

International Affairs: Summary №6, 2014



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Establishing Competitive Cooperation With a Unifying Agenda

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Every session of the UN General Assembly is a landmark event that not only sums up the results of the past political year and assesses the status of international relations at the current stage, but also sets out a vector for future movement forward. As they say, the UN, like a mirror, reflects global processes in the political, economic and human rights spheres, as well as collective security issues.

In this sense, the current session has encompassed the entire complex of the challenging, conflicting problems that permeate world politics. It could be said that

the main outcome of the general political discussion was the recognition by the overwhelming number of world states that there is no alternative to collective coordinated efforts in countering global threats, based on compliance with international law and the UN Charter.

It is telling that the attempts to ensure U.S. domination at the expense of the multi-vector principle, which showed through clearly in the remarks by President Barack Obama at the session, were largely met with distrust and rejection.

Concerning the formation of an international coalition, as S.V. Lavrov said, we have long been combatting terrorism steadily and consistently, regardless of any high-profile statements on the establishment of coalitions.

On the practical level, Russia is providing large-scale supplies of arms and military equipment to the governments of Iraq, Syria, and other countries in the region in support of their efforts in combating terrorism.

If we really want to achieve a breakthrough in putting an end to the violence in Syria, then it is necessary to return to the Geneva process and not arm the opposition in order to oust the Damascus regime.

Our position on the current situation in international relations and ways of overcoming the existing problems was presented frankly in the course of numerous bilateral contacts.

As an alternative to that, we spelled out our position in favor of establishing truly constructive cooperation based on a unifying agenda. It is especially important to follow such an approach today, as the days count down to the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, as a result of which the World Organization was created.

Barack Obama: "At a Crossroads Between War and Peace"

Author: Armen Oganessian

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DURING his 40-minute-long address to the UN General Assembly, President Obama sounded



less like a president and more like a prophet" or a preacher with a mission to reveal the truth about the world to mankind. The host is expected to be restrained, especially in view of the realities of the day. This time, the host pushed aside all rules to confirm the old truth that weaker positions are defended by stronger rhetoric. It seems that time has come for the UN Security Council and General Assembly to revise the tradition of long introductory speeches. Indeed, people who represent the world community are exposed to endless bragging and all sorts of opinions voiced by the leader of one, even if the most influential, country.

His speech abounded in "political drama": "We come together at a crossroads between war and peace; between disorder and integration; between fear and hope" in the world "threatened" by Russian aggression in Europe." It looked as if the master of the White House was lost in a wood of different times, epochs, facts, and people. He showed us a black-and-white world in which white was taken for black and black for white. This brings to mind Vasily Rozanov who wrote in *Fallen Leaves* about a nightingale bewitched by his own song.

It would have been funny had not it been dangerous. Today, many in Europe and even in America have assessed "political extreme" of the Obama Administration in its relations with Russia for what it is: irresponsible and open provocations rather than just a short-sighted and unrealistic course. On both sides of the Atlantic middle-aged and older people have been lamenting the loss of the tradition of Russia studies. Russia is turning into terra incognita while the degree of ignorance has practically reached the highest point. This is true at the grassroots level and is testified by blunders of prominent political figures of the West, the United States in the first place.

Those who expected that sanctions would force Russia to toe the line were wrong: in the globalized world these measures can ruin only a relatively small country. Today, this is what they say in Europe: Russia is cherished as a partner, its role being not limited to the energy sphere. Europe knows that it will pay dearly for the possible split - there is no hope that the United States will shoulder at least part of the cost.

President Obama spoke of the "threat of Russia" as the world's second gravest danger after the virus Ebola. I should say that an epidemic of hatred is much worse, for it is said: "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather, be afraid of the One who can destroy both soul and body..." (Matt. 10:28).

A New Paradigm of International Relations

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TODAY, we are watching how the present stage of world history is coming to an end amid great or even fundamental changes of the geopolitical picture of the world.

The twenty-five-year-long partnership between Russia and the West has ended. It will be probably replaced with a new structure of international cooperation much more pragmatic and devoid of illusions and exaggerated expectations nurtured by Russia rather than the West. It is

wrong to expect that when the situation in Ukraine has been stabilized the world will go back to its pre-crisis state. There is no way back. The old bridges were burned while new bridges have not yet been built. The paradigm of world development geared at the prospects of long-term was destroyed.

How did this happen? Moscow and the Western capitals are ready with diametrically opposite answers.

The Western mega-players which insisted on pushing the areas of military-political and economic influence of NATO and the EU to Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe to the detriment of Russia's security interests increased the potential risks of unwelcome developments of any conflict in Europe and, finally, arrived at the avalanche of an uncontrolled Ukrainian crisis.

Russia and the West have found themselves at the crossroads: they have to choose the road at which they would be able to get out, without great losses, from the very difficult, not to say dangerous, situation into which they, and the rest of the world, have been plunged.

Headed by the United States the West has gone too far with the policy of anti-Russia sanctions. One cannot but wonder whether people in Washington and the other Western capitals believed that sanctions would force Russia to obey their commands. This is naive, or even absurd. It seems that the West has already recognized this yet still pretends that everything goes according to its plans.

The sanctions are not limited to economy - they are related to five top leaders of Russia. Absolutely useless from the point of view of their impact on individuals, these sanctions can be described as an insult to the Russian state and the Russian people. Their effect will be very opposite to the expected yet the aftertaste of the rotten political product will linger for a long time. The Ukrainian crisis proved to be a severe test for Russia which, very much as usual, has positive sides as well. We now know our friends and our opponents. It's worth a lot.

The European Parliament: Eurosceptics on the March

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THE BAFFLED European and international media described the results of the May 2014 elections to the European Parliament as revolutionary. On the eve, there had been a lot of talk that the traditional parliamentary majority could be pushed aside; immediately after the elections, the result looked as a political earthquake of sorts.

The press and political analysts concentrate at the stunning success of the French Front National (FN) and the British United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). They gained more votes than the leading parties which represent the political images of their respective countries to the rest of the world. The world was even more interested in their leaders - Marine Le Pen in France and Nigel Farage in Britain - two charismatic persons who attracted voters and even opponents by enthusiasm and charm.

In other countries the victory of Eurosceptics was less stunning yet equally baffling: they got enough to win seats in the parliament.

It is wrong, however, to describe Euroscepticism as a novel phenomenon: Eurosceptics were represented in the European Parliament; perceived as a boring minority they were practically excluded from parliamentary activities. Today, Eurosceptics and allied deputies account, according to different sources, for one-third of the total number of deputies.

It was people, not factors, who came to the polls in May 2014 and opened the doors of the European Parliament to Eurosceptics.

The results of European elections can be discussed in the European and national contexts, that is, we are either interested in the number of Eurosceptics in the European Parliament, their quality and quantity and an ability to influence the parliament or in their popularity at home to correlate it with the degrees of popularity of other parties to trace down the dynamics of changes.

When seen from the point of view of their national affiliation the Eurosceptics present an interesting object of study: in each of 28 EU member-states Euroscepticism may have a distinctive regional or national dimension.

So far, the Eurosceptics, either deliberately or intuitively, are seeking alliance on geographical or historical principles. Eurosceptics from the south of Europe tend to the FN to a much greater extent than their colleagues from the continent's north.

Their positions on the Ukrainian crisis, which has already complicated the relationships between Russia and the EU, are very important: they might either create a more favorable atmosphere in the RF-EU relations or widen the split. There are signs, however, that the EU is gradually moving toward common sense.

Some Political Challenges for Russia's SCO Chairmanship

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IN MID-SEPTEMBER this year, Dushanbe hosted another summit of the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which marked the starting point for Russia's chairmanship of it for the period 2014-2015.

