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A History of Ups and Downs: The 140th Anniversary of the Establishment of Russian-Bulgarian Diplomatic Relations

Sergey Lavrov,
Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation

Key words: Russia and Bulgaria, 140th anniversary of diplomatic relations.

Question: *Today, just as 140 years ago, Bulgaria remains strongly attached and grateful to Russia for restoring Bulgarian statehood. How does Russia feel about Bulgaria?*

Answer: The ties between Russia and Bulgaria date back many centuries. Their special nature arises from their spiritual and cultural affinity. We likewise remember and pay tribute to outstanding personalities such as Saints Cyril and Methodius, Saint Cyprian, metropolitan of Moscow, and other prominent figures of the Slavic Enlightenment. The liberation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman yoke was a fateful event in our shared history. More than 20,000 Russian officers and servicemen were killed and over 50,000 injured in fighting for the freedom of their Slavic brothers and for the triumph of the ideals of truth and justice. That was when the solid foundation of Russian-Bulgarian friendship was laid.

Russia always stood by the Bulgarian people at crucial, fateful moments. Suffice it to recall the Provisional Russian Administration (1877-1879), which Mikhail Madzharov, a well-known Bulgarian politician, described as a “selfless teacher who groomed the country’s entire administrative, judicial and financial personnel in less than two years.” During the 1946 Paris Peace Conference, Moscow remained Sofia’s dedicated protector.

Needless to say, our bilateral relations have seen both ups and downs. However, each time we successfully overcame temporary difficulties and

Mr. Lavrov was interviewed by **Chavdar Minchev**, Editor-in-Chief of *Mezhdunarodni otnosheniya*, a Bulgarian journal of foreign policy

returned to the path of dialogue based on mutual respect. And it could not have been any different, since the feeling of mutual sympathy shared by the Russian and Bulgarian peoples has invariably prevailed over any short-term political goals.

This year we will mark an important date – namely, the 140th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. The Russian and Bulgarian foreign ministries have developed a wide-ranging program to mark the event. I am confident that its consistent implementation will help further strengthen trust and mutual understanding between our nations.

Q: How do you assess the current state of Russian-Bulgarian relations? What are the prospects for bilateral cooperation in key areas, such as the economy, the energy sector and tourism?

A: I am pleased to note that despite the complicated situation in Europe, Russian-Bulgarian relations are dynamically developing. Lately, political dialogue, in particular at the top level, has intensified. In May 2018, Bulgarian President Rumen Radev and Prime Minister Boyko Borisov made working visits to Russia. In October 2018, our heads of government met on the sidelines of the ASEM Summit in Brussels. In March 2019, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev was in Bulgaria on an official visit.

We hope that the positive momentum of political contacts will help strengthen practical cooperation, primarily in energy, trade and the economic area, especially considering that there is great potential for that. The Turkish Stream natural gas project opens very broad opportunities for our joint efforts. Extending it across Bulgaria will enhance your country's energy security. Taking into consideration the unfortunate experience of the South Stream project, it is essential to receive firm guarantees from the European Commission that these plans will not be thwarted by Brussels' arbitrary decisions.

Sofia's decision to resume the construction of the Belene nuclear power station opens good prospects for deepening bilateral cooperation. Russia has all the requisite technology and many years of experience to successfully resurrect the project. At present, Rosatom [Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency] is exploring possible forms of participation in building the nuclear power plant. It should be mentioned in passing that in 2017-2018, Rosatom already made it possible to extend the service life

of Units 5 and 6 at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, currently Bulgaria's only nuclear power plant, for 30 years.

Unfortunately, after bilateral trade turnover grew by 24% in 2017, in 2018, it was up just 0.6%. Prospects for increasing and diversifying bilateral trade are discussed in substance at the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation. Currently, the commission is meeting on a regular basis. On October 25, 2018, it held its 17th meeting in Moscow; its next meeting is due to take place in September 2019 in Bulgaria. We believe that cooperation between Russian and Bulgarian experts will make it possible to significantly strengthen trade and economic ties.

In 2018, over 500,000 Russian tourists visited Bulgarian resorts. On March 5, 2019, a Russian-Bulgarian business forum on tourism took place in Sofia, focusing on ways of further expanding tourist exchanges.

This year, more than 30 Bulgarian cities held Immortal Regiment marches. I would like to use this opportunity to sincerely thank our Bulgarian friends for helping preserve historical memory.

Russia always stood by the Bulgarian people at crucial, fateful moments.

Q: How important is regional cooperation in the modern globalized world?

A: In the current international situation, regional cooperation is making a significant contribution to promoting a positive interstate agenda and to building up trust and mutual understanding among nations – to a very large extent due to its nonpolitical nature.

A good case in point is the Black Sea region. Back in 1992, Russia and Turkey initiated the establishment of a venue for international cooperation on a wide array of issues in the Black Sea region. They were joined by Bulgaria. Those efforts led to the creation of a diversified multilateral mechanism, i.e., the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC).

Experience shows that for regional formats to function successfully, several conditions have to be met, such as openness, inclusiveness, harmonization, and interconnectedness.

The “integration of integrations” concept should help increase the

practical payoff from regional cooperation. That is the focus of President Vladimir Putin's initiative to form the Greater Eurasian Partnership, aligning various integration processes unfolding in both Europe and Asia. I am sure that deeper cooperation within the BSEC framework would help implement this wide-ranging initiative and eventually ensure harmonious and sustainable development throughout the Eurasian space.

Q: Can Bulgaria become a conduit of peace and cooperation in the Balkans and the Black Sea region?

A: There is a pressing need to ease tension in the Black Sea region. This problem can be solved only through joint efforts, by abandoning zero-sum games, as well as stereotypes and models imposed by outside players.

The economy could become an important unifying factor. Promoting mutually beneficial practical cooperation, enhancing interconnectedness in information, communications, transport, trade, culture, tourism and other areas, and developing people-to-people contacts – all of this should help normalize the situation in the Black Sea region. I am confident that Bulgaria could contribute to this effort, including as part of its BSEC chairmanship.

Q: How do you assess Bulgaria's BSEC chairmanship?

A: We like Bulgaria's approach toward performing its chairmanship functions, which is aimed at ensuring a balance of interests of all member countries, promoting a non-confrontational agenda and searching for compromises.

We are ready to closely engage with our Bulgarian partners on the declared priorities, including transport, culture and the environment. We hope to make progress in adopting fundamental Russian-Turkish documents to facilitate trade, introduce one-stop shop technology and overcome the groundless and politicized objections of several countries over the signing of a BSEC-EaEU memorandum of understanding.

Technical assistance projects in tourism and culture provide good opportunities for joint efforts. We are ready to finance them together with our Bulgarian partners, including as part of Russia's 2016 voluntary contribution to the BSEC and the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank in the amount of \$1 million. Needless to say, we are always open to counterproposals.

Q: What is your view of this organization's future?

A: The Black Sea region is home to different countries that at the same time are closely linked and interconnected historically and economically. Long-established trade routes intersect here, and new routes, transport and energy corridors are being created. The region has every chance of becoming a source of global economic growth and a key element of logistic chains in the Eurasian space. Therefore, there is considerable potential for economic cooperation. The main thing is to use it appropriately.

It is difficult to overestimate the BSEC's role in these efforts. The organization has a wide-ranging mandate – from macroeconomic issues to individual sectors, including overlapping areas of culture, health care, emergency response, and the fight against organized crime. A broad spectrum of supporting agencies has evolved around the BSEC – a bank, a parliamentary assembly and a business council. It is strengthening its ties with the business community.

Over the last few years, the Russian contribution has helped develop an array of much needed practical tools and launch several applied projects designed to put BSEC interstate agreements into practice. I hope that other countries will follow Russia's suit and thus help improve the organization's financial base.

Q: How are Russia's relations with the European Union and NATO developing? Is there any possibility of renouncing the sanctions policy and returning to constructive dialogue in the foreseeable future?

A: Russian-EU relations are going through a difficult patch. At the same time, Brussels links their normalization to the implementation of the Minsk Package. Such a contrived pretext is bewildering. As you know, the implementation of this international document, incidentally, approved by UN Security Council Resolution No. 2202, is being actively sabotaged by Kiev.

Unfortunately, the well-being and stability of the common European home today depend on a small but extremely aggressive group of Russophobes in the EU, whose actions are being effectively directed from Washington. The anti-Russian propaganda campaign and attempts to demonize Russia and portray it as the main threat to Europe's security are continuing. Unilateral sanctions are regularly extended, resulting in multibillion dollar losses to European businesses.

Nevertheless, there are certain positive trends. Trade turnover has been increasing for the second year in a row. It was up 19.3% in 2018, at \$294.2 billion. Political dialogue has somewhat improved as well. There is continuing interaction on several sectoral issues. Contacts in science, technology and culture are making headway. This goes to show that there are no objective reasons for the further degradation of relations. Russia and the EU are close neighbors. We have a lot in common economically, historically, culturally, and civilizationally.

As far as sanctions are concerned, the first step toward lifting them should be made by those who initiated them – that is, the European Union. Then Russia will be able to terminate its countermeasures. The ball is in the EU's court.

We hope that common sense will eventually prevail and Russian-EU relations will go back to normal, based on respect and consideration for each other's interests, especially given that at the end of the day, both Russia and the EU are facing the same challenges – from ensuring sustainable economic growth to effectively addressing numerous security issues. I am confident that they can be resolved only by combining our capabilities.

At present, relations between Russia and the North Atlantic alliance have slipped into a protracted crisis. NATO has proved unprepared for joint efforts to build a system of equitable and indivisible security in the Euro-Atlantic region. Instead, it has set a course toward containing Russia, pushing the dividing lines further to the east. The ongoing expansion of the alliance, the buildup of its capabilities near Russia's borders and the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system have led to a crisis of confidence and the escalation of military-political tensions in the Euro-Atlantic region.

Nevertheless, the possibilities for putting Russian-NATO dialogue back on a constructive track have clearly not been exhausted. To that end, our partners should live up to the commitments that they assumed at OSCE and Russia-NATO summits to not ensure their own security at the expense of the security of others. For our part, we are always open to joint efforts in fighting international terrorism, drug trafficking, cybercrime, and other real, not contrived threats.

Q: What needs to be done to restore trust in present-day international relations?

A: I have been repeatedly asked such questions. In order to restore trust in international affairs, it is necessary to abandon the counterproductive methods of pressure and blackmail and to start building interstate communication on the fundamental principles enshrined in the UN Charter, such as the sovereign equality of states, noninterference in their internal affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, and the nonuse of force or the threat of force.

It is essential to rely on the generally recognized norms of international law, not on an exclusive set of rules that our Western partners keep changing depending on the political situation of the moment. Restoring diplomatic culture, which Washington and several other Western capitals seem to have lost, is a high priority on the agenda.

That is the only way to enhance predictability and strengthen mutual understanding between countries.

“Expanding Our Country’s Circle of Friends Has Been Our Main Goal”

Eleonora Mitrofanova

Armen Oganessian, Editor-in-Chief of the journal International Affairs: Eleonora Valentinovna, Rossotrudnichestvo will turn 95 next year. This is an important date. How did the agency come about and what are its current goals?

E. Mitrofanova: Rossotrudnichestvo is a governmental organization promoting international cooperation in culture, science, education, public relations, and cultural and scientific circles in other countries.

Expanding our country’s circle of friends has been our main goal for almost a century. It is another matter that each period of time adds some new tools for achieving our objectives and practicing our activities.

The agency was created in 1925. It was originally called the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; in 1958, it was renamed the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries; in 1994, it was called Roszarubezhtsentr [the Russian Center for International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation] and finally, in 2008, Rossotrudnichestvo was established as an independent legal entity under the umbrella of the Russian Foreign Ministry. We have 98 representative offices and 76 Russian centers of science and culture in 81 countries.

However, the main goal has remained the same – i.e., promoting friendship with other countries in various spheres. Naturally, high priority is given to promoting the Russian language and Russian education abroad.

The latter is quite a time-consuming and challenging task. Every year,

Eleonora Mitrofanova, Director of Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation)

Transcript of the *Vizavi s mirom* (Vis-à-vis the World) show on Radio Sputnik

we enroll 15,000 students who are then admitted to budget-funded university programs on the Russian Education Ministry's quotas. Future applicants are trained at our centers abroad in programs that include Russian language studies.

We also provide retraining and advanced retrained programs for Russian language teachers abroad. Currently, 19,000 students are enrolled in our language courses.

Young people are our utmost priority. We have established a special youth affairs department that has talented, energetic, wonderful staff members, who work hard to promote youth communication projects. It is important to note the *Novoye pokoleniye* [New Generation] program of short study trips to Russia for talented young people from abroad.

Programs for compatriots living abroad are high on our list of priorities. All our centers are open to them. We celebrate important dates there. In addition, we have two programs allowing children of compatriots living abroad to visit Russia. We host 750 people a year under the *Zdravstvui, Rossia* ["Hello, Russia"] program, which helps them get to know our motherland better. The other program is World Games of Young Compatriots, also for about 750 participants. Every year, qualifying rounds are held in other countries and competitions take place in Russia.

Q: *Do your current activities differ from the way Soviet centers of culture worked?*

A: Of course, they differ greatly. We are doing practically the same thing but back in Soviet days, the ideological component prevailed. In 1925, the main objective was to breach the diplomatic blockade, and so the organization worked abroad with elite, intellectual circles. They were lured over to the Soviet side and in that way they influenced their respective governments. Then the organization was used to support communist parties.

It should be noted that our centers did not work with compatriots living abroad who were afraid that they could be accused of disloyalty to the local authorities, and so on. Today, we work with various audiences, and all ideology is gone.

This allows us to engage and interact with various waves of emigra-

Many compatriots living abroad are generally very interested in acquiring Russian citizenship.

tion, and this is wonderful. I would say representatives of the first wave of emigration and their descendants are the most active of all.

We are establishing and promoting contacts with the expert community. We have several ongoing projects, for instance in Belarus, where we are working to attract analysts from the Baltic states and Poland – that is, from countries that we have strained relations with. Various issues, including political ones, are under discussion. In Belgium, together with the Egmont Institute (the Royal Institute for International Relations), we have established what I hope will be a standing platform for the discussion of various current issues. We are also creating a youth platform for discussion there as well.

So, naturally, our target audience and our objectives have changed.

Technically speaking, we have also changed. We actively use new technology. We have our own website. We offer subscription to the Boris Yeltsin Electronic Library and other online libraries, and we provide our readers free access to all these formats.

Applications from foreign nationals to study in Russia are accepted online on the Russia.study portal. Rossotrudnichestvo has its own portal, *Sistema podderzhki russkikh shkol* [Russian Language Schools Support System], where teachers can apply for extra supplies of textbooks. Our modern facilities provide access to a total of over 180,000 e-books, textbooks, etc.

Q: How many Rossotrudnichestvo centers are there currently in the CIS and other foreign countries?

A: Rossotrudnichestvo has 12 representative offices and nine branches in CIS countries, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The CIS is our priority, so we work not only in these countries' capitals but also on the periphery, including schools, universities and local communities.

Our center in Ukraine is very much in demand. Over 500 students there are enrolled on our quotas each year.

Unfortunately, we do not work directly in the Baltic countries. Some time ago, we had our representatives in Lithuania and Latvia as part of the Russian embassies there. We organize cultural events there through our offices in Finland and Belarus whenever possible. We would like to be more active in that region, but so far it is difficult to open a center there. It should be noted, however, that there is a Latvian cultural center in Moscow.

Our largest center is in Berlin. It houses a concert hall and cinemas with the most modern, state-of-the-art equipment. An exhibition hall is nearing completion. The center also runs the largest Russian language course, with over 1,000 students.

We have a very large center in Egypt, with a Russian language course for 800 people. There is a spacious, wonderful center in Mongolia, which is also working at full capacity. There are two centers in France – one belongs to Rossotrudnichestvo and the other – to the Russian Embassy. At our center alone, over 500 people are studying Russian. So, there is every reason to say that our centers are very popular.

Q: Can you comment on Rossotrudnichestvo's role in promoting humanitarian ties with Turkey?

A: We have a cultural center in Turkey: a wonderful building and well-attended Russian language courses. I would especially like to note the High-Level Cooperation Council that was established by our presidents. One of the council's components is the Russian-Turkish Public Forum, which I co-chair. There has been a downturn since the well-known events, although contacts have not stopped.

Recently, there has been a surge of interest. Earlier this year, the forum's fifth meeting was successfully held in St. Petersburg. It was attended by over 250 people, including influential representatives of business and scientific circles, the creative intelligentsia and the media. The forum hosted a congress of rectors of Russian and Turkish universities, with 60 rectors in attendance, which is quite an impressive number. They signed 20 cooperation agreements. There are big plans as part of the inter-museum exchanges program. These 2020 and 2021 events are timed to coincide with the 100th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between our countries and the 100th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood – a unique treaty, of course.

Another important date in 2020 is the 100th anniversary of the Evacuation of Crimea, when the White Army left Sevastopol. A book about that event, with memoirs of our compatriots and archival materials, has already been published in Turkey. The book is in Turkish, but the original materials that were used in it are in Russian. We intend to translate the book into Russian.

Rossotrudnichestvo plans to hold events related to the Evacuation of Crimea in the countries to which our compatriots had to move. These

plans include Turkey, that is Gallipoli, where most of our warships went.

Q: You hail from Volgograd. There are plans to hold an international public diplomacy forum there, titled “Dialogue on the Volga: Peace and Mutual Understanding in the 21st Century.” Could you tell us more about this initiative?

A: Naturally, it is important when a person remembers his roots, especially such as the great Stalingrad, where the sister city partnership movement was born 75 years ago. Russian Volgograd and British Coventry became twin cities, gave the world the concept of “twinning,” and they preserve it and continue to develop it today.

The forum is due to receive federal status, since it is the only format where municipalities meet – not only the authorities, but also residents, public organizations, NGOs, and associations. Together, we can achieve a synergetic effect. The forum’s organizers are Rossotrudnichestvo, the regional authorities and the Volgograd city administration. Rossotrudnichestvo is bringing in participants in the *Novoye Pokoleniye* [New Generation] program, involving its London office and providing information support. We hope to raise the forum’s status to a new level and give it a fresh impetus.

Q: Eleonora Valentinovna, how does Rossotrudnichestvo define the concept of “compatriot”? Does it refer only to Russian people in emigration? Or to those who were born in the USSR? Or to those who currently live on the territory of the former Soviet Union?

A: Thank you for a very good, profound question. The definition of the word “compatriot” has long been a source of controversy. We are guided by the concept of “compatriots” established by the Federal Law on the State Policy of the Russian Federation relating to Compatriots Living Abroad. This definition is broad and comprehensive.

Art. 1 of the law states that compatriots are citizens of the Russian Federation residing permanently outside of the country. This is understandable to everyone. Needless to say, these citizens must enjoy consular protection.

Compatriots are also people and their descendants who live outside of Russia and belong, as a general rule, to peoples historically living on its

territory and who have also made their free choice in favor of spiritual, cultural and legal ties with the Russian Federation.

The definition of compatriots also includes persons whose relatives previously lived in our country's territory, including USSR citizens who lived in states that were republics of the former USSR.

There was also the Russian Empire. Indeed, we have a complicated history of dispersion. This is why the Russian diaspora is so multiethnic and multireligious. It includes not only Orthodox Christian Russians, but also members of other ethnic groups and confessions.

In this context, it would be appropriate to recall Russian President Vladimir Putin's remarks at the first World Congress of Compatriots Living Abroad (in October 2001) to the effect that "'compatriot' is not only a legal concept.... It is above all a matter of personal choice."

However, once "compatriot" is defined, practical action is needed on the part of the state. Why do we work with compatriots living abroad? What do we want from them? Who are we protecting? Who are we helping? The law does not provide a straightforward answer to these questions.

Q: How effectively is the state program for the voluntary resettlement of compatriots functioning?

A: Rossotrudnichestvo is not involved in migration processes. We provide information about rules and regulations. The relevant documents are posted on our website and our centers offer advice on what to do and how.

I must say that many compatriots living abroad are generally very interested in acquiring Russian citizenship. Recently, amid Russia's growing authority, as well as the difficulties apparently emerging in some other countries, higher priority has been given to the implementation of the state program for the voluntary resettlement of compatriots living abroad. However, it would be wrong to say that many of them are moving to Russia. Between 2007 and 2017, 800,000 people came and were registered as residents of Russia.

Voluntary resettlement is not an easy matter. Which Russian regions are prepared to accept what specialists? Migrants are interested in moving to good cities, not to an empty field. In my opinion, this migration option is appealing to young people who are still willing to make a fresh start in life or to people in a critical situation, who have to run away as quickly as possible. I believe this process has yet to be fine-tuned.

Q: Next year will be the 100th anniversary of the evacuation of the Russian naval squadron with refugees from Crimea. Anastasia Aleksandrovna Shirinskaya, the keeper of documents and memory of the squadron, lived in Bizerte, Tunisia. Do you support the public initiative to name a street or square in Sevastopol after Anastasia Shirinskaya? Will Rossotrudnichestvo hold any events to mark the 100th anniversary of the evacuation?

A: Indeed, a series of large-scale events are being planned for the 100th anniversary of the evacuation of the Imperial Black Sea Fleet from Crimea and Sevastopol, including thematic film shows, international roundtables, exhibitions, public educational and cultural events, and press conferences.

The squadron left Crimea in the 1920, with over 150,000 refugees on board, 6,000 of them arriving at the Tunisian port of Bizerte. As for the initiative to name a street or square in Sevastopol after Anastasia Shirinskaya, Rossotrudnichestvo definitely supports it. Rossotrudnichestvo's representative office in Tunisia (and prior to that, Roszarubezhtsentr's office) was in constant contact with Anastasia Shirinskaya and provided her assistance in preserving Russian historical legacy in the country. Suffice it to mention that her 95th birthday was celebrated at the Russian center of science and culture in 2007. Prior to that, in 2005, Tunisian television had made a documentary film titled "Transition"; some of its episodes were shot at the Russian center with Anastasia Shirinskaya's participation. As is known, a public square in Bizerte, where a memorial sign in honor of Anastasia Shirinskaya was established, bears the name of the "angel of the Russian squadron." In December 2018, the anniversary of Anastasia Aleksandrovna's death, the MiR teenage club, as part of the Russian center of science and culture in Tunisia, cleaned up the area around the memorial and planted flowers there. Rossotrudnichestvo's representative office in Tunisia came up with an initiative to include Anastasia Shirinskaya's tomb, among others, on the list of Russian historical memorials. The initiative was approved by the [Russian] Government Commission on Compatriots Living Abroad, and the Russian government is currently expected to issue a directive on this matter.

Q: Let's go back to the Russian language. What should happen in the global arena for the CIS countries to adopt Russian as a second state language or language of communication?

A: What should happen is what is in fact happening in Russia. Our country is becoming more attractive in many respects. These countries should want to be close, to be together with Russia.

As for Russian, it is currently a language of official communication within the CIS as an interstate association. In several countries, Russian is an official or state language alongside a national language. So, I wouldn't say it is falling out of use.

In Azerbaijan, for instance, Russian is compulsory at almost all schools. The same goes for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Still, it is important to take into consideration the number of migrants living in Russia. Russia has always been attractive, and Russian will never disappear.

It is also essential to take into account the process of state-building, the search for identity and the need to promote one's own language. Under these circumstances, can Russian possibly be the only language? After all, we cannot expect something that does not exist in nature.

I believe the Russian language remains strong in the CIS space, and the more attractive Russia is, the more interest people in these countries will have in studying Russian, because people will understand that knowledge of Russian is potentially a new source of keeping bread on the table.

Q: *As is known, there are churches in various parts of the world – from Latin America to Africa to Asia. How do you build your relations with those churches, priests and their communities?*

A: We have close relationships with churches. There are Sunday schools in almost all countries. And we help them with textbooks and educational programs. Naturally, we cooperate with all religious denominations. I would like to stress that since we represent a multireligious country where all major world religions are present.

Outside of Russia, we engage mostly with the Russian Orthodox Church, since they are also guardians of the Russian language. In Turkmenistan, for instance, where it is forbidden under the law to create public associations on a national, ethnic or cultural basis, a Rossotrudnichestvo representative is in constant contact with the heads of 12 ROC parishes and the most active sections of the Russian-speaking population as a natural part of the Russian diaspora.

Practice shows that the religious factor is emerging as a key element in contacts with compatriots living abroad, especially in non-CIS countries.

