countries are very skeptical about the sanctions system as a whole.

A year and a half ago, Ukraine was confronted with the choice: Who are you with - Russia or the West, and now entire Europe is being confronted with the same choice and urged to meticulously follow the instructions that it is getting. To reiterate, not everybody in Europe likes that. I am not an economist. Nevertheless, it is quite obvious that this crisis situation gives our agricultural sector an additional stimulus for development. Judging by last year's indicators, it is developing at quite a good pace.

Going back to the topic that our Western partners like talking about so much - the isolation of Russia, let us consider BRICS where Russia is the most active participant. It is the world's largest economy, accounting for half the global population and half the global territory. Even looking at BRICS, what kind of isolation of Russia can they talk about?

Our Western and European partners, who pay lip service to human rights and civil society interests, on the practical level often take steps that are aimed against free communication and free movement of people. Of course, visa requirements between Russia and the EU in the 21st century are an anachronism. But unfortunately, such are political realities.

## Germany's Ostpolitik: Controversial Evolution

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AFTER THE ESTABLISHMENT in 1955 of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and what was then West Germany, Russia and Germany have accumulated an impressive reserve of confidence and traversed a difficult historic path of conciliation between them. Despite turbulent times, Moscow and Berlin for a long time gravitated towards each other and valued this.

THE CURRENT CRISIS in relations between Moscow and Berlin is impossible to comprehend without assessing the experience of the Ostpolitik (Eastern policy) of Chancellor Willy Brandt, who was in office from 1969 to 1974. That policy varied in nature depending on historical periods.

After Christian Democratic Union (CDU) leader Angela Merkel became chancellor in 2005, relations between the two countries were initially constructive.

Merkel's tough defense in 2012 of the three Russian women who had put up the notorious blasphemous concert at Moscow's Cathedral of Christ the Savior caused disappointment and bewilderment in Russia. While Brandt supported the thinker and writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Merkel chose to support young women with suspicious reputations.

THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE, the events in Crimea, and the referendums in the regions of Donetsk and Lugansk have speeded up Berlin's diversion from its former course. Statements by Chancellor Merkel, President Joachim Gauck and the foreign and defense ministers, and what has been said by lawmakers during Bundestag debates on Ukraine and anti-Russian sanctions have meant that the German political class is taking a harder line on Russia. Words such as friendship between Russians and Germans or historic reconciliation between the two nations have been disappearing from the political vocabulary of German leaders and lawmakers.

Nobody has any doubt that German business circles have little interest in participating in economic retaliation against Russia but are forced to go along with the German chancellor, who seeks approval for her moves from Washington and Brussels and possibly sees the sanctions as a substitute for Ostpolitik.

But the Ukrainian crisis is not the only or the main cause of the strained Russian-German relations.

Merkel can hardly be accused of ignorance. She holds an academic degree, and possesses

sufficient knowledge, political experience, and experience of governance to state views on the future of Europe, on Berlin's Russian policy, and on its foreign policy in general that can be taken seriously. In her public speeches, she both analyzes current developments and forecasts future risks and challenges. But when she talks about Russia, all she does is to reiterate the abovementioned demands. She makes no proposals for interaction.

This situation has been bringing Russian political and expert circles to a natural conclusion that Merkel is no more than a product of the current times, which have so far failed to produce any new vivid charismatic leaders for Europe or the world at large, and that her world outlook has little in common with the holistic thinking of Willy Brandt, the determination of Konrad Adenauer, the wisdom of Helmut Schmidt, the persistence of Helmut Kohl, or the firm convictions of Gerhard Schroeder.

## Consolidation of the Non-Western World During the Ukrainian Crisis: Russia and China, SCO and BRICS

*Author: A. Lukin*

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THE IMPACT of the Ukrainian crisis on the structure of international relations as well as accelerated Russia's turn toward Asia as one of its widely discussed consequences can be hardly overestimated. Reorientation, very much within the concept of the multipolar world, began long before the crisis. Before the clashes in Ukraine, the leading Russian politicians were unanimous in their conviction that closer cooperation with Asia would complement rather than weaken Russia's partner relationships with the U.S. and the EU. RUSSIA AND CHINA continue drawing closer together as part of Russia's turn to Asia. The process has already invited all sorts of comments in Russia and abroad, some of them mutually exclusive. THE DELIBERATIONS discussed above share one basic fault: they proceed from the authors' political preferences rather than from

their analysis of the sides' real positions and motivations. This is true, in the first place, of the motivations that are pushing Moscow and Beijing closer. The process began long before the Ukrainian crisis: it has been going on for over thirty years now and was set in motion by the sides' gradual awareness that their fundamental opinions about the international system and geopolitical situation are very close or even identical.

China, which claims leadership in the developing "South," is especially critical of the concept of "universal values" as an instrument with which the West is trying to perpetuate its domination over its former colonies and semi-colonies. Chinese are growing increasingly appreciative of their traditional morals based on Confucianism. Despite the fact that Confucianism and traditional Christianity have very little in common Russia and China are driven closer by their unanimous rejection of Western ideology.

These common interests are developing into a common ground on which Beijing and Moscow may move even closer.

By its anti-Russian policies the West has already undermined, to a great extent, the positions of the pro-Western groups in Russia and supplied their opponents with fresh arguments.

Today, Chinese challenges look less threatening than the threats coming from the West. They might be diminished through active economic and political cooperation with other Asian states, including China's neighbors, as well as through sincere exchange of opinions with China which, guided by the spirit of cooperation, frequently takes Russia's wishes and apprehensions into account.

On the whole, there are no chances that full-scale cooperation between Russia and the West will be restored any time soon: there is no understanding between the sides while their ideas about the world are drifting apart.

## The Indian Ocean: New Players in the Game

*Author: G. Ivasbentsov*

*Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary*



THE WORLD'S MAIN REGION of oil and gas extraction; the world's busiest trade route; the only year-round route between Russia's European part and its Far East; the home region of Afghanistan and Iraq, the seats of the largest armed conflicts, and of Iran, the target of Western attacks for over three decades - now the Indian Ocean and its littoral zone is an entanglement of numerous problems. Some of the local states

cannot boast domestic stability while pirates have made the coastal waters of the Horn of Africa and the Strait of Malacca very dangerous.

FORTY-THREE years ago, in December 1971, the UN GA passed a Declaration initiated by the non-aligned states which called "upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great Power rivalries and competition.... should be excluded."

In the post-Cold War period, Russia practically ended its naval presence in the Indian Ocean; the U.S., on the other hand, made its presence even more obvious. Today, the Indian Ocean belongs to the responsibility zones of two American.

Very much as 30 or 40 years ago, the missiles carried by the U.S. air-crafts and submarines deployed in the Indian Ocean are targeted at Russia. According to the American president, Russia, as a threat to the world, ranked between the Ebola virus and ISIS.

Today, Washington is working on a Greater Middle East project to spread its control to the littoral of south Eurasia which Zbigniew Brzezinski called the Eurasian Balkans.

SINCE THE 1990S, the United States has been using the aquatic of the Indian Ocean as a toehold from which it shelled Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries and which served the starting point within the "war on terror" against the Afghan Taliban in 2001 and the Saddam Hussein regime in 2003.

NO MATTER how strong it is, the United States will have to part with its monopoly in the Indian Ocean. New and fairly strong players are ready to join the Big Game to limit America's regional impacts in the area sooner or later. India and China, their naval potentials strengthened by the fast growing economies, are the most likely newcomers together with Iran, the only Middle Eastern country steadily building up its economic, scientific,



technological and military potential.

Today, the rapidly developing trade in the India-Southeast Asia-China triangle has already ensured the annual trade turnover with the ASEAN countries of \$80 billion and about \$66 billion with China.

This means that India and China have acquired close or even common security interests in the Indian Ocean and the transportation routes across it and that they can and should ensure them by concerted efforts of their naval forces as the only alternative.

The Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2020 speaks about "a course focused on the transformation of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, stability and good neighborly relations."