Scan the political and economic landscape in the SCO's area of responsibility and along its perimeter with an eye to the planned events schedule as well as the evolving explosive situation in Afghanistan and Ukraine. You can already assert that Russia's initiating and coordinat-

ing role in this period will be constantly affected by challenges like increasing political, military and social instability in the region and the world at large, the resurgent terrorist and narcotics threats, and continued attempts by extra-regional forces to gain a foothold and expand their presence in Central Asia.

There is an understanding that threats from across the Afghan border will be dealt with firmly by the SCO. For more than 10 years now, their Tashkent-based Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) has been preparing for a coordinated mighty counterstrike.

Overall, in the year or the Russian Chairmanship, it is to be expected that the Afghan theme will be very high on the SCO's agenda to hammer out a joint position on all aspects of a peace deal in Afghanistan.

A SECOND, but no less important, two-fold political task, which Russia must help solve, is, first, to promote economic cooperation within the SCO and, secondly, to gain an understanding with the partners on how the SCO will interact with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB).

In view of the extremely volatile nature of international life and the expected important changes in the region it is desirable to regularly update the policy and position dossier of the SCO, making it a more dynamic and effective organization. The rare, even once a quarter, meetings of the directors of the relevant departments of the ministries of foreign affairs of member states cannot give significant effect, because in them the parties only set out their own positions without addressing the primary task of formulating common approaches for the Organization. (As it is known, for this one needs the appropriate authority.) Returning to the statutory provisions, we will note that the "search of common positions on foreign policy issues of mutual interest, including issues arising within international organizations and international fora" also refers to a priority political task of the Russian Chairmanship of the SCO.

The Eurasian Integration Process of the CIS Countries

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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT for market economy countries presupposes the formation of country integration groups based on the mutual adaptability of national economies. The objective prerequisite for such action is the existence of a Single Economic Space (SES) provided by political, legal, informational and institutional measures. As a trend in the development of the system of international relations, the integration process goes in its evolution

through certain stages. With respect to the Eurasian integration, we can view these steps from the perspective of the implementation of the political agreements made by leaders of the CIS countries.

Stabilization processes in the economic systems of the countries of the agreement made it possible to work out the national programs for socioeconomic development, and to determine the best approach to agree the directions for regional integration within the CIS framework. Of the utmost importance was the initiative of the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, for a special Program for the Economies of Central Asia, to which Turkmenistan also was a party. On the basis of the program it is possible to single out two main objectives: first, the continued strengthening of economic ties between the states of the region; secondly, the development of economic integration of the Central Asian countries with Europe and Asia. In addition, the program contemplated the following priority directions of cooperation among the CIS countries: transport infrastructure development, rational use of water and energy resources, attracting foreign investment and providing multiple routes for the delivery of hydrocarbons to external markets.


AFTER COMPLETING the formation of the single customs territory - the basis of the Customs Union - the EurAsEC countries (Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan) began to create a Single Economic Space, the next integration step.

As agreed at the highest level between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, they are to complete, by January 1, 2015, the codification of the various international treaties making up the legal framework of the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space.

The Economic Union - as a new stage of integration - is attractive also for other foreign countries. In addition to the planned entry of Armenia and Kyrgyzstan into the EAEU, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Tajikistan have expressed their intention of participating in some or other form. Negotiations are underway to create a free trade area with Vietnam. South American partners and India have voiced similar intentions.

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UNTIL RECENTLY, many of those who speak and write about BRICS on a professional level were in a bit of a dilemma. Yes, over the past five years, the meetings of the heads of four (BRIC) and then five states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) seemed to be more like a political "club. Summit discussions were of an increasingly comprehensive nature, gradually expanding the agenda, but such facts in and of themselves did not as yet mean the formalization of a new association or alliance.

Moreover, informed experts say that the BRICS countries have to go much further before such an association (even with the common will) can be created.

Yes, the countries of the informal alliance in question indeed have

plenty of common interests and similarities.

Furthermore, their economies are essentially complementary and in the process of development. However, even the emergence of de jure joint BRICS institutions does not eliminate the differences and objective difficulties for their transformation into a full-fledged international association of states.

Thus, the existing trade and economic ties between the BRICS countries do not point to deep and comprehensive cooperation between them. Perhaps the only exception in this regard is their bilateral economic ties with China. Nor do the BRICS countries have multilateral, mutually beneficial wide-ranging projects. Finally, on a whole number of sensitive issues on the international arena, we are in fact rivals, or do not have similar positions.

Therefore, already at the current stage, the BRICS project requires constant and thorough parliamentary support. In addition, the further expansion and deepening of cooperation between the "Global Group of 5" can easily lead to the adoption of additional national laws, as well as the harmonization of separate legislation provisions in its member countries.

With regard to the BRICS member countries, the "Soviet factor" is not in evidence, but there are other constraints. Some of them were mentioned earlier. This list could be expanded with such factor as significant financial costs.

Finally, frankly speaking, it is difficult to imagine in the short term a full-fledged agenda for such an international body operating on a permanent basis. Interaction between the BRICS partners has not as yet achieved a level that would call for - even in the foreseeable future - ongoing support from a supranational parliamentary body. I do not think that the BRICS member countries are in principle prepared to approve the establishment of a full-fledged international legislature above them (similar to the European Parliament).

In any event, the visible successes in the development of relations between the BRICS countries (which is a source of serious concern for our traditional opponents, and a source of encouragement for our friends) should be consolidated and strengthened not only at the top level (which is certainly very important and necessary) and the level of ministries and government agencies, but also in other formats, which, with their effective use, can create "added value" for the common cause.

International Law and the Problem of International Information Security

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THE IMPACT of information and communication technologies (ICT) on all aspects of human life, society and the State cannot be overemphasized. Apart from the obvious benefits in terms of economic, social and cultural development, the enhancement of the role of ICT in the contemporary world inevitably brings new risks for international and national security. There is already real evidence that the damage from the use of ICT for purposes contrary to the Charter of the United Nations, as

well as for criminal and terrorist purposes may be comparable to the most destructive weapons. The list of potential targets for information weapon attacks includes not only the information resources of the Internet, but also the critical infrastructures of States in the industry, transport and energy sectors. What's more, the scale and technological level of such destructive impact are steadily increasing.

All countries without exception acknowledge the severity of threats of a criminal, terrorist and military-political nature in the information space. The international community has been engaged in discussion on how to ensure international information security (IIS) for more than a decade and a half. At this point, the apparent key problem is the lack of a full-fledged international legal framework governing ICT-related activities by States, including their military aspects.

The UN GGE on IIS will convene for the fourth time. In 2010 Russia's Chairmanship ended with the adoption of a report whose wording made it possible to lay the basis for a substantive discussion on IIS. As evaluated by Deborah Stokes, an Australian expert who headed the GGE in 2012-2013, the report "paved the way" for discussion of the most topical problems in this area, including the politico-military aspects of the use of ICT.

The Australian Chairmanship, in turn, resulted in a document that consolidated the general interest of States in the peaceful use of ICT. In addition, the report of this GGE reached consensus on another fundamental issue, that of the applicability of international law to the use of ICT. The document lays out a balanced formula: while international law is generally applicable to the field, there has to be a common understanding as to the way States can apply it, and in what direction, if necessary, it should be adapted.

International law has no reference to universally recognized notions of war or armed struggle. Moreover, there is no universally accepted definition of information war though some interna-

tional acts include such definitions. There is also a need to study the attributes of information war and elaborate a universally recognized definition since some of the specifics of unlawful use of ICTs for the resolution of interstate differences are impeding in terms of its legal regulation:

ICTs are not a weapon per se, which makes it difficult to classify an attack with the use of ICTs as an armed one.