Rossotrudnichestvo's employees act as experts for the Orthodox Initiative, an international open grant contest. This initiative is led personally by the patriarch. Such contests are based on a combination of secular and religious values and practices. For example, the Orthodox Normandy children's camp in France attracts children of preschool and school age, who expand their knowledge of the Russian language, Russian literature and Russian history. In Kyrgyzstan, a theatrical studio called *Yuzhnoye Sozvezdiye* [Southern Constellation] was created in the city of Osh as part of an Orthodox Christian school called Svetoch.

We also interact with other faiths. The agency is in close contact with the Central Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Russia, the representative office of the Buddhist Traditional Sangha of Russia and the Chief Rabbinate of Russia.

We have joint projects with Jewish centers. We observe International Holocaust Remembrance Day, and January 27, the day of the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp. Together with the Blavatnik Archive Foundation, we are preparing a wide-ranging interactive exhibition dedicated to Jewish Red Army soldiers who laid down their lives for the liberation of the motherland. It will be on display in Germany, France, Belarus, and Israel.

Q: Do you hold Russian culture festivals, including film festivals abroad?

A: In drawing up a cultural program for our centers, we follow certain principles. There are three basic components. First, we plan exhibitions and select an array of films dedicated to important dates and prominent people. Our centers are provided with ample material.

For example, next year will be the 75th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War. A series of exhibitions have already been planned and a collection of films selected. The films are being dubbed into seven languages. We are working in collaboration with the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War. Our centers initiate events relating to national holidays and traditions of their host countries.

Another important approach is when we receive a request from a respectable organization to hold a particular event.

The year 2019 is the Year of Theater in Russia. We have held a series of theater workshops and stage performances. While Georgia and Russia engaged in an exchange of political "courtesies," a workshop in theatrical art was held to great success. The *Posolstvo Masterstva* [Embassy of

Excellence] project is led by conservatory students, who have already performed at our centers in 75 countries.

Every year, we observe anniversaries. This year, for instance, we are celebrating the anniversary of Dmitry Mendeleev's Periodic Table – 150 years. Everyone knows about the table, but Mendeleev is not always remembered. All educational events that took place at our centers, as well as at the university that we work with abroad, had a big impact.

We do not act as agents or organizers of major tours. That is the purview of the Russian Ministry of Culture. However, if we are asked, we can always help. We provide a permanent platform and we know the host country and its people.

Ahead of the 200th anniversary of the birth of Ivan Turgenev, Rossotrudnichestvo sponsored two large-scale exhibition projects. The Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts organized a traveling exhibition titled “Ivan Turgenev, a Russian European,” devoted to the life and work of the great Russian writer, which was on display at 14 representative offices – in Chisinau, Budapest, Baku, Bratislava, Brussels, Copenhagen, Paris, Warsaw, Gdansk, Berlin, Beijing, Minsk, Sofia, and Belgrade.

Also, the Manege Central Exhibition Hall had a themed art exhibition titled “A Thought-Provoking Landscape: Nature in Turgenev's Writings as Presented in Modern Russian Painting,” at the Russian center of science and cultural in Berlin, Brussels, Luxembourg, and Paris.

NATO's Military Activity in the North Atlantic

Yu. Belobrov

Key words: NATO, Russia, North Atlantic, security, confrontation.

THE ATLANTIC OCEAN, first and foremost its northern stretch, is what NATO considers its exclusive zone of vitally important interests. This idea is supported by the fact that it is the site of vital lines of communication and transport bridging North America and Europe, as well as strategically important military and civilian facilities, the protection of which is becoming one of the Alliance's key objectives amid what Western sources call an unprecedented increase in activity by the Russian Navy and Air Force in this subregion. What's more, the definition of the North Atlantic is being enlarged to include not only its strictly geographic area, but the entire water surface of the Baltic and Barents seas. These bodies are now considered a single theater of operations in the case of a military conflict with Russia.¹

For more than a quarter of a century after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the status of the security realm (according to NATO's strategists) had remained stable, predictable, and wholly favorable for NATO. The thought is that this led the countries in the Alliance to shift their focus from security and defense within the region to stabilizing operations outside the borders of NATO countries (as in the missions in Bosnia and Kosovo), as well as intervening in strategically remote regions (as in Afghanistan and Iraq). They say that this weakened NATO's potential to defend its own territory.

In reality, NATO's military potential, as is commonly known, continued to grow during this period due to the armaments and skills of its new members – the former allies of the USSR in Eastern Europe. This allowed the “old guard” of the Alliance's European member states to substantial-

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ly lessen the number of their armies and thereby lower their military expenditures. Yet, since the end of the first decade of the 21st century, as Russia has shifted to a more independent course on the world stage and strengthened its own armed forces, some stirrings of concern have emerged in the West, and some anti-Russian feelings have resurfaced, fanned mainly by Washington and some of its more zealous European partners.

The events that occurred first in Georgia and then in Ukraine served as the pretext for Western powers to return to promoting a more active containment of Russia. It was announced at the Alliance's subsequent summits – in Wales in 2014 and Warsaw in

2016 – that Russia was the main security challenge for all the bloc states and was their real global competitor. The nations of the Alliance then set about boosting their military capacity and the frequency of joint maneuvers across the spectrum, counting on the idea that with harsher military, economic and informational pressure, Russia would return to a more compliant pro-Western approach. By bringing to an end any sort of cooperation with Russia, NATO was actually renegeing on its own security strategy (adopted in 2010 in Lisbon), in which Russia was to be viewed as the Alliance's potential strategic partner in solving the most pressing global problems.

One cannot dismiss the possibility of NATO's aggressive intentions morphing into military adventurism by the bloc countries against Russia in the long or even the medium term.

Bases of a Regional Strategy

NATO'S CURRENT APPROACHES to security in the North Atlantic are based on such fundamental documents as: the Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, adopted by Heads of State and Government (of the NATO nations) in Lisbon (2010); the Alliance Maritime Strategy, adopted in 2011; and the Joint Air Power Strategy unveiled on June 26, 2018. They are also based on NATO's summits in Wales (2014), Warsaw (2016), and Brussels (July 2018). In these documents, NATO proclaimed a broad new approach to guaranteeing security that encompasses not only the military sphere, but political, economic and social aspects that contribute to sta-

bility of international relations in the West's interests. The idea of containment was the key concept, based on an adequate combination of nuclear and conventional military assets.

The heart of this strategic concept is not political methods of achieving stated ends, but the "right" of NATO to carry out operations not only in its zone of responsibility, but far beyond those borders.

As such, it was put forward in the strategic concept and in troop strategies that in the interests of containment, NATO is prepared to use its full arsenal of forces and assets, including: the creation of powerful, mobile and rapidly deployable conventional and nuclear forces and assets; assets to defend member nations from ballistic missiles, WMDs, and cyberattacks; as well as the execution of joint large-scale and smaller-scale operations for collective defense and crisis management.² Keeping this in mind, the zones of operations remain undefined in the documents pertaining to strategy. They are, however, defined in resolutions from later NATO summits.

In accordance with the Alliance Maritime Strategy, NATO's security interests include such spheres as: supporting the freedom of movement along sea routes, guaranteeing the security of critically important infrastructure and energy pipelines, and protecting marine resources and the environment.³ In order to defend these interests and keep those maritime expanses from potential adversaries (mainly Russia and China), the Alliance has set up joint air and sea commands that are integrated into the NATO Rapid Response Force (NRF). They consist of four constant naval warfare groups, with each member state contributing two to six of its own vessels. Inasmuch as the majority of NATO countries are naval powers, the number of ships in the Alliance's pool constitutes quite a powerful force at sea. These forces constantly patrol NATO's zone of responsibility in the North Atlantic, carry out training exercises and maneuvers together to support the Alliance's missions both within and outside its zone of responsibility. Back in December 2012, the Allied Maritime Command was created in Northwood (Great Britain) to direct operations of such forces.

In June 2018, for the first time in history since its creation, NATO also unveiled its Joint Air Power Strategy (JAP). These joint assets are tasked with effectively opposing the forces of the Alliance's leading rivals on land, in aerospace, at sea, and in cyberspace, as well as tackling other fundamental goals of the Alliance on the global stage. This document mentions neither the sources of threats nor the main areas of operations

of the Alliance's Air Force. However, it is clear that special attention will be given, as before, to the actions of these forces on the eastern flank of NATO and in the North Atlantic region.

That is where they are creating new command structures, centers of strategic communication and electronic warfare. That is where they are constructing new airfields and modernizing existing ones, along with ammunition depots and other strategic infrastructure and logistics facilities. The above mentioned are intended to provide a base to conduct operations of various sizes involving the rapidly increasing number of manned and unmanned aircraft under NATO's command. For these reasons, the document states, components of the global U.S. missile defense system are already stationed in Romania, and the infrastructure for this system is coming soon to Poland. Across the region, bases for air and missile defense are being built at local and regional levels.⁴

Practical measures to support the strategic interests of the bloc are determined by decisions made on the NATO Council at the level of heads of state and government. A significant push toward military preparations by NATO came as a result of decisions passed at the Alliance's summits in Wales (September 2014), Warsaw (July 2016), and Brussels (July 2018). These meetings saw the endorsement of a collective military agenda for the Alliance, the key elements of which were proclaimed as strengthening the struggle against "provocative acts of Russia." This means a new confrontation, "a deterrence to be based on a combination of nuclear and usual arms, including deployment of ABM systems," as well as the continuing expansion of the Alliance to the East, the Balkans, and Scandinavia.

At the summit in Wales, a Readiness Action Plan was endorsed that would provide for: positioning allied air, ground, and sea forces along Russia's periphery on a continuous basis; increasing the number of Rapid Response Forces; forming Advanced Expeditionary Forces (AEF), which would operate on a rotational basis; increasing the coherence and efficiency of NATO's joint maneuvers; strengthening naval and air force potential; and carrying out large-scale exercises. These measures are reinforced by the decision to increase all NATO members' military expenditures to 2% of GDP in real terms, according to growth, by 2024, and by a guideline to spend up to 20% of their national military budgets on the purchase of military equipment (of course, mostly American). The North Atlantic, coincidentally, is not mentioned in the document as one of the subregions of concern for the Alliance.

Afterward, at the summit in Warsaw, strategic rivalry with Russia was identified as a part of the long-term Euro-Atlantic vision. In order to suppress Russia's resistance to NATO's global policy of establishing Western hegemony on the planet, and to curb its independent actions both on the international arena and within the country, the bloc's multifaceted approach to strengthening Russian containment was approved. This will include a wide range of measures to apply military, political-diplomatic, financial-economic, and informational pressure. This time, the final statement mentioned the North Atlantic, where NATO will be ready to deter any potential threats against sea lines of communication and maritime approaches of NATO territory.

Reassessing Concepts

AFTER THE MEETING in Warsaw and before the next NATO summit in Brussels in July 2018, an initiative put forward by the "original" members of the alliance (including the USA and Great Britain) launched another process of reassessing the military strategy of the North Atlantic bloc. This work involved think tanks from the leading NATO countries.

In the course of a quite lively discussion about zones of concern and about subsequent steps to strengthen defensive capabilities and enhance the containment of Russia, noticeable differences of opinion within the military scientific communities of leading NATO countries came to light. A key issue was whether the Alliance's eastern flank should continue to be the main direction for further expansion of the base of the bloc's fighting forces. This is a matter stubbornly promoted by Poland and the Baltic countries. At the same time, the Alliance's leadership was criticized for not paying enough attention to strengthening the joint naval forces, focusing only on the development of informational and new command structures to the detriment of strengthening naval deterrence forces and improving strategies and tactics for their application.

In this regard, it was pointed out that at the present stage NATO's priority area in the field of security should be primarily to strengthen both the Alliance's and the USA's conventional naval forces and air forces, in order to effectively defend against Russian submarines and large ships operating in the North Atlantic and Baltic region, and to develop a new and more ambitious naval strategy for the Alliance that takes into account the rising new threats to NATO security. It was noted that the modern naval strategy of NATO (passed in 2011) is now outdated, since it was

oriented toward the struggle against international terrorism and the maintenance of security at sea beyond the Alliance's own zone of responsibility.⁵

A number of influential military figures, as well as the leading think tanks of the USA and Great Britain, called on NATO to expand its zone of influence to include the North Atlantic. To justify such an idea, an anxiety about resumption of great power competition at sea was artificially inflated. This anxiety arose from allegedly unprecedented (since the end of the Cold War) expansion of Russian naval might, the development of new thinking regarding its use, and the inadequacy of NATO's current military potential to handle the growing threats to the Alliance in this region coming from Russia.

These circles claim that the activity of Russian air and naval forces in the North Atlantic has led to dangerous vulnerability of critically important pieces of NATO's infrastructure, as well as strategic communication between the USA and Western Europe, thereby allowing Russia (despite its comparatively smaller military budget) to challenge NATO's superiority at sea and in the air above these zones.

In a report produced by leading experts of an American conservative think tank, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), it was suggested to take a more flexible approach in reevaluating the Alliance's military posture. This idea boils down to adding to the plan of strengthening the forward stationing along the eastern front of the Alliance the concept of Enhanced Deterrence in the North (EDN). Its main elements are listed as follows: the creation of a Joint Northern Naval Command; the restoration of the Second Fleet, which had been disbanded by the Obama administration in 2011 for the sake of reducing military spending; the expansion of American military presence in the North Atlantic; and the buildup of combined air force potential.

In the opinion of the report's authors, these measures would allow for the expansion of the Alliance's zone of operations to include not only the North Atlantic, but also the Baltic and Barents Seas. They would help strengthen regional containment and overcome the remaining differences between the Alliance's member states on security issues, and at the same time ensure a long-term U.S. presence in the zone of operations.⁶

The report also argues that ensuring security in the region would be unrealizable without the deep involvement of Finland and Sweden in the defensive structure of NATO. And although the report recognizes that in the foreseeable future, we would not expect the entry of these countries

into the North Atlantic bloc (due to their unique historical and domestic political factors), a deeper level of cooperation between their governments and the USA, Germany, Poland, as well as among themselves, would allow getting around these obstacles. The report says that the USA should play a significant role in promoting the concept of EDN, by offering the framework for the relevant diplomatic negotiations.⁷

British analysts are of the same mind as the Americans. A report by the Royal United Services Institute titled "NATO and the North Atlantic: Revitalising the Strategy of Collective Defence" emphasizes that in the context of the growing competition with Russia for dominance in the North Atlantic, NATO should revise its naval strategy by toughening its opposition to Russia's activity in Northern Europe. They say that if NATO loses effective control over the waters of the North Atlantic, or at least is unable to challenge Russia's access to this expanse of water, the Russian Federation could block reinforcements coming from the USA to Europe if an active conflict should arise. The main idea that the research rests on is that the North Atlantic should again be declared an independent and extended transatlantic theater of military operations.⁸

The recommendations that these studies put forward were in effect supported by such authoritative military figures in NATO and the USA as Generals Petr Pavel and Phillip Breedlove, as well as Admiral James Stavridis, all of whom are calling for NATO to put the North Atlantic back on its agenda, to renew the Alliance's naval strategy and revive its command structure, which should become able to make decisions on countering any threats that may arise in the North Atlantic.

And yet, it is plain to see that among the Alliance's military officials and experts there is no unanimously solid opinion as to the changes proposed by the Anglo-Saxons regarding NATO's approaches to security on the continent. Representatives of France and other countries of Southern Europe hold a markedly different position regarding NATO's adaptation to an unpredictable and rapidly changing world. Along with the need to counter Russia's military policy, they see genuine, highly serious threats to their security coming from the south, rather than the east or north. They are convinced that terrorist threats to the Euro-Atlantic region will continue to grow. This is why the prominent British researcher Julian Lindley-French stresses that NATO needs to not only strengthen its military capabilities, but to actively pursue a Southern strategy, which includes joint action with Russia and other members of the Partnership for Peace.⁹

With this in mind, he says, dialogue with Russia in managing security risks needs to be further developed.

Subregion Turning Into a Potential Theater of War

AS THE ALLIANCE'S SECRETARY GENERAL, Jens Stoltenberg, publicly acknowledged, the differences of opinion among NATO's member states about a new course of action for the bloc cannot be completely eliminated. Nevertheless, at the last NATO Council summit in Brussels on July 11-12, 2018, the leaders of Great Britain, the USA, and NATO managed to push through decisions about further strengthening the policy of comprehensive containment, which at its heart means putting pressure on Russia from all sides, including the North Atlantic.

Concerning this matter, the final declaration of the summit saw the passage of a compromise formula, which stated NATO's intent to continue to address its weakening security by ramping up its own military potential and by building its own forces for both deterrence and defense. Special attention will be paid to increasing speed and mobility in deployment, both to the east and in the North Atlantic. In accordance with this declaration, NATO countries by 2020 will have to provide additional 30 large warships, 30 mechanized battalions and 30 Air Force combat squadrons that would be ready for battle within 30 days or less. Among other things, the NATO Allied Fleet is tasked with providing support via reinforcement by and from the sea, including the transatlantic corridor, as the North Atlantic is the connecting passage for communication and strategic reinforcements.

In order to ensure effective command and control for the growing mass of NATO forces and for the deployment of additional forces from the USA, Great Britain and Canada, it was decided to recreate the Joint Allied Forces Command center for the North Atlantic Alliance. It is to be based in Norfolk, Virginia. NATO will also form a command to be stationed in Ulm, Germany, for the logistical support and coordination of NATO's Rapid Reaction forces, as well as a center for cyber operations in Belgium.

A strategy was also adopted on the joint Air Force potential and a strengthening of the Alliance's Integrated Air and Missile Defense System. The summit declaration also confirmed the importance of continuing NATO's efforts to ensure interaction with the EU in the sphere of military mobility, including the improvement of relevant procedures that should equally apply to all NATO countries.¹⁰

It only makes sense that the realization of such an all-encompassing program of action would require divvying up among the member states of NATO the price tag for the additional financial and material resources to accomplish these goals. According to Brussels' preliminary estimates, by 2024, additional military expenditures from the European members and Canada will see an increase of \$266 billion.¹¹

In terms of strengthening NATO's military potential, much importance is being ascribed to activating measures to raise military preparedness and coordinate all elements of the Alliance's collective forces and their oversight.

There has been a heightening of intensity, as well as an increase in scale and degree of military exercises in Europe involving members of the Alliance. There are more than 200 multilateral and national maneuvers in Europe annually among NATO members.

In the fall of 2018, for the purpose of demonstrating NATO's determination to repel any threat from wherever it may occur, and to show the ability of allied troops to act in concert, NATO carried out the largest military exercises in decades in Iceland and Norway. Titled Trident Juncture 2018, they included more than 50,000 soldiers and a large amount of military hardware from all 29 countries of the Alliance. They even included its so-called neutral partners, Sweden and Finland.

At the same time, additional steps are being taken to build up the presence of the navies and air forces of each of the NATO countries, as well as Sweden and Finland, in the North Atlantic and the Baltic Sea. In May 2018, the American commander of naval operations, Admiral John Richardson, announced the reestablishment of the Second Fleet (dissolved in 2011). According to his announcement, it will be ready to carry out operations in the North Atlantic and react to any challenges that may arise from the growing competition of Great Powers in the region. It is yet unclear how many forces and assets the Pentagon will allocate to the reborn Second Fleet, but at the point when it was dissolved, it numbered 126 warships of different types, about 4,500 planes and helicopters of various designations, and about 90,000 personnel.¹²

Following the American lead, Great Britain, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries are strengthening their own naval and air force presence in this region to stand up to the "Russian threat." As Admiral Phillip Jones, head of the Royal Navy, stated in an interview with the TV channel Sky News, the North Atlantic region is becoming a priority in Great Britain's operation. The British Navy is to create a "zone of joint

maneuvers” in this region that would allow them to carry out various naval and air exercises more frequently.¹³

The USA and NATO also insist that Germany play a larger role in strengthening the potential of the navy and air force in the region. Berlin supports this approach. In January 2016, Berlin announced that as a first step it was budgeting an additional 130 billion euros for the purchase of arms and equipment until 2030.¹⁴

However, this does not satisfy Washington or Brussels, both of which continue to exert increasingly severe pressure on Germany. They continue to claim that Berlin is not fulfilling the promise it had made at the Wales summit to increase its military budget and strengthen its military capabilities. According to a report from the NATO Secretary General, Germany is still seriously behind the schedule that was agreed upon in Wales, as it currently plans to raise this figure to only 1.5% of GDP by 2024. As was made public in the U.S. media, the White House threatened Berlin with the removal of American forces from Germany if it continued to stall in the fulfillment of its stated promise.

In turn, Norway and Denmark, as well as neutral Sweden and Finland, have been referring to the increasing risks to their security posed by Russia. They have announced additional measures to strengthen their military capabilities and are preparing their reserves for possible military operations. For example, in 2017, Oslo signed the largest military contract in its history with the USA for the purchase of American arms, including 52 F-35 multi-role attack fighters for a price tag of \$10 billion, and Denmark is set to purchase another 27 of these planes.

There has been an unprecedented eagerness shown in this regard by the formally “neutral” Sweden. In 2017, the government of this country passed a new National Security Strategy that foresees a significant expansion of its national military potential and a deepening of its bilateral cooperation with NATO, the USA, Great Britain, and its direct neighbors Germany, Poland, and Finland. In particular, decisions were made to: expand the country’s military expenditures by 17% within the coming five years; build two new-generation submarines; strengthen the air force through the additional acquisition of the Gripen aircraft; and purchase the U.S. Patriot missile system. As of January 1, 2018, the Swedish Army reinstated the draft for men and women.

The country’s leadership is artificially fomenting panic in society, scaring the population with a growing prospect of external aggression while developing the concept of total defense.¹⁵ Sweden’s senior politi-

cal and military leaders openly state that the old doctrine of neutrality became obsolete after Sweden joined the European Union and the Lisbon Treaty, as Article 42.7 obliges EU members to use all the means at their disposal to support the other members of the Union if they become the victims of aggression. With this in mind, they are not hiding the fact that in the case of a military conflict in Europe, Sweden would not be willing to remain neutral, as it claimed, the country was during the World War II.¹⁶

For its part, Helsinki is inclined to follow Sweden: if the latter were to submit an application to join the Alliance, then Finland would have to do the same practically automatically. Given such sentiments, these neighbors have fully justified the conclusion of Russia's own experts: that the strategic choice of these nations in favor of NATO would cross a "red line" for Russia, leading to a crisis that could be comparable to the Cuban missile crisis.¹⁷

The plans approved at NATO summits (as well as the practical steps for their achievement) to strengthen attack potential on NATO's "eastern flank," and to further enlarge the Alliance to the east, are heightening tensions and weakening the military security of Europe by destroying the post-Cold War balance in the region. As a result of these destructive and provocative acts, Europe is increasingly turning into a zone of heightened military antagonism. There are growing risks of unintended and potentially dangerous incidents occurring, thereby seriously weakening stability in the region. In these circumstances, one cannot dismiss the possibility of NATO's aggressive intentions morphing into military adventurism by the bloc countries against Russia, in the long or even the medium term. As pointed out above, preparations for such actions are being carried out more intensively, and the so-called "hybrid war" against our country and its allies is becoming more fierce.

Nevertheless, the increasing power of Russia, demonstrated during its antiterrorist operations in Syria and seen in the large-scale military exercises our troops have carried out (as well as the country's firm determination to protect Russia's vital national interests without allowing the existing strategic balance in Europe to be broken), is a serious deterrent for NATO members' behavior. They are taking these issues into account in their decision-making on the national level and within the framework of NATO.

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The EU in Search of Itself

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Key words: European Parliament, Eurosceptics, European defense, Russia-China interaction.

ELECTIONS to the European Parliament that took place on May 23-26, 2019 reflected the far from simple processes that have been unfolding in the European Union for several years now. They confirmed the desire of a fairly big number of voters to see new people among the political elites. The Right and Left centrists that had dominated the parliament for many years lost their traditional majority and, therefore, the chance to elect the chairman among themselves. This was not the only surprise.

First, in their zeal the mainstream media controlled by the liberal elites devoted to the ideas of European integration that demonized the Eurosceptics as dangerous populists forced the voters to mobilize and close ranks to a much greater extent than before (51.2% against 42% in 2014). Second, unexpectedly, the Greens, the majority of which belonged to the Left camp, demonstrated good results: they came second with 20.5% of votes in Germany and third in France with 13.5%. It should be said that they partly owed their success to the United States that had left the 2016 Paris Agreement.