## A Trap for Germany?

*Author: Armen Oganesyán*

*Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs*



MANY PEOPLE still wonder why Angela Merkel performed her "U-turn over the Atlantic" toward Washington. Indeed, there should be reasons which forced her to abandon the eastern political vector in favor of a center of power which, while retaining appearances, is losing real instruments of global governance.

Throughout the last quarter of a century, Germany's special relations with Russia were a

fairly large political and economic bonus of sorts which added weight to Germany on the world scale, to say nothing of Europe. I have already written elsewhere that Germany's "Eastern policy" supplies it with strategic depth. This helps Berlin oppose the pressure of rivals and "friends" on both sides of the Atlantic who are watching the rising star of Germany with barely concealed irritation.

The United States comes second after France as the largest market of German products and services outside the EU. In some years, its trade surplus with the U.S. and UK reached 20 percent; therefore, those who say that in the near-and mid-term perspective it will compensate all German losses in Russia are basically right.

The unprecedented preferences, the result of Germany's trade and economic expansion over a vast areas stretching from the Balkans to Southeast Asia, are ensured by its economic growth and, last but not least, by security guarantees supplied by its Western partners, the U.S. in the first place.

Germany's "Eastern policy" supplies it with strategic depth. This helps Berlin oppose the pressure of rivals and "friends" on both sides of the Atlantic who are watching the rising star of Germany with barely concealed irritation.

Long-term political motivations are much vaguer: Berlin knows that its growing strength will alert or even has alerted its EU partners and the United States. The latter is impressed not so much by Germany's economic growth (its economy, anyway, is smaller than American) but by the fact that its working capital strengthens the EU as an alternative center of political and economic power.

Washington needs Europe as a teammate or a reliable ally not as a rival. To be more exact, Europe can be accepted as a rival the share of which in economy and global governance remained under Washington's control to guarantee continued American domination in the EU economic and

military-political sphere.

It took Germany several decades to become the leader of Europe. It had covered a tortuous road of making peace with France, its enemy of long standing, and with its closest neighbors; there had been "the German economic miracle" and the tragic division and the coveted reunification before it arrived at an absolute leadership in Europe. In the terms of Realpolitik, the U-turn was exchanged for the guarantees of its hard-won domination in Europe.

Simon Serfaty has pointed out: "The balance of military forces appears to favor Russia more than ever before; rarely, too, has the balance of economic influence been as favorable to Germany as it is now."

"Atlantic discipline," the price Germany paid to Washington proved to be fairly high while the United States used this "stone" to kill two birds: it has "divorced" Berlin and Moscow (to weaken the latter to the greatest extent possible) while shouldering tactical support of German leadership in Europe at the minimal risk for itself. Indeed, there are London and several absolutely loyal East European and Baltic states to look after Germany.

The choice made by Frau Merkel is full of holes, the biggest being the hardly predictable developments in Europe. Irrespective of the angle at which we contemplate the situation in Europe we will see economic collapse, mounting ethnic tension and signs of a crisis gradually unfolding in the EU.

It remains to be seen whether the Eurasian vector of cooperation between Russia and Germany and Russia and Europe will become attractive enough; much will depend on whether the EAEU project proves successful. Not matter how Utopian is a possibility of closer relationships between the EU and EAEU the statement about possible cooperation has been made. We live at the times when history moves amazingly fast.

## Russia and Belarus: The Space of Common Statehood

*Author: G. Rapota*

*State Secretary of the Union State of Russia and Belarus*



This is a very good project, which is designed to create a common statehood. However, before approaching the issue of common statehood, it was necessary to resolve a number of very serious problems. It has been recorded in all the principal documents. It was necessary to create a single social field for the citizens of Belarus and Russia. This includes free movement, the freedom to choose the place of employment, residence and studies. In other words, it was cre-

ating conditions so that Belarusians in Russia and Russians in Belarus do not feel strangers. Another group of issues concerns economic integration. Our goal is to create a single field for Russian and Belarusian business, for the industrial, financial and banking systems. There are also foreign policy goals - specifically, to harmonize our foreign policy efforts on the international arena. There are military-political and scientific and technical goals. Only after they were achieved, there will be grounds to speak about the formation of the Union State, the passage of a constitutional act, the introduction of a single currency and so on and so forth.

A segment of this wide-ranging plan has largely been carried out, and very effectively so, especially the first, social segment. Both neighbors feel quite comfortable.

Belarus produces software products for all world trends. Russia also has such companies, but we take this for granted because Russia is a big country. However, when a relatively small country achieves high standards this is very impressive.

The level of integration within the framework of the Union State is higher than within the Eurasian Union, not to mention the CIS. The open border alone is enough to show the fundamental difference, because there is no equivalent to this across the post-Soviet space.

Minsk enjoys the trust of both Russia and Ukraine, it is used as a venue for consultations. This is of course thanks to the Belarusian leadership. How do they do it? Through their policy, their diplomacy, their position, their assessment of the present realities, and their sincere desire to resolve this conflict in some way or the other. It is certainly very important to eliminate tension near its southern borders. I believe that public opinion is unanimous in this regard.

I believe that Russians and Belarusians will preserve their common cultural space. Consider this: Russian film directors are working at Belarusian film studios.

## The Maidanian Knot

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For twelve months now, Europe and the world have been trying to untie the Gordian knot of Ukrainian developments and their dramatic echo in the country's east. Rabid nationalists and Rus-sophobes who captured power in Kiev by force and, supported by the United States and Europe, deposed the legally elected President of Ukraine tied one of the most complicated geopolitical knots in the post-Soviet space. Today, we all know

that the aggressive and anarchical philosophy of Maidan was knocked together by the theoreticians of color revolutions from Washington and those who had implemented their theories in Yugoslavia, Georgia and elsewhere. They pushed Europe into one of the most painful and dangerous crises in its postwar history and moved the continent dangerously close to a total "hot" war.

While Washington deliberately conjured up the crisis as a pressure instrument to be used against recalcitrant Russia, the "enlightened" European political community which feigns "total ignorance" of its disgraceful role in the evil designs of the United States causes amazement or, to be more exact, stirs up indignation and disgust. More and more experts and analysts outside the official circles of the European Union have started talking about the pernicious nature of Brussels' Russian policy. It does nothing good for Europe and causes deep disappointment among Russians in Europe's political and economic impotence and its masochist acceptance of America's harsh and uncompromising lead.

In 1954, the international community tacitly accepted the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine; there was no question of a referendum since people in Crimea remained Soviet citizens. The right of the citizens of Crimea to express their will was ignored or, say, suspended till the time when it would become meaningful, that is, when their citizenship would be changed.

The entire system of law has not been created by a supreme legal power; it is based on the basic principle of free assessments by any sovereign state of actions of another state. Each state is free to assess its legal status in relation to other states; this means that interpretations supplied by different states are equally valid.

Confronted with protests of humanitarian organizations and the badly hit economic circles, as well as with legal inferences, court rulings and UN resolutions the United States agreed

to simplify the use of general sanctions by replacing them by measures aimed at leaders of some countries or corresponding organizations (mafia or terrorist) and their spheres of influence.

In any case, the Federal Council has interpreted the "restrictive measures" of Brussels as if they were a European Directive. This means that it applied the principle of supremacy of European law within the framework of its legal system.

This confirms that the Maidanian knot in Ukraine was tied by skillful puppeteers from across the ocean and their European satellites to destabilize and suppress Russia and move it to the margins of history. They are not going to untie it any time soon, which means that we should wait for another Alexander the Great.

## The Soviet Union's Salvation of Jews During the Great Patriotic War and Its Support for the Creation of the State of Israel

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THIS YEAR will see the 70th anniversary of the Great Victory, one more illustrious jubilee date commemorating the end of the Great Patriotic War. But this year, along with voices from progressive forces that make objective assessments of events and results of the Second World War, stressing their significance and prominence, in some countries obnoxious (there is no other word) officials are coming forward and so-called historians are waking up who are painting upside-down pictures of all that has to do with that

global tragedy.