Specific attributes of the ICTS are in compliance with the fact that any war waged to conquest or defeat the adversary violates the UN Charter and the principle of sovereign equality of states. There is a need to elaborate a specific terminology, including such definitions as "information weapons," "information warfare," "act of ICT-based aggression," etc. The principles of international humanitarian law would undergo substantial adjustment. In some cases, new legal norms for international relations in information space should emerge. It is necessary to adapt the generally recognized principles and norms of international law to the specifics of digital space.

Regime Change in Ukraine and the Evolution of Russian-American Relations

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FOR A LONG TIME, Russian researchers remained riveted to the problem of resource deficit in the world as a potential cause of international instability or even conflicts. In recent years, however, we are growing increasingly aware of deficit of confidence, a resource which is equally important for world economy and world politics and which, therefore, can be described as universally important.

NOT VERY LONG AGO we hoped that the 2010s would bring a U-turn, a tectonic shift for the better in Russian-American relations. President Obama's second term strengthened the hopes: it seemed that the highly promising trends started by the reset policy would be consolidated. This did not happen: the reset had been exhausted

while new cooperation impulses never cropped up. Today, it is becoming increasingly clear that the relations between Russia and the United States are sliding down.

The Americans acting within the double track approach believed that they could and should cooperate with the official structures but also with the NGOs living on American money. The "reset" rhetoric of recent years apart, Americans insisted on their interpretation of Russia as an unpredictable and, therefore, dangerous country with the ambitions spreading far and wide beyond its region.

In 2013, the contradictions between the U.S. and Russia in the post-Soviet space became even more obvious; it was equally obvious that they could not be resolved through consensus, that is, a "non-zero-sum game."

Common history and lives of common people (up to one-third of the Russian population has relatives living in Ukraine) make the two countries closely intertwined. This means that the Russian political elite and common people regard as unacceptable the efforts to draw Ukraine into NATO and association with the EU to detach it from Russia economically.

Unexpectedly, the EU with its Eastern Partnership Program and the invitations to sign association agreements extended to some of the Soviet-successor states came forth in Ukraine as a provocative "third force."

The fact that the highest stage of confrontation on the Maidan in Kiev coincided with the Winter Olympics speaks volumes. This makes it a trend, not coincidence. The crisis was going from bad to worse; legally elected President Yanukovich was removed from power when the Sochi Olympics was at full swing.

In recent years, much was said in the West that Moscow behaved irrationally and that Putin had completely destroyed the trust of Western leaders, etc. However, much earlier the mutual trust had been undermined by the West which proved unable to deal with Russia as an equal partner.

VIKTOR YANUKOVICH, though incompetent and corrupt president not alien to power abuse, consistently objected to the NATO membership for his country. The West, however, consistently refused to accept Ukraine's new non-aligned status. It never missed an opportunity to remind that Kiev and Tbilisi had reached the NATO threshold, that the doors remained open, etc. None of the prominent Western politicians either American or European deemed it wise to say that "we respect Ukraine's choice of neutrality."

The deficit of mutual trust between Russia and the West was exacerbated by the fast and calamitous collapse of the February 21 agreements which Moscow regarded as a considerable concession on its part. Guaranteed by Germany, France and Poland the agreements were devalued on the next day by an illegitimate regime change.

For a better understanding of what happened next we should bear in mind that seen from Washington the situation in Ukraine went beyond the limits of geopolitical contradictions: it was political strategy rather than Ukraine that was at stake. The United States was upset by Moscow's a-systemic actions in Crimea which in fact cast doubt on Washington's ability as the world leader to achieve its aims and maintain the norms and principles of the post-1991 world order.

So far everything or practically everything still depends on the Russian elite and its ability to control the situation inside the country and use the unique organizational resource of Russian diplomacy. We should launch the announced and long overdue reforms inside the country and correct the development models of Russian society and economy so that not to make the country even more vulnerable.

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Russia and East Asia in the Context of the Ukrainian Crisis: "No" to Sanctions, "Yes" to a New World Order

THE SYSTEM of international relations and the world order are being "tested by Ukraine," the situation in which Russia's relations with East Asia are not an exception but a confirmation of the process and an illustration of it.

The closest allies of Washington in East Asia found it hard to stand opposed to the Big Brother's pressure. In September 2014, Japan introduced additional sanctions against Russia's financial sector. Sberbank, VTB Bank, Vnesheconombank, Gazprombank, and Russian Agricultural Bank were in the fourth package of anti-Russian sanctions; the process had started in spring 2014.

It should be said in all justice that Japan demonstrated more lenience than the other G-7 members. From the very beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, it has been balancing between its duty to side, to an extent, with G-7 and its desire to keep the relations with Russia alive. While Japan introduced sanctions under pressure, South Korea, another close ally of the United States in East Asia, was very open about its intentions: "South Korean Ambassador to Russia Wi Sung-lac said that South Korea had no plans to follow America and Europe's lead in adopting sanctions. Then, after the meeting with the U.S. official this week, a spokeswoman for South Korea's Foreign Ministry reaffirmed it hasn't committed to sanctions."

This decision was logical in the context of the two countries' resolution to arrive at constructive strategic partnership; Vladimir Putin's visit to Seoul in November 2013 was a big step toward this goal.

Russia and Republic of Korea agree on international issues ranging from a peaceful settlement in Syria to the UN stronger role on the international scene. Strategic partnership between Russia and the Republic of Korea is becoming more and more obvious to the extent that South Korea refuses to mar these prospects with anti-Russian sanctions.

The mutual sanctions of the West and Russia, an aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, consolidated Moscow's partner relationships with the BRICS countries which, in their turn, closed ranks on the world arena.

There is a widely shared opinion in China that it should help Russia with its own experience of disentangling from the Western sanctions introduced in the wake of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 (the West, however, failed to isolate China from the rest of the world) and positive cooperation which will reduce the efficiency of the sanctions (the same happened in Iran).

The above should not create an illusion that Beijing will openly side with Russia on the Ukrainian issue: the Chinese believe that this would have looked as indirect support of the separatist sentiments in Tibet and the SUAR (this also explains why earlier China preferred not to recognize independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia). On the whole, China does not want to enter into a direct confrontation with the West because of Russia and Ukraine.

France Will Probably Pay More Than Others for the Crisis

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The Ukrainian crisis brought to the fore what had been going on during the last two decades: numerous political advantages lost amid diplomatic misunderstandings and economic blunders. The West, Europe in particular, is responsible to a great extent for the entanglements: when dealing with Russia Brussels deliberately ignored Russian culture and development dynamics; it proceeded solely from its own ideas about politics and the future order. The Russians, meanwhile, prefer a different development model while Putin is convinced that we are watching the decline of Europe and erosion of European values.

OUR SQUABBLES with Putin are eclipsed by the split between

Europeans and Russians, whom I consider Europeans. A technocratic structure, which knew next to nothing about Russia, conducted the dialogue in technocratic manner. The visa-free regime talks have been going on indefinitely despite the ambitious tasks and huge civilizational challenges we are facing together with Russia. This cannot be tolerated any longer!

The West has not yet realized that Putin is no longer a KGB officer - he is building History. He tried and failed to fit Russia's history into the European trajectory Brussels style: to him a structure of twenty-eight members and the system of Euro-pean governance does not look functional. He treats Russia's national interests as supreme value.

Contrary to what people think the crisis is not a Cold War sequel. The Cold War was a clash of two claimants to worldwide ideological domination. Russia's current ambitions are quite different.

WE SHOWED that we had not understood Russians and their deeply rooted motivations. The Ukrainian crisis is a quintessence of our callousness and the hurt feelings of Russians.

The present political crisis between Ukraine and Russia is a result of twenty years of Europe's diplomatic blunders, vagueness and political blindness. We should have established closer ties with Russia yet the last two decades saw no large-scale economic projects with it!