Contrary to expectations, however, it was not a breakthrough even if Eurosceptics gained more seats than in 2014: 173 against 140 (24% of the total number of 751 seats). This means that even if they manage to form a faction, the decisive impact on the political course of the European Parliament will remain outside their reach. In an absence of a clear majority, however, they got a chance to influence new laws and decisions. Theoretically, they might form temporal alliances with other forces. So far, deputies of other parties who look at them as a threat to unfolding

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integration reject the very idea of such alliances. It seems that they are determined to close ranks to prevent Eurosceptics from filling the important posts of deputy chairman and chairs of the main commissions. They became even more determined in demonizing the movement.

In view of the fact that it is a conglomerate of very different forces which find it hard to come to an agreement on many questions of domestic and foreign policies and that have no clear support in the member-states (where they survive on protest votes), panic in the

ranks of European integrationist elites looks excessive – at first glance. Indeed, in Italy where the Lega Nord of Matteo Salvini got 34.5% of the votes, its obvious victory was marred by the results of its partner in the ruling coalition. The Five Star Movement of Luigi Di Maio got two times less (17.4%) votes than at the 2018 parliamentary elections. In France, the National Rally of Marine Le Pen came first with 23.3% which is less than in 2014, when it had gained 24.9%.

The forces normally defined as extreme Right that dominate the camp of Eurosceptics are, in fact, highly varied. Some of them are much closer in many respects to the Right and Left centrists and cannot, therefore, be tagged as extreme Right. Very much like the Centrists, they are very negative about immigration from the Muslim countries in the first place; they share with the Centrists the idea of sovereignty, a specific formula of national sovereignty opposed to the current model of European integration. They cannot agree, however, on the modality of immigration policies and on acceptable alternatives to it.

Some of them see an exit of their countries from the European Union as the final aim; others will be satisfied with the “Europe of Nations,” the European Union in which decision-making belongs to the member-states and the present European institutions are replaced with a moderately-sized executive secretariat. Still others will be satisfied with a greater role of the European Council of heads of state and government at the expense of the supra-national European Commission. It should be said that moderate Eurosceptics or those who had moved to more moderate positions (Marine Le Pen being one of them) reaped the biggest number of seats on May 23-26.

The majority of Eurosceptics look at Russia as the bulwark of sovereignty in Europe and the world – one that protects traditional, mainly Christian values.

There are liberals or even Left forces among the Eurosceptics – such as La France insoumise of Jean-Luc Mélenchon that supports immigration for ideological reasons (humanitarian values).

It should be said that the Polish Eurosceptics, on the one side, and the supporters of Salvini and Le Pen who want better relations with Russia, on the other, are divided by a wide gap of different opinions about the EU anti-Russia sanctions.

In other words, Eurosceptics might close ranks on certain issues; it is highly unlikely, however, that they might knock together a fairly big faction in the European Parliament.

What people in the member-countries really think about the European Union limits, to a great extent, Eurosceptics and their parties. In Italy, Austria and Greece, the countries with the lowest level of positive assessment of the European Union (39%, 45% and 45% respectively), the share of negative assessment is much lower (17%, 21% and 16%). We should bear in mind that the EU drove Greece into a corner of high debts. In Poland and Hungary, two countries in a conflict with the EU, 70% and 61% of their citizens are very positive about the European Union. In the Netherlands and Poland, the share is 79%; in France, it is lower (55%) yet the share of negative feelings is very low (13%). On the whole, 65% of the EU population are positive about it.¹

The European integrationist elites fear Eurosceptics because, first, they are gradually adjusting to the political landscape which makes it much harder to demonize them. Second, the sources of Euroscepticism have not disappeared. According to public opinion polls, the majority of the EU citizens are irritated by Brussels that fails to fulfill their priority demands: settle the problem of immigration, fight terrorism and reduce unemployment. In Italy, Austria, Greece, and Germany that received the greatest number of migrants, people want more secure borders. In Hungary, this is the basic priority.

This means that while approving the EU on the whole as “useful” or “needed” Europeans are dissatisfied with the European institutions and their inability to cope with the challenges of time. The present organizational structure of the European Union looks too bureaucratic, too cumbersome and far removed from the people. Those who say so mean the European Commission, first and foremost, the members of which are appointed rather than elected. People are irritated by regulation of such trifles of their everyday life as the amount of water in toilet tanks or the length of bananas. Agriculture is the most regimented branch which

explains why European farmers who get considerable subsidies from the EU are often on the side of Eurosceptics. This is what happened in Britain in 2016 when they voted to leave.

The image of the European institutions suffered a lot when they failed to oppose the U.S. withdrawal from the “Iranian nuclear deal” and the 2016 Paris Agreement. Protection of the environment is gaining popularity in the EU member-countries, the younger generations in particular.

The European Union has not yet overcome the external disagreements caused by the Greek crisis of 2010. The disagreements between the North and the South (the latter was especially displeased with the harsh measures imposed by Germany) over economic assistance to Greece are much deeper rooted than an eye can see. According to many experts and politicians in France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, German banks were the main beneficiaries. Entrusted by the European Central Bank with the rescue mission, they receive the larger part of repaid credits extracted from Greece. This is an outcrop of a wider problem – the majority of those who live in the European South are convinced that Germany gained its present might in the banking sector due to, among other things, introduction of the Euro, while their countries sustained great losses. This is one of the favorite subjects of Eurosceptics in France and Italy in the first place.

Another split was caused by the migration crisis and the refusal of the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia) to receive migrants on their territories under the EU quotas. A lot has already been written about this. It is enough to say here that President of France Emmanuel Macron, a self-appointed leader of European integration, addressed them with “Europe isn’t a supermarket. Europe is a common destiny.” A response was harsh.

By the irony of fate, when the European Union driven by geopolitical considerations hastened to draw, in 2004 and 2005, the East European countries (economically unfit for EU membership) in the EU, it was holding forth about “common values,” democracy and human rights in the first place. The polemics unfolding today showed that these values are not quite common. Today, there is an opinion in the European Union that Poland and Hungary have created “non-liberal” democracies and should be confronted with sanctions. It turned out, however, that this is easier said than done.

France added vehemence to the migration crisis: in 2017, having agreed to a small quota of about 38 thousand, it received 32 thousand. For Greece, Austria, Italy (to say nothing of Germany that received over 1

million), the figures were much higher. This led to a serious crisis in the relations between France and Italy when Eurosceptics came to power in the latter in June 2018. Macron who criticized Italy that refused to let vessels with migrants dock at any of its ports received a harsh retort from Rome. The squabble went as far as mutual recalling of ambassadors.

The Franco-German tandem, seen by everybody as a motor of sorts of European integration, caused another disagreement. The obvious crisis of the European Union confirmed by the British referendum on Brexit prompted the tandem, under President François Hollande, to move toward a two-speed Europe that will consist of core Europe (19 states of the Eurozone) and the others (nine states) expected to catch up when they are ready. This proved to be nothing more than declaration of intentions.

Even before he was elected president in May 2017, Macron had dreamed of the EU as a center of power able “to protect ourselves with respect to China, Russia and even the United States of America.” In September of the same year, speaking at the Sorbonne, he offered a program of reforms in the Eurozone which, in fact, would have opened a road to a federal state: he spoke about a common budget for the Eurozone, a common finance minister, a European Currency Fund and European Security Council, a Eurozone parliament and election of the European Parliament and appointment of European commissars on a transnational basis. He also formulated several initiatives related to autonomous European defense capabilities.

It should be said that since that time Emmanuel Macron supported by Angela Merkel (who needed time to accept Macron’s initiatives) has promoted or made the first steps toward promoting some of these ideas partly due to Donald Trump’s one-sided politics and his impudent “America First” slogan.

In February 2018, the European Commission decided to support in 2019 transformation of the current European Stability Mechanism into the European Monetary Fund. In June 2018, in Meseberg, Macron and Merkel adopted a declaration in which they said: “We propose establishing a Eurozone budget within the framework of the European Union... starting in 2021.... We need a European debate on new formats, such as an EU Security Council.” They suggested “a broader debate on majority vote in the European Council... together with elections to the European Parliament on the transnational basis as of 2024.” It was also suggested “to work for the European Commission to have less Commissioners than

there are Member States that is, the principle one country-one commissioner should be abandoned.”

The concerted efforts of France and Germany moved the EU further on along the route of European defense and common security. In November 2017, 23 EU states joined the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) which suggested that it would receive some practical content. In July 2018, the European Parliament approved the European Defense Fund to be created in 2019 with the expected budget of €13 billion. Earlier, in June 2018, nine EU members (Belgium, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Estonia, and France) and Finland that joined later signed an agreement on European Intervention Initiative, a small headquarters of sorts, an embryo of a common intervention force, one of Macron’s initiatives.

In March 2019, the Intelligence College in Europe, another Macron’s brain child to be developed into a coordinating center of the EU special services, was opened in Paris. The European Public Prosecutor’s Office, another novelty, will start functioning in Luxemburg in 2020; there is a decision to knock together by 2027 a corps of border guards of 10 thousand at the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex).

Inspired by these achievements, Emmanuel Macron started talking about a “European army.” His statement of November 2019 (“We have to protect ourselves with respect to China, Russia and even the United States of America”) caused Donald Trump’s indignation who found this statement insulting. Later, the Élysée Palace had to apologize: it was a “misunderstanding” caused by “exaggerated” U.S. press reports.

The displeasure stirred up by Macron’s initiative in the member-states outside the Eurozone was even more important. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were especially vocal: they feared, and with good reason, of being pushed to the EU margins. Practically all East European countries, in which the pro-NATO sentiments, were especially strong did not like the idea of a “European army” as a threat to the Alliance’s power. The Polish media accused the president of France of violating “Atlantic solidarity” in the face of “aggressive Russia” and the intention of squeezing America out of the region to occupy its place. Some journalists went even further to accuse Macron of an intention to become a “new emperor of Europe.” The Czech media insisted that a “European army” would disintegrate NATO and make Europe defenseless.²

Assessed objectively, the East European countries are a great social problem of European integration. The EU citizens insistently demand that

it should finally address the social problems (so far, they mainly belong to the competence of member-states) to ensure equal social guarantees for all. The still obvious differences in the economic development level and the wages between the East and the West make this practically impossible. Indeed, in Luxembourg, the minimal wage is €2,185 while in Bulgaria, it is €288.

By way of summing up the above we can conclude that the Eurosceptics respond to the crises and domestic problems of many member-states with the “less Europe” and more national sovereignty strategy. European integrationists led by Macron and Merkel pin their hopes on the “more Europe” argument in expectation that “nipping on ahead” will revive the integration process and add new synergy. Today, the idea of the European Union as a “new world center of economic, technological and military power” is as inspiring and mobilizing as the Common Market and the common European currency in their time. At the same time, it is not clear whether this idea will inspire and consolidate the majority of the EU citizens since the supporters of the third strategy – “different Europe,” rather than “more or less Europe,” more aware of the needs of its citizens – gain attention. The Greens and part of the moderate Eurosceptics are among its supporters.

It seems that the “more Europe” strategy has exhausted itself and that the Franco-German integration “motor” is losing its efficiency because, among other things, their leaders has lost part of their political weight. The European elections undermined the positions of Merkel as head of the fragile CDU/CSU and SPD coalition; everybody knows that she will resign from the post of Chancellor in 2021.

The job approval rate of Macron, who tried to revive the French economy according to the German model (favorable conditions for employers at the expense of the employed) and save some money at the expense of pensioners, dropped to 24-25% after a social upheaval, while his party *La République En Marche* gained only 22.4% of votes at the latest elections to the European Parliament. Under pressure of the Yellow Vests Movement, which was supported at the initial stages by about 80% of the country’s population, he had to retreat. His considerable concessions to social groups with moderate incomes included raised minimal wages, lowered social charges for old-age pensioners and indexed old-age pension to inflation.

This undermined the financial base of the president’s efforts to modernize the economic sphere and its positions in the EU. His political

adversaries in France and Eurosceptics seized the opportunity. On the eve of the elections, Marine Le Pen minced no words: she called on the country to treat the elections to the European Parliament as a no-confidence vote to the president and reaped more votes than expected.

The German model that President Macron has chosen as a pattern to follow is malfunctioning for internal and external reasons. German economy has accumulated a lot of structural contradictions; inequality and unreliable employment came to the fore in the social sphere. The gradually growing protectionism in U.S. policies pursued by President Trump revealed the shortcomings of the German export-oriented production model. Germany is the EU hegemon yet its voice in the European institutions, in the European Council and the European Commission in particular, is losing its former consequence.

This background brought to light contradictions between France and Germany in the foreign policy sphere. Emmanuel Macron, very much like his predecessors François Hollande and Nicolas Sarkozy, is seeking stronger support from Germany and the EU for his policies in the Mediterranean and Africa. Germany that is gradually rediscovering its historical interests looks at Eastern Europe (and Ukraine in particular) as the region of its priority interests. The camouflaged rivalry between the two countries became obvious when in February 2019 France supported the draft decision of the European Union to block Nord Stream 2. Merkel poured a lot of effort into a compromise that saved the project.

It should be said that the Franco-German tandem that claims the main role in the EU causes a lot of concerns or even animosity in other member-states from Italy to the Netherlands or Poland.

The discussion about the sources of Euroscepticism that took place in April 2019 at a conference at the European Parliament which I attended is directly related to the subject of this article. Organized by the faction of the European People's Party that dominated the parliament revealed that the traditional European integrationist elites were at a loss. Some of the deputies believed that Euroscepticism is a product of inadequate information of the EU citizens about the achievements and the boons that they could enjoy.

Others laid blame on European bureaucracy, an enthusiastic regulator of all and everything in the member-countries. Still others preferred a wider approach: the tasks and duties of the European institutions, the European Commission, should be redistributed between them and national governments in the first place. Each side should be allowed to do what

it can do better than the other; in other words, the principle of subsidiarity was involved. Practically all speakers referred to “common values” as the main factor of solidarity. It was a deputy from Slovakia who set right the priorities: “It is good to have common values, yet it is much better to have common interests.”

The European deputies of France and Germany, on the one hand, and their colleagues from Austria and Italy, on the other, started a highly meaningful discussion about the means and methods by which the current crisis could be settled. The former pinned their hopes on a more active performance of the Franco-German tandem that should pour more fuel into the integration motor. The latter looked at this as a trend to even greater domination of French and Germans that, they argued, would widen the rifts.

This discussion and the results of the elections to the European Parliament clarified the main problem of the European Union – it needs a more flexible and more efficient model of integration that would bring its members together. The democratic states with the developed culture of compromises can cope with the problem yet this will take time. This moves the dream of the French president about the “world power center,” unrealistic at the beginning, into a dim future. This is, probably, good news for Russia: it does not need the EU as a federal state with the logic of a “new empire” that will inevitably try to push the Russian Federation to the Eurasian periphery. This trend is obvious in Brussels and in some of the EU members, chiefly Poland and the Baltic states.

On the whole, there are two opposite trends in the EU policy regarding Russia at the level of national states. The majority of Eurosceptics look at Russia as the bulwark of sovereignism in Europe and the world – one that protects traditional, mainly Christian values.

In the geopolitical context, they and some other forces, mainly from the Right camp, look at Russia as a counterbalance to the United States, a “bridge” between them and China and a barrier to Chinese expansion. There is another trend that brings together the liberals and a significant share of the Greens: they talk about the threat of Russia to consolidate the European Union.

Russia’s choice is obvious: It needs the EU not only for mutually advantageous economic cooperation but also for security on the continent. The current multidirectional interaction with China can be described as an achievement of Russia’s foreign policy. It became indispensable for objective reasons and because of confrontation with the U.S. and its

allies. This interaction should be consolidated for obvious reasons.

Realities, however, demand that we should take into account the widening gap in economy and technologies that has already put the problem of Russia's dependence on the agenda. The problem of counterbalance is growing more and more urgent. The European Union is the closest of such counterbalances geographically, culturally and civilizationaly. Disunited, the EU is still a pole of economic might that adds a lot to its geopolitical importance. Indeed, at the level of member-states, France, Germany and Italy are significant geopolitical players. It is highly important that in these and certain other EU countries public opinion is turning slowly but surely toward Russia despite the sanctions and confrontational propaganda.

NOTES

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Germany and China: From Cooperation to Competition

Ye. Leonov

Key words: Chinese market, partnership, Chinese investors, German-Chinese trade and economic relations.

IN 2016, China for the first time became Germany's main foreign trade partner, replacing the seemingly unshakable U.S., which came in third place after France. This event was an indicator of certain changes taking place in modern world trade and in international relations in general – what would seem to be the emergence of a trend toward the establishment of a new balance of power in world politics. The basis for such a turn of events was China's adept and very balanced economic diplomacy against the backdrop of Washington's rather impulsive and sometimes rash actions.

Speaking of German-Chinese relations, it should be understood that over the past three years, they managed to weather a whole series of events. According to the German Federal Statistical Agency, in 2016 – i.e., at the turning point – foreign trade turnover between China and Germany totaled 170 billion euros (trade turnover with the U.S. was 165 billion euros). By 2018, two years later, it had grown by almost 20%, reaching the mark of 200 billion euros.¹ Several factors contributed to such an intensive increase in bilateral trade and investment activity.

First, the openly tough protectionist policy of the American administration toward Germany that Donald Trump initiated immediately after taking office further pushed German businesses to reorient foreign trade activity toward Asian markets. Given the development of similar trade wars between China and the U.S., the interests of Beijing and Berlin in increasing cooperation and reducing dependence on the U.S. market coincided. The leaders of both countries have been effusive about prospects for bilateral cooperation. For example, in January 2017, a telephone con-

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versation took place between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Prime Minister of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Li Keqiang, during which an agreement was reached to strengthen trade ties. In July 2018, in Berlin, they formulated a joint statement of interest in a trading system based on the principles of multilateralism, openness and freedom of access, openly alluding to the inadmissibility of American protectionism in modern world trade.

Second, the mutual interest in building partnerships is due not only to the presence of a common irritant in the face of the current American administration, but also the real trade, economic and investment advantages of collaboration – namely, cooperation in the field of investment and advanced technologies. The EU and China are currently working on a relevant investment agreement that is expected to be signed soon.

The Chinese market, because of its size, has become to a large extent a priority for German businesses. As of 2017, more than 8,000 companies from Germany were represented there as investors.² The scale of the Chinese economy is impressive: Volkswagen AG sells every second car in China.³ Robert Bosch GmbH, one of the world's leading technology suppliers, announced in 2018 that China is now its largest foreign area of focus.⁴ The list goes on and on. Western companies' characteristic focus on commercial profits and the Chinese pragmatic approach to obtaining access to innovations in the automotive, engineering and other high-tech sectors of the leading economies of Europe (primarily Germany) perfectly blend and complement each other.

China's demand for German technology is enormous and stems from the Chinese government's commitment to narrowing the technological gap between Beijing and the leading Western economies, which was reflected in the corresponding "Made in China 2025" program, launched in 2015. The strategic program focuses on boosting 10 key industries of the country, from aerospace to robotics. Representatives of major research centers together with various government agencies under the supervision of the Ministry of Industry and Informatization of the People's Republic of China have participated in its development.

The openly tough protectionist policy of the American administration toward Germany further pushed German businesses to reorient foreign trade activity toward Asian markets.

The innovative development of the Chinese economy would generally merit the support of other world players if not for several fundamental provisions of the aforementioned program that displease the West.

The program aims to increase the share of Chinese manufacturers in the domestic market to 70% by 2025 – in other words, to introduce gradual import substitution or locally produced goods. China is not interested in attracting foreign investment on a broad scale or granting foreign companies broad access to the local market, which is what Germany, for example, is expecting. Instead, it uses the latter as tracing paper to copy others' innovative and technological achievements, and subsequently utilizes them at its own production facilities. Therefore, import substitution in China is becoming phony in some places.

In this regard, the Chinese program runs counter to a similar German plan, *Industrie 4.0*, unveiled at the Hanover Industrial Exhibition in 2011 and designed to increase the global competitiveness of the German economy through its digitalization. A key aspect of the German initiative is support for research and development. In the Chinese case, it is not a question of developing basic research and expanding knowledge, but rather of an innovative pseudo-breakthrough based on foreign technologies. The downward trend in the trade balance of China's high technology sector in recent years indicates a proportionate growth in the importance of foreign innovation in the Chinese economy.

Until recently, Berlin maintained an open-door policy for investors from China. This was only partially due to the limbo caused by Trump's unpredictable policy of promoting American nationalism and, accordingly, protectionism, and had more to do with the natural interest of German companies in easy profit. For example, in 2016, Chinese investment in Germany amounted to almost \$13 billion,⁶ which is 24 times higher than the level in 2015 (\$530 million).⁷

The period of 2016-2018 was the most fruitful in the history of investment cooperation between the two countries: China literally bought at any price German assets that it found interesting. For example, by early 2017, China's Media Group had taken over the German robotics company Kuka (for 4.5 billion euros),⁸ the cornerstone of the *Industrie 4.0* program (or, as it is often called, the "fourth industrial revolution"). In turn, the Chinese conglomerate HNA Group Co. became the largest investor in Deutsche Bank, acquiring a 9.9% stake in 2017.⁹ Finally, Li Shufu, the main owner of the Chinese Zhejiang Geely Holding Group, bought almost 10% of German automaker Daimler (worth about \$9 billion).¹⁰

As of 2018, Chinese investors had a 51% stake in more than 200 German companies,¹¹ two-thirds of which are related to the key industries mentioned in the Made in China 2025 program – mainly energy, robotics, the automotive industry, and biomedicine.¹²

However, this turn of events soon began to raise some concerns in German political circles, including in the context of possible espionage. Hans-Georg Maassen, former president of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution of Germany, described the Chinese economic course as follows: “There is no longer a need to have your spy at an enterprise – just buy the enterprise.”¹³ In particular, according to Maassen, the increased interest of Chinese investors could pose a direct threat to the country’s security due to the close connection of many Chinese enterprises to intelligence services.

Words were backed up by actions, which led to the German side adopting the “National Industrial Strategy 2030,” which aims to protect local enterprises from unwanted takeovers, as well as facilitate the formation of large private companies (so-called European champions) that can successfully fend off Chinese conglomerates embodying the ideas of state capitalism. In turn, in 2017, the German government issued a decree allowing the veto of the sale of German companies to investors from non-EU countries.¹⁴ Despite attempts by a number of experts to accuse German Economic Affairs and Energy Minister Peter Altmaier, the architect of both initiatives, of trying to steer the country toward a planned economy, state support and subsidies, the German public largely approved of the minister’s decision. This is due to two factors.

First, Berlin has recently begun to more soberly assess the prospects of cooperation with its Asian partner. According to Amrita Narlikar, director of the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Europe has long been naïve about China. The EU’s hopes for China’s gradual integration into the global economy through the liberalization of the Chinese economic system, as well as for instilling in Beijing the principles of a Western-style open market economy, have not materialized.

Instead, China is using its growing economic potential to influence the existing world order and promote the foundations of its sociopolitical and trade-economic model. For example, “Partner and Systemic Competitor: How Do We Deal With China's State-Controlled Economy?” a policy paper published by the Federal Association of German Industry on January 10, 2019, openly defines the competition between the West and China as a confrontation between systems.¹⁵ In this regard, experts

are convinced that Germany will pay a heavy price if fundamental decisions on changing the paradigm of relations with Beijing are not made in the near future and the rules of multilateral trade are not reformed. The situation is heating up to the point that some of Germany's political elites are advocating ramping up a policy of isolating Beijing and maintaining it until China agrees to play by the West's rules.

Second, the U.S., which is trying by any means to squeeze China out of the area of its trade, economic and political influence, is pressuring its European partners, forcing them to fall in line. For example, in 2016, the U.S. forced the German government to withdraw its approval for Chinese investor Fujian Grand Chip Investment (FGC) to take over German semiconductor manufacturer Aixtron. A final decision was made after the German side reviewed information provided by American intelligence agencies indicating that Beijing might use chips manufactured at Aixtron facilities for military purposes, posing a threat to U.S. national security.

A similar situation arose in March 2019, when Washington warned Berlin that mutual intelligence exchanges could be restricted if the Chinese company Huawei participated in the launch of fifth-generation mobile communications (5G) in Germany. According to the Americans, Huawei and other technology companies from China can collect data and send it to government agencies in Beijing. The issue of security cooperation with the U.S. is sensitive for Germany, since it was American intelligence that helped Berlin foil a terrorist attack in Cologne in 2018.