The most prominent role among such "experts" belongs to Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk, who has announced that the Soviet Union attacked Ukraine and Germany, and Polish Foreign Minister Grzegorz Schetyna, who has suggested either Warsaw or London instead of Moscow as the venue of the Victory Parade.

So it is an important task today to study and analyze what the Second World War put the Jews through, and to describe their heroism in fighting fascism.

It is worth stating the obvious fact that the heaviest losses in the Second World War were suffered by two peoples - nearly 19 million Russians and about six million Jews.

The Second World War inflicted multiple disasters on the Jewish people during its five and a half years and six million Jews were exterminated in Nazi camps. It failed, however, to break Jewish spirit and, moreover, became one more step towards the creation of the Jewish state.

The Soviet Union played a key role in the establishment of the State of Israel. In the critical period of the Second World War and during postwar diplomatic battles at the United Nations over the future of Palestine, it was Soviet diplomatic, military and political support that determined the course of developments. It was mainly to the Soviet Union that requests for help and support came from the leaders of the Jewish community of Palestine and later, during the critical time of the War of Independence, from the leaders of Israel.

The creation of modern Israel can be considered one of the most illustrious events of the 20th century both in the history of the Jewish people and in world history in general. The revival of the Israeli state was a uniquely successful project, to use the modern word. That state came into being almost exactly at the time predicted by the founder of political Zionism, Theodor Herzl

- about 50 years after the first Zionist congress.

The essence of distortions of history by anti-Russian politicians, public figures and scholars is that they see the former Soviet Union as an entity that in a way was similar to Nazi Germany from the viewpoint of home and foreign policy.

We will see the absurdity of such conclusions if we go to real events and facts as recorded in documents and statements of politicians.

Despite difficulties it came up against, the evacuation policy did save very large numbers of Jewish lives. The greatest problem was evacuation from western regions of the country that bordered Germany and were the first to be attacked. Due to the successful first few months of the blitzkrieg, it was only possible to evacuate 12% or just about 200,000 of the two million Jews who lived in western Belarus, western Ukraine, the Baltic region, and Moldova. At the same time, more than one million Jews, one third of the Jewish population of the European part of the Soviet Union, had been taken beyond the Urals from territories that were further away from the frontlines by the time German forces arrived. In addition, a significant number of Jews - the exact figure is unknown due to the absence of any reliable statistics - fled without the assistance of state services responsible for evacuation.

At that time, Soviet leaders, including Joseph Stalin, made very cautious statements about mass killings of Jews in occupied territories, claiming emphatically that Jews were being subjected to the same form of persecution as Slavs.

Going back to the Soviet Union's role in creating the State of Israel, it should be pointed out that, in the late 1940s and in the 1950s, our country followed up its powerful diplomatic support for the newborn state with political support for it and with major military and economic assistance to it. Due to increasingly intense rivalry between great powers in that part of the world, the Soviet Union quite often acted via its new Eastern European allies.

The Soviet Union supported Israel throughout the first Arab-Israeli war. Moscow condemned the actions of the Arab states and qualified Israel's armed action as a legitimate act of self-defense.

It would be important to mention that, besides giving Israel extensive political and military support, there was significant Soviet influence in the construction of the Jewish state's government and political systems, in the evolution of its economic model, and in its cultural development. Recently, many intellectuals in the West have been saying that humankind is moving closer to a "Rubicon" - a third world war or the first global great depression. Today there are only a few countries that can launch a destructive global crisis. They include Israel, which is one of the formalized results of the Second World War, and "creeping" revision of the results of that war will inevitably affect that country. But the future of Israel cannot be understood without analyzing its history, least of all without analyzing the mutagenesis of the term "Holocaust." The term "Holocaust" was popularized by writer Elie Wiesel, a Nobel Prize winner, as a symbol of Nazi gas chambers and crematoriums and a symbol of the natural fight of the Jews for the recognition of the scale of the tragedy of the Jewish people during the Second World War.



# The Nuclear Problem of the Korean Peninsula: Is There a Way to Break the Impasse?

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THE NUCLEAR CRISIS on the Korean Peninsula is escalating and is increasingly difficult to resolve. The six-nation mechanism for negotiating a solution, which brings together Russia, China, the United States, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea, has remained stalled for more than five years. Agreements enshrined in the sextet's Joint Statement of September 19, 2005 have never been put into practice. Relations between the two Koreas are as sour today as ever, and time and again tensions between Pyongyang and Seoul reach extremely dangerous proportions.

All this is part of an overall aggravation of the situation in Northeast Asia. There are increasingly intense territorial disputes between China and Japan, between South Korea and Japan, and between South Korea and China. Beijing's decision to set up an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea has become a new irritant.

THE GRAVITY of the nuclear problem calls for urgent measures to unblock the six-nation negotiation mechanism and for the fulfillment by all its participants of commitments they made in the Joint Statement of September 19, 2005. The following measures might help attain those objectives:

1. The six nations would officially reaffirm their allegiance to all provisions of the Joint Statement and pledge to fulfill every single aspect of their commitments under it.
2. North Korea would declare an indefinite moratorium on all forms of nuclear missile activities.
3. The United States and North Korea would start a dialogue to try to normalize their relations and to remove obstacles to mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields.
4. Japan and North Korea would likewise begin negotiations to try to normalize their relations.
5. North Korea would take practical measures to fulfill its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement.
6. The UN Security Council would first mitigate and then lift its sanctions against North Korea.
7. North Korea and South Korea would resume dialogue and pledge loyalty to all earlier agreements.
8. The two Koreas would launch coordinated measures to relax tensions on the Korean Peninsula

and build economic, cultural, and other ties between them.

9. Whenever necessary, the six nations would hold foreign minister-level meetings to review compliance with the Joint Statement and seek to remove possible barriers to the resolution of the nuclear crisis on the peninsula.

It would be important to use the Iranian nuclear program case as a precedent in negotiations on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (with due account being taken of the specific character of the North Korea issue) if the current efforts to solve the Iranian problem produce an acceptable result from the point of view of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. The search for a solution to the North Korea nuclear problem is inseparably linked to the Russian initiative for creating a peace and security mechanism for Northeast Asia. It is obvious that such a mechanism can hardly materialize if no progress is made towards a North Korea nuclear deal. Nonetheless, it is important not only that our fellow participants in the six-nation talks should time and again be reminded of the Russian idea and a Moscow-proposed agreement on basic principles for peace and security in the region but also that the working group set up as part of the six-nation mechanism should resume its efforts.

A Russian-Chinese initiative approved at a recent Northeast Asian summit is also potentially fruitful from the point of view of building a new system of security and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region.

## Contemporary Integration Processes in the Post-Soviet Space; Crimea as a New Reality

*This conference was held in Yalta from October 15 to 19, 2014*

### Session One The Evolution of Integration Processes in the Post-Soviet Space: A Glimpse into the Future



**Armen Oganesyyan**, Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs

ESTEEMED COLLEAGUES, today we are meeting here in Yalta for the fifth time at an annual conference organized by the International Affairs journal with support from the Russian Foreign Ministry. At our meetings we discuss the concept of "Eurasianism" both as an idea and as the realization of this idea on the practical level. Every year, our discussion brings something new to the understanding and assessment of integration processes in the post-Soviet space regarding a broad spectrum of political, economic and humanitarian ties. Every year, the makeup of our participants renews and expands both numerically and geographically. Every year, we say good-bye only to meet here on the Crimean land again next fall. Today, this conference is especially important for us, as it is taking place in totally new geopolitical conditions. We have gathered again in Yalta, in Crimea, but this time on Russian land. I am looking forward to a lively and productive discussion. I would like to give the floor to Dmitry Alexeevich Polyansky.



**Dmitry Polyansky**, Deputy Director, First Department of CIS Countries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

FRANKLY SPEAKING, I am expecting a great deal from this conference. It is taking place for the fifth time but in totally new conditions. We currently at a stage of Eurasian integration of which we can be rightfully proud. On January 1, the Eurasian Economic Union comes into being. However, the present complicated geopolitical subtext is understandable to everyone. It seems to me that based on this premise, the

present conference could become a starting point for further discussions in the new conditions, which are rather complex and which will remain so for the next several years. We are counting on intellectual input from the expert community and expecting bright, bold ideas and suggestions that, as a general rule, lead to important initiatives, which are then developed on a governmental level. I wish everybody successful work and look forward to your presentations.