IT SEEMS that Germany and France have already realized that sanctions will not force Russia to retreat. Politically, the principle "who is stronger" does not work - it merely intensifies Russian patriotism and consolidates the nation around the people in power who are increasing their pressure. Today, Putin's rating has reached its highest (over 80%). Europe has created an external threat of sorts; Russians responded with stronger patriotic feelings and rallied around their president. This is an immediate effect; I do hope that we will trim long-term negative repercussions.

THE ABOVE MEANS that we should look for and find a political solution to the crisis and that this should be entrusted to individual states. If French and German diplomacy shoulder the task we will limit the negative economic effects of the crisis. If split, Europe risks to be pushed to a much weaker position in the world, in which the center of gravity is gradually shifting to the Pacific. The traces of these negative developments will survive for a long time in History.

Who Are You, Mr. Tefft?

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THE QUESTION may seem odd, since there is too much known about the new U.S. Ambassador John Tefft, and then, too, among diplomatic circles he is remembered for his work as minister counsellor in Moscow in the late 1990s. However, the political situation in which John Tefft is now in Moscow will perhaps force him to show some other qualities of diplomacy, revealing new facets of his personality. If that does not happen, then his mission is unlikely to succeed.

Tefft is a diplomat of wide-ranging activities. Despite his age, he nonetheless belongs to the new generation of employees of the State Department, to which also belongs his predecessor, Mr. McFaul. This galaxy of diplomats adheres to the doctrine of "democracy promotion" through intensive work with the opposition and civil society. At some point in the past, Jack Matlock, a former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, gave a remarkable appraisal of this most ideologized generation of diplomats.

Other American critics have called the new style of U.S. diplomacy "Wilsonism in boots." It is known that President Woodrow Wilson was an advocate of a world "democratic revolution" and, in our time, the neo-conservatives and a whole array of eminent Democrats have imparted to the Wilson doctrine a more forceful, coercive character - hence the term.

However, the current situation in Russia leaves no room for "democracy export": the stronger the pressure on Russia, the higher its use of the sanctions instrument, the higher President Putin's rating and the greater the discontent of ordinary Russians with Washington's policy.

Although Tefft apparently also takes into account the unsuccessful public diplomacy campaign of the previous ambassador McFaul, all of these factors combined narrow the corridor for the realization of his image as the organizer of "colored revolutions."

Another hobbyhorse of Mr. Ambassador: to make wide use of U.S. funds for the implementation of his goals - is also hardly realizable in Russian conditions. Thus, the impact on political processes and civil society institutions will inevitably be limited in terms of financial support.

However, the main constraint on Mr. Ambassador's freedom of maneuver is the current state of Russian-American relations - the worst since the Cold War.

Recently, the American diplomat etched himself in the memory of Russian television viewers as an active supporter, if not to say a participant of Maidan.

But it is not in the Russian tradition to receive a guest with an unfriendly air. Since the first part of the task, as formulated by Mr. Tefft, is to promote the interests of the United States and evokes no doubts, I would like to wish that the second point of his program - informing Washington about Russia's position - should equal the first in zeal and quality.

EurAsEC: From Integration Cooperation to a Eurasian Economic Union

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THE CONCEPT OF EURASIANISM is among the most sought-after and promising lines of modern social thought.

CURRENT Eurasian integration in the post-Soviet space has its origins in the Project for the Formation of a Eurasian Union of States (EAU), first presented by Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev at Lomonosov Moscow State University on March 28, 1994.

But in 1995-2000, despite numerous supporters, the EAU Project was not realized for both objective and subjective reasons.

AT A MEETING in Minsk on May 23, 2000, the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan took a decision to establish a new economic organization with international status, with wide powers to resolve issues of integration cooperation, a clear structure and effective mechanisms and institutions.

On October 10, 2000, the heads of state of these five countries met in Astana and signed a Treaty Establishing the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), which went into force on May 30, 2001. Five countries became members of the Community, and observer status was granted to three countries (Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine).

THE SUCCESSFUL OPERATION of the Customs Union created the conditions for deeper integration processes, which made it possible to proceed to the next stage of Eurasian integration: the creation of a Single Economic Space (SES).

The main advantages of the SES include:

- creation of larger markets for national producers and consumers;
- economic growth and diversification through a reduction of barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital and labor;
- along with a traditional expansion of mutual trade in the SES, priority is given to financial and investment cooperation, scientific and industrial cooperation, and the development of the human potential;
- increased business activity of large, medium and small enterprises; creation of interstate industrial and trade associations and joint ventures;
- greater economic security for each member state and for the SES as a whole;

- formation and joint development of an energy market; creation of a common market for transportation services and a single transportation system, and realization of the SES countries' transit potential;
- the single market is more attractive for mutual and foreign investment and innovation; businesses can obtain additional resources, which helps to accelerate economic development and create new jobs;
- greater order in organizing labor migration;
- significant facilitation of cross-border ties for citizens, who can use their energy and skills in the common labor market; in this market, migrant workers are protected by law, with mandatory health insurance and educational services available to them and members of their families;
- opportunities for member countries to jointly defend their interests in relations with other states and at the level of international organizations.

At the same time, the three member countries do not fence themselves off from other markets but, on the contrary, seek to develop multiform cooperation with both individual states and regional integration groupings, including the EU. European and Eurasian integration can effectively complement each other.

IN ITS 14 YEARS, the EurAsEC has successfully accomplished the tasks set before it: it has developed a legal and regulatory framework for a Customs Union and a SES.

The EurAsEC is registered with the United Nations and effectively cooperates with its institutions, and also with the EU, IAEA, CSTO, SCO, CIS and many other international organizations, which helps to accelerate Eurasian integration.

Thus, the EurAsEC has accomplished its historical mission and from 2015 will pass the baton to a new integration association: the Eurasian Economic Union. The creation and active work of the Union are of historical importance for the future of Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and other post-Soviet countries that will eventually become its members. The Eurasian Economic Union will be able to compete and cooperate on equal terms with the other poles of the modern multipolar world, raising our countries to a fundamentally new level of integration and creating a totally different geoeconomic reality of the 21st century.

Author: B. Zaritsky

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GERMANY has traditionally been and remains a net exporter of capital. According to UNCTAD estimates, the cumulative amount of German foreign direct investment abroad (outward FDI stock) at the end of 2013 was more than double the stock of foreign direct investment in Germany: \$1.7 trillion and \$851 billion, respectively.

Increasing competition in global markets compels not only large, but also many medium-sized German companies to modify their foreign economic strategy by supplementing traditional exports of goods with an expansion of production facilities and distribution networks in other countries.

Increasing investment in research and development abroad is a new trend in Germany. From 2007 to 2011, its amount increased from EUR 9.5 billion to EUR 14.8 billion, making up almost half of Germany's private sector spending on R&D within the country (EUR 33.6 billion).

According to Rosstat data, in 2013 Germany maintained its third place among the main investor countries in terms of foreign direct investment in the Russian economy (\$12.7 billion) with a share of 10.1% of total FDI stock, ranking behind Cyprus with a share of 35.5% and the Netherlands with a share of 18.8%.

Today, German business is tapping into almost all Russian regions. The top three most attractive investment destinations are Tatarstan, Kaluga and Ulyanovsk.

For the German engineering industry, for example, Russia is now the fourth largest market in the world with sales of around EUR 8 billion a year, but only 8% of German companies in this industry actually manufacture their products in Russian territory.

But in the spring and summer of 2014, the political and economic situation in Russia and around it changed dramatically. The behavior of investors changed accordingly.

The quarterly reports of German companies show that their business in the Russian market began to suffer from the depreciation of the ruble and the decline in production long before the imposition of any Western sanctions.