The U.S.'s traditional blackmail and coercion tools are combined with a large-scale information campaign to cast Beijing as a competitor or even an opponent in the European public consciousness. Washington is doing that, of course, to discredit Chinese businesses operating in Germany.

All those factors compelled Berlin to ostensibly disrupt several deals between German and Chinese businesses. For example, in the summer of 2018, the German government "leaked" information in the media that it was intending to use a 2017 government directive to veto the sale of assets of the machine tool manufacturing company Leifeld Metal Spinning to the Chinese company Yantai Taihai Group. As a result, the latter abandoned its plans for the deal. Leifeld Metal Spinning specializes in providing processing services for Germany's nuclear industry.¹⁶

The same was the case with the German power line operator 50 Hertz, which provides electricity to nearly 20 million people in the country. The Chinese state conglomerate State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) was

interested in acquiring a 20% stake in companies owned by an Australian investor. However, the state-controlled German bank KfW helped a shareholder from Belgium to quickly redeem this block of shares just to oust a potential Chinese buyer from the deal. The operation took place despite accusations from the expert community about the use of methods that do not comply with free-market requirements. This once again confirms the seriousness of the German leadership's intentions.

Aware of the scale of China's plans, which clearly go beyond the framework of the German economy, as well as the degree of interdependence of the economic systems of the EU member states, Germany regularly calls on European countries to develop a common policy to curb China's economic expansion. Given Germany's central role in developing EU integration processes, the call is more likely a paradigm for the rest of the community. Consequently, in the fall of 2018, the EU began to develop a mechanism for auditing foreign direct investment that would reduce the risk of the possible theft of European advanced technologies and innovations by a foreign investor (especially a state-subsidized enterprise). The relevant agreements are to be finalized in the second quarter of 2019.

Such restrictions would certainly put substantial but not fatal pressure on Beijing's economic interests, considering China's timely diversification of its trade, economic and foreign investment policies. Mention should be made first of the "16+1" cooperation format successfully functioning between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is significant that this formula allows China to develop cooperation with European countries while bypassing EU supranational foreign policy institutions, which to some extent undermines the unity and solidarity of European integration associations and undercuts their decisions regarding Beijing.

Finally, China has recently been betting on developing the One Belt, One Road project, where the Sea Silk Road concept plays a special role. Facing less than favorable financial situations, the countries of Southern Europe have been reaching out to China, sometimes to the detriment of their national interests. For example, in March 2019, Italy and China signed a declaration of intent that opened the door to billions of dollars of Chinese investment in the development of several key trade ports in Italy. In this regard, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas predicted that Italy would soon fall into the trap of dependence on the Asian partner because of Rome's desire for short-term profit.

Greece has also found itself in the orbit of Chinese influence. The China Ocean Shipping Group Company (COSCO) has bought a 67% stake in the company that manages and services Piraeus, the largest Greek port.¹⁷

Despite the existence of alternative promising forms of cooperation, Beijing nevertheless decided to reconsider its approaches to developing trade and economic ties with Germany, fearing an aggravation of relations with the “driver” of the European economy and the flagship of the EU’s innovative development. In particular, China has begun to gradually open its market to German investors in response to criticism on that score from Berlin. In addition, in June 2018, during a meeting with German Chancellor Merkel, the Chinese delegation promised to respect intellectual property rights. During the visit, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang said: “People who steal intellectual property are trying to achieve a goal by taking a short cut. Of course, we will not allow this.”¹⁸ Given the amount of illegal borrowing by Chinese entrepreneurs, that statement will be difficult to implement in the short term. Apparently, with its promises (regardless of whether they are kept or not), China is intending to temporarily tone down the negative backdrop of the bilateral agenda in order to create additional opportunities for building a dialogue and, of course, to buy time for further political, trade and economic maneuvers.

In any event, both parties will soon have to settle on either partnership or competition for developing relations. Recently, the situation began to shift more toward the second option. China, in its assertive desire to borrow other people’s innovations, has clearly frightened off its European trading partner that, on the one hand, is being forced to take protectionist measures to protect the national market, and on the other, has begun to accelerate the pace of investment in science and education to make new innovative leaps that competitors cannot.

In 2018, the German government set an ambitious plan to become a world leader in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) by 2025. In turn, 2019 was declared the year of AI¹⁹ in German science. It is no coincidence that Berlin chose that course. For example, German Education and Scientific Research Minister Anja Karliczek noted that AI is the most important key to growth and well-being.²⁰ Representatives of other countries agree with that notion. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a key statement on that subject relatively recently, as if anticipating the world trend, remarking that the country that is the best at creating artificial intelligence would “rule the world.”²¹

By presenting in 2018 the AI Development Strategy, Germany openly challenged other global players, including China. German Economic Affairs Minister Altmaier made it clear to competitors that AI technologies should be developed and used in Germany and Europe – at home, not abroad. Through the creation of a closely interconnected European network of centers of excellence and the corresponding mobilization and accumulation of new knowledge and experience, Germany is striving to become the flagship of global innovative development. To that end, the German side has already launched a campaign to attract leading scientists and specialists from around the world, and it also plans to create a specialized agency for breakthrough innovations.

The prospect of the active introduction of AI and robotics in the German economy poses a serious threat to China. And it is not only the innovative spurt of the European competitor as a whole that is undoubtedly raising concerns for Beijing. According to expert forecasts, the era of industrial production transfer by developed countries to the Asian region is gradually coming to an end. Instead, the concept of reshoring, or reindustrialization – i.e., the return of production to their places of origin – is becoming increasingly popular. Accelerated technological development, including the success of the previously mentioned German Industrie 4.0 program, eliminates the importance of cheap Chinese labor. Finally, rising wages in China and shipping costs have made reshoring even more attractive to Berlin. In addition, after the return of production to Germany, the country will receive new jobs and investments, helping to revitalize the national economy.

Of course, a purely political context for the intensification of reindustrialization cannot be ruled out. The undeniable growth of China's influence in the world economy and international politics raises the need for Germany – and more broadly, the EU – to accelerate regional economic security by introducing such tools. Despite the opinion of some researchers that the value of reshoring is overstated and the Chinese economy will be able to quickly get on the track of import substitution by using residual production capacity in the event of a possible exodus of Western companies, this phenomenon speaks to something even greater – it is a manifestation of the emerging trend of developed countries to curb Chinese foreign economic ambitions. In effect, we are talking about the beginning of a confrontation between two fundamentally opposed socio-economic structures. At the same time, despite the trade wars with the U.S., Germany has apparently remained committed to both the neoliber-

al approaches that are traditional to the West in general and to transatlantic value guidelines in particular.

NOTES

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⁸ <https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2018-05/chinesische-investitionen-deutschland-unternehmen-handelsstreit>

⁹ <https://www.vestifinance.ru/articles/106559>

¹⁰ <https://www.vedomosti.ru/auto/news/2018/02/24/751898-geely-stal-aktionerom-daimler>

¹¹ <https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2018-05/chinesische-investitionen-deutschland-unternehmen-handelsstreit>

¹² <https://www.dw.com/de/chinas-strategie-auch-bei-firmenk%C3%A4ufen/a-43874621>

¹³ <http://www.taz.de/!5498078>

¹⁴ <https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article166586117/So-stoppt-Berlin-den-Aufkauf-deutscher-Hightech-Firmen.html>

¹⁵ <https://bdi.eu/media/publikationen/#/publikation/news/china-partner-und-systemischer-wettbewerber>

¹⁶ <https://www.dw.com/en/chinese-takeover-of-leifeld-collapses-ahead-of-expected-german-veto/a-44906055>

¹⁷ <https://regnum.ru/news/2326957.html>

¹⁸ <https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/em-china-eu-economic-talks/4476928.html>

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The Transformation of the UN Concept of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

Yu. Trefilova

Key words: conflicts, development, peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, security, preventive diplomacy, national resilience.

THE UNITED NATIONS has time and again revised its concept of post-conflict peacebuilding and still has not come up with a definitive opinion.

Conflicts have their dynamics affected both by new and by old factors, and as a result become complicated and difficult to resolve, with settlement efforts increasingly often proving futile.¹

Today's main post-conflict peacebuilding paradigms are still not very effective. They are not consistent or stable enough, and have insufficient resources.

The UN's Development of a Strategy for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

THE FIRST COMPREHENSIVE exposition of the United Nations' peacebuilding concept is to be found in a 1992 report by then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali entitled *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*.²

Boutros-Ghali argued in the report that the United Nations should play the central role in developing and implementing methods for the prevention, control, and settlement of conflicts. He also set guidelines for measures to resolve particularly dangerous conflicts.

A sharp increase in domestic conflicts in Third World countries made the international community revise its security and development principles and the relationship between these two sets of principles. The United

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Nations became the main actor in security affairs and put forward a concept of security that ditched the latter's traditional militarist interpretation.

It was replaced by a "more humane" interpretation of security while *An Agenda for Peace* was a revision of the peacebuilding concept.

According to the report, peacebuilding is a logical follow-up to peacemaking and peacekeeping, its main purpose being to prevent a conflict from resuming after being settled. It was implied that countries involved in reconstruction work after armed conflicts should be put in a separate category.

In a 1994 report entitled *An Agenda for Development*,³ Boutros-Ghali described development as "the most secure basis for peace." The report put forward a different concept for peace – peace not just as the absence of conflict but also as the absence of structural violence, the absence of any fundamental reason for conflict, and the existence of strong guarantees of personal security.

According to the 1995 *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, peacebuilding should not be limited to a post-conflict peace process but should start before a settlement agreement is reached and should comprise a wide range of measures, including support for social and economic development. This idea was reflected in the United Nations *Millennium Declaration*, which advocated an integrated conflict prevention strategy.

An Agenda for Peace was an attempt to lay the basis for a post-Cold War world order and was intended by Boutros-Ghali as a catalyst for putting the international community back on the path toward the original goals set by the United Nations. However, peace maintenance was the central theme of the report and became an even more important function of the United Nations, although there is no reference to it in the UN Charter.

The UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, in a report released in December 2004,⁴ made points that were follow-ups to ideas set out in *An Agenda for Peace* and were used by Kofi Annan, Boutros-Ghali's successor as UN Secretary-General, in his famous 2005 report *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*.⁵

The peacebuilding theme was also raised at the World Summit of 2005, which, in a document entitled *2005 World Summit Outcome*, advocated "a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation."

All this represented a top-level UN decision to build a new peacebuilding architecture, and great expectations were pinned on it worldwide.

Recommendations made in *An Agenda for Peace* were reiterated in 2005 by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1645 and by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 60/180. The two documents formed the basis for three New York-based UN institutions – the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO). These bodies were to fill an institutional and structural gap in the UN peacebuilding system⁶ so that to help countries transitioning from the violent conflict stage to the stable peace.

The PBC was a consultative body for coordinating international peacebuilding efforts and recommending stabilization, economic reconstruction, and development measures to countries that had been through protracted crises. The General Assembly and Security Council authorized the commission to:

- (1) bring together all those concerned for making recommendations for post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction strategies and for mobilizing resources for these tasks;
- (2) propose organizational measures for post-conflict reconstruction and help draw up sustainable development strategies;
- (3) recommend ways of improving the coordination of everyone involved in post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction activities both within and outside the United Nations and help organize the financing of these activities.

The creation of the PBC, PBF and PBSO was a significant move. However, the General Assembly and Security Council were strongly critical of their performance in the first review of their activities in 2010. It was said that “the hopes that accompanied the founding resolutions have yet to be realized.” Detailed recommendations were made on how to improve the three entities’ performance.⁷

“Our hope,” the General Assembly and Security Council said, “is that

It would be in Russia’s interest to be more deeply involved in practical aspects of UN post-conflict reconstruction programs, rather than merely taking part in UN institutional mechanisms for reconstruction.

the present review will serve as a wake-up call, helping to strengthen the collective resolve to deal with peacebuilding in a more comprehensive and determined way.”⁸

It was, besides, pointed out in the review that the PBC had been unable to achieve even minimal success in its five years of existence, that the United Nations had failed to put post-conflict peacebuilding among its priorities, and that the PBC, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the UN Economic and Social Council had failed to establish strong mutual relationships.

“Those hopes ... if anything, further waned” by 2015, the review said.⁹ Not just the architecture of peacebuilding but the whole peacebuilding concept needed revision.

Problems of Implementation of the UN Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Concept

IN 2015, the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture submitted a report as a follow-up to the Millennium Summit. According to that report, the PBC, PBF and PBSO had failed to accomplish the mission of peace maintenance, a key objective set by the UN Charter. They had not received enough attention or resources either within or outside the United Nations for fulfilling this mission.

In the report, the Advisory Group advocated revising the basic principles for post-conflict peacebuilding, primarily insisting on an end to the practice of the United Nations dividing its peacebuilding activities into separate, unconnected categories.¹⁰

The idea that the basic principles for post-conflict peacebuilding needed revision was also stated in the *2030 Sustainable Development Agenda*, a UN plan for global action that was adopted by world leaders in 2015 and set what are known as the *17 Sustainable Development Goals*.¹¹

The main problem of today’s UN system for post-conflict peacebuilding is that the latter is relatively low on the agendas of many of the UN member states or the agenda of the UN structures. Peacebuilding activities receive inadequate attention, are given insufficient resources, and do not normally start before guns stop firing. Moreover, it is a predominant international assumption that PBC, the PBF, and the PBSO make up the entire UN peacebuilding system. This gives rise to systemic barriers to enlarging the UN peacebuilding mechanism.

One more problem is that some key UN institutions, mainly the Security Council, only deal with individual aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding within the limits of functions vested in them by the UN Charter. This fragmentation affects the activities of the United Nations in general – the work of its Secretariat, relationships between the Secretariat and other UN bodies, and peacebuilding operations on the ground. This problem has been generally recognized for a long time but is still extremely hard to solve.

The fragmentation of the UN peacebuilding system puts constraints on the United Nations' ability to help conflict-stricken member states achieve and maintain peace.

It also causes the United Nations to pay less attention to conflict prevention than to reacting to conflicts that have already happened (although this reaction is still usually inadequate), and to give comparatively little attention to post-conflict reconstruction.

The aforementioned fragmentation leaves the PBC with a very limited mandate – the commission has the official status of an auxiliary body for the Security Council and other key UN institutions.

Although the Security Council receives annual reports from the PBC and occasionally invites its chairperson to speak at an open debate, the two bodies have more an official than a working relationship. To make matters worse, there is no direct contact between PBC members and the UN bodies that have nominated them. As a result, the goal of imbuing commissioners with a collective sense of responsibility for the commission's performance has never been achieved.

There are, moreover, gaps in the PBC's rules of procedure that protracted debates have been unable to fill. Some states made a lot of effort to win a place on the commission's Organizational Committee but did not work nearly as hard after being included in the committee. The PBC has been struggling for a niche that would have enabled it to be an efficient coordinator of all UN peacebuilding activities.

At operational level, the United Nations' peacekeeping activities come up against various hindrances, which range from mediator groups that are active in the peacemaking phase but are not always controlled by or accountable to the United Nations to large-scale peacekeeping operations, and from ad hoc peacebuilding missions to UN resident country teams.

Transition from some mechanisms to others is often poorly organized and poorly controlled, which is an extra barrier to continuity. The replace-

ment of an ad hoc mission with a resident country group is often the greatest obstacle to peacebuilding.

To sum up, lack of coordination has prevented the PBC, PBSO, and PBF to be more effective implementers of the United Nations' post-conflict peacebuilding strategy.

Given the scale of problems in post-conflict peacebuilding affairs, UN peacebuilding efforts require effective partnership between the Security Council, General Assembly, and Economic and Social Council, with each of them staying within the limits of competence vested in them by the UN Charter. The PBC would be able to play a unique role in strengthening such a partnership by giving the three bodies advice that could improve coordination among everyone involved in peacebuilding activities both within and outside the United Nations.

Yet another problem is insufficient financing of UN peacebuilding activities. The PBF is too small. It is currently supporting more than 120 projects in 25 countries, and since its creation has allocated \$623 million to 33 countries.

There is, moreover, lack of coordination between the PBF and PBC about which countries are to be priority recipients of financial aid. A country that is emerging from a conflict would need large amounts of money for a long time. Though post-conflict stabilization has been in the focus of the United Nations' attention for decades, its funding remains insufficient, unstable, and unpredictable.

Insignificant financing is provided for activities to attain the five Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) set in the course of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding – “legitimate politics, justice, security, revenue and services, and economic foundations.”

For instance, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in citing financial aid statistics in a book published in 2015, said, in part: “There is very low investment in legitimate politics (4%), security (2%) and justice (3%).” Only 6% were directed at securing the gender equality as one of the main goals.¹²

Outlook for the UN Post-Conflict Reconstruction Strategy

POST-CONFLICT REGULATION is normally a complex, multi-component process with its components not measurable in quantitative terms. Due to their specific character, neither the United Nations nor interna-

tional financial institutions can promptly and effectively carry out tasks arising in the course of post-conflict reconstruction.

This was undoubtedly a problem when the PBC was coming into being, and it remains unsolved. The United Nations obviously needs to update its principles. It should regularly reassess its performance and review its priorities to ensure that they reflect developments on the ground.

The PBC should remain primarily a consultative body. It is in a position to become an effective link between the United Nations, states that are aid recipients and those that are donors, peacekeeping forces, non-governmental organizations, and financial institutions. However, it is primarily in people's minds that peace ideas need to be embedded. Only then they will become part and parcel of society.

“National ownership” of post-conflict peacebuilding is an imperative and should underlie peacebuilding efforts. The 2010 Review of the United Nations peacebuilding architecture said that the national ownership principle formed the basis for the activities of the PBC.¹³ Countries should balance their domestic needs with the needs of the increasingly interdependent world.

For this reason, the term “post-conflict reconstruction” should be reinterpreted to mean not just post-conflict activities to re-lay foundations for peace but a hybrid of political activities and activities to ensure sustainable development as a way to eliminate roots of conflicts.

In March 2018, UN Secretary-General António Guterres submitted a report in which he argued that action to prevent conflicts is more important than reaction to conflicts that have taken place. “Investing in prevention pays off. It saves lives, money and development gains,” he said.¹⁴

The development theme has returned to the UN agenda. Research has proven that lack of economic development is the most frequent cause of conflict. Many conflicts are believed to stem from social and economic problems, especially if governments fail to live up to public expectations.

There exists sufficient evidence that economic growth makes a settled conflict much less likely to resume. In fact, economic development as a principle may form the basis for the most effective international peacekeeping strategy.

A state's ability to ensure comprehensive economic growth and hence solutions to acute social and economic problems is crucial to post-conflict normalization.

Hence, post-conflict reconstruction is not only a harmonious part of the peacekeeping concept but also an economic strategy for the required

time. Post-conflict reconstruction implies sustainable development and national stability achievable by social and economic programs, and these programs would need to vary to meet the specific needs of each post-conflict territory.

Successful post-conflict reconstruction involves the achievement of the following five key objectives:

- a minimum level of security
- rule of law
- a sound basis and efficient infrastructure for the economy
- eradication or minimization of unemployment
- food security.

Meeting all these objectives means achieving national resilience that is key to successful post-conflict regulation. Failing to meet even one of them would raise the risk of conflict resumption.

Foreign assistance should target precisely the specific needs of a recipient country to restore its social and economic sphere. It is the model for national resilience.

Seeking national resilience is the most effective and interesting path for a post-conflict nation to take. On the one hand, it involves preventive measures to facilitate overcoming the crisis. On the other, it gives economic and other advantages to a donor state enabling it to increase its influence on the recipient nation and strengthen its foreign policy instruments.

By laying a sound basis for development, a national resilience strategy can prevent a settled conflict from resuming and can therefore bring out an inclusive peacebuilding architecture that involves public confidence in political institutions that can prevent the conflict from being rekindled.

National resilience building implies that usually lasting peace cannot be achieved by conflict settlement alone and that structural, institutional, and behavioral changes are also highly important. Normally, only that can bring today's practice of international post-conflict assistance to an end and eliminate all need to such help.

In practical terms, resilience building means that a nation threatened with a conflict would be provided with long-term assistance that involves systemic and specific economic measures and is essentially a form of partnership. This can stabilize this nation economically and socially.

This strategy implies a multilevel, multisectoral and comprehensive assistance policy that can optimize relations between donor countries,

recipient countries, financial institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and the UN structures.

As said above, the national resilience concept was the United Nations' response to the ineffectiveness of previous ways of helping countries settle conflicts or deal with their effects. However, it still has not been put into practice on a large scale since there exists no generally approved post-conflict reconstruction mechanism to be used by post-conflict countries and by the United Nations.

Post-conflict national resilience building would be successful on the following conditions:

- the existence of a concrete action plan with a list of priorities;
- the existence of long-term multisectoral programs for comprehensive political, social, economic, and cultural assistance, and the availability of sufficient resources to implement them;
- the existence of working groups to discuss and evaluate specific plans, e.g., justice, economic stabilization, and security projects;
- use of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) mechanism.

Today, some countries help others under the aegis of the United Nations and on the basis of UN advice with the result that multilateral assistance is largely undifferentiated. This makes the main donor countries such as the United States always provide about 80% of their assistance on a bilateral basis and only 20% by participating in multilateral programs. A bilateral arrangement, besides meeting the specific needs of the recipient nation, enables the donor country to advance its own political interests through its assistance, to win market positions in the recipient country for its companies, and to use its assistance for propaganda purposes.

The population of a country that is offered foreign assistance should take a sober-minded view of the offer – the latter may put the potential recipient country before a geopolitical choice, and there may also be other global or regional players seeking to join the game.

One important way to avoid conflict resumption is the public conviction in the post-conflict country that its economy would benefit from assistance offered by another country.

The United Nations should be an observer and consultant – it is by definition an external power for any country, and ideally would be an unbiased and honest mediator and organizer of political, technical, and financial support.

There still is no consensus about how to move forward. Today's inter-

national support for post-conflict reconstruction in various countries is rather timid and amounts to three sets of measures: urgent provisional measures such as employment programs; near-term reconstruction measures chiefly aiming to restore sources of revenues; and long-term reconstruction measures such as macroeconomic reforms for bringing about growth.¹⁵

In recent years, the United Nations has made frequent sporadic and ineffective attempts to deal with conflicts and crises that had already happened. This did not go further than debates and theoretical analyses. It is a hazardous practice that is more hazardous today than ever before.

The United Nations should be more focused on the prevention of conflicts and crises and should give assistance to countries that is designed to meet their specific needs. Preventive measures should also be developed at national level – for example, donor states should help post-conflict countries avoid the resumption of conflicts.

Rapid changes in today's world confront the United Nations with extra tasks, and to be able to deal with them successfully the organization needs to reform its current mechanisms and create new ones.

As regards Russia's position, it would be in Russia's interest to be more deeply involved in practical aspects of UN post-conflict reconstruction programs, rather than merely taking part in UN institutional mechanisms for reconstruction.

One important point is that post-conflict reconstruction means more than laying foundations for peace and development after a conflict – it can also be an effective channel for political influence. This means that Russia should move from declarations to developing practical strategies to help post-conflict countries rebuild themselves, and this help should meet the specific needs of specific countries.

This assistance should be based on clearly formulated Russian interests, with post-Soviet countries topping the list of its potential recipients.

Russia would also be well-advised to revise its membership in some of the UN bodies such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development or the World Food Programme.

Russia should also revise its general position on post-conflict activities on the basis of the national resilience concept. This concept involves long-term assistance to other countries that is based on partnership terms and involves systemic and concrete economic measures to bring about sustainable development.

The Official Development Assistance mechanism would be the most

effective channel for assistance in resilience building, and bilateral assistance arrangements should take priority over multilateral arrangements.

NOTES

¹ A little more than half of conflicts that are on today's agenda of the UN Security Council can be considered resumed conflicts.

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³ An Agenda for Development: report of the Secretary-General. New York. UN Doc. A/48/935, May 6, 1994.

⁴ High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2003-2004 // <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/226-initiatives/32369-high-level-panel-on-threats-challenges-and-change.html>

⁵ UN Doc. A/59/2005.

⁶ UN Doc. A/59/2005.

⁷ Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393, July 21, 2010.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490, June 30, 2015.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ The ability of a nation to prevent any conflicts or shocks from halting its development.