Today, this conference is especially important for us, as it is taking place in totally new geopolitical conditions. We have gathered again in Yalta, in Crimea, but this time on Russian land.



**Sergey Bazdnikin**, Deputy Director, Foreign Policy Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

ESTEEMED COLLEAGUES, first of all, I would like to heartily welcome all the participants in our international conference with a longish name which, I believe, accurately reflects its agenda. The Ministry

of Foreign Affairs supports the efforts taken by the International Affairs editorial board to organize an expert dialogue on a broad range of issues. We regard them as an important part of the essential political expert discourse on key aspects of the international agenda. We proceed based on the premise that close interaction between Russia's foreign policy agency and civil society, as well as academic and expert, circles is key to success in achieving the wide-ranging goals set by the country's leadership in ensuring favorable foreign political conditions for the country's dynamic development, its economic modernization, and enhancing the quality of life and living standards of our people.

The Crimea is a special subject. I believe that Vyacheslav Leonidovich Svetlichny will have an opportunity to speak on this in more detail, but nevertheless, I should say that the combination of these two lines of discussion can lead to some interesting results, which will certainly be significant in our practical work.



**Vyacheslav Svetlichny**, Head of the Representative Office of the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Republic of Crimea

ALLOW ME to welcome the participants in the Yalta meeting, which we are holding together with the International Affairs editorial board here in Yalta, not for the first time.

First of all, I would like to say a few words about our representative office that has been organized on the basis of the General Consulate of the Russian Federation in Simferopol. We have been working in the new capacity for just a few months and are currently analyzing the events that have taken place recently.

The Foreign Ministry addresses real-life problems. On the foreign policy level, we seek to minimize the consequences of the information and political blockade of Crimea. On the internal political level, we are doing all we can to ensure that not a single resident of Crimea regrets the events that have taken place and that nothing in his or her life changes for the worse.

We hope that during this conference, through joint efforts we will work out recommendations that will, without a doubt, facilitate our daily work on the practical level. Thank you.



**Dmitry Polyansky**, Deputy Director, First Department of CIS Countries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

I BELIEVE that in addressing such a respectable and highly professional audience, there is no need to once again describe some fundamental aspects of Eurasian integration. Nevertheless, I would like to look at the most important special aspects and elements of Eurasian integration today. Probably everyone remembers the Eurasian Economic Union Treaty that our leaders signed in Astana on May 29. A recent session of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council in Minsk noted that the states have completed the treaty ratification process and that it will come into effect on January 1, 2015. Here are two key reference points of 2014 that, without a doubt, will be ones for the textbooks. Over the past 20 years, perhaps we have not had much to be proud of with respect to Eurasian integration, but it is important that since the catastrophic breakup of the Soviet Union, when everything was done without any regard for human norms and even common sense, we have preserved a format for cooperation between our nations, for dialogue, which enables us to judge how well prepared we are to move further, and on what basis. Pursuing the course of integration, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan started energetically acting on the idea put forward by Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev 20 years ago - i.e. building the Eurasian Economic Union. It was a rocky path. The commission board makes some decisions by a specific majority. However, if a particular decision does not respond to the interests of a particular state it can be reviewed or discussed again on a new basis. This is also a fundamental point. Neither Belarus, nor Kazakhstan nor Russia can promote a decision on its own. Neither the role nor the weight of a state plays much of a role here.

We do not need to search for an alternative to our operating procedure in Russian, which suits everybody just fine. As is known, the EU has plenty of problems over the need to translate official documents into different languages. Under our treaty, only fundamental agreements subject to ratification are translated into national languages, which is certainly not the scope of translation that is required in the European Union.

Since we are primarily an economic association, the future WTO system, its transformation, and its strong and weak aspects amid the regionalization of trade negotiations are also a factor that we should analyze in our work.



**Vladimir Zharikhin**, Deputy Director, the CIS Institute

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION in the post-Soviet space has moved from the stage of wishful thinking and unfinished projects into a stage of the formation of real economic integration associations. This is facilitated by the formation of rationally oriented national elites and the general

situation in the world, which leaves no other reasonable options except for the intensification of economic integration processes.

The much touted worldwide globalization has unexpectedly taken the path of establishing rather isolated economic clusters, such as the European Union, NAFTA and Mercosur. Countries outside these associations are doomed eventually to become sources of natural resources and cheap labor.

The position of the Kazakh and Belarusian leaders is understandable. They are concerned that the introduction of political integration elements will lead to the unification of these countries' political models with the Russian model, which stands out for its significantly higher level of democracy.

Elena Ponomareva, Professor, Chair of Comparative Political Science, Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Aggressive globalization and the threats and challenges it creates have convinced each and every one that civilizational variety of Eurasia can be protected only within integration projects which will shape the real "all-Eurasian unity" with Russia as its core. The road to the continent's future security and prosperity lies through a new strategy of the development of Russia - the "smart power" strategy which, in its turn, will change world politics.

Today, the indices of power which cover the widest possible range of the country's resources and also the intellectual, information and will power of the system and political

leaders have been brought together in the "smart power" concept formulated by Joseph Nye in 1990.

We should be fully aware that in the new geopolitical realities the development vector of any country or even region is no longer geared at the available resources alone: it also depends on human relationships, or the human factor which tends to change together with the changing circumstances.



**Yuri Shevtsov**, Director, Center for European Integration Studies

STRANGE as it may seem the first signs of a possible synthesis of two integration processes became clearly visible as the Ukrainian crisis was unfolding. In many respects it is a product of preparations for the signing of the Association Agreement between

Ukraine and the EU which created many problems in their relationships with Russia. The Agreement had been signed yet its postponed implementation reduced to naught its consequence. The crisis, however, flared up and created new impediments for the continued integration in the west and the east of Europe. There are, however, two unexpectedly positive processes worth of closer examination.



**Mikhail Smolin**, Deputy Director, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies

TODAY AND IN THE FUTURE this theoretical problem does not and will not allow Russia to treat this state as another neighbor. The ideology of political "Ukrainianism" keeps Ukraine away from the integration processes unfolding across the post-Soviet space.

Many correct words have been said about the heroization of Nazism and the revival of fascism in Ukraine; the ideology of "Ukrainianism," however, is older than Nazism and fascism; it was very much obvious in the Russian Empire. Russia cannot accept this ideology not only because it has borrowed much from the ideology of fascism but for many other reasons.

In Russia "Ukrainianism" is perceived as a problem because in the twentieth century throughout which Russian civilization was coping with far from simple internal disagreements it was doubted whether the South Russian population should be involved in building the Russian world. The post-Soviet elite of the South Russian population fall victim to the

virus of conceited regionalism.



**Sergey Kizima**, Deputy Head, Foreign Policy Section, Consultative Council, Union Parliament of the Union State of Russia and Belarus

ASIA will be the focus of Eurasian integration for many reasons.

One of them is the general trend for Asia to become the hub of the world's economic activity. Fifteen to 20 years will go by and Europe will end up at the pe-

riphery of the global economy while its center will have shifted to China, Japan, and India. China will be the economic center not only of Asia but of the entire world. By that time, due to such extrapolation of development dynamics, the Chinese economy might be about twice the size of the economy of the European Union or roughly equivalent in size to the economies of the United States and EU put together.

Another reason is that attempts by principal countries involved in Eurasian integration to cooperate with the EU over the past two decades have been fruitless.

In either case, neither corporations nor governments in the EU have been prepared to invest anywhere outside the resources sectors of the Eurasian troika and or have shown the slightest desire to deploy modern high-tech industries on the territory of Russia, Belarus, or Kazakhstan, or share high-tech knowhow with them.

The EU has failed to see the potential for its relations with important eastern neighbors or to pull serious resources into large-scale programs that would stimulate Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to cooperate with it.