The pro-Russian lobby in Germany is by no means the most influential one, and the German media are on the whole unfriendly. In addition, there are quite a few people in Berlin who like to play geopolitical games and use the "Ukrainian card" to discredit and weaken

Russia. Besides, Germany's room for maneuver on serious international issues is very limited. It is more than prepared to listen to Washington regardless of all the spying scandals. AFTER THE CRASH of a Malaysian Boeing 777 airliner, there was a noticeable change in the attitudes of a significant part of German business. One can speak of the business community coming under strong pressure from the German authorities and the mass media, but it is a fact that the heads of leading employers' associations, including the Committee on Eastern European Economic Relations, have thought it necessary to publicly declare their loyalty to the authorities and their support for tougher sanctions against Russia despite their negative impact on the German economy. In the first quarter of 2014, German exports to Russia already fell by 13%, and imports from Russia, by 9%. If things continue as they are, German exporters could lose an estimated EUR 4 billion to EUR 6 billion during the year.

Nationalism as a Friend and Foe of the Eastern Partnership

Author: E. Arlyapova

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NEVER BEFORE, throughout its four-year history, has the Eastern Partnership (EaP) attracted so much attention as in the months that followed the Vilnius Summit of November 28-29, 2013 at which Ukraine did not sign the Association Agreement with the European Union.

THE ABOVE APPLIES, first and foremost, to Russia, involved by default by the EU in its political initiatives in the post-Soviet space. There is nothing enviable in the role ascribed to it which ranges from indifference, because of its weakness, to fear because of its power. This means that we should learn to treat and assess this and similar programs seriously. Before the

Ukrainian crisis, they were seen as a strong political irritant rather than a strong potential of geopolitical changes. Supported by the United States, a powerful extra-regional player, the countries of the "second echelon" gained considerable political dynamics in the post-Soviet space.

Der Spiegel offered uncompromising or even scathing critical comments about the summit and some of the officials. It refused to treat the signed agreements with Georgia and Moldova as a consolation prize.

The strategy of accelerating the process of political rapprochement and economic integration between the EU and Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine was a response to Russia's stronger international presence.

Moldova stood a good chance to become a "success story" in the EaP format: "The Eastern Partnership needs a success story, an example to spur on the doubters." The fact that Moldova and Georgia signed the agreement did not spur enthusiasm; this looked as a consolation prize against the background of the Ukrainian developments during and after the summit. Since much had been done to persuade Ukraine to sign the agreement one may surmise that the "objects" were replaced as the political process was unfolding and even try to identify those who initiated the intrigue and why.

Latvia is trying to keep in step with Lithuania which helps the U.S. be maximally involved in European politics.

In view of Baltic rivalry and possible negative developments, the special mission of Vilnius

will be probably replaced with a special mission of Riga, as soon as Latvia becomes a fully-fledged EU president with corresponding powers. Possible scenarios are described as "highly conflicting". Regrettably, they look highly realistic, too.

THE EAP, "farmed off" to the EU "small nations" which tend it according to their political and other ideas and possibilities, did not, and could not bring political dividends to "old Europe." It was forced to sacrifice its national interests to somehow diminish the harm done.

Russophobia and anti-Russian position, so far the only domestic and foreign policy resource of the Baltic states, make Russia's relations with them hardly promising.

Russian-Chinese Border Talks: A Mutually Beneficial Outcome

Author: V. Vorobyov

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary



TEN YEARS AGO, on October 14, 2004, a package of documents was signed with respect to the Russian-Chinese border on an island section at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers and near an island in the upper reaches of the Argun River. This brought to an end the 40-year long marathon of complicated, hard, and intermittent negotiations on the settlement of border issues between the two neighboring countries.

FROM THE MOMENT the negotiations were started in 1964, the dispute centered on an island section at the confluence of the Amur and the Ussuri. Granted, even at the most conflict-prone periods of our relations, there were no particularly serious incidents there, let alone armed clashes. On the other hand, because of acute disagreements, the negotiating process often slowed down and sometimes froze on the verge of a complete stoppage. Nor was any agreement reached after the negotiations resumed in 1987, when the parties achieved a consensus on practically all the border issues.

Toward the beginning of the 1990s, the relations between our two countries were already normalized and were rapidly proceeding to the phase of developing constructive cooperation a key element of which was the strengthening of good neighborliness.

Today, the Russian-Chinese border is perceived as not so much a dividing line as mainly a peaceful good-neighborly line that connects the two states.

THE NEW DIRECTIVE, coordinated by both parties at the very top level, gave cause for optimism. Nevertheless, the burden of the complexity and unconventionality of the task was making itself felt. There were absolutely no signs of an acceptable outcome at the time. It is important to note, however, that the negotiators were given broad leeway to consider possible options without a deadline.

It took some time before the highly charged atmosphere of ideological confrontation began to defuse, and first signs of coinciding standpoints began to emerge, which the delegations were supposed to report to the higher agencies without delay. The field of mutual understanding was gradually expanding; each move was watched personally by the foreign ministers, who acted as a kind of a high-level monitoring team. This procedure only benefited the cause, making it possible to maintain the high dynamics of the negotiating process.

The search alternatives sometimes appeared contrasting, arousing heated debate. This,

however, did not affect the sides' general commitment to forge a mutually acceptable, coherent solution.

TODAY, the Russian-Chinese border is perceived as not so much a dividing line as mainly a peaceful good-neighborly line that connects the two states. Multifaceted cross-border cooperation is on the rise. Military confidence-building measures in the border area are being meticulously implemented. The unprecedented flooding in the Amur in 2013 did not cause any border incidents. The devastating natural disaster showed that the border rivers are our common asset and our common problems. It is hard to avoid the conclusion: These rivers require joint careful monitoring, an expansion in the field of information exchanges, and the establishment of even closer coordination in the activity of various departments and services in both countries both in preventing and neutralizing the effects of emergency situations and in the implementation of shore protection and water use programs.

Author: K. Dolgov

Commissioner for Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation



HUMAN RIGHTS is truly an area for broad-based international cooperation.

Without a doubt, the most effective method of promoting universal human rights values consists in adherence to equal, mutually respectful and constructive dialogue based on adhering to the cornerstone principle of sovereignty and cultural-historical features of nations.

We think it is extremely important to pool efforts of all responsible members of the international community to further fundamental human rights, trust in dignity and value of the human person in today's turbulent world still reeling from the

financial and economic crisis.

We see no alternative to honest partnership in combating what are now global threats to the socioeconomic rights, the spread of xenophobia, human trafficking, and an offensive against traditional values and human morality.

The policy of discrimination against ethnic minorities and language minority groups continues to gather steam in a number of countries in Europe. One has to conclude that this policy is already in effect on a systematic basis in everyday affairs, employment, education, and language-related matters.

The West is disinclined to seriously oppose Christianophobia which is on the rise around the world. Studies indicate that Christians are a religious group most affected by discrimination. Their rights, according, for example, to Austrian experts, are under attack in 130 countries. Extremely worrying in this context is the situation facing Christian communities in Arab Spring nations.

We oppose the drafting of social service-related documents by international organizations to protect people with non-traditional sexual orientation against discrimination because their rights are already sufficiently protected by general anti-discrimination provisions in universal treaties in the field of human rights.

Russia is often criticized for its alleged failure to comply with the rights of LGBT persons. We find this criticism being biased and politicized.

As part of this approach we see provocative PR campaigns with the intent to attract attention of the West's mass media.

Ukraine sets the latest and bitter example to all of us by letting itself "democratized" by the West in the wake of an anti-constitutional coup carried out with active intervention from outside in February.

The tarnished human rights realities left in the wake of the Maidan protests in Ukraine include crude violations of the right to freedom of expression and restrictions of freedom for blacklisted media, the rise in extremist, ultra-nationalist and neo-Nazi sentiments, xenophobia, the intimidation of political opponents, purges and arrests among them, repressions and physical violence, acts of religious intolerance, including threats to Moscow Patriarchate-ruled Russian Orthodox churches in Ukraine and the killings of their priests. We will continue to urge the Ukrainian authorities to conduct, under international supervision, an impartial investigation into the tragedies in Odessa and Mariupol, and to track down those responsible for the murder of Russian journalists by punitive squads. Crude violations of international humanitarian law should not go unpunished in Ukraine. There should be no double standards in this sphere.