¹² <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/9789264227699-7-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/9789264227699-7-en>

¹³ UN Doc. A/64/868-S/2010/393.

¹⁴ UN Doc. A/72/707-S/2018/43.

¹⁵ Collier, Paul a.o. *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. A World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington, DC: World Bank; Oxford University Press, 2003.

Negotiating the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea: Some Nuances

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Key words: Caspian Sea, Russia, littoral states, Fifth Caspian Summit, convention, legal status, diplomacy.

THIS AUGUST will mark the first anniversary of the adoption of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. The heads of the coastal states unanimously regarded the signing of the “Caspian Sea Constitution” at the Fifth Caspian Summit in Aktau on August 12, 2018, as a historic and extraordinary event. Russian President Vladimir Putin called it epochal. The completion of more than 20 years of negotiations on the main Caspian treaty, coupled with the signing of intergovernmental documents on cooperation in the fields of economy, transportation, incident prevention, combating organized crime, terrorism, and the work of border agencies, opened a new chapter in the history of the Caspian Five regional mechanism.¹

The summit completed a symbolic loop: Starting in 2002 in Ashgabat, the regular meeting of the heads of the five states made its way around the perimeter of the Caspian Sea, stopping in Tehran, Baku and Astrakhan before finally returning back to the east coast – to Aktau, Kazakhstan. The convention is the result of many years of diplomatic efforts that arrived at a common denominator among the initially drastically differing positions of five countries: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan.² Given the growing conflict component in the regions adjacent to the Caspian Sea, this was a truly significant success in the foreign policy of Russia and its neighboring Caspian states.

It seems interesting to analyze the nuances of the convention negotiations, focusing on the stage between the truly “breakthrough” Fourth

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Caspian Summit,³ held in Astrakhan on September 29, 2014, and the Aktau Summit, which completed the diplomatic marathon.

Launch

RUSSIA initiated a meeting of the leaders on the banks of the Volga, taking into account that the parties had come to 2014 with solid experience in five-party talks both on the draft treaty (the convention), and on a number of other legally or politically binding documents.

By that time, the convention had been under discussion for nearly 20 years (the relevant Special Working Group [SWG], at the level of deputy foreign ministers, was officially created in 1996).

Five-part multilevel dialogue channels were well-established: After 1996, the foreign ministers met periodically,

three summit meetings took place (Ashgabat, 2001; Tehran, 2007; Baku, 2010), and the SWG met with varying intensity. Joint commissions and committees monitored issues concerning Caspian biological resources, meteorology and the environment. A bank of general documents had formed: the 2003 Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea (Tehran Convention), the Declaration of Presidents adopted following the 2007 Tehran Summit, the Joint Statement of the 2010 Baku Summit, and the Agreement on Security Cooperation in the Caspian Sea in 2010.

An important element of the Caspian international legal framework was (and still is) the agreements concluded by most of the Caspian states in bilateral and trilateral formats on delimiting the seafloor and subsoil assets of the Caspian Sea for subsoil use. Although not pan-Caspian, these documents are nevertheless of key importance in the system of relations in the region, because thanks to the agreements between Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in 1998-2003, jurisdiction over the mineral resources of the northern segment of the sea and part of the Middle Caspian was determined.

An aspect of the Astrakhan summit with significance for the entire

The convention is the result of many years of diplomatic efforts that arrived at a common denominator among the initially drastically differing positions of five countries: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan.

Caspian process was the signing almost immediately after it (in December 2014) of a similar bilateral agreement between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan that led to the delimitation of half the Caspian seafloor. Thus, by 2014, not only was the viability of the “northern” model of resource delimitation confirmed, but so was its optimality from both economic and political standpoints.

At convention negotiations leading up to Astrakhan, each party strove to adhere to its initial principles, formed back in the early 1990s in the heat of disintegration of positions,⁴ which were more speculative than realistic. The parties balanced between the desire to fully unite efforts to solve joint regional problems and attempts to create hard boundaries, to “encapsulate” each of the participants in the “cocoon” of narrow national unilateral approaches to the Caspian. The second scenario was enthusiastically supported by large nonregional players interested in dividing the “five,” in turning the sea into a patchwork of national “sectors” where almost any common issue would automatically be transformed into a cause for disagreement and could be internationalized – i.e., resolved only with the help of third-party intermediaries.

Nevertheless, by 2014, the SWG was able to establish the general structure of the future convention and agree on its thematic sections, which include the seafloor, water body, shipping, naval navigation, fishing, environmental protection, and marine scientific research. Work was underway on drafting specific language.

However, the group was unable to find solutions to two conceptual issues. First, whether the establishment of rules for delimiting the Caspian seafloor for subsoil use would be part of the five-part document, or whether the relevant lines and points would be coordinated by neighboring states separately in each individual case – i.e., bilateral (on the demarcation line between two states) and tripartite (at the junction of three demarcation lines) agreements, as in the Northern Caspian. And second, to what extent delineation of the seafloor for subsoil use would determine the delimitation of water bodies.

Some parties sought to include a self-benefiting exclusive principle in the article of the convention on delimiting bottom sectors. Meanwhile, Russia – at that time the only Caspian littoral state with clearly determined seafloor boundaries – had the idea that there was no need to establish a universal methodology in the convention, since in the Northern Caspian, the parties had agreed on specific points for drawing seafloor boundaries based not only on generally accepted international legal prin-

ciples (for example, the midline) but also a number of “subjective” factors: the location of deposits, the desire for their joint or individual development, etc. In other words, each agreement was unique and contained a list of specific coordinates. Based on this, the Russian side advocated using that method as a model for future settlement in the southern part of the sea.⁵ That would prevent the convention from becoming hostage to lengthy bilateral negotiations on the ownership of disputed deposits.

Thus, on the one hand, by 2014, experience was gained in the practical interaction of the five Caspian littoral states, and an initial legal basis for cooperation was formed. On the other hand, the question of concluding a comprehensive five-part treaty establishing a modern legal framework for the Caspian Sea remained open. The scales could swing both toward consolidation and in the opposite direction. An unusual political decision was required.

The Volga Threshold

ON RUSSIA’S INITIATIVE, in April 2014 in Moscow and in September in Astrakhan, meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Caspian littoral states (CMFA) were held that made it possible to prepare a solid package of final documents for the Fourth Summit: three sectoral inter-governmental agreements (on cooperation in the conservation and rational use of biological resources, hydrometeorology, emergency situations prevention), a communiqué with an analysis of the achievements of the “five” and tasks for the future, and also the main component – a statement of the presidents.

This compact document included the principles of the activity of littoral countries in the Caspian Sea, some of which might seem self-evident to an outside observer, while others, on the contrary, looked incomprehensibly specific. At the same time, the statement in effect became the “framework” of the convention, being included almost verbatim in the Preamble and Article 3, and showing up in other articles.⁶

The heads of the five states finally managed to find an optimal, universally acceptable formula for resolving disputes in the Caspian. The basis of this formula is the understanding of the need to “decouple” the delimitation of water spaces from the delimitation of the seafloor. For the water column, the decision was made to develop a common methodology for establishing sovereign coastal zones with a width of 15 nautical miles and subsequent 10-mile fishing zones, beyond which would be a

common water area. As for the seafloor and subsoil, the approach was to reach separate agreements with respective neighboring states on the basis of the norms and principles of international law.⁸ At the same time, it was clearly indicated that the method of delimiting water spaces would not affect the delineation of the seafloor and in no way predetermine the outcome of the relevant negotiations.

The clarification of conceptual issues made it possible to outline the contours of other sections of the convention. The political and military-political principles that were of key (if not decisive) importance were agreed upon: Only littoral states are allowed a military presence in the Caspian; military construction is to be conducted within the framework of a stable balance of arms and to a reasonable degree without prejudice to the security of other parties; confidence-building measures are stipulated in the spirit of predictability and transparency. The exclusive authority of the five countries in resolving all key issues of the Caspian agenda is clearly indicated. Common approaches were formulated to shipping, transit to oceans, fisheries, scientific research, and environmental protection.

With respect to the military-political part, it should be added that later in the convention the parties not only reaffirmed all the Astrakhan principles but supplemented them with an obligation not to provide their territories to other states for aggression and other military operations against any of the parties.

At the same time, two sensitive topics were not reflected in the final documents of the Fourth Caspian Summit on which separate painstaking work was to be carried out in the new conditions after Astrakhan: rules for pipeline construction and military navigation in the Caspian Sea.

The presidents' pivotal decision to finish work on the convention in time for the next summit, the Fifth Caspian Summit, which the Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed holding in his country, was a sign of change. The scales had tipped in favor of consent.

The Course to Aktau: Tailwind

THE CASPIAN TOPIC has always been a focus of the leaders of the littoral states. This becomes clear when studying the bilateral and trilateral statements of the presidents made in 2016-2018,¹⁰ and their public statements of that period. During final preparations for the Fifth Caspian Summit, telephone conversations were regularly held by the foreign min-

isters, and the Caspian subject was discussed during “sideline” meetings at various events.

The negotiating groups, in addition to formulating convention articles and transforming the principles of the political statement into strict convention norms, were to concentrate on comprehensively developing a methodology for delimiting sea spaces, and a procedure for naval navigation and pipeline construction. The interaction mechanisms of the Caspian Five in the “new era” – after the adoption of the convention – also needed to be structured.

Preparations for the next leaders’ summit began at the foreign ministers’ meeting in Astana on July 12-13, 2016. The five ministers for the first time discussed the draft convention article by article, endorsing most of its provisions. However, despite the expectations and forecasts expressed in the press, it was not possible to reach a final consolidated text at that time. The parties took a break to develop at “home” the compromise arrangements that were outlined during the meeting.¹¹

The next attempt took place at the Ministerial Council on December 4-5, 2017, in Moscow. And this time, the participants were successful.¹² The text of the convention was agreed. The path to the summit was open.

Already in Aktau on August 12, 2018, Sergey Lavrov emphasized: “I am very pleased that it was in Moscow in December 2017, at the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the five Caspian countries, that we finally agreed on the text of the convention, which was signed today by the presidents. But since December, very difficult work has had to be done.”¹³

Final approval of the draft convention could take place in each of the states only at the highest level, and this required going through all the necessary domestic procedures and justifying in the capitals the compromise agreements that were reached with partners. Those agreements were based on a sensible, “experience-based” assessment of the real situation both in the Caspian Sea and around it, as well as the need to legally consolidate the status that had in effect developed in the water body in the post-Soviet period.

EIA Harbor

IT SHOULD BE NOTED that following the “package” agreements reached by the ministers in Moscow, it was necessary to finalize in paral-

lel with the convention a document that at first glance seemed not directly related to it.

Since 2011, the draft Protocol on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (EIA), practically agreed upon by the parties, had been on the negotiating table for additional protocols to the 2003 Tehran Convention, waiting to be filled with specific environmental content. Right when it was ready for signing in 2012, one of the parties was asked to make some changes to the text that slowed down its adoption, because those changes required new approvals. At the same time, the project contained a very detailed description of the procedure for the joint assessment by the Caspian states of possible environmental consequences of planned large-scale infrastructure projects, including pipelines. Since it had been agreed at the Moscow Ministerial Council that the need for just such an assessment and a particularly precautionary approach would be enshrined in the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea as a condition for constructing trunk pipelines, the decision was made to quickly return to work on this protocol and finalize its agreement before the Aktau summit.

To that end, two rounds of intensive negotiations took place in Baku in February and in Moscow in March 2018. The parties discussed in detail various scenarios in the event one of the littoral states raised concerns about the potential invasive environmental impact of planned infrastructure construction by another Caspian state. Limiting the right to an EIA could lead to unilateral decisions resulting in the disruption of the fragile balance of the Caspian ecological system.

During the discussions, the partners agreed that they were in essentially identical situations. They invested in developing transportation infrastructure, and coastal and marine economies. At the same time, they realized the insular and extremely vulnerable nature of the common water body. Therefore, everyone was equally interested in the strict observance of environmental standards and the broadest and most transparent assessment of projects at the planning stage (to avoid grievances at later stages). The hypothetical creation of artificial obstacles to the economic development of the Caspian countries does not profit any of the parties due to the reciprocity of obligations assumed both under the protocol and under the status convention.

Thus, a solution was found to one of the aforementioned sensitive problems. Article 14 of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea allows the parties to lay submarine pipelines (which the parties have

been successfully doing almost from the very beginning of oil and gas production in offshore fields and even more actively now). At the same time, it provides for the mandatory observance of general rules and standards in the construction and operation of trunk (trans-Caspian) pipes. Monitoring is carried out as part of the EIA procedure.¹⁴

Three weeks before the Aktau Summit, on July 20, 2018, in Moscow, the environmental ministers of the five Caspian states signed the Protocol on EIA to the Tehran Convention. Another important step had been made toward the decisive event.

Puzzles for the Wardroom

AS FOR the other “difficult” topics, their decoupling became possible only by taking into account the fundamentally important national interests of each of the negotiation participants and compromises on the basis of reciprocity.

The Caspian Sea was to receive a special legal status due to a set of specific characteristics. It is an inland water body that does not have a direct connection with the world’s oceans and therefore cannot be considered a sea. But at the same time, due to its size, water composition and bottom features, the Caspian cannot be considered a lake, either.¹⁵

Some parties opposed the verbatim transfer to the Caspian Convention of the rules on the “peaceful passage” of foreign warships spelled out in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. And that is understandable. If the contracting parties are the majority of the countries of the world, and the scope of application is all the seas and oceans of the planet, it is logical to use universal language. But when five neighboring countries are reaching an agreement on a closed and relatively small body of water, modifying the UN language is appropriate in order to specify the regulations.

As a result, Article 11 of the Caspian Convention, fixing in general a procedure similar to “peaceful passage,” describes in more detail the rights and obligations of a warship at the entrance and passage into/through the territorial waters of other parties. This seems to be the most correct approach for countries building their relations on the basis of mutual trust and friendship: When in foreign waters, a ship shall respect the laws and rules of the littoral state, which, in turn, shall not impede peaceful passage. If necessary, interested parties can conclude separate additional agreements regulating this issue in more detail.

An essential element of the system of confidence-building measures in the military sphere was the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on the Caspian Sea, signed in Aktau and developed in accordance with the initiative Vladimir Putin proposed in Astrakhan. In a package with a large convention, these documents form a system of mutual obligations and rights of the parties regarding the actions of warships in the water body and aircraft in the airspace over the Caspian Sea.

In addition to the standard procedure for such agreements regarding compliance with international rules for preventing collisions at sea, established in 1972 (a table of special signals, alerts on planned maneuvers and other measures aimed at preventing any dangerous incidents), the agreement contains a number of Caspian-specific provisions. For example, under Article 4, warships and groups of warships must not conduct dangerous maneuvers in areas of heavy shipping and other economic activities. Article 7 contains an obligation to refrain from actions that could pose a threat to underwater facilities, artificial islands and structures of a littoral state. Article 8 prohibits establishing areas for activities hazardous to navigation and air navigation in foreign fishing zones. Such areas may be established in a common water area only if they do not contain artificial islands, installations and structures of that state, over the seafloor sector of which is a common water area.

The most complex task in the “Caspian quest” was determining the procedure for delimiting the water column of the Caspian (recall that details of seafloor demarcation for the purposes of mineral resource extraction were left out of the scope of the convention).

The parties were searching for a middle ground between the desire to claim a vast amount of water as their own and the desire to preserve as much water as possible for common use (historically, this water body did not have national zones and was traditionally jointly used by the littoral countries).

And again common sense prevailed. Having thoroughly studied all geographical features (coastal outlines, depths, tidal activity, water salinity, the presence of vegetation, etc.), experts from the five countries agreed on the advisability of using delimitation methods adopted for other seas, but with modifications.

As agreed back in Astrakhan in 2014, the width of territorial waters here is not 12, but 15 nautical miles. Inland waters appear if a straight baseline has to be used to measure that width. In other words, in most cases 15 miles are laid off from the coast, but in some places where the

shape of the coast does not allow this, the line straightens, and waters located toward the coast from it are considered inland waters.

At the same time, the definition of a “straight baseline” indicates that the parties will spell out detailed technical instructions for drawing such lines in an additional five-part agreement, while taking into account the “disadvantageous” configuration of the coastline of individual countries. In fact, this means that the generally accepted method from the Law of the Sea is taken as the basis, however, again with creative adaptation to the specific conditions of the Caspian: taking into account the special relations of the contracting countries and the need to “endow” inland waters even to those countries that would hardly get them by any standard methods. The Russian side was entrusted with drafting the relevant agreement. Its coordination is a priority for the Caspian Five in the coming period.

Engine Room

AT THE FINAL STAGE of work on the convention, the parties realized the need to create a permanent consultation platform that would oversee implementation of the convention, as well as monitor Caspian cooperation on various tracks in the interest of building and improving it.¹⁶ The prototype, of course, was the SWG, which proved the efficiency and optimality of this format in Caspian realities: a mobile, flexible, non-bureaucratic structure that meets the modern requirements of dynamically developing relations. Thus, addressing Article 19 of the convention in the communiqué of the Fifth Caspian Summit, the presidents decided to establish, under the auspices of the foreign ministries of the five countries, a new five-part mechanism: the High-Level Interstate Working Group on Caspian Sea Issues (HLWG).

Here it would be useful to note some nuances of the organization of the work of the SWG that emerged over the years of negotiations (a total of about 60 rounds: 52 “numbered” meetings and a series of ad hoc meetings). National delegations were formed specifically for each round depending on the topics discussed, with the core being diplomats and lawyers from various departments. The head of the delegation was approved by presidential or governmental decree (usually a foreign ministry representative; in Turkmenistan, it was the head of the state-owned Caspian Sea enterprise that reports to the president). The functions of the chairperson and the secretariat of the SWG rotated among the national delegations, and the corresponding costs were borne by the host country.

Agreement on the subsequent round was reached at the previous one, including the dates and venue. An alphabetical order of the meetings was usually maintained; however, from time to time it was changed at the consent of the parties. The organizational burden of preparing a summit or Ministerial Council fell on the host country. The public summary document of the SWG meeting was traditionally a communiqué. The draft convention as amended by the results of the negotiations or the draft of other five-party documents discussed (statements by the presidents, summit communiqués, protocol decisions of the ministers, industry agreements, etc.) remained unpublished. These were distributed by the presiding party through diplomatic channels.

A distinctive feature of communication within the SWG was direct contacts between delegation heads and members; the principle of consensus in decision-making; a focus on results; and the desire for synergy. A meeting usually consisted of two parts: “testing the waters” during consultations and a formal plenary segment. Often, possible compromises were first worked out informally, without being written down, after which the participants went home to study the new ideas that arose during the dialogue, often in heated but healthy debate.¹⁷

Between sessions, constant communication was maintained both among the heads and members of delegations in a working, non-bureaucratic manner. Since the substantive part of the negotiations was generally confidential, bilateral consultations were regularly held, during which delegations could bring their positions closer together or at least relate their views to each other in detail.

Clear Sailing

FOLLOWING AKTAU, Sergey Lavrov emphasized: “Now we have an absolutely universal basis for considering any cooperation issue in the Caspian. Until recently, we had agreements on protecting biological resources, on security and in a number of other areas, but suffice it to say that seven international legal documents were signed in Aktau. Over the entire period of the Caspian summits since 2002, nine were signed: nine documents over the course of four summits; seven documents in the course of one summit. Moreover, this is not only a quantitative result but also a really qualitative one.”¹⁸

In the period after the Aktau summit, significant work has been done in the Caspian countries to implement its decisions. The main focus has

been on domestic procedures necessary for putting the convention into force. Turkmenistan was the first of the Caspian Five to go through all the formalities, followed by Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.¹⁹ Russia and Iran are systematically moving toward wrapping up the legal procedures.

The agenda at the current stage also includes the issues of navigation safety, scientific research, joint efforts to combat drug trafficking, and tourism projects.

At the suggestion of the Turkmen side, preparations are under way for the First Economic Forum involving the participation of the five countries' economic ministers and representatives of business, industry, energy, and the tourism sectors at the Avaza large tourism cluster (Turkmenbashi). A regular meeting of transportation ministers is to be held soon.

Based on a decision of the Intergovernmental Commission on the conservation and rational use of the aquatic biological resources of the Caspian Sea and the management of their joint stocks, made in Baku in November 2018, commercial fishing for sturgeon species was temporarily banned – i.e., a “zero quota” for their extraction was approved on a voluntary basis. Ashgabat hosted discussion of a draft protocol on cooperation in combating the illegal extraction of biological resources (poaching).

Without waiting for the formal entry into force of the convention, in February 2019, the high-level working group gathered in Baku for the first meeting. Plenipotentiaries of the five countries were appointed in the new organization, and its work plan and Rules of Procedure were agreed upon. In accordance with Article 1 of the convention, work has begun on an agreement on straight baselines in the Caspian. A second meeting was held in April in Nur-Sultan. The purview of this negotiating platform, in accordance with the approved rules, includes reviewing the implementation of high-level decisions, developing recommendations on key cooperation issues in the Caspian, preparing proposals for consideration at summits and meetings of foreign ministers, and developing documents of a contractual or other nature.

Thus, the multilevel regional mechanism of the Caspian Five, like a multideck cruise ship, has set sail. Ahead is a new large port: Work is under way to convene the Sixth Caspian Summit, in Turkmenistan, and ambitious plans for the future have been outlined. The signing of the convention was not the final port of call on this journey; on the contrary, it opened up a wide expanse for moving forward on a steady course.

BY ADOPTING the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, the Caspian littoral countries showed solidarity and a commitment to creating favorable conditions for sustainable development and maintaining stability in the region, to deepening mutually beneficial economic cooperation by comprehensively resolving territorial and resource issues, and to overcoming potential disagreements.²⁰

The degree of involvement of the Russian side in joint work with its neighbors in the Caspian to formulate a new legal status of the sea demonstrates the significance of this issue for the foreign policy of our country.

Peaceful, predictable development at strategically significant frontiers; friendly relations with immediate neighbors; the establishment of a status quo that meets realities and guarantees security; the creation of a platform for pooling efforts to develop the region – achieving these goals required vigorous and proactive action from Russian diplomats. The level of organization of the Astrakhan summit, the geography and effectiveness of the Ministerial Council and meetings of the SWG in recent years, the intensity of negotiations – all this shows Russian diplomats are paying increased attention to the Caspian, they desire to prevent possible negative trends and create the most beneficial environment for the cooperation of the Caspian Five. Moscow certainly could not have achieved this on its own. Its aspirations coincided with the desires of dialogue partners. The common will of the five countries made it possible to overcome a considerable number of difficulties and reach a qualitatively new level of trust.

NOTES

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⁶ Op. cit.

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Political and Economic Space in the Caspian Region: A New Configuration

S. Zhiltsov

Key words: Caspian Region, convention, economic cooperation, energy cooperation, Caspian states.

THE CONVENTION on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea signed a year ago, in August 2018 at the Fifth Caspian Summit in Aktau (Kazakhstan), clarified the future of the Caspian region and offered the littoral states more chances of economic cooperation. This is confirmed by the intention to mark the International Caspian Day and the first year of the Convention by the First Caspian Economic Forum to be held in Turkmenistan on August 12.

The genesis of new political-economic realities in the Caspian in the course of preparations for this consequential summit and its far-reaching impacts on the political-economic configuration in the region deserves closer scrutiny.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation adopted on November 30, 2016 identified new foreign policy priorities and specified regional policies, in the Caspian region in particular: “Russia’s approaches to working with partners in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions will be designed so as to reaffirm the commitment to the goals and principles of the Charter of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and take into account the need to strengthen the mechanism of cooperation among the five Caspian States based on collective decision-making.”¹

In view of the political processes unfolding in the world in 2017, the basic documents of the Russian Federation specified its relations with other states and foreign policy priorities. The Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the

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period until 2030 approved in July 2017 pointed out that “requirement for the naval presence of the Russian Federation in strategically important and other areas of the World Ocean is also determined by the following threats: a) the increased aspirations of a range of states to own sources of hydrocarbon energy resources in the Near East, the Arctic, and the Caspian Sea basin.”²

Other littoral states, likewise, invariably stated in their fundamental documents that the problems created by the Caspian issue should be addressed and settled. The Concept of Foreign Policy Course of Neutral Turkmenistan approved in February 2017 points to the need to promote the country’s national interests in the region and

develop regional cooperation. The Military Doctrine of Kazakhstan approved in September 2017, likewise, points to the need to defend its national interests in the territorial waters and on the Caspian shelf.