Today, Russia is practically in a state of war. Courtesy of Western countries, Ukraine, a Slavic sister nation that some time ago fought fascism shoulder to shoulder with all other peoples of the Soviet Union, is increasingly an irreconcilable enemy of Russia.

Armen Oganessian: We should support the healthy unifying trends that exist today. The current trend of the Russian World is quite viable. Things will certainly not be smooth with regard to Hungary, especially considering that Hungarians will support Uniatic trends, since they are Catholics. However, we should uphold and defend our interests, finding allies such as Hungary. Considering the specifics, identity and heterogeneity of the Ruthenian movement, they should be given their due. The moral aspect is very important: Nothing is being said about Ruthenians in our media.





**Georgy Muradov**, Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea, and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Crimea at the President of the RF

FOR OVER TWO DECADES which followed the tragic dismemberment in 1991 of the historical space of the multi-national Russian World, our academic and public thought has been seeking a na-

tional idea of new Russia.

An aggression against the Russian World in Ukraine or, rather, ethnic and cultural purges in the country's southeast as well as the war of sanctions and slander against Russia revived in Russians their patriotism and the feeling of national unity and awakened the slumbering national idea which turned out to be straightforward, clear and familiar.

We have already seen that restoration of our civilizational strength, defense of our historical space is not an easy task: the geopolitical risks, including the military risks, cannot be underestimated.

Today, we are watching as the worst of the possible scenarios of transformation of the world order is gaining momentum; the Russian World is drawn into the biggest (since World War II) tragedy.

The grave exacerbation of the international situation calls for a professional assessment of the current developments; we need forecasts of possible developments and we should abandon the illusions that "everything will finally come out right."

First, we should recognize that neither Ukraine nor the West will reconcile themselves with the loss of Crimea and will never leave Novorossia alone.

Second. The Ukrainian crisis is fraught with numerous risks: this is a comprehensive anti-Russian project.

Russia was reunited with its spiritual cradle - Crimea, historical Taurida, which has been the symbol of our Eastern Christian identity for a millennium now.

Third. Everybody should become awakened to the "Russian question," that is, violations of the basic rights of the autochthonous Russian, Russian-speaking and culturally Russian population in the post-Soviet space.

Fourth. The hysterical statements that the autochthonous Russian-speaking population of the Baltic countries constitutes a "threat" and is a "fifth column" are nothing but a provocation and a pretext to resume ethnic purges in these countries. This should be said openly; we should no longer pass over in silence numerous provocations.

Fifth. We should say to those who have started the war of sanctions and initiated other unfriendly measures against Russia that for historical reasons we are much tougher than pampered Europe which is sinking into a deep crisis.

Crimea should become a model subject of the Russian Federation. This is a political task. This means that the instruments our financial technocrats love so much should not be applied here.



**Anatoly Filatov**, Deputy Director, Ukrainian Branch of the Institute of the CIS Countries (Simferopol)

OUR STUDIES of the social and historical process confirm that the cultural-civilizational centers of antiquity developed into geopolitical centers, as we know them today, under pressure of cultural-civilizational determinants. In other words, the most de-

veloped cultural centers which appeared in the course of human history created advanced civilizations. The cultural-civilizational centers of Ancient Egypt, Ancient India, Ancient China, Ancient Mesopotamia, Ancient Greece, and Rome dominated in the geopolitical space of their corresponding regions as centers of geopolitical impact.

This trend extended into later ages and is still going on. The European cultural-civilizational center which had taken shape in the mid-second millennium and reached its highest point by the end of the last millennium created a seat of geopolitical influence represented, in turn, by Spain, Sweden, France, Germany, the UK, and the U.S.

The cultural-civilizational centers are created by sociocultural systems which include the entire range of social activity of a society living in and developing a certain global natural-geographic space.

None of the key spheres of any sociocultural space and a socium as a system can be described as dominating and as the only force behind social movements and geopolitical processes since each of them contributes to sociocultural changes.

In the process of moving to its authentic civilizational model Russia passed through several stages at which civilizational models of reproduction and implantation were used.

Baptism of Rus late in the tenth century was not so much a new religion but implantation into Russian sociocultural space of values and standards of Byzantine civilization and their reproduction.

This means that reunification of 2014 is a cultural and civilizational event; political means were used to address the past and present problems of historic importance. This makes Crimea one of the main meanings and signs of Russia's sociocultural tradition, civilizational progress, its specificity and continuity of its history.



**Sergey Yurchenko**, Head of the Political Sciences Department, V.I. Vernadsky Crimean Federal University

THE REUNIFICATION of Crimea with Russia was a landmark event that indicated "break in global continuity," and demonstrated Russia's new status and readiness to reintegrate its historical lands. The importance of this event determines the need to

study a geopolitical context, the strategic and tactical results of the reunion, and the possible models of Crimea's development.

The bipolar world became unipolar as the USSR lost the Cold War and eventually disintegrated.

The fall and disintegration of a great empire produces a number of tensions for its heirs. The first emerges as a result of its stronger neighbors' attempts to incorporate parts of the former empire or grip control over them; the second emerges due to the former imperial center's striving to regain its position, at least in part; and the third results from antagonisms between the newly emerged states. Russian foreign policy has been affected by all three types of "tensions."

A change in the Ukrainian system of government which led to the strengthening of radical nationalism, put the southeastern regions on their guard, which was reflected in the Crimean referendum of March 16, 2014, when an overwhelming majority voted for joining Russia. The developments demonstrated the importance of the public will as a geopolitical factor.

The reunion has brought about the following strategic results: the regaining of Crimea has strengthened the Russian civilization area from the point of history, culture and religion; Russia made a stride to the formation of its "greater" territory in conditions of a close international competition; the Russian presence in the Black Sea region has strengthened; Russia scored a symbolic victory for the first time since 1945; it has demonstrated that it is possible to regain former Russian lands by peaceful means; the Russian national awareness received a mighty impetus; a bridge was built between the Russian ruling top and the general public while the political elite stayed divided; last but not least, Russia has received a clear signal that its centuries-long confrontation with the West is still there.

**A. Oganesyán:** I would like to say a few words about the Tatar factor in Crimea. This is certainly a difficult question. As long as we guarantee the rights of the Tatar population, the situation remains calm. Tatar has become an official language in the territory of Crimea. The Tatar population has never had such attention. Stability in Crimea is an important factor. But how far should these guarantees go? And what about the other nationalities of

Crimea: Greeks, Armenians, etc.? Is it possible to divide Crimea on ethnic lines?



**Viktor Arkhipov**, Chairman of the Russian National Committee for Black Sea Economic Cooperation

TODAY'S EMERGING multipolar world offers new prospects for global economic development of countries and entire regions (SCO, EurAsEC, etc.). The Russian National Committee for Black Sea Eco-

economic Cooperation (RNC BSEC) represents Russia in the BSEC Business Council and is a socially oriented non-profit organization aimed at coordinating the activities of Russian business and public structures related to Russia's participation in the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. The main founder of the Committee is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.

One of the Committee's primary tasks is to create the conditions for a favorable investment climate in the Black Sea Region that could have a significant effect on the dynamics of economic processes.

The Committee takes an active part in developing concepts that would ensure integration and mutually beneficial economic and trade cooperation of Russian business entities with BSEC participants and in promoting Russian intellectual products in the international market.

The RNC BSEC Business Council is an instrument for turning the Black Sea Region into a joint regional economic center of power by addressing four strategic tasks:

- Provide effective assistance in establishing contacts between business circles and in developing public-private partnerships;
- Establish a close mutually beneficial partnership between the interested parties and international and regional organizations;
- Strengthen regional economic policy, increase economic integration and develop the business potential of territories;
- Ensure a comprehensive, all-round approach to the implementation of priority projects and programs meeting the economic needs of territories.

Special attention is paid to work with small and medium business as the most promising sector of the Russian economy which requires support and real organizational assistance at the intergovernmental level of the BSEC member countries. World practice shows that without due attention to small and medium business it is impossible to ensure decent living standards for the population.