Russia and Japan: Drawn to Cooperate

Author: Yu. Raikov

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THE MYSTIFYING TITLE is merely a statement that everything is possible in international relations even if recently a full-scale cooperation between Russia and Japan looked unreal.

Today, they are pushed aside by the U.S. and rapidly developing China and play only the second fiddle in the APR political context.

China is steadily pushing the United State out of East Asia and is narrowing down the field of ma-

neuver for Japanese diplomacy very much irritated with China's aggressive struggle for the APR markets and natural resources.

Today, Japan, once more in its history, is facing a challenge: survival in the present far from simple multipolar international system dominated by stronger powers. In fact, survival is one of the most typical features of Japan's foreign policy. As distinct from the other great powers, throughout its history Japan has been treating all changes as objective reality and demonstrating a lot of pragmatism when trying to adjust.

The past and the present problems have been forgotten; Tokyo believes that successful cooperation with Moscow will make Russia a real pivot in the struggle against Chinese hegemony.

Japan relies on the following arguments. First, Russia is a great power with big resources and military potential and a permanent member of the UN SC. Under certain conditions, its support for one of the conflicting sides in East Asia may tip the balance of power in its favor. Second, closer cooperation will supply Japan with raw materials and power sources. The unfolding competition on the Russian market between China and South Korea supplies the Japanese with a chance to realize megaprojects in Russia's eastern parts. Third, Russia is a capacious consumer market for Japanese industrial goods. Fourth, China's strengthening suggests that Japan should pour more efforts into competition on the Russian market; it should prevent a possibility of turning Russia into China's resource base with a practically unlimited access to the natural riches of Russia's Far East. Fifth, involved in economic development there Japan could expand the program of modernization of partner relationships. Sixth, Japan is aware of the fact that today the main strategic challenges are created by the U.S. and China and, possibly later, by reunited Korea. This means that Japan will be left in the cold if any of the three or all of them together get stronger,

while Russia remains economically weak.

There is an opinion in the Japanese political community that the time has come to abandon the "passive policy" of following the U.S. to become more actively involved in shaping a new world order.

Tokyo does not conceal its desire to support its economic might with a more active involvement in East Asia, its politics and security. There is no agreement among its East Asian neighbors about Tokyo's intention to oppose Beijing's initiatives (strengthening its military garrisons and aquatic patrols, conducting naval exercises and establishing an aircraft recognition zone over the East China Sea) through policy of deterrence and closer relations with Russia.

It remains unclear whether the planned official visit of the president of Russia to Tokyo will take place. Both sides need political will and strategic vision of the prospects of the APR to save the visit and the course toward closer relations.

Russia and China in Central Asia: Evolving Strategies

Author: Ewa Czarkowska

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Candidate of Science (Political Science)*



For several reasons, Central Asia occupies a special place in the regional policies of Russia and China. First, it is their geographic proximity and common history which, on the one hand, promote their cooperation and, on the other, stir up their rivalry.

Second, the Central Asian countries are rich in natural resources, hydrocarbons being the most attractive of them. Third, their transit potential is very high: it makes it easier (or harder) to reach strategically important regions, viz. Southern and Eastern Asia and the Middle East.

The regional policies of both players went through several stages while their foreign policy strategies were developing synchronously since both Moscow and Beijing faced internal and external challenges, albeit at different periods.

Disappointed with the CIS, Moscow relied on already existing instruments to deal with the specific problems in the south.

Dissolution of the Soviet Union stirred no enthusiasm in Central Asia yet Russia was not treated as one of the honorable elements of the Central Asian states' new national identities.

When dealing with the Central Asian states the Kremlin had to keep in mind that the region might slip away to the sphere of interests of other powers.

At no time China has publicly described its strategic aims in the region yet its priorities and stages of regional policies can be identified through an analysis of Beijing's regional activity. On the international arena China is seeking security, realization of its economic and energy interests, and favorable conditions for the final settlement of the Taiwan issue. The fundamental goals of Chinese diplomacy are united into a system of coordinates, according to which the importance (rank) of each state and each region in general is assessed within China's priorities, while its general and particular political aims in individual countries and regions are identified.

THE HISTORY of the relationships of Russia and China with Central Asia is varied and ambiguous. The very special emotional burden of the past creates a very specific atmosphere which creates new challenges for them.

Reduced American presence in the region might tip the balance of forces in favor of China. Concerns about this possibility are voiced more and more frequently in the discussions of future Russian-Chinese relations.

Russia and Asian Nations: We Need Each Other

Author: A. Davydenko

First Deputy Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs



It is only logical and natural that the Asia-Pacific region is high on the list of Russia's foreign policy priorities. It is for a reason that this region is called a driver of global development. Asia-Pacific nations are demonstrating confident growth rates as the focus of global economic and political activities is moving closer to it. This is de facto where a new poly-centric global world is taking shape.

Russia's ties with the region are rooted in history. At one point, Russia's support was a key factor behind the victory

of national liberation movements in many countries of Asia.

During her official visit to Laos, Russian Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko held negotiations with Choummaly Sayasone, President of Laos and General Secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party.

The Russia-Laos discussion focused on further cooperation between the two countries on the world scene, coordination of their actions, formulation of a common approach to meeting new challenges, including terrorism, drug trafficking and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Russia and Laos agree that there is a considerable potential for trade and economic cooperation between them, citing geological surveying, mining, aircraft building, and the pharmaceutical industry as the most promising areas.

The Russian delegation further traveled to China. The year 2014 marks 65 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries. The delegation first paid an official visit to Hong Kong, China's Special Administrative Region and currently one of the world's largest finance and investment hubs.

The Hong Kong officials supported more intensive business cooperation with Russia noting their special interest in Russia's government program to speed up the development of its Far East and Eastern Siberia. Both parties also agreed to update the contractual and legal framework of cooperation between Russia and Hong Kong.

Bilateral trade and economic ties were the focus of the Russian delegation's visit to Valentina Matviyenko spoke in favor of establishing joint science and technology parks, business clusters, and business incubators both in China and Russia. She mentioned as a successful example the joint Russia-China business incubator operating in Guangdong province. She also stressed the importance of intensifying direct dialogue between business circles of both countries. One way to do it is to hold exhibitions, presentations and meetings of entrepreneurs as well as increasingly tap the potential of such reliable mechanisms as chambers of commerce and industry and specialized associations.

Symbol of an Era: Yevgeny Primakov at 85

The journal International Affairs and the World Politics and Resources Foundation hosted a meeting of scholars and public figures ahead of Yevgeny Primakov's jubilee.



OPENING THE MEETING, **Armen Oganessian**, *editor-in-chief of International Affairs*, said: "Thanks to Yuri Konstantinovich Shafranik, his idea, and his energetic efforts, Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov's friends and students have gathered here, taking this opportunity to bring their reminiscences, thoughts and judgments about the celebrant. I hope that our portrait of this outstanding person will not be over-complimentary or over-

flattering, but will represent Primakov's multifaceted personality in an objective and impartial way as a scholar, a journalist, and of course, as a person."

Throughout his entire life, Yevgeny Maksimovich has been closely connected with our journal. As A.G Oganessian pointed out, the author's bylines can be used to watch his career growth, while the content of his articles can be used to study the history not only of the Middle East issue, but also of Russia's foreign policy and international relations as a whole. The first item in International Affairs with the byline "Journalist Yevgeny Primakov" appeared in 1957.



Continuing the meeting, **Yuri Shafranik**, *president of the World Politics and Resources Foundation*, noted that at crucial moments and during trying times, one unwittingly looks back at history, experience and authority.