In the context of its Caspian policy, Russia paid particular attention to transportation and economic cooperation in the most important spheres of marine economy. This was discussed among other urgent problems at the Meeting of the Russian Ambassadors to Caspian States chaired by State Secretary-Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Grigory Karasin that took place in Astrakhan in May 2017. It was attended by the governor of the Astrakhan Region, head of regional power structures and representatives of the Central Office of the Foreign Ministry of Russia.

The meeting analyzed in detail how the assignments formulated by the leaders of the Caspian states at the Fourth Caspian Summit (Astrakhan, September 2014) had been fulfilled; identified the priorities for the period of preparation to the next summit in Kazakhstan, within the concluding stage of the work on the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, in the first place. The meeting paid a lot of attention to other agreements to be discussed at the summit designed to consolidate cooperation among the littoral states in the spheres of security, economy, ecology, and cultural and humanitarian exchanges.

Regional problems were also discussed at bilateral and trilateral

Under pressure from the rising importance of the transit and logistics factor and the need to optimize the transportation process in the Caspian, Moscow developed and approved the Strategy for the Development of Seaports in the Caspian Sea to 2030.

meetings of Caspian leaders. In November 2017, presidents of Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran met in Tehran to discuss among other things the project of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and its Caspian segment. They signed a Joint Statement in which they pointed to the importance of tripartite interaction and cooperation between the governments and parliaments of the three countries at the regional and international levels. The document emphasized the extreme importance of cooperation in the sphere of motor, railway and air transport very much needed to modernize the transport infrastructure and INSTC development as well as of prompt realization of the Rasht-Astara railway project.

The presidents pointed to the highly positive nature of five-sided talks on the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and confirmed their intention to accelerate its adoption on the basis of the consensus of all littoral states. The sides that look at the Caspian as a sea of peace, friendship, security, and cooperation indicated that greater consolidation is needed in cooperation between port administrations, in maritime traffic, multi-modal transportation, cruise tourism, preservation of water bio-resources, protection of the environment, power, trade, economy, scientific studies, hydrography, meteorology, security and cooperation in the military sphere, prevention of emergencies.

This adds even more importance to comprehensive development of the Caspian transportation hubs of the Russian littoral subjects – the republics of Kalmykia and Dagestan and the Astrakhan Region. Accordingly, it intensified efforts of the Caspian states determined to bypass Russia by building modern port infrastructure, modernizing old ports and pouring more money into the new and already functioning transport corridors.

Late in 2016, Kazakhstan put into operation Kuryk, a new port on the Caspian on the shores of the Bekovich-Cherkassky Bay to the south of Aktau. This infrastructural project complete with a railway is an important link of the Chinese New Silk Road initiative. Intended to lighten pressure on the old port of Aktau, it started functioning in March 2017 by moving cargoes from Kuryk to the Azeri port of Alyat, the ferry terminal of the port of Baku. In 2017, the Aktau and Kuryk ports handled 5.4 million tons of all sorts of cargo; in 2018, the figure was 6.4 million while in 2019 the two ports are supposed to handle 7.5 million tons of cargo.³

It is expected that in future ice-free Kuryk will replace Aktau with its less favorable weather conditions. The planned Kuryk complex of an annual capacity of 5.1 million tons of cargo consists of a ferry service and

a railway that connects Borzhakty and Ersai in the Mangystau Region of Kazakhstan. Two ferries to be commissioned later are expected to be loaded directly from freight cars.

So far, Aktau remains highly important when it comes to moving cargo to other countries. In April 2019, regular feeder container service was opened along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) used to bring goods from China and Central Asia to Europe via Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Ukraine. Earlier, in October 2017, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Georgia signed a treaty on an international TITR association to attract transit and foreign trade cargo and develop integrated logistic products along the TITR.

A Lapis Lazuli Corridor is also planned to the south of TITR to move cargo from Afghanistan to Europe across Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.⁴ It will begin in the Aqina checkpoint in the Faryab Province in the north of Afghanistan and the border town of Torghundi in the Herat Province, reach the port of Turkmenbashi in Turkmenistan, Baku in Azerbaijan, Tbilisi and Batumi in Georgia and Istanbul in Turkey. China, Central Asian republics, India, Pakistan, and Iran might be also attracted. The newly built port Turkmenbashi with an annual total capacity of over 17 million tons of goods not counting oil products is expected to become the main hub; it has already become the main link of the Lapis Lazuli Corridor.⁵

According to official data, in recent years, Russia's Caspian ports lost a lot of their former importance. In six years, from 2010 to 2018, the total freight turnover of Astrakhan, Olya and Makhachkala dropped from 10.9 to 6 million tons. Makhachkala handled about 55% of total freight turnover (87% of which was crude oil and 13%, grain). Its oil storage and oil loading facilities were gradually losing their importance: in 2012, it handled 5.27 million tons and in 2016, 2.8 million tons.⁶ This is explained by the more intensive use of oil pipelines. The situation stabilized in 2018 when Aktau transshipped 2,089 million tons of oil to Makhachkala.⁷

The same can be said about ferrous metals: between 2011 and 2016. their volume transshipped by the port of Makhachkala dropped from 270 to 34.5 thousand tons. There were positive figures as well: in the same period, the volume of grain transshipped by Russian ports increased from 51 to 132 thousand tons.

Two Caspian ports (Astrakhan and Olya) deal mainly with dry goods, the bulk of them moved to Iran which makes Astrakhan the key exporter port of agricultural products. It handles over 60% of grain moved to Iran.

Iran, on its side, is developing its metallurgy the products of which are not exported across the territory of Russia. In 2010, Russian ports handled 5 million tons of metal (70% of the total amount of dry goods); in 2016, the share dropped to 18.4% of total cargo turnover.⁸

Under pressure of the rising importance from the transit and logistics factor and the need to optimize the transportation process in the Caspian, Moscow developed and approved the Strategy for the Development of Seaports in the Caspian Sea, with connected rail and road transport, to 2030. Approved by the Government of Russia in November 2017, the document is expected to ensure sustainable development of the Caspian Region and cover the infrastructural, legal and economic aspects.

It was intended to consolidate Russia's economic and geopolitical presence in the Caspian, widen and deepen its economic and cultural ties with the littoral states and create conditions indispensable for the region's continued social and economic development by increasing the cargo flows as part of international trade handled by Caspian ports. The document pointed out that the cargo turnover through the Russian ports depended, to a great extent, on external factors, on what is going on in Iranian economy, in the first place, as well as development of new oil fields and construction of new oil pipelines by the oil companies of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.

The Caspian countries do not limit themselves to new export routes; they are struggling to widen their presence on the external hydrocarbon markets. In 2017, the port of Makhachkala lost to Azerbaijan the bigger part of oil transshipment from Kazakhstan and the northern regions of Russia's shelf. This made it doubly important to preserve Makhachkala as one of the key points where Caspian oil is pumped into the pipeline system of Russia. It handles light Turkmenian oil; by 2020, its annual volumes might reach 2 million tons. It is expected that in the near future (2024-2026), the gas condensate field Tsentralnoe (150 km from Makhachkala) will be put into operation; the hydrocarbons will be moved by tankers to the capital of Dagestan which will increase the present level of transshipment from 2 to 5.5 million tons in 2025 (there is an even more optimistic figure of up to 10 million tons).⁹

We should bear in mind the changes in the Caspian hydrocarbons when they were moved to external markets. Early in 2017, building of the fourth branch of the gas pipeline Turkmenistan-China was officially suspended. More than that: starting with 2014, the volumes of Kazakh oil exported to China were declining while the transit of Russian oil toward

China was increasing. At the same time, starting with October 2017, Kazakhstan increased, for the first time, the annual volumes of gas supplied to China to 5 billion cu m.

In November 2017, the Joint Statement of the Presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan on the 25th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries confirmed their determination to regulate the legal status of the Caspian Sea through a consensus between the five littoral states. The presidents were convinced that it would open a new stage in deepening regional cooperation. In the same document, Russia and Kazakhstan revived the problem of developing the fields, the objects of earlier bilateral agreements.

The sides signed an Additional Protocol to the Protocol to the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan of July 6, 1998 on delimitating the northern part of the Caspian seabed to be able to use their sovereign rights on the deposits. The sides expressed their interest in the joint development of the hydrocarbon resources of the Kurmangazy structure (Kulalinskaya until 1991) in the northwestern part of the Caspian shelf of Kazakhstan. They reached an agreement on increasing the contract territory envisaged by the product sharing agreement of July 6, 2005. Russia pins great hopes on the Tsentralnoe field in the Russian part of the Caspian. In 2015, the presidents of Russia and Kazakhstan signed a Protocol related to the development of this field with assessed reserves of 314 million tons to be used for seven to nine years.

Lukoil plays a prominent role in Russia's increasing extraction of hydrocarbons in its part of the Caspian. It re-equipped the Filanovsky Oil Field to increase oil extraction. Today, it is realizing the second and third stages of the project. In 2017, it extracted 4.6 million tons of oil; in December 2017, it began drilling the first producing well from the second fixed offshore platform. It expects to reach the annual amounts of up to 7.2 million tons of oil in 2019, and preserve this level till 2023.¹⁰

In recent years, Dagestan, a Caspian littoral republic of the Russian Federation, has been demonstrating industrial development (machine building, agricultural machine building in particular, food industry, instrument engineering, and power production) and agricultural growth. Its economic future is associated with, among other things, development of port facilities. In February and April 2018, the workgroup of the presidium of the State Council of the RF on the development of transport infrastructure in the Caspian region met in Moscow and Astrakhan to dis-

cuss the prospects of transport infrastructure in the Volga-Caspian basin.

Simultaneously, the Astrakhan Region came up with several initiatives related to a free trade zone; it was suggested to remove restrictions on wheat export to Iran; develop cruise tourism in the Caspian; improve the sanitary and veterinary checkpoints; create facilities for building passenger, transport and fishing ships; oblige oil and gas companies to use Russian shipbuilding enterprises; and improve the extraction facilities in the Russian sector of the Caspian.

Russia's neighbors, likewise, are actively developing the transport segments of their economies. In February 2018, the workgroup for the development of energy cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan met for the first time to discuss the problems of resource delimitation and possible cooperation in the energy sphere. In March 2018, during the visit of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to Baku, the sides signed an agreement on funding the Iranian part of the Rasht-Astara railway to complete the West Caspian segment of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

In May 2018, a new port was opened in the Ələt settlement, the Qaradağ District of Baku, with an annual initial transshipment capacity of up to 15 million tons. The Azeri side hopes to increase its annual handling capacity to 25 million tons. In the next few years, this might strongly affect the freight flows in the Caspian region.

In May 2018, the Southern Gas Corridor was put into operation to move natural gas from Shakh Deniz in the Caspian to Europe. The project realized by Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, and Italy is a system of functioning and planned gas pipelines that united the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). Its total cost was assessed at \$40 billion. Built in full accordance with the EU Third Energy Package, it is intended to diversify energy routes. According to the already achieved agreements, gas from Azerbaijan will be sent to Turkey and further on to South Europe (Greece and Italy).

Turkmenistan pursues no less ambitious aims. In May 2018, it opened Turkmenbashi, an international sea port built in full accordance with the Strategy of the Development of the International Sea Port Turkmenbashi and the Turkmenian Merchant Marine Fleet up to 2020 and intended to serve the main maritime gates of Turkmenian and of regional economy as a whole. At the same time, Turkmenistan commissioned a new shipbuild-

ing and ship repair yard “Balkan” to build and repair sea vessels and floating constructions with an annual capacity of four to six big ships and 20 to 30 repaired ships.

Gradually, the Caspian Five arrived at a conclusion that it would be much wiser to avoid rivalry inside the group and to coordinate their transportation projects. Indeed, two ports on the Eastern shore of the Caspian identical by their capacities (Kuryk of Kazakhstan and Turkmenbashi of Turkmenistan) might become rivals. In view of a considerable potential of concerted efforts in the sphere of transport infrastructure, the Caspian states arrived at an Agreement between the governments of the Caspian states on cooperation in the field of transport signed in the presence of all leaders at the Fifth Caspian Summit. The discussion revealed obvious advantages of joint use of all possibilities of integrated transport systems of all Caspian states. The presidents decided to coordinate additional documents needed to regulate marine transport and security in the Caspian.

In May 2018, Astana hosted the 51st meeting of the Special Working Group on the development of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea at the level of deputy foreign ministers of the Caspian littoral states (SWG) that adopted a communique which said in particular that “the participants of the SWG meeting ... discussed progress in the coordination of five-sided sectoral draft documents and preparation for their signing at the Fifth Caspian Summit.” The Workgroup completed negotiations on the draft of the final political document of the coming summit as well as drafts of five-sided documents: the Agreement between the Governments of the Caspian Littoral States on Transport Cooperation, the Agreement between the Governments of the Caspian Littoral States on Trade and Economic Cooperation, the Agreement on Prevention of Incidents in the Caspian Sea, the Protocol on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism in the Caspian Sea, the Protocol on Cooperation in Combating Organized Crime in the Caspian Sea, the Protocol on Cooperation and Interaction of Border Agencies to the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Security in the Caspian Sea.

On August 12, 2018, Aktau, a city on the Caspian coast, hosted the Fifth Caspian Summit; meeting of foreign ministers of the Five were held within the summit that agreed on a plan of realization of the agreements achieved by the presidents in the economic, transport and economic spheres.

The Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea was the key document adopted by the summit. The sides agreed that “delimitation of

the Caspian Sea seabed and subsoil into sectors shall be effected by agreement between States with adjacent and opposite coasts, with due regard to the generally recognized principles and norms of international law, to enable those States to exercise their sovereign rights to the subsoil exploitation and other legitimate economic activities related to the development of resources of the seabed and subsoil.”¹¹

The Convention specified the approaches of the Caspian states to the realization of the trunk submarine pipelines. Article 14 said that “the Parties may lay trunk submarine pipelines on the bed of the Caspian Sea, on the condition that their projects comply with environmental standards and requirements embodied in the international agreements to which they are parties, including the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea and its relevant protocols.” This means that the submarine pipeline projects should be discussed together with the Protocol to the Tehran Conference of 2003 on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-Boundary Context signed on July 20, 2018 that confirmed the right of each of the Caspian states to take part in the assessment of possible ecological impacts of the proposed project. This means that it will be not enough to present a national assessment of possible impacts and that all sides should be involved in the process. Each of the Caspian states can take part in the assessment procedure. According to the protocol, these assessments should be related to the “large diameter pipelines for the transport of oil, gas and oil products or chemicals.” The same article of the Convention says: “Submarine cables and pipelines routes shall be determined by agreement with the Party the seabed sector of which is to be crossed by the cable or pipeline.”¹²

The Fifth Caspian Summit clarified the future development of the Caspian region while the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian put cooperation between Caspian states in all areas, including economy and transport, on a firm legal basis. This can be described as a Caspian breakthrough, the definition confirmed by the Summit’s eight final documents. This serves the foundation of a new system of relations; the entire range of problems will remain within the scope of attention of the High-Level Workgroup created by the decision of the presidents. It consists of representatives of foreign ministries of the Caspian states who will supervise how the convention and other five-sided agreements are fulfilled, draft new treaties and organize meetings of foreign ministers and heads of the Caspian states.

The set of other five-party documents signed in Aktau is no less

important. The vast normative legal base will allow the Caspian states to accelerate realization of the already launched projects in all spheres of marine activities and formulate new high-tech initiatives. It is expected that these subjects will be discussed in detail within the economic forum to be held in Turkmenbashi in August that will be attended by ministers of economies of the Caspian states, members of the business community and representatives of industrial enterprises. This highly promising cooperation format will increase the region's competitiveness at the international level, create conditions for sustainable development of the Caspian states and their subjects and help resolve the most important problems created by the collective use of the common sea.

NOTES

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Effectiveness of Russia's Foreign Policy Information Support in Its Confrontation With the United States

M. Kovshar

Key words: media, Russia, USA, information space, informational influence.

ONE FEATURE of the modern system of international relations is the increased influence on it of the information component. The transnational nature of the media space is being actively utilized by world actors to achieve their foreign policy objectives, leading to a clash of their interests and the beginning of information confrontation. The goal of modern-day confrontations is not only to fight for resources or territory but to fight for control over minds and public loyalty. In that respect, today it is strategically important to all states that they be viewed positively by the international community and successfully get the mass audience to form a favorable perception of their positions on the world stage, achieving understanding and acceptance of their actions and objectives.

Modern Russian scholarship does not have a well-established concept of information confrontation. The term is defined in the individual works of various authors [7, p. 18]. In general terms, it can be understood as a relationship of opposition and rivalry between several information entities that are influencing the information space of an adversary through various means and methods.

Researchers identify two areas of information confrontation: technical, which affects an enemy's technical means, and psychological, which impacts consciousness and public opinion [5, p. 23]. While the main goal of the former is to inflict maximal material losses on the enemy, the goal of the latter is to undermine state stability from within. The simplest and most affordable platform for waging psychological warfare is the mass

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media. That is why the media space is considered a major tool of foreign policy pressure today.

The basic areas of information confrontation where Russia is active today are outlined in its fundamental foreign policy documents. For example, a presidential decree emphasizes the need "to improve the information support of foreign policy

activities in the interests of achieving an objective perception of the Russian Federation in the international arena" [2]; and the Russian Foreign Policy Concept states that Russia should seek "to be perceived objectively in the world" and develop "its own effective means of informational influence on public opinion abroad" [1]. The work plan of the Foreign Ministry includes a separate point on the information support of foreign policy activity. It states that "in light of the aggravation of the information situation in the world, great importance will be attached to the maximally complete and prompt communication to the foreign audience of Russia's stance on key international developments and the counteraction of attempts to discredit the country's foreign policy course" [3].

The relevance of studying how effectively Russia can foster an objective perception of its foreign policy position abroad will inevitably increase. Amid the current media confrontation between the U.S. and Russia, studying Russia's influence on the American public is of particular interest.

This could be studied by examining the presentation by Russian and American media outlets of information regarding the same event. To that end, Russia's means and methods of conveying its foreign policy position to the American audience and the U.S.'s main means of informational influence on the domestic audience should be analyzed, and the effectiveness of Russia's current means and methods of foreign policy influence should be evaluated.

The main channels for promulgating Russia's stance on situations on the international stage in the media space can be divided into official and unofficial. Official channels include official websites and official social network pages of government agencies responsible for shaping foreign policy, which include the Russian president, government, Foreign Ministry, and Defense Ministry. These all have an Internet presence, with

The efforts of Russian media resources to counter the widespread propaganda against Russia are insufficient.

websites presenting material in at least two languages – English and Russian – as well as social network pages (see Table 1). A social media presence is an important part of information-sharing these days. According to a survey conducted by an American research center, in the past few years, a growing number of people prefer to receive news from social networks (about 60% of the adult population). Most often, Americans receive news via Facebook (45%), YouTube (18%) and Twitter (11%) [15].

Table 1
Availability of pages of the Russian president, government, Defense Ministry, and Foreign Ministry on social networks and their activity

	Facebook language	Followers	Daily news posts (Avg.)	YouTube language	Followers	Daily news posts (Avg.)	Twitter language	Followers	Daily news posts (Avg.)
The president							Russian	3.74 million	3-4
Foreign Ministry	Russian	367,888	15-17	Russian, English	13,076	2-3	Russian	1.23 million	20
Defense Ministry	Russian	12,336	less than 1	Russian	128,000	1-2	Russian, English, Arabic	179,000	31
Government							Russian	630,000	4-5

Based on the data in the table, Russian government agencies are not well represented on popular American social networks (for comparison, the U.S. State Department has about 5 million Twitter subscribers with an average of 8-10 posts per day). It should be noted that the material published on social networks was not unique, but merely duplicated content of official sites.

It should be added that in the U.S., many officials have their own social networks pages where they share their own – often emotionally

colored – opinions and views of certain situations and are therefore very popular. For example, former U.S. President Barack Obama has about 101 million subscribers, which is comparable to pop stars such as Justin Bieber (106 million). U.S. President Donald Trump also has accounts on social networks, where he actively shares his thoughts (he has about 50 million subscribers on Twitter).

This method of presenting information has many advantages, including speed, accessibility and maximum proximity to the “end user.” And given its growing popularity in the U.S. and the world, it deserves special attention and a special approach, and a distinctive vernacular model for the social network behavior of politicians and officials should be created that corresponds to the main national political traditions.

The next method of influence is conveyed through international media. Unfortunately, Russia has a relatively small number of international information sources that could provide quality services and thereby contribute to the international community's understanding of Russia's position. According to Irina Napalkova, Russia's attempts to develop media projects such as the Valdai Club and “Russia Profile,” “which were supposed to help spread its position in the world, have not yet yielded significant positive results” [8].

Nevertheless, there are some news agencies that are doing the job rather well. Among them are Russia Today (RT), TASS, Russia Beyond the Headlines, Meduza and others. The best proof of it is the accusation that Russia “manipulated” Americans on social networks through RT in order to influence election outcomes. And as *The New York Times* states, in the end, almost 126 million people were affected [11].

To study the effectiveness of Russian media influence on the American audience, the methods and means used to present information need to be examined. The most convenient approach is to consider the presentation of information on a specific subject. The reunification of Crimea with Russia in 2014 is proposed as such a reference point, given that it was a key moment in modern Russian history that triggered the reevaluation of Russia's position in the international arena and a decline in Russian-American relations.

The issue will be studied, on the one hand, on the basis of the English version of the Russian news agency TASS. This source was chosen because of its high international level and the availability of archival materials for research.

On the other hand, the study of American influence will be based on


the mass media outlets Fox News and *The New York Times*. These sources were selected because of the influence their orientation has on a certain segment of consumers, which entails the projection of corresponding meanings and values. Thus, the presence in American politics of two leading parties – the Democratic and Republican parties – was taken into account. According to the Pew Research Center, about 88% of Republicans trust Fox News and 62% of Democrats trust *The New York Times* [14].

The main research method was a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of publicly available materials from the considered news resources.

The purpose of using this method is to determine the level of coverage of events related to the reunification of Crimea with Russia in 2014, the dynamics of this process, as well as to establish the distinctive features of their coverage by Russian and American sources.

To determine the level of coverage of Crimea-related topics, a quantitative content analysis of site materials was conducted via monitoring (a search for the word “Crimea”) from February 1 to June 30, 2017. During this period, reports about Crimea appeared 488 times on the TASS site, 702 times on the Fox News site, and 861 times on *The New York Times* site. The results showed that this topic was most actively covered in March, during the referendum and the subsequent accession of the territory to the Russian Federation (see Chart 1).

Chart 1
Search results for “Crimea” on the TASS news agency platform,
February-June 2014



The chart also shows that the events were covered in direct proportion in all media outlets. Considering that we are examining the impact of all media on one object, the American public, it can be argued that in the

given time period, it was subjected to massive informational influence simultaneously from three different sides.

Russian media outlets operate in the same information field as U.S. media in direct proportion, thereby confronting them. Nevertheless, due to an excessively large disparity in the amount of information supplied, Russian news agencies are significantly losing out to Western ones.

To study the mode of the presentation of information regarding the accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation, a quantitative content analysis was conducted to determine the semantic charge of the material (the methodology of German political scientist Werner Früh was used [10]).

This study was conducted on Crimea-related articles selected in the period from March 16 to April 1, 2014 (the period with the greatest number of articles): 144 TASS articles, 267 *The New York Times* articles, and 227 Fox News articles were reviewed. For their analysis, the following categories were identified: politics, economics, legal issues, social issues. The study showed that all news agencies paid almost the same attention to the following topics (see Table 2): political (this category accounts for the largest number of articles), military, economic, and social topics.