**Konstantin Zatulin**, Director, Institute of CIS Countries

This is a very rare case in Russia's history since 1991 when it made full use of "soft power," of which it learned not so long ago and which we in Russia began to seek, organize and try to put on a serious government footing. To my mind, the only instance of serious employment of "soft power" by Russia,

in more than 20 years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, is the returning of Crimea and Sevastopol.

It would be of course unnatural to be a Sevastopol resident, walk past the Monument to the Scuttled Ships every day without knowing what caused the Crimean War and what its consequences were. This is why the idea of de-Russification proved hard to carry into effect right from the start because people of many generations still remember past history. The Donetsk and Lugansk regions were for more than 30 years constituent parts of Soviet Ukraine and went through Soviet Ukrainization in the 1920s-1930s. As the people in these regions faced the harsh reality, they became split up into those who would like to join Russia and those who would like federalization of Ukraine.

No such split was seen in Crimea, much less in Sevastopol. I say what I think in the perfect knowledge that present here are not only delegates from Russia.

Today, Crimea has new taxes, norms and tariffs; all these norms are tougher than in Ukraine and costlier. Traffic fines have doubled in size. Whereas traffic cops sent from Russia to Crimea didn't initially take bribes, as do the local cops, today they do but only at a double rate. One ought to say that all types of bribery are on the up. Dmitry Kozak, who now works in Crimea, has a chart showing what there was under Ukraine and what is there today. We must deal with these problems as quickly as possible and start resolving others. I think it would take a long time for Crimea before it feels at home as part of Russia, for Russia and Crimea to get fully familiar with each other, and for developing a tactful and gentle attitude to Crimea's uniqueness in all respects.



**Vladimir Kazarin**, Professor, Taurida National V.I. Vernadsky University

CRIMEA'S CULTURE has been pro-integration at all times and periods. It is therefore highly important for Simferopol and Moscow not to harm Crimea's cultural environment on the crest of the reintegration wave.

The top priority is to carefully preserve Crimea's cultural heritage.

The first symptoms of abuse are already in evidence. In Sevastopol, they have removed the monument to Herman Sahaidachny. The novelist Konstantin Paustovsky was always proud of having been a direct descendant in the male line to Sahaidachny. The Republican Library named for Ismail Gasprinsky - the major collection of Crimean Tatar literature - is currently practically closed to its users. As a matter of record, Ismail Gasprinsky was Ivan Turgenev's secretary when the great Russian author lived in Paris. There are many more examples that could be cited.

One ought to realize that the less than professional actions create the impression that the new authorities favor one set of cultures and reject others. The latter may also include even Russian culture: no high-ranking official from Moscow, including the Russian minister of culture, found find time to visit the Pushkin Museum in Gurzuf.

**A. Oganesyanyan:** The word "symphony" was used here to describe relationships between the church and state, but there is also symphony between the government and the people. Crimea is a symphony, a sense of unity between the people and the government. One would like for the sense of what we experienced during reunification with Crimea to last. Daily realities, however, make us take a sober look at things. We should not stop thinking of what might have happened here in Crimea.

This symphony of the government and the people should not be disturbed. But let's take a realistic look at historical processes.

Lastly, as regards international cooperation discussed here. The time we live in is full of challenges being met by appropriate associations and unions. Environmental protection is truly a crying issue. The IAEA Marine Environment Laboratory has built an extensive store of information on the condition of the Black Sea. This information is available to Black Sea countries if they request it.

It was mentioned here that the Danube is polluting the Black Sea. It would be a good idea for the Black Sea countries to raise the issue before the European Union. It should be discussed. What's more, Turkey could give us assistance. We can't cope singlehandedly with the pollution of the entire Black Sea basin.

So, let us begin by what is the most essential to us. There is nothing more important than the environment. What good would the beautiful landscapes of Crimea be if they get poisoned? I think the countries of the Black Sea region have many interests in common which can be taken care of through mutually advantageous and productive work.

We are grateful to you for holding high the banner of our conference for the fifth time. Special thanks are due to the Russian Foreign Ministry. This project is very dear to us and I hope we will be remembering these fine days in Yalta for the addresses and discussions which enriched us. enabled us to voice our own opinions and hear alternative viewpoints. We will be happy to see you again in Yalta.

## The Tragedy of Russia: The Victor that Lost the Victory

*Author: A. Kuznetsov*

*Director, Department of History and Records, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*



Very much like many people in our country I look at this war as one of the greatest tragedies in the history of Russia: it lost the state which had been developing on its territory for a millennium. Russia's development had been evolutionary, not free, however, from problems and complications. On the eve of the war, it was developing by leaps and bounds, something which Europe feared and could not accept. World War I cut short this progress.

The tragedy of Russia was a tragedy of the victor that lost its victory. Russia's share in the victory of the Entente was huge even though this is passed over in silence at the numerous conferences

and discussions going on all over the world. Russia saved France from complete routing and also saved itself: having destroyed France in a lightning campaign

This generation should be aware of this history and should learn from it. I mean not only Russia but this generation of politicians especially in view of what is going on in the world. Today, we are confronted with the dangers very similar to those of July 1914: the same arrogance, the same feeling of exclusiveness, the same rejection of what other states think, the same tendency to confrontation and pressure, and the readiness to use force. This was obvious 100 years ago and this is no less obvious today. If the lessons of World War I remain ignored despite discussions, conferences and publications the future will hold no promise.

The phenomenon of World War I is interesting because in July 1914 nobody could imagine the catastrophic scope of its repercussions.

In Russia, the very intensive studies of the last few years have allowed us to revise the pre-revolutionary history of Russia and its foreign policy and to arrive at the following: first, Russia did not want a war; second, Russian diplomacy tried hard to prevent it. Russia was, however, part of the international system which was gradually sliding toward a conflict in Europe. Russia could not jump off the footboard of the train moving toward a war and, equally, it could not abandon Serbia to its fate. That would have meant that Russia relinquished its historical interests, its solidarity with the Orthodox peoples and its obligations. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Western leaders tended to consistently underestimate the positive role of Russia in Europe and the fact that at all times Russia was a guarantor of security if it was indivisible security. We insist on equal security in Europe rather than on security for some countries at the expense of others. This is one of the les-

sons of the history of international relations in Europe.

From the very beginning, Russian diplomacy had to address the problem of Russian subjects who found themselves in the countries at war with Russia. There were 40 thousand of them in Germany alone who should be returned to Russia.

We want the public to know as much as possible about our documents first, because in this way people learn more about history; second, because documentary publications are the most efficient weapon of struggle against all sorts of speculations and manipulation with facts.

Every year, tens of Russian and foreign historians work in our archives. So far, we have no space for those who want to work with archival documents: the building of the Archives of the Foreign Policy of Russia and the reading room are being renovated. I do hope that next year we will open the doors to Russian historians and their foreign colleagues.



*Authors: Alexei Filitov, chief research associate, Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor, Doctor of Science (History)*

*Evgeniya Pyadysheva, Executive Secretary of International Affairs, Candidate of Science (History)*



**E. Pyadysheva:** The Yalta Conference is an example of how the powers that had acquired great influence and authority as a result of the Great Victory over the challenge to humankind, such as Hitler's aggression, were able, in the course of negotiations, to find compromise solutions to serious and conflicting problems.

We still live according to the Yalta rules. However, we see that they are changing. Alexei Mitrofanovich,

when do you think the destruction of this political system began?

**A. Filitov:** This is a very interesting question, which is somewhat unexpected to me. It is often said in the West that Yalta divided the world. As a matter of fact, the division of the world began in 1917, when two opposing systems appeared. But the problem was how the dividing line would pass. As is known, before the war, it passed along the western borders of the Soviet Union while in Yalta it was established that this line would pass across the middle of Europe. It is also important to understand how rigid that line was supposed to be.

Going back to our observations with regard to the beginning of the end of the Yalta system, I believe that this system was created under the conditions of bipolarity. So when one of its components - the socialist system - ceased to exist, then the Yalta system has in fact collapsed. So the goal today is to build a new security system, maybe with some border changes, because the old system is history now.