Now that the country is going through a new round of trials, we turn to Yevgeny Primakov's personality, his work and vision, which have passed the test of the strictest examiner: time. "We have set the goal of identifying the key, landmark stages in the life of our country and assessing the role of Ye. Primakov at those stages, as well as highlighting the most valuable elements of his experience, which will serve as a basis for Russia's development," Yuri Shafranik said.

Thanks to Yevgeny Primakov, from the second half of the 1990s, guidelines reflecting the new status quo in new Russia and the protection of its national interests were formulated

and followed in the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Foreign Ministry.



Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Alexander Dzasokhov, Yevgeny Primakov's long-standing comrade and associate, addressed perhaps all the aspects of Primakov's life. "A bright journalist and writer whose talents of a politician and statesman eclipsed, as it were, his literary gift," Dzasokhov said.

Alexander Dzasokhov said that Ye.M. Primakov was a trailblazer in many areas. He even coined a term: "Primakov's patent."

Grigory Rapota, *State Secretary of the Union State of Russia and Belarus*, spoke about his work with Ye.M. Primakov at the Foreign Intelligence Service: "Primakov is a systemic person. He brought in that systemic approach when he joined the intelligence service. First, he consolidated the role and place of intelligence services in the system of state government on the legislative level. Second, acutely aware of public needs, he in effect opened up the intelligence service. A press service was created, a bulletin was published on current political issues, and so on and so forth.



A press service was created, a bulletin was published on current political issues, and so on and so forth.

Anatoly Torkunov, *the rector of the Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations (MGIMO) of the Russian Foreign Ministry*, followed up on the subject of patents, brought up by A. Dzasokhov: Yevgeny Primakov and "his friends and colleagues have essentially created a school of international journalism in the Soviet Union. Our generation was introduced to it primarily by reading his publications in the daily Pravda."



Torkunov noted that in addition to all of his wonderful talents as a statesmen and public figure, Ye.M. Primakov is also a wonderful teacher. When Primakov had a little free time, the rector managed to persuade him to come to work in the MGIMO as professor. He immediately agreed, but conducted only situational seminars.



Natalia Narochnitskaia, *head of the European Institute of Democracy and Cooperation*, said with confidence: "As prime minister, he thought not only about what was reasonable and appropriate but also about what was righteous and fair."

"But the most important thing," she continued, "is that although he was built into the high echelons of power both in the Soviet and post-Soviet history, Ye.M. Primakov, luckily, did not seem to identify

the state - always an imperfect and sinful political institution - with the Motherland, which has eternal and immutable national interests. He knew that navigable rivers, ice-free ports, and protective borders are equally important for the monarchies of the 18th century, the communist states of the 20th century, and the democracies of the 21st century. It was enough to look without rose-colored glasses at the foreign policy of the world around, which lectured us on fundamental human values and, while we feasted on new thinking, took advantage of old thinking!"



Alexei Vasiliev, *director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Africa*, believes that one of Ye.M. Primakov's special features is that he knows how to analyze facts and, especially important, how to predict them.

A. Vasiliev describes another unique feature: "It is a view of the world events as a big picture. It is reflected in some of Ye.M. Primakov's works. Primakov said that Russia's future lies in its relations

with China and the U.S. We should not be in alliance with China against the U.S. or in alliance with the U.S. against China. We should cooperate, taking into account our common interests with both parties. This is one of the most difficult strategic challenges facing our foreign policy."



Vitaly Tretyakov, *dean of the Higher School of Television at the Moscow State University*, believes that 'Ye. M. Primakov has in effect started the overt and covert struggle against the oligarchs, and V.V. Putin followed in his footsteps.

Continuing the hypothetical line of reasoning, he says: "Suppose Ye.M. Primakov became the president of Russia as a result of the 1996 election, and then V.V. Putin followed. How much more fortunate

Russia's fate would have been!"



Vitaly Naumkin, *director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies*, devoted his remarks to the subject of Ye.M. Primakov's patents, which was brought up by A.S. Dzasokhov: "Patent No 1, 'shuttle' diplomacy conducted by a person from an unofficial agency.

"The second know-how is situational analysis. Today, just about any table talk is referred to as situational analysis. This has nothing to do with the

system developed by a group of academics. It is no longer a secret that they were awarded a classified State prize, Primakov among them.

"The third area where he holds know-how is public negotiation formats. This applies above all to the Russian-U.S. meetings in Dartmouth, which started in the 1960s, and then, in the 1980s, a regional conflict group was established. It was led by Ye.M. Primakov.

"Patent No 4, in my opinion, is his memoirs. There is something that sets them apart from those written by other statesmen and public figures and gives them some very special meaning. In my opinion, this is his unique ability for analytical thinking and the careful treatment of facts and judgments.

"Patent No 5. He has raised Russian Oriental studies to a new level. This includes the re-formatting of the Institute of Oriental Studies, which he headed for seven years, building connections between academic science and applied political fields, and the training of state and government officials for Asian and African countries.

"And finally, Patent No. 6. These are his annual January 13 reports. I believe that he has invented this format and genre. 'Old Year' meetings have become a real phenomenon in Russian politics and Russian society."

In conclusion, it should be said that the complete report of this meeting will be published in a special edition of *International Affairs*, dedicated to Ye.M. Primakov.

70 Years of the MFA Department of Economic Cooperation

Author: V. Nebenzya

Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation



EXACTLY 70 YEARS AGO, on September 7, 1944, an order was signed in the USSR People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs establishing within it a new arm, the Economic Division.

The moment for organizing the economic service in the foreign affairs agency was not accidental. World War II was ending. The anti-Hitler coalition governments had already been in discussions about postwar arrangements for Europe, focusing, inter

alia, on economic issues, including the reconstruction of the war-ravaged European economies. Preparations were under way for the creation of the United Nations along with its socio-economic bodies and specialized agencies.

However, the MFA's economic service became particularly important in later years, in a period of rapid development of a system of foreign economic relations, as well as considerable strengthening of the role of economic diplomacy in international affairs.

Currently, the Department of Economic Cooperation is at the core of the economic activity of the Ministry. The Department deals with a wide range of developments in the world economy and international economic relations, including foreign economic strategy and tactics, economic security, energy policy, developing new forms of international economic cooperation, Russia's participation in international economic organizations, support of Russian business abroad, etc.

I would especially like to mention the spirit of camaraderie, friendship and mutual support that was born in this team long ago and remains not only among the current staff, but also between those who for various reasons moved to other departments or are working now outside the Foreign Ministry. This also applies to relations with the veterans who gave many of us, then still very young, a start in great life ahead in the MFA, sharing not only their professional expertise but also proper human communication skills. Hats off to them, and wishing them health and a long life.

Today, the backbone of the economic service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consists of highly qualified specialists capable of skillfully tackling the complex issues facing Russian diplomacy.

I want to wish the staff in the Department continued success in their professional endeavors.

The Russian Foreign Ministry's Economic Service

Author: Ye. Stanislavov

Director, Economic Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation



SEPTEMBER 7, 2014 was the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the Economic Cooperation Department (ECD) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (at that time, the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs), a specialized unit tasked with the elaboration of state economic matters of international importance. The first head of the Economic Cooperation Department was Vladimir Sergeevich Gerashchenko.

Soon after the war, the department became closely involved in economic matters at the UN, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the UN administration for aid and reconstruction in Ukraine, Belarus, and other war ravaged regions.

The importance of the Foreign Ministry's economic service increased notably in the second half of the 1980s. During this period, the country was in the middle of dynamic changes: the abolition of the state monopoly over foreign trade, with domestic manufacturers entering foreign markets. As Russia's participation in world economic processes expands and as its positions strengthen, the economic component of Russia's foreign policy is becoming increasingly weighty.