Table 2
Thematic classification of “Crimea” articles, March 16-April 1, 2014

Categories	Topics	The New York Times	Fox News	TASS
Politics	Total number of articles devoted to Crimea	267	227	144
	Criticism of U.S. leadership	4	27	4
	U.S. official statements	15	3	1
	Annexation of Crimea	26	16	1
	Military issues	30	28	17
	Russia in Crimea	16	4	5
	Russian policy in Crimea and Ukraine	23	21	22

Politics	Crimea in Russian-American relations	27	26	0
	Russia in world politics	21	8	12
	Ukraine's policy regarding Crimea	0	0	26
	OSCE in Crimea	0	0	12
	Crimean Prime Minister Aksyonov	0	0	4
Economic and legal issues	Sanctions	28	32	4
	U.S. and Russian economic issues	21	2	0
	Admission of Crimea to the RF	6	5	8
Society	Referendum in Crimea	29	5	32
	The situation of the Crimean Tatars	2	4	5
	Problems of Crimean residents	1	4	8
	Other	14	38	0

A significant disparity was noted in the number of articles relating to issues such as criticism of the U.S. leadership, in particular of President Barack Obama, regarding his sanctions policy, as well as the chosen vector for developing relations with the Russian Federation in light of the Crimea events (TASS devoted four articles to criticizing the U.S., Fox News – 22 and *The New York Times* – 28). A disparity in the amount of material from the considered resources was also noted regarding the statements of U.S. officials on the Crimean issue (5.6% of *New York Times* articles were devoted to that topic compared to 1.3% of Fox News articles). This difference is explained by the political bias of the media outlets.

It should be noted that TASS, in its coverage of the events in Crimea, paid almost no attention to issues of U.S. influence on this process. The largest number of articles was devoted to the referendum – more specifi-

cally, its social component (almost 22%). Also, an important place was given to issues regarding relations with Ukraine. Thus, the general emphasis of all TASS articles was on the relationship of Crimea and Russia. Therefore, it can be argued that TASS took a soft stance on the U.S. and did not take not a path of clear confrontation, avoiding a value judgment on America's role in the Crimean issue. Unlike in the American media, almost no hot-button issues were raised.

A separate analysis was conducted of the headlines of selected articles that contained phrases describing the process of Crimea's reunification with Russia. The most frequently used phrases were selected and classified according to their degree of negativity or neutrality with respect to the events in question (the classification was made based on this author's personal assessments using materials from an explanatory dictionary [9]) (see Table 3).

Table 3
Phrases used to describe the process of Crimea joining the Russian Federation

Rating	Phrase	Fox News	The New York Times	TASS
Negative	Total number of articles on Crimea	227	267	144
	Occupation of Crimea	0	4	1
	Invasion of Crimes	1	1	1
	Annexation of Crimea	30	31	0
	Absorption of Crimea	0	7	0
	Takeover of Crimes	7	2	1
	Secession of Crimea	0	1	2
Neutral	Crimea' reunification with Russia	0	0	0
	Crimea's decision to declare independence	0	1	2

Neutral	Recognition of Crimea as a sovereign and independent state	0	0	1
	Crimea's integration into Russia	0	0	1

This classification made it possible to determine that American media most often used such words as “occupation,” “annexation,” “absorption,” and “takeover” to describe the Crimean events. These words have a very negative connotation. Their frequent use in the media in one way or another affects readers’ perception of the provided information, prejudicing a negative attitude to the described event. This allows us to conclude that American media offered a one-sided presentation of information about the events in Crimea.

Coverage of the process of Crimea’s reunification with the Russian Federation in the Russian news source was reflected most softly, using such words as “secession,” “return of Crimea to Russia,” “Crimea’s integration into Russia.” However, some isolated instances of the use of such negatively colored words as “occupation” and “takeover” were also noted. It should also be added that TASS used such phrases relatively infrequently, avoiding in every possible way an emotional coloring of semantic constructions. Such an approach may indicate that TASS is not bent on playing on readers’ feelings and emotions.

Nevertheless, based on the classification proposed by Doctor of Science (Philology) Iosif Dzyaloshinsky, several manipulative methods for influencing society can be identified in the studied materials [6]:

1) creating media buzz around an event to introduce certain information into the public consciousness. Based on Chart 1, we can say that this method was used, since the topic of the reunification of Crimea with Russia for a short while amounted to one-third of the total news coverage of the examined resources (in the first three months, it accounted for about 30% of all content). The use of this method first focuses attention on the subject of the information provided. At the same time, the method hampers critical understanding of the subject, makes it possible to introduce disorientation and misunderstanding of details, and creates a basis for the subject of the media materials to acquire psychological impact;

2) the psychological impact on the most impressionable points of public consciousness (topics that evoke anxiety, fear, hatred). Use of this

method is evidenced by the data in Tables 1 and 2, which show that the topics discussed and the words used by the American side in many cases carried a negative connotation, and insufficient use of positive words in the Russian resource indicates the weakness of psychological impact methods on public consciousness;

3) the manipulation of rational content, the use of persuasive arguments (opinion polls, expert commentary, forecasts). Expert opinions, commentary and the analysis of specialists were also often used.

Research by Rob Suls shows that percentage of Americans who perceived Russia as the “greatest threat” to the U.S. increased in 2014 (from 1% to 6%) and did not stop increasing until 2017 (an average of 30%) [14]. This was confirmed by a study by the American Pew Research Center in 2017 (when 47% of Americans perceived Russia as a potential threat).

This allows us to conclude that the efforts of Russian media resources to counter the widespread propaganda against Russia are insufficient. The heightened activity of the Russian state in the international arena and the adoption of bold political decisions require appropriate information support in order to convey Russia's position to the countries and peoples of the world as efficiently as possible.

So, it would be appropriate to create content directed at the target audience, to use the opponent's “weak spot” in order to achieve Russia's goals – namely, to leverage the domestic political confrontation in the U.S. In addition, the presence of two politically engaged parties (the Republicans and Democrats) creates a need for Americans to look to other, external sources of information. Russia could very well become a provider of these services.

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Media and Information Literacy as a Strategic Resource for Diplomacy in Dealing With Information Threats and Challenges

Ye. Grebenkina

Media and Information Literacy as a Concept

Key words: media and information literacy (MIL), diplomacy, international relations, information society, information war, foreign policy.

TODAY'S DIPLOMACY is an extensive field that, in addition to professional diplomats, politicians and government officials, brings together public activists, science and culture figures, businesspeople, industrialists, information and communication technology (ICT) specialists, journalists, and many others.

It takes a considerable amount of knowledge to be able to build international ties in various forms and at various levels. While diplomats are professionally skilled and experienced in intercultural communication, in negotiating, in looking for, analyzing and verifying information, and in studying other countries, people who are outside the diplomatic profession are usually short of skills and knowledge of this kind. Information space accumulates multitudes of viewpoints and a wide range of ideologies and theories, and one can hardly get one's bearings in it without comprehensive and critical analysis. It is no less important to keep up with rapid developments in technology and detect key trends in communication and behavior in physical and digital space, which means knowing how to react to constant changes in the international information environment.

The combination of these abilities is often termed media and information literacy (MIL). This term covers a whole range of competences: adequate command of a wide range of (ICTs), the ability to think

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analytically and critically, and good skills to assess, use, create, and disseminate information.¹ MIL definitions along these lines are extensively used by the United Nations and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in documents on media and information issues the best-known of which is UNESCO's Information for All Programme (IFAP).²

One can learn more about MIL from UNESCO educational programs. One of them argues that media literacy and information literacy are largely overlapping concepts and stand for library, news, digital, computer, and Internet literacy,³ and competent attitudes to the freedom of expression, television, advertising, cinema, and computer games. Homework prescribed by some of the programs includes comparing the first pages in different newspapers, with one being asked why one believes that particular form of content presentation has been chosen and what effect one thinks the font, images and photos can have on the reader. Students are also taught to use and compare different search engines and analyze search results. All this helps develop analytical and critical thinking and generally understand how information works.

In its programs, UNESCO credits media and other information providers with promoting democracy and intercultural dialogue and helping improve governance but complains that quite often they publish disinformation, promote stereotypes and pursue discriminatory policies, excluding some social groups from public debates. The organization also points out that public television, libraries and archives often have restrictions put on them by the state.⁴ These are common practices in most countries, and MIL aims to teach people to navigate their way through the vast sea of information. UNESCO argues that, if, metaphorically speaking, media are the fourth branch of government after the legislative, executive and judicial branches, media and information-literate citizens are the fifth branch. They are able to look for, compare and analyze views alternative to mainstream ideas.⁵

Definitions of MIL in some of the UNESCO programs reflect Western political values and legal standards. But, on the whole, those programs provide people in various parts of the world with the basis for more effective involvement in electronic democracy, for taking part in building a digital economy, and for being members of the global information society. If used in many countries, these programs could defuse information-caused tensions but, on the other hand, they would offer means of using information for more latent and subtle pressure.

International conferences on MIL that are organized by UNESCO are usually attended, besides UN and UNESCO officials, by politicians, government officials, scholars, various experts, and librarianship specialists who make their own recommendations. Let us look at some key documents related to these issues.

UNESCO Declarations

ONE OF UNESCO's first documents on information issues was the Prague Declaration of 2003. That declaration addressed what it called the "information literacy,"

not "media and information literacy," issue. It described information literacy as not just "knowledge of one's information concerns and needs" and competent use of information but also as "a prerequisite for participating effectively in the Information Society, and [as] part of the basic human right of lifelong learning."⁶ In 2002, experts had called on nations to put their entire systems of secondary and higher education and vocational training on an ICT basis over the next 10 to 15 years.⁷ That period was going to see the emergence of a permanent education ideology, a concept representing extensive educational activities run both by governments and by nongovernmental bodies. The lifelong learning idea has gained considerable popularity by now but largely stays within the realm of theory since far from all countries see it viable enough to justify expenditure for putting it into practice.

A potential alternative to this proposed permanent education is electronic learning and massive open online courses (MOOCs). MOOCs are growing in scale and include diplomatic courses. For example, DiploFoundation, a nonprofit foundation established by the governments of Malta and Switzerland, runs electronic courses, online conferences, and webinars on diplomacy and international relations that provide diplomats, scholars, and anyone else with opportunities for learning and debate.⁸

UNESCO's next document on information literacy was the Alexandria Proclamation on Information Literacy and Lifelong Learning. Signed in 2005 as part of celebrations of the confirmation of the site of the Pharos of Alexandria, one of the ancient wonders of the world, this document described information literacy and lifelong learning as "the

Russia ranked 10th in the 193-country Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) 2017.

beacons of the Information Society” and “key elements for the development of generic capabilities which must be required for the accreditation of all education and training programs.” It declared information literacy to be “a basic human right in a digital world [that] promotes social inclusion of all nations.”⁹ The proclamation said that information literacy and lifelong learning illuminated “the courses to development, prosperity and freedom.”¹⁰

The Fez Declaration of 2011 was UNESCO’s first declaration to use the term “media and information literacy.” Reiterating principles that underlay definitions of information literacy before, the declaration said that MIL “enhances the quality of human life and sustainable development and citizenship” and that it can play “the critical role ... in building a culture of peace towards intercultural dialogue, mutual knowledge and understanding among civilizations.” Natalya Gendina points out that Russian researchers split the MIL concept into two parts, “information training” and “media education.”¹¹ The meaning of the former term is obvious. The latter term denotes knowledge obtained by audiovisual means such as cinema, music, theater, photography, and mass media, including their online forms.

UNESCO’s 2012 Moscow Declaration on Media and Information Literacy says: “MIL competencies ... extend beyond information and communication technologies to encompass learning, critical thinking and interpretive skills across and beyond professional, educational and societal boundaries.”¹² Hence, MIL is a comprehensive notion denoting not only diverse competencies but also a degree of activity.

The 2013 Sakhalin Declaration on Internet and Socio-Cultural Transformations emphasizes that “access to and use of ICTs, Internet and communication services among generations and countries are ... challenging the value orientations and behaviour of individuals, the social fabric of societies and even national integrity in much of the world.”¹³ Consequently, MIL should help build models of behavior in the digital world and ethical and legal principles for it and should mean competencies that “guarantee safe and responsible use of networks.”¹⁴ The declaration proclaimed four knowledge society principles: “promoting freedom of expression in traditional and new forms of media, including the Internet; access to quality education for all; respect of cultural and linguistic diversity; and universal access to information and knowledge, especially in the public domain.”

The 2017 Ugra Declaration on Preserving Languages and Promoting

Linguistic Diversity in Cyberspace for Inclusive Sustainable Development did address MIL but mainly focused on the cultural and linguistic identity issue.¹⁵ It encouraged speakers of the world's least-spoken languages to acquire competencies such as MIL in order to "enable them to create, document and disseminate indigenous knowledge."

In all the above-cited declarations, MIL is regarded as a component of the UNESCO-led Education for All global movement and as one of the means of attaining the Millennium Development Goals, eight international development goals set by the United Nations. The Alexandria Proclamation and the subsequent declarations urge governments and non-governmental organizations to support and promote MIL in every way.

There are other international organizations besides UNESCO that are involved in MIL and various other information issues. The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), a two-phase conference, was co-organized, besides UNESCO, by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which is also a UN body. The first phase of WSIS was held in Geneva in 2003 and the second in Tunis in 2005. WSIS released two programs – the Geneva Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action¹⁶ and the Tunis Agenda for the Informational Society.¹⁷

WSIS was followed up by WSIS+10, a decade-long process of reviewing and facilitating the implementation of WSIS outcomes. The latest WSIS+10 high-level meeting took place in 2015.

One more format is the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), an annual event whose launch was announced in 2006 by then UN secretary general Kofi Annan.¹⁸ It was only in 2009 that this forum acquired a clear structure, and therefore it marked its 10th anniversary in 2019. In a sense, IGF is an information version of the United Nations as it includes an extensive network of committees and groups dealing with various ICT and information society issues. The educational role of ICTs was on the agenda for an IGF session during WSIS Forum 2019 in April.¹⁹

Obstacles to MIL and Information Society Development

THE MOST OBVIOUS obstacle to MIL and to building information societies are different development levels of countries, as a result of which digital technologies are used on a wider scale and develop more rapidly in some countries than in others. This explains the term "digital

divide,” which refers to the gap between countries, regions and social groups that have wide access to ICTs and make extensive use of them and those who practically have no access to or use obsolete versions of them, normally for technical, political, social, or economic reasons,²⁰ with consequently different incomes, educational standards, social status and so on.

There are global, national, regional, and global digital divides, which means that efforts to overcome them should be made at each of these tiers. Teaching MIL may be one solution. It can narrow, if not close, rifts between cities and rural localities, between high- and low-income strata, and between age groups. But this cannot be achieved without doing away with gaps in general education standards, which is a serious problem in network societies.²¹ Rising living standards could be an ideal means of overcoming digital divides as they would make ICTs accessible to larger numbers of people.

Another problem is poor ICT infrastructures, which hinder ICT accessibility. In 2015-2016, the Yandex company, in collaboration with London-based market research group TNS, today known as Kantar, and Russia’s Public Opinion Foundation, carried out a survey on the use of the Internet in Russia. It was found that, as of the end of 2015, a minimum of 83 million people aged over 12 were using the Internet every month.²² According to statistics published by the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) in 2017 and 2018, 77.7% of Russia’s population used the Internet in 2015, 80.8% did in 2016,²³ and 83.7% in 2017.²⁴

This means that the majority of the country’s population, which numbered 146.9 million in 2018, had access to the global information space and used its resources.²⁵ There still are no information policy program documents in Russia that set the goal of increasing Internet accessibility.²⁶

Russia held the 45th rank in the 176-nation ICT Development Index (IDI)²⁷ in the ITU’s Measuring the Information Society Report 2017. The IDI’s criteria are the accessibility of ICTs, their use, and acquisition of skills for it. In 2017, the ITU decided to revise and expand its set of indicators underlying the IDI. The ITU has announced that it would launch the new IDI in the 2019 Measuring the Information Society Report.²⁸

Digital skills are directly dependent on secondary and tertiary education.²⁹ The Global Information Technology Report 2016 of the World Economic Forum ranked Russia 11th among 139 countries³⁰ in terms of general adult literacy, which is quite a high level, though it is an indicator that does not include a MIL level. The World Economic Forum has so

far released no data for 2018 or 2019. As regards cybersecurity, Russia ranked 10th in the ITU's 193-country Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI) 2017.³¹ Cybersecurity training was one of the criteria for a GCI score. Hence, MIL is increasingly dependent on standards of ICT infrastructures, cybersecurity and education.

Potential Ways of Addressing Information Threats and Challenges

ICTS ARE EXTENSIVELY USED for military purposes. Some of what used to be purely military technologies have gradually become accessible to ordinary civilians but there still exist ICTs that are used by militaries alone. Military expert Yury Gorbachev points out that the military of a modern nation will typically have precision weapons, means of information warfare, and ICT-based control, communication, and intelligence systems in its arsenal.³² Use of cyber weapons by one's adversary would hinder the analysis, assessment and forecasting of situations while accurate information is essential for strategic decisions and combat action.

Russian analyst Igor Panarin sees an information war as a conflict in which each party tries to make sophisticated use of information to paralyze the adversary's command and control systems and inflict other forms of damage on it. In Panarin's view, an information war is a clash between top ideologists who set goals for such a war, sometimes organize it, and manipulate decision-making during it.

Panarin also says that, in the 20th century, there were instances where an entire society would be drawn into an information war.³³ From the geopolitical point of view, an information war or a cyberwar is, he says, "a means of creating a system of control of information with the aim of organizing the noosphere and the global information and psychological space to suit one's own interests."³⁴ There may also be civilian conflicts in which one side uses all available political, economic, scientific, scholarly, cultural, and sporting means to protect its information sphere and inflict damage on the other side's information sphere.³⁵

The armed forces of major countries include services that specialize in rebuffing information attacks, although no cyberwar has been formally declared. Some analysts believe the five countries with the most powerful information warfare services are the United States, China, Britain, South Korea, and Russia.³⁶ In 2017, Russia announced that it had set up "information operations forces" for defending its military digital infrastructure, including computer nets, command and control systems, com-

munications, and information transmitted through them.³⁷ The United States set up its cyber warfare service, the Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), back in 2009.³⁸

It remains a moot point, however, how to fend off information attacks on civilian populations. Issuing denials in reacting to streams of disinformation, fake news, and false propaganda takes a lot of time and resources. Traditional media are not the only source of information since numerous alternative viewpoints are stated on the Internet – in blogs, in social networks, and elsewhere on the Web.

Some analysts suggest tighter regulation of media but not by censoring them but by carefully analyzing information they publish.³⁹ One can agree, given the closely interconnected nature of today's world and the speed information travels at. Reaction should be just as quick. Probably, artificial intelligence (AI) systems will be developed soon that can detect information attacks and block them in ways similar to those antivirus software works in.

However, it is still the user, a human being, that will have to make the final choice, and this choice will depend on their competence. This means that MIL is essential. MIL is the basis for correct decisions in information space and provides a form of immunity against deliberate disinformation and mendacious propaganda that is spread through national and international media.

There need to be mass education systems for all age groups to enable people to orientate themselves in the information world. Education of this kind should give anyone the basis for starting a “digital way of life.”

A population that is capable of systemic and critical analysis and has cutting-edge ICTs at its fingertips can provide effective support for the diplomacy of its country, especially its public diplomacy, which can bring together various nongovernmental organizations and ordinary people.

Media and information-literate people will soon be able to partner with governments in dealing with a wide range of issues, integrate into an emergent digital economy, participate in network, public, and electronic diplomacy, and ultimately create a knowledge society and a genuine information society where everyone interacts fruitfully with everyone else.

NOTES

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Participation of Russia's Constituent Regions in Implementing Its Foreign Policy

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Key words: foreign policy, Russia, regions as subjects of the Russian Federation.

BY THE END of the 20th century, foreign relations maintained by individual constituent territories of various countries had become a generally accepted element of the global political system. Practically ever since politicians and experts have been focusing their attention on the relationship between such contacts and Russia's foreign policy as the presence of individual Russian territories in the international arena was seen as a potential challenge to the centralized character of the country's foreign policy, to its security, and to its territorial integrity.¹ Foreign contacts established by the administration of constituents regions of countries in seeking greater autonomy and solutions to regional political problems have been labeled "protodiplomacy."²

However, international and Russian experience testifies that, if they are in tune with national interests, the foreign relations of regions not only can make those regions more competitive but can also be a serious catalyst for national development.

In Russia, the character of the relationship between the international activities of the central government and those of regional administrations is based on legal mechanisms established by Russia's political

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system. Besides, the central government and regional authorities have developed a practice of consultation and cooperation, something that works better in a federal state than in a unitary authoritarian one. According to John Kincaid, regional-level foreign relations are not really a threat to national interests but are rather a challenge to the unitary state system, and consequently to an international order based on it.³

A country's foreign policy may affect the interests of its constituent territories in ways such as the signature of an international treaty by that country or a decision by an international organization that the country is a member of. Russian and foreign scholars

have made detailed analyses of ways of harmonizing a country's foreign policy with the interests of its constituent regions. (Chapter 2 of the book cited in Note 4 reviews the experience of legal aspects of attempts to achieve such harmony.)

It is an accepted principle in Russia that regional authorities should keep their international relations within the framework of the country's centralized foreign policy, base them strictly on Russian law, and coordinate them with the central government.⁵

Today, economic effects on Russian regions of political developments abroad have become a matter of special scholarly interest in Russia. One instance are effects of Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2012, which forced Russian regions to make adjustments that resulted in financial losses and social problems.⁶ Another instance are impacts of economic and political sanctions imposed by the West on Russia in 2014 and afterward.⁷

Regional authorities in Russia cannot make national foreign policy decisions, which are the prerogative of the central government, but can influence them through institutions such as consultative councils or legislative bodies. This article examines practical aspects of the participation of the administrations of Russian regions in implementing Russia's foreign policy. This participation represents the fulfillment by regional

Tatarstan's international activities, which the region closely coordinates with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, play a significant role in advancing Russia's national interests and are part and parcel of the country's multidirectional foreign policy.

authorities of their own international commitments and is one of the international commitments of Russia as a nation. It is a trend in Russia for regional authorities to be involved in implementing specific individual aspects of the country's foreign policy, including its economic and cultural components and soft power instruments. We base our analysis on the experience of the Republic of Tatarstan.

The Experience of Tatarstan

TATARSTAN began its history of international relations in 1992 and since then has accumulated rich experience in this. Tatarstan's international activities, which the region closely coordinates with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, play a significant role in advancing Russia's national interests and are part and parcel of the country's multidirectional foreign policy.

The Tatars have lived on the territory of what today is the multiethnic Republic of Tatarstan in central Russia for about a millennium, and this has naturally given rise to traditions of cultural and religious tolerance. Separatism is not a problem in Tatarstan, and serious attention is paid in the region to harmonizing its international activities with the strategic objectives of Russia.

Tatarstan's international activities take a variety of forms. They include:

Seeking to build a good-neighborly belt around Russia, primarily by strengthening ties with members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Tatarstan develops strategic partnership with many CIS countries and regularly hosts CIS events. Kazan has been the venue of two CIS summits – a meeting of the Council of Heads of State in 2005 and a meeting of the Council of Heads of Government in May 2017. Also in May 2017, the city hosted a meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council. Tatarstan often exchanges governmental and business delegations with CIS countries. In 2018 alone, Kazan welcomed the then president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Turkmenistan President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow, five delegations led by Kazakh regional governors, and two delegations from regions in Uzbekistan. Tatarstan President Rustam Minnikhanov pays six or seven visits a year to CIS countries.

Tatarstan also regularly participates in regional cooperation forums under the aegis of heads of state that are organized by Kazakhstan, Belarus and Uzbekistan.

The Tatar government has nine agreements with the governments of CIS countries, six interregional agreements, and action plans to implement such accords.

Tatarstan has permanent missions to five CIS countries – Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – that oversee trade, economic relations and cultural contacts between Tatarstan and those countries.⁸

Tatarstan exports a wide range of high value-added products to CIS countries, including transportation machinery, chemical and petrochemical products, energy equipment, and consumer goods. Tatarstan and CIS countries, especially Belarus, set up joint ventures. There exist facilities in CIS countries for the assembly of equipment from parts manufactured in Tatarstan, and in Tatarstan there are dealership networks and high-tech product servicing centers.

Since there are large ethnic Tatar communities in CIS countries and some of the latter are Muslim nations, Tatarstan maintains close cultural ties with those countries. About 10,000 students from CIS countries are studying in Tatarstan.

There are well-developed transportation links, including numerous direct flights, between Tatarstan and CIS countries.

CIS Executive Council observers at presidential and parliamentary elections in CIS countries regularly include representatives of Tatarstan.

Economic and cultural relations with foreign policy partners of Russia

In this group of countries, it is Turkey and member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS that Tatarstan has the closest relations with.

The majority of SCO member countries are among Tatarstan's key business partners. Tatarstan's business relations with China are marked by particular dynamism. Tatarstan maintains intensive contacts with various Chinese provinces, having signed more than 20 agreements with them. There is a Tatarstan mission in Beijing.