**E. Pyadysheva:** Let us recall the historical circumstances that compelled, above all, Roosevelt to ask for a conference to be held. He was also the one to propose a venue - the Black Sea coast.

With his characteristic sarcasm Winston Churchill advised the Americans to call the upcoming event the Argonaut Conference. He wired to Franklin Roosevelt: "We are direct descendants of Argonauts."

A memo and other documents prepared for the president in Washington for the Yalta talks stressed: We need support from the Soviet Union to rout Germany. We desperately need the Soviet Union for a war with Japan after the war in Europe ends. Judging by the present situation, all peoples of Europe are affected by leftist sentiments and advocating for far-reaching economic and social reforms.

**A. Filitov:** Here is an interesting fact: As military representatives at this conference discussed when the war would end, A. Antonov, the chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, said that the war should objectively end by July 1 and possibly by December 1, 1945. They were mistaken: The war ended earlier. It was clear that the war was won and now peace had to be won. There was a need to decide what the postwar borders and new European governments would be like.

The well-known Declaration of Liberated Europe was signed, which made it incumbent on the great powers to help those countries build democracy. The declaration provided for intervention to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism.

**E. Pyadysheva:** I cannot help remembering official Ukrainian rhetoric today, which falsifies historical facts and supports Nazi movements. The reaction of Germany, which positions itself as a state that has completely overcome its Nazi past, may also seem a little strange. At present, Germany is Europe's principal foundation on all ideological issues. However, when Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseny Yatsenyuk recently said that Russia had attacked Germany and Ukraine and that Europe had won World War II single-handedly, no one in Germany reacted with a word of condemnation.

**A. Filitov:** I would not like to modernize this issue so much. Until the end of 1943, the West was advocating for the idea of federations that were to emerge after the war. In effect, those were the attempts to create a cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union because it ended up outside those federations. The United States and Great Britain could have exerted great influence on those federations via their ties with prewar politicians. If the federations had been established at that time, then there would have been no need to think about countries such as Ukraine joining NATO.

**E. Pyadysheva:** The Americans of course initiated this confrontation mainly in an effort to persuade the Soviet Union to enter the war with Japan. Moreover, the aforementioned memo spoke about that in no uncertain terms. In fact, they did that. The Yalta conference reached an agreement that the Soviet Union would join the war with Japan two or three months after the end of the war in Europe.

Now, what main disagreements between the Soviet Union and its allies had to be resolved just before and during the Yalta Conference?

**A. Filitov:** The Polish issue was of course a principal concern.

The border issue was resolved quickly, especially given that at the Tehran Conference, none other than Churchill had proposed the following scenario: In the east, western Ukraine and western Belorussia would be part of the Soviet Union while Poland would get compensation in the west. At the Yalta Conference, Stalin made well-known concessions: 5-8 km from the "Curzon line" to the east.

So the Yalta Conference, which drew up a "roadmap" for a world order for postwar decades, was also an extraordinary event in terms of diplomacy, where a configuration of political plans, aspirations and strivings by world leaders could be observed.

## "Norge Takker Dere" - "Norway Thanks You"

*Author: Oyvind Nordsletten*

*Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Norway to the Russian Federation, 2000-2008*



IN THE NORWEGIAN CAPITAL'S largest cemetery, there stands a monument to Soviet soldiers with three words on the pedestal, "Norge takker dere" - "Norway thanks you." These are simple words but they express the deep feelings that the Norwegians had after the Soviet army, in October 1944, drove the invaders not only out of the Soviet Union's own Arctic areas and Kola Peninsula but also out of Eastern Finnmark, a Norwegian province that in those days

bordered the Soviet Union and today borders Russia.

Germany had attacked Norway on April 9, 1940. After battles with a superior and powerful enemy, Norway was forced to surrender in June of that year. When Germany unleashed its war against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, our countries became allies in fighting the common enemy.

Naturally, the Norwegian people and government were jubilant when the liberation of our lands began. At that time, the government was in exile in London. King Haakon VII, in a radio address on October 26, thanked the Soviet liberators on behalf of all Norwegians. His son, subsequently King Olav V, described Soviet troops' relations with the local authorities and population as exemplary.

When I had the privilege to represent my country as ambassador in Moscow, my Russian colleagues would often say that the border between Norway and Russia might be the most peaceful of Russia's borders - there had never been a war between the two neighboring countries.

The wartime history that we share with the Soviet Union has many aspects to it.

The Norwegians will forever remember the liberation of Finnmark by the Soviet army. Our country's leadership and King Harald V himself usually attend celebrations of anniversaries of this event.

When I had the privilege to represent my country as ambassador in Moscow from 2000 to 2008, my Russian colleagues would often say that the border between Norway and Russia might be the most peaceful of Russia's borders - there had never been a war between the two neighboring countries.

This is our common achievement. This frontier is now a bridge between our countries.

Not only will the present-day generation remember the heroic act accomplished by the Soviet soldiers and the Soviet people 70 years ago. It will be an example for future generations as well.

## Centripetal and Centrifugal Trends in Multiethnic States

*Author: Yu. Bulatov*

*Dean, School of International Relations, Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations,  
Professor, Doctor of Science (History)*



In the past and today, the national question demonstrated and is demonstrating two trends in the Russian multiethnic state. On the eve of World War I, in Russia and abroad functionaries of left-wing parties paid enough attention to the subject. Their analysis of the socio-economic processes in the European countries suggested a conclusion that under capitalism social development demonstrates two clearly discernible trends in the sphere of national relations.

In the twentieth century, the West smoothly moved from the first to the second trend in the national question. All sides of social life became internationalized.

It should be said that throughout the twentieth century the Russian politicians had to learn how to correctly assess the centrifugal and centripetal trends and use this skill in practice. Today, very much like in the past, the country leaders keep in mind this specific feature of Russian society and Russian politics.

The history of the national republics in the Soviet Union is an inalienable part of the history of the Bolsheviks' program on the national question formulated at the early stages of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party.

The attempts of the Kremlin leaders to use Lenin's ideas about a single community of people failed and the corresponding plans remained unrealized. The Third Program of the CPSU (1961) postulated that the peoples should be drawn closer together to achieve their complete unity and a common internationalist culture. The program, however, did not say how this could be done. The national policy of the Russian Federation should be divided into two stages according to Putin's first and second presidential terms. During his first term as president, Putin put the entire administrative resource into action to stop decentralization: the country was divided into several federal districts which consolidated the vertical of power; the principles on which the Federation Council was formed were changed; the State Council and a Public Chamber were set up; the federal center annulled over 3.5 thousand normative acts passed by the subjects of the Russian Federation which contradicted the Constitution of Russia.

During Putin's second term as President, much was done to elaborate specific measures to consolidate the multinational people of Russia and to ensure civil and national unity.

Today, for the first time in the history of the Russian state, the share of Russians in the Russian Federation is slightly over 80 percent, which means that according to international standards Russia is a monoethnic state. Russia, however, is not only a state but a self-sufficient civilization

populated, since time immemorial, by over 150 peoples and nationalities. The majority of them look at Russia as their Fatherland and their homeland; they are autochthonous peoples with no statehood outside Russia.

The process is going on: the events around Crimea and the Ukrainian crisis showed that the majority has closed ranks around the president and that the Russian society has become consolidated. In this far from simple time, the multiethnic people of Russia demonstrate unprecedented unity, determination and patriotism.

## Russia-Afghanistan: Three Milestones

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THE YEAR 2014 marked three good round figures in the nearly century-long history of the relationships between Soviet Russia/Soviet Union/Russian Federation and Afghanistan. Last spring, the 95th anniversary of the recognition by Moscow of sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan remained unnoticed; in February, veterans of the Afghan war widely celebrated the 25th anniversary of the Soviet pullout of Afghanistan, while in December we pondered once more on the decision of the Politburo

of the CC CPSU to move Soviet troops into Afghanistan adopted 35 years ago. The first date belongs to a prologue of a new stage of international relations launched by the end of World War I and the 1917 October Revolution in Russia; two others belong to the epilogue of the post-World War II international developments and the beginning of the Soviet Union's disintegration.