At present, the ECD is focused on its core activities via the Foreign Ministry. As a principal actor, the department "covers" a broad spectrum of economic issues. Its "dossier" includes various matters of international economic relations and multilateral economic diplomacy, trade and economic policy, economic security, energy and sectoral cooperation, business support, participation in international and regional economic and financial organizations, etc.

In its activity, the department is focused on the creation of new interaction mechanisms and the use of foreign experience in advanced technology in the interest of the country's modernization. One important area of our work is the institutional upgrading of foreign economic ties. Its key element is the need to consolidate interagency coordination in the process of foreign economic cooperation. In conjunction with the RF Economic Development Ministry, we are working to upgrade the national export support system and the implementation of the concept of giving a "new look" to Russian trade missions abroad.

The department analyzes new world economic challenges and works out recommendations with regard to the protection and promotion of national interests. Modern international trends related to the reorganization of the global economic management system and Russia's active participation in these processes in conjunction with our BRICS partners are creating a new "window of opportunities" for Russian economic diplomacy.

In conclusion, it should be noted that as Russia's participation in world economic processes expands and as its positions strengthen, the economic component of Russia's foreign policy is becoming increasingly weighty, while the realities of international development are setting forth new requirements.

Theory and Practice of Russian Foreign Policy

Author: L. Klepatsky

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THEORY AND PRACTICE of Russian Foreign Policy - these are precisely the words we see in the title of the book authored by a team of contributors from the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. I can say at once that this is a non-standard publication, if only in its concept. The book consists of four chapters. The first of them focuses on the conceptual foundations of our country's foreign policy, the second bears the title "Russia and the Contemporary World," the third looks

into the regional priorities of Russian foreign policy, and the fourth into its major areas. The logic of construction of the analysis of Russian foreign policy is not objectionable. The book has an educational purpose, and therefore the description of Russian foreign policy is largely academic, not exploratory. However, its claim to verify theory with practice mandates appropriate demands. All the more so as the international setting of Russia since the Soviet Union's collapse, and the challenges facing it today, give rich material for a meaningful analysis of our country's foreign policy and for forward-looking conclusions. The aim is to help ensure that foreign policy and diplomacy perform the function of a watchman and not one that only responds to emerging global trends and issues. Moreover, foreign policy is obliged, with the utmost care, to balance its conduct and actions with the country's resource potential in all respects.

Perhaps my interpretation of the authors' intent is not fully correct, but the subtitle of "theory and practice" pushes me toward reading the book in just this context: in what measure and degree the foreign policy practice of our State meets the theoretical postulates of foreign policy and, on the contrary, how theories contribute to the shaping of foreign policy.

What does the book lack? Perhaps only the theoretical comprehension of the present-day Russian foreign policy.

It is an informative material, no doubt about it. But somehow there is no word about how the foreign policy activity of the Russian State is built and how it relates to the listed theoretical principles

The book links the development of the theoretical foundations of the country's foreign policy to the overall transformation of international relations that began following the disintegration of the world socialist system. This approach is methodologically correct since it helps identify the leading trend of this transformation.

The book provides rich coverage of the regional priorities of our foreign policy. However, the priority of some or other of its directions seems to need an additional theoretical elaboration that has a practical applied character.

The book contains a glossary and the latest Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.

To sum up my reading of this solid work on foreign policy (theory and practice), I must note that its authors have done a considerable amount of serious research from just this perspective. However, there are still many blank spots, for example, to what extent existing theories of international relations are adequate to the contemporary situation in the world (a consenting acceptance of these theories dominates Russian research).

Recipe for Overcoming the Crisis Is Written but the Reality Is More Complex

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THE PUBLICATIONS of Paul Krugman, a renowned American economist and a 2008 Nobel Prize winner, invariably arouse interest, occasionally showing an out-of-the-box approach and to some extent even shocking views and comments.

As to the book under review, with the shocking title *End This Depression Now!* its second edition (the first came out in 2012) has clearly demonstrated its timeliness and success. What needs stressing is the

creative boldness of Krugman, who resolved, amid general pessimism, to announce the possibility of ending the crisis "here and now." This mindset opened the door for a new perspective of which American society was clearly in need. The position of Paul Krugman favorably contrasted with negative socio-economic assessments of the crisis in the economy of the U.S. as well as of most of the European and developing nations. They had taken hold in world media from 2008, when a global financial crisis hit. The fact that it started against the backdrop of a relatively long period of economic growth, just as expected due to the cyclical nature of the world economy, made it even more painful. The interest in Krugman's new book came from a defensive reaction to the constant discussions among variously competent economists and policy makers about a further downturn and protracted crisis; hence the increasing desire to hear words of encouragement and hope from one of the contemporary economics gurus.

A short but an expressive epigraph prefaces the work, essentially determining one of its basic propositions: "To the unemployed, who deserve better."

Interesting in the book are the author's frequent references to John Maynard Keynes, the undoubted authority on questions of employment/unemployment/inflation - in a word, of economic crisis.

Unusual for modern economic literature is the absence in the book of a focus on globalization - how the crisis relates to the position of the U.S. in the world economy, how much external influences affect its progress and how the U.S. financial policy affects developing markets.

Paul Krugman's work merits reader interest - it deals with pressing issues. As no country

is immune to crises, they recur with joyless regularity and no country, despite all the qualitative differences in levels of national wealth, happens to be prepared for them. Old and new exits from crisis recipes are galore, but none of them guarantees a solution. The book further suggests that it is necessary to know very well the economy of a country, to have reliable statistics, to take into account previous experience and, on this basis, to search for ways to end the crisis. In any case, though, it takes time. There is no quick fix, especially as forms of crisis become ever more diverse, sometimes implicit and camouflage themselves as global market effects. The well-known classical character of the cycle is losing its usual sequence. This makes it all the harder to suggest methods for exit.

Discover the History of the Galician Lands

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THE HISTORICAL DESTINY of the autochthonous people of Galicia as an integral part of the ancient Russian ethnic group is of direct practical interest, since it gives the key to understanding many of the present-day problems in the region. At the beginning of 2014, the Kuban State University (Krasnodar, Russia) published a book entitled "Short Essays on the History of the Galician Land (9th to late 19th centuries)," a study dedicated to the nearly thousand-year history of a people who fought for preservation of their Russian (Rusyn) self-identity during centuries of foreign domination. "Essays" follow a chronological pattern and are supplemented by conclusions, tables and charts.

At the end of the first chapter, the author invites the reader to reflect on what he thinks is an important conclusion: of the two opposite vectors, one aimed at incorporating local tribes into the general Slavic-Russian world and the other at maintaining intra-tribal isolation with power retained by the autochthonous politico-economic estate, the former was the historical winner.

The second chapter is devoted to Galician Rus', the Russian Voivodship within Poland, in the period from the mid-14th century until the late 18th century.

Historical analysis permits a conclusion about the non-synthesis type of feudal development in the Galician region due to its direct origin from the tribal system with some elements of synthesis. By virtue of this specificity, the feudalization of the region lasted quite a long time and came to an end only by the end of the 16th and beginning of the 17th century in both economic and ideological aspects.

The third chapter of the book is devoted to Galicia (Krolestwo Galicji i Lodomerii) within Austria from 1772 until the end of the 19th century.

The chapter then describes the political, economic, and social development of Eastern Galicia on the basis of materials of Polish economists of the time.

The offered essays on the history of Galicia convincingly prove the existence of the three historical periods. The first period (late 9th century-mid XIV century) describes the advancing development of the Galician and Galician-Volhynian Principalities and the independent indigenous people of the area, the growth of national self-consciousness, the flourishing of its culture, and the increase of political influence both in Kievan Rus' as well as among the neighboring states. However, a number of objective and subjective factors, and the related tragic events, led the Galician lands to the loss of independence at the start of the second period (middle of the 14th century-1772) and to the Polish occupation.

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