As regards political affairs, in March 2007, the then Chinese president, Hu Jintao, came to Kazan during a visit to Russia. In 2011, Tatarstan

hosted the 20th meeting of the bilateral commission for the organization of regular meetings between the Russian and Chinese prime ministers. In 2017, Kazan was the venue for the second meeting of this commission's subcommission for industry, for the sixth meeting of the United Russia party-Communist Party of China dialogue mechanism, and for the fifth Chinese-Russian political party forum.

There are Chinese-Russian ventures based in Tatarstan, which include the Ammony chemical company and a facility manufacturing refrigerators and other household appliances for Chinese company Haier. There is a pipeline of joint petrochemical, engineering, information technology, high-tech, and education projects.

Tatarstan also maintains cultural contacts with China. A sabantuy that has been held in Urumqi, capital of China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, brings together hundreds of ethnic Tatars living in China. About 1,200 students from China are studying in Tatarstan. Addresses in Kazan where Vladimir Lenin lived and worked have been put on a Chinese tourist itinerary called Red Route Tour. To promote tourism, direct charter flights have been put on between Kazan and Chinese cities.

India, another SCO member country, has been having business ties with two major Tatarstan-based engineering companies – heavy duty truck maker Kamaz and Kazan Helicopters – and Tatar oil producers and refiners for more than 20 years. There is a lot of interest in Indian culture in Tatarstan. Many Indian cultural events take place in Tatarstan, including festivals, concerts of Indian music and exhibitions of Indian art. There have been festivals called Indian Culture Days. Kazan hosts an invariably successful annual fair called Lyubimaya Indiya (Beloved India). There also exist wide-scale academic and scientific contacts between Tatarstan and India.

Tatarstan's relations with Turkey may be seen as a paragon of fruitful economic and cultural cooperation. Turkey was the first foreign country to be visited by an official delegation of the post-Soviet Republic of Tatarstan in 1992, and the Turkish Consulate General in Kazan was the first foreign diplomatic mission to be opened in Tatarstan.

Common Turkic cultural roots form the basis for successful cooperation between Tatarstan and Turkey. Tatar delegations to Turkey are received at the highest level, and Turkish leaders have repeatedly visited Tatarstan. Kazan has hosted a session of the Russian-Turkish Public Forum, which is a regular conference for the promotion of cultural, educational, and religious cooperation, and two meetings of the Russian-

Turkish Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation, one in 2009 and one in 2017. Tatarstan is represented in Turkey by two institutions, both of them located in Istanbul, - a Tatarstan diplomatic mission opened in 1997 and the Tatar Trade House, opened in 1995.

For many Turkish companies, Tatarstan has become the door into the Russian economy. Turkish businesses have invested \$2 billion in Tatarstan. There are ten large Turkish-owned factories in the region. There also are Tatar-Turkish logistical, social infrastructure, health service, and educational projects underway in Tatarstan. Seventeen local-level twinning agreements have been signed.

Tatarstan and Turkey also have extensive cultural ties with numerous joint events that have included the “Kazan – the Cultural Center of the Turkic World in 2014” program. The arts communities of Tatarstan and Turkey are permanently in dialogue. Turkey has an ethnic Tatar community of about 10,000, and there are Tatar nongovernmental organizations in the country.

Iran, Kazakhstan, Hungary, China, and Uzbekistan all have consulates general in Kazan, and the Belarusian Embassy has a consular service based there as well. This makes Tatarstan the Volga Federal District’s leader by the number of foreign diplomatic missions in it.

Tatarstan is, furthermore, involved in BRICS activities both at national and at regional level. More than 200 delegates, including heads of government agencies in charge of youth policy, took part in the First BRICS Youth Summit in Kazan. In cooperation with other Russian regions, Tatarstan helps advance BRICS regional projects. The program for Russia’s pro tempore presidency of BRICS in 2020 includes various planned events in Kazan.

International events that have been held in Kazan included a forum that was entitled “Eurasian Economic Integration: Achievements and Problems” and was organized with support from the Federation Council, the State Duma, and the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo). The eighth iteration on May 9-11, 2019, of the Kazan-based forum entitled “The Integration and Modernization Potential of Eurasia: The Current State, Projects and Implementation Formats” was combined with a meeting of the State Duma Committee on Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots.

Promotion of Russia's eastern-oriented foreign policy activities, including contacts with Islamic and Asia-Pacific countries

Russia maintains diverse relations with Islamic countries, and Tatarstan's contacts with Muslim nations help Russia consolidate its positions as one of the global centers of influence and conduct a constructive dialogue with Islamic nations and cooperate with them fruitfully in the interests of the mutual enrichment and harmonization of civilizations and in line with Russia's Foreign Policy Concept of 2008.⁹

Cultural similarity between Tatarstan and Muslim countries is a good basis for an intercivilizational dialogue within the framework of Russia's foreign policy. Tatarstan has productive relations with more than 40 member countries of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

Tatarstan has participated in the activities of the Russia-Islamic World Strategic Vision Group since its inception in 2006. In June 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed Tatarstan President Rustam Minnikhanov head of the group and authorized him to organize the resumption of its activities. The group has the mission of promoting cooperation between Russia and Muslim countries. It makes systemic efforts to organize economic, religious, and cultural cooperation between public figures, experts and journalists in Russia and the Muslim world,¹⁰ helping the Russian government systematize its diverse relations with Islamic countries.

Partnering with large European, U.S., and Japanese companies

Despite the anti-Russian sanctions, Western European, American and Japanese capital maintains strong presence in Tatarstan's economy with various Western and Japanese companies doing business in the region, among them the United States' Ford, Cummins, Federal-Mogul Corporation, 3M, Armstrong World Industries, Cisco, and IBM; Germany's Daimler, BASF, Siemens, and Bosch; France's Air Liquide and Schneider Electric; Japan's Mitsubishi Electric, Mitsui & Co., Yokohama Electric, and Fujitsu; the Netherlands' Philips; and Denmark's Rockwool International and Danfoss. There also is large-scale trade going on between Tatarstan and developed countries. All this proves that regional-level international relations have become one of the means to thwart attempts to isolate Russia.

Relations with individual regions in foreign countries as a way to boost Russia's international prestige and geopolitical power

Let us give some examples. Tatarstan has long had ties with Gagauzia, a predominantly Orthodox Christian autonomous region in Moldova that speaks a Turkic language. The election of Irina Vlah as governor of Gagauzia in 2015 imparted new dynamics to Gagauzia-Tatarstan ties. The two regions signed a plan for trade and economic, scientific, technological, and cultural cooperation. They run joint agricultural and social projects and conduct cultural exchanges. In autumn 2018, Minnikhanov had a meeting with Moldovan President Igor Dodon during a visit of a Tatarstan delegation to Moldova.

On March 5, 2014, Tatarstan signed an agreement with Crimea, which at that time was still an autonomous region in Ukraine, opened a mission in the Crimean capital Simferopol, and established contacts with the Crimean Tatar community. Later, Tatarstan, making use of its rich experience of ethnic and religious harmonization, became closely involved in efforts to integrate Crimea and the Crimean Tatar community into the society and economy of Russia.

Over the past few years, Tatarstan delegations have been making visits to Latin American countries that have resulted in new areas for cooperation. One country Tatarstan has stepped up its cooperation with is Cuba, a traditional importer of Tatarstan-made trucks. In 2015, Kazan hosted a meeting of the Russian-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic, Scientific and Technological Cooperation.

Tatarstan also has been having more extensive business and political contacts with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). A Tatarstan delegation visited North Korea in spring 2014. In February 2015, the North Korean minister of external economic relations visited industrial facilities in Tatarstan and held negotiations with the top managers of large petrochemical companies. For many years, North Korean workers have been among the personnel of some of Tatarstan's enterprises.

Contacts with ethnic Tatar communities abroad and soft power

Tatarstan's foreign relations are unimaginable without the region's contacts with ethnic Tatar communities abroad and participation in Russia's migration policy. Tatarstan helps build the Russian soft power model by trying to popularize Tatar culture as a component of Russia's

ethnocultural diversity. Acting in permanent collaboration with Russia's Foreign Ministry and Government Commission on Compatriots Living Abroad, Tatarstan seeks to give all forms of support to ethnic Tatars living in other countries and to help them satisfy their cultural needs. Simultaneously, Tatarstan pursues a consistent policy of enlisting the services of ethnic Tatar scientists, businesspeople and arts figures living abroad in seeking closer contacts with individual regions in other countries and in building support for Russia's foreign policy in general.¹¹

Tatarstan's diverse international cultural, educational, sports, and youth projects are a serious factor in Russia's soft power policy.

A contribution to building a positive international image of Russia

Tatarstan pays a great deal of attention to being reputed internationally as a dynamically developing innovative region with rich cultural traditions. It has developed the image of a tolerant multiethnic and multireligious society, a region possessing rich natural resources and making effective use of them, having a developed multi-industry economy, extensive research and educational resources, and pursuing wide-scale international contacts with governmental support.¹²

By boosting international cultural relations in the spirit of friendship, tolerance and mutual understanding and by hosting large-scale cultural and sports events such as the 2013 Summer Universiade, the 2015 World Aquatics Championships, and games of the 2018 FIFA World Cup, Tatarstan helps build a global image of Russia as an economically self-sufficient multiethnic country with a rich history and a great cultural and territorial diversity.

Tatarstan has also hosted numerous international events, including more than 15 meetings of bilateral specialized intergovernmental commissions on cooperation. Choosing cities in various regions as venues for international events benefits Russia's international image. For those regions themselves, it means opportunities for international contacts. It is a wide-scale practice in Russia to include regional officials in various delegations visiting foreign countries and to invite regional figures to national-level international events.¹³ As a result, more projects are put on Russia's international relations agenda, and the Russian government gives more support to regional initiatives.

Tatarstan also cooperates with international organizations. For instance, the region collaborated intensively with the International

University Sports Federation (FISU), the International Swimming Federation (FINA), and FIFA in organizing the above-mentioned sports events. Tatarstan has developed a special relationship with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Three historical and architectural monuments in Tatarstan have been put on UNESCO's List of World Heritage Sites in Russia – the Kazan Kremlin, which was listed in 2000, the Bolgar Historical and Archeological Complex (2014), and the Assumption Cathedral and Monastery in the town-island of Sviyazhsk (2017). In August 2017, UNESCO appointed the first president of post-Soviet Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev, as its special envoy for intercultural dialogue. A world culture institute was set up in Kazan with UNESCO support in 2000. Tatarstan regularly hosts large-scale events that are organized by UNESCO and have included the first Youth Model of the World Heritage Committee, which took place in Kazan in 2012, and the 2018 Forum on Intercultural Dialogue, which was also held in Kazan.

Tatarstan's collaboration with international organizations, which include European bodies specializing in regional affairs, mainly the Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, advances Russia's European and global integration.

Facilitating international transit through Russia

Tatarstan lies at an intersection of land and water transportation arteries and possesses sufficient resources for building an efficient international transportation infrastructure. Tatarstan has been involved in large-scale transportation and logistics projects, among them the construction of the Western Europe-Western China (WE-WC) Highway, which runs through Kazakhstan, and a multimodal interregional logistics center in Sviyazhsk. Work is continuing to finish a project for a high-speed railroad between Moscow and Kazan as an element of an East-West transportation corridor.

THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS and foreign trade model to be used by constituent regions of Russia involves not only contacts with regions in foreign countries but also participation in national-level foreign policy activities with the Foreign Ministry playing the coordinating

role. Russian regions' economic and cultural resources and geographical and ethnocultural diversity are important factors in their international relations.

Via its foreign economic contacts, Tatarstan helps Russia implement its strategic task of building a competitive innovative economy and winning markets for its high-tech products. Tatarstan's business contacts with regions in various countries help Russia diversify its geography of economic relations with additions that include agreements with Asian and Muslim countries.

Russian regions' economic and cultural contacts with countries pursuing at the current stage unfriendly policies toward Russia are important for keeping relations between Russia and those countries in place.

Cultural, educational, social, and other international contacts developed by Russian regions have become an important element of Russia's foreign policy. The inclusion of ethnic regions in Russia in intercivilizational dialogue confirms that the world's civilizational and cultural diversity is not a disunity factor but a resource for development.

Coordinated international activities by Russian regions serve to advance national interests. They help Russia integrate into the world community and maintain fruitful relations with foreign countries in various fields.

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Military and Military-Technical Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus

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Key words: Russia, Belarus, military-technical cooperation.

MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION between Russia and Belarus takes place in the context of a common and broad political partnership between the two countries and very close political, economic and socio-cultural ties.

In Belarus, as in Russia, the memory of the victory of the Soviet people over German fascism in the Great Patriotic War is considered sacred. The Belarusian people made tremendous sacrifices during this war. A powerful partisan movement existed in Belarus.

Russia and Belarus have fundamental common security interests that are assured both by the cooperation of the two states within the CSTO and by very extensive bilateral interaction, especially as part of the Union State. Both Russia and Belarus condemn the eastward expansion of NATO and the intensification of military preparations in such NATO countries as Poland and the Baltic countries.

According to Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei, the activities of NATO member countries, “including along the borders of Belarus, do not contribute to strengthening security and reducing tension in the region.”¹

Speaking to participants in the joint Collegium of the Defense Ministries of Russia and Belarus on October 24, 2018, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said: “NATO military activity at our borders has reached an unprecedented level since the Cold War. The alliance’s policy is aimed at strengthening its advanced military presence on the eastern flank. To this end, the alliance is actively using the myth of the Russian

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threat.”² Shoigu further commented that the scale of the operational and combat training of NATO countries near the borders of Russia and Belarus is expanding, the intensity is growing, and offensive military operations are being rehearsed.

All this cannot but provoke political and military countermeasures from Russia and Belarus. In this context, Russian-Belarusian military-technical cooperation is developing, designed to ensure that both states have a proper level of defense capability.

Speaking about Russian-Belarusian relations, the Russian defense minister emphasized that Belarus is a reliable military ally of Russia. Belarusian Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Andrei Ravkov mentioned at the same meeting that the defense ministries of the two countries hold common assessments of regional security challenges and threats.

The official website of the Belarusian Foreign Ministry comments that the extensive bilateral agenda in Belarusian-Russian relations is determined by geographical, historical and other factors, the mutual complementarity of the economies of the two countries, and close cooperative ties between enterprises. It emphasizes that Belarus is interested in maximizing the strategic partnership potential in relations with the Russia.³

The website of the Embassy of Belarus in Russia states that Russia and Belarus have a common defense space, engage in joint military planning and organize joint measures to avert military threats.⁴ This cooperation between Russia and Belarus is developing in the following areas in particular: the functioning of the regional group of troops (forces) of Russia and Belarus; military-technical cooperation; the use of military infrastructure; military intelligence; cooperation of Air and Air Defense Forces; joint military scientific activity; cooperation in implementing arms control obligations; the training of Belarusian soldiers in military schools of the Russian Defense Ministry.

The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on the Creation of the Union State has been in force since 1999. This agreement states (in Article 18) that the jurisdiction of the Union State includes joint defense policy, the coordination of military develop-

Military and military-technical cooperation between Russia and Belarus relies heavily on the extensive traditions of the Soviet period, when the two countries were part of a single state.

ment activities and the joint use of military infrastructure.⁵ (Military development includes equipping the Armed Forces with various weapons systems, a variety of military and special equipment.)

Russia and Belarus realize how much further development and improvement is needed of the Regional Force Group (RFG), created in 2000. Belarusian Foreign Minister Makei commented that “the Regional Force Group of the Armed Forces of Belarus and Russia is able to adequately respond to challenges and potential threats to the security of the two countries in the military sphere.”⁶ Over the years of the RFG’s existence, the Russian and Belarusian sides have held a series of drills and training exercises during which the interoperability of Belarusian and Russian components of the RFG were addressed, the optimal combat strength of the group was determined, and all supporting systems were created.

The Russian Armed Forces are represented in the RFG by formations and units of the 20th Combined Arms Army located in Smolensk, Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod Provinces (with headquarters in Voronezh). In addition, military reinforcements are included in the RFG. The RFG is intended primarily to repel possible aggression against Russia and Belarus, and it includes command and control structures and troops (forces) of the armed forces of the two countries, as well as other military units of the parties. The Belarusian Armed Forces are represented in the RVG in full strength.

The Agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus on Joint Protection of the External Border of the Union State in the Air and the Creation of the Single Regional Air Defense System (SRADS) of Russia and Belarus was ratified in Minsk on February 13, 2012, by a decree of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko. According to the Chief of the General Staff of the Belarusian Armed Forces, First Deputy Defense Minister Maj. Gen. Pyotr Tikhonovsky, “The Single Regional Air Defense System has already in effect become an essential element of the Regional Forces Group, as well as an integral part of the Single Air Defense System of CIS member states.”⁷ He added that the system makes it possible to jointly protect the western air borders of our states and monitor the use of airspace. Tikhonovsky emphasized that use of troops, forces and SRADS is centrally implemented according to a single concept and plan, and this principle can only be implemented if there is a single control system.

SRADS has been successfully tested during operational and combat

exercises, including during Union Shield joint exercises of the Russian and Belarusian Armed Forces. Belarusian and Russian SRADS units demonstrated the level of cooperation during joint action, and also confirmed the preparedness for effectively repelling air strikes. The formation of the Belarusian and Russian SRADS was basically completed in the spring of 2016, after rather lengthy work in this very important area.⁸ (This system had been functioning in test mode since 2009.) The presence of SRADS elements in Belarus many times over “increases the possibility of defeating an air and missile attack on the Union State.”⁹

SRADS includes five aviation, 10 anti-aircraft, and five radio technical units and electronic warfare subunits. The headquarters, squads and crews assigned to SRADS from the Belarusian and Russian Armed Forces are stationed in their former places of deployment in their respective countries; their scope of activity has simply expanded.

Every year, Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces hold live-fire tactical exercises at Russian training grounds; another area of cooperation is joint air defense combat duty.

The main goal of these exercises is to allow Belarusian troops to master skills carrying out combat operations in conditions of a difficult target situation. In the city of Ruza (Russia), at the 1517th training center, crews of anti-aircraft missile regiments of the Air Force and Air Defense Forces coordinate their efforts; the defense ministries of both states are working to strengthen the Belarusian component of SRADS.¹⁰

An important element of Russian-Belarusian military cooperation is joint military exercises. One such exercise is the Zapad 2017 strategic exercises. They were held on September 14-20, 2017, at three Russian training grounds and six Belarusian training grounds. They involved 12,700 soldiers of the two states and as many as 680 units of weapons and military equipment, including about 70 aircraft and helicopters, and 10 warships. Russian Defense Minister, Army General Shoigu, summing up the results of these Russian-Belarusian exercises, said that during the maneuvers, soldiers of the two countries rehearsed tactics to rebuff units of the Islamic State (ISIS) (banned in Russia); in preparation for the exercises, the tactics of ISIS units in Syria were comprehensively analyzed and taken into account.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking after a regular meeting with his Belarusian counterpart Vladimir Makei, noted that during the meeting they “expressed concern about attempts to demonize Russian-Belarusian military cooperation, including in the context of the

September Zapad 2017 exercises, and the use of this propaganda campaign to justify the additional deployment of NATO military forces on the eastern flank.”¹¹

Large-scale military cooperation of Russia and Belarus as a whole has a positive effect on military-technical cooperation between the two countries. In general, it can be stated that the Belarusian defense industry holds a prominent place in the military-technical cooperation with Russia.

There is an extensive legal base of over 30 relevant treaties and agreements for Russian-Belarusian military-technical cooperation.

This cooperation exists in the interests of the security of the Union State on the basis of the Union State treaty, as well as on a multilateral basis within the framework of the CSTO and the CIS.

The legal framework for Russian-Belarusian military-technical cooperation can be traced back to the Collective Security Treaty (May 15, 1992) and the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Belarus on Military-Technical Cooperation (October 29, 1993).¹²

The 1993 agreement (Article 1) states that “the parties, through their authorized bodies of state administration, will take measures to implement mutually beneficial bilateral military-technical cooperation by maintaining and developing existing cooperative ties in the development and production of military products; the mutual supplies of military products; the provision of military services.”

Article 2 of this agreement states that “the mutual development and supply of weapons shall take place on the basis of intergovernmental agreements; the mutual supply of cooperatively supplied spare parts of training and auxiliary equipment, as well as of military services shall be carried out on the basis of contracts concluded by authorized business entities of the Parties.” The parties undertake (Article 3) “not to sell or transfer to a third party, including foreign individuals or legal entities or international organizations, military products and information supplied by one Party to the other Party without prior written permission of the supplier.”

On December 19, 1997, Russia and Belarus concluded the Military Cooperation Treaty, which entered into force on May 14, 1999. Article 1 of this agreement states that “military cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus shall be carried out in order to ensure the security of both states and be based on the following principles: the compliance with international law and international obligations

of the Parties, the implementation of the provisions of previously concluded military cooperation agreements; the sovereignty of both states, equality and mutual benefit; the guarantee of joint actions of the Parties on the armed defense of Russia and Belarus; the congruence of the construction and development of the Armed Forces of both states with the goals and objectives of joint armed defense.”¹³

Article 2 of the 1997 Treaty identifies the main areas of military cooperation between Russia and Belarus as defense policy and strategy; harmonization and unification of legislation relating to defense, military development and the social protection of military personnel. It also states that military cooperation between Russia and Belarus includes, among other things, general programs for commissioning, producing and repairing military equipment.

The Belarusian and Russian Defense Ministries hold annual meetings of the Joint Collegium. This body comprehensively addresses the most important political-military and military issues.

Meetings discuss the implementation of the Plan of Joint Activities of the Russian and Belarusian Defense Ministries on Ensuring the Military Security of the Union State; as well as interstate, intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements on cooperation on military security, on the joint protection of the external border of the Union State in the air and the creation of the SRADS of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, etc. International agreements, cooperation plans and other documents are also drafted, signed and approved, and the main approaches are developed to preparing and conducting the Union Shield and Zapad joint exercises of the Russian and Belarusian Armed Forces.

As Russian Defense Minister Shoigu commented, the collegium is an important tool for coordinating the efforts of the Russian and Belarusian Defense Ministries to maintain stability and security in the region amid a difficult political and military situation.¹⁴

Russia is Belarus’s most important supplier of military products, spare parts for weapons and military equipment, as well as partner in repairing and modernizing the weapons and military equipment in service with the Belarusian Armed Forces.

Based on the Agreement Between Russia and Belarus on the Development of Military-Technical Cooperation, signed on December 10, 2009, Russia and Belarus, in accordance with Article 1 of the agreement, “supply military products, including:

- armaments, military equipment, work, services, the results of intel-

lectual activity, including exclusive rights to them (intellectual property), and information in the military-technical field;

- any other products, work and services that, in accordance with the legislation of any of the Parties, relate to military products.”¹⁵

Acting within the framework of the agreement, Russia and Belarus save time by drafting and signing military documents directly from manufacturers, bypassing intermediaries.

According to Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, “the Russian military industry is interested in close cooperation with Belarusian enterprises of the military-industrial complex.”¹⁶

Belarusian enterprises supply 1,880 products to 255 defense enterprises in Russia. There are 99 such Belarusian enterprises. The main partners of many Russian enterprises are 67 enterprises in Belarus that supply about 4,000 products. In general, many types of Russian weapons are created using Belarusian components.¹⁷ In turn, Belarusian defense industry enterprises need cooperation with approximately 900 partners in Russia.¹⁸

Belarus’s ability to engage in rather substantial military-technical cooperation with Russia is largely due to the presence in Belarus of the State Military-Industrial Committee (SMIC), an important government agency created by Belarusian President Lukashenko in December 2003. The SMIC was put in charge of all defense industry enterprises still surviving at that time, including repair plants. In the post-Soviet period, they were mainly republic unitary enterprises (RUE). In 2009, they were corporatized and transformed into opened joint-stock companies (OJSC), with 100% of the shares in all cases going to the state. At the same time, the Belarusian defense industry also has several private enterprises (Tetraedra, Monitor-Servis, STC DELS, etc.). These firms are usually established by people from the “traditional” defense industry.¹⁹

According to several estimates, Belarusian supplies make up 15% of the Russian defense order. In turn, Russian arms and military equipment exports to Belarus cover a very wide range: from small arms and cannon artillery to aircraft and air defense systems. Among the latter are such modern anti-aircraft missile systems as the S 400. According to some estimates, the Belarusian Armed Forces are 98% dependent on military hardware supplies from Russia