Before the Russian revolutions which followed one another in 1917 the world had been watching a clash of imperial ambitions of two superpowers; in the post-revolutionary period, the Great Game became a conflict between two world political systems even if the aims remained the same: protection of the strategic interests and spheres of influence. Very much as before Moscow wanted to remain in Central Asia, while Britain remained concerned with India isolated from Central Asia by Afghanistan. After the Russian revolution, Foggy Albion no longer feared the "Russian bear" of czarism; it was, however, very much concerned with protecting the "jewel of the British crown" against the zealous propaganda of the ideas and slogans of the world revolution carried out by the Bolsheviks and the Communist International - the Comintern. It was at that time that new players joined the next stage of diplomatic warfare between the two old rivals.

There are certain parallels between what Moscow was doing in Afghanistan in the late twentieth century and what Washington has been doing there in the early twenty-first century.

THE FIRST STAGE of mutual "adjustment" was crowned in February 1921 with a Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty which laid the foundation of the relationships for many years to come. Its text was a product of strenuous efforts accompanied by prolonged delays, mutual mistrust and so on. Kabul, obviously unwilling to let Moscow open its consulates in the country's east bordering on British India, slowed down the ratification of this document of fundamental importance for the future of their bilateral relations in all areas. London, in its turn, used Kabul's indecision to tighten its demands: recognition of Afghanistan's full independence in exchange of total break-off with Moscow. Not ready and not willing to obey the Amir exploited the situ-

ation to enforce his conditions on the Bolsheviks: no political propaganda, extension of financial, economic and military aid as promised, etc.

The new relationships between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan were further consolidated by border settlements and the visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Kabul late in 1955 with an absolutely pragmatic aim of forming a friendly regime in Afghanistan to secure the southern borders of the Soviet Union.

For many years, the Soviet Union helped Afghanistan train engineers and technicians by allotting free places in Soviet educational establishments and paying stipends to the Afghan students. In the 1970s, thousands of local specialists engaged in the country's national economy received higher or secondary education in the Soviet Union.

Turbulence in Afghanistan which many superficial observers took for an island of stability in the ocean of international storms was unfolding amid the rapidly worsening situation in the region and at the Afghan borders. Tension between China and India; the Indo-Pak conflict; the degrading situation in the Middle East shaped the political situation at the regional level, while the East-West confrontation at the global level was caused among other things by consolidation of NATO.

Neither Moscow nor Washington could have expected that in a short while Afghanistan would move to the frontlines of international politics to become the stumbling block in the relationships between the two superpowers.

I VISITED Kabul in spring 2014 as member of the delegation of the Central Election Committee of Russia to observe the presidential and provincial elections in Afghanistan, which, as many hoped, would open a new page in the country's political history. I found that much had changed in Kabul during the tragic decades. It became larger yet the contrast between the narrow and dirty bypasses of the city's old part and the multistoried buildings which sprang here and there without much logic or order in the center spoke of the sharp and dramatic turns of the last decades.

## Pope Francis: More than Meets the Eye

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POPE FRANCIS continues to enjoy growing popularity. This is seen from the polls in many countries and conclusions made by international media and the worried reaction among broad public to the pope's words at the end of August of 2014 giving himself another "two or three years" to live.

Argentine Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio was only elected head of the Roman Catholic Church on March 13, 2013, but there have already appeared substantive

studies focusing on the pope's character and his activities.

The book is a thorough analysis of Bergoglio's main stages as a religious leader - as leader of the Jesuits in Argentina, in the period before becoming Archbishop of Buenos Aires, as President of the Argentine Episcopal Conference in that capacity, and currently as Pope of the Catholic Church. Few Western reviewers have demonstrated talent for critical assessment of the intentional and practical deeds of the person who is the current pope.

The author cites solid reasons against simplistic assessments and conclusions about the 266th head of the Catholic Church, the first from the Americas and from the Southern Hemisphere, the first member of the Jesuit order, the first pope to take the name Francis.

The author has good reasons to note that the Vatican's head at times greatly differs from what he used to be as cardinal, "but if he was a wise teacher and a gentle pastor, Benedict XVI was a weak governor and a poor politician" (p. 9).

The book comes up with an impeccable analysis of the situation in the world and in Argentina ruled by the military junta. It says that the United States insisted that the conflict with communism was to be waged as a total war. The best allies of the U.S. in that would be those right-wing military dictatorships, while the clergymen in the countries of the region were being persuaded by CIA agents that it was necessary to defend Catholicism against the anti-Church atheist onslaught (p. 70).

When still archbishop of Buenos Aires in 2010 today's pontiff said in an extensive interview to the press that the church was gradually coming to realize what had happened in Argentina as a result of the putsch. The documents since declassified and cited in the book, however, tell a different story.

Quite a few religious experts and political scientists, and members of the mass media covering religious matters voiced their approval of the book reviewed here. In the summer of 2014, I met many of them during our work at the library of the UN Office at Geneva. I am convinced that this book is a must for all who are interested in the workings of the Catholic Church today.



## Foreign Policy of Georges Pompidou

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RUSSIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY has never thoroughly examined the foreign policy doctrine of France under President Georges Pompidou. This gap has been filled by a special research "The Foreign Policy of France during Georges Pompidou's Presidency (1969-1974)" carried out by Ye.A. Osipov under the auspices of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Having relied on numerous sources for the first time used in an academic research, the author provides a panoramic overview of Pompidou's foreign policy activities. Osipov has painted in bright colors a detailed political portrait of George Pompidou. According to the author's *mot juste*, the latter's personality fancifully combined universal humanitarian values of a teacher of literature and connoisseur of the French poetry with a pragmatic approach of a Rothschild bank director.

Summarizing Ye. Osipov's study on the foreign policy of France during Pompidou's presidency, we would like to underline the following:

- The foreign policy pursued by Pompidou became a strong connecting link between de Gaulle's epoch and the subsequent periods;

- The initial foreign policy approach adopted by Pompidou aiming at priority development of the European vector in a close contact (and on a preferential basis) with the United States, somewhat differed from the classical Gaullist conceptions. At the same time, a collapse of French-American negotiations on the world financial system reform initiated complications in the relations between Paris and Washington, while President Nixon's proposal on signing a new Atlantic Charter only served to confirm France's reservations regarding a growth of the American impact on the decision-making process within the EEC; with the passage of time, France returned to a classical Gaullist pattern in its relations with the U.S.;

- France confirmed its former course in relations with the Soviet Union. The French side for the first time spoke in favor of holding a conference on security and cooperation in Europe, which was one of the key issues of Soviet foreign policy. Despite the fact that the 1970 Protocol and the 1971 Principles of Cooperation could not be regarded as full-fledged interstate treaties, they have become important landmarks in the history of détente and represented a "new step" in Franco-Soviet relations;

- Pompidou's decision in favor of expanding the borders of the "united Europe" by admitting to it the United Kingdom cannot be considered as a departure from the Gaullist principles, because this promoted the security of France's national interests, which is an essential component of Gaullism. Stepping up political cooperation within the "united Europe" was largely an attempt

to counteract a growing American-Soviet influence both in Europe itself and in the zone of "European" interests. Under Pompidou, the outlines of the future European Union were drawn, including the initiation of discussions on the creation of a single European currency;

- The French leaders' balanced and professional reaction to the demand of African states on revising inequitable cooperation treaties signed in the 1960s, has allowed France to preserve with its former African colonies the relations based on the preferential treatment principles.

There is no doubt that the author of the monograph has succeeded in moving out of historical shadow President Georges Pompidou who was somehow lost among other luminaries of French politics. Georges Pompidou has been portrayed as a strong supporter not only of the united but also of the "European Europe." One of the fundamental conceptions of Pompidou's legacy in international affairs is the idea that the trade and economic ties should never get mixed up with political considerations but rather be flexibly adapted to suit political objectives.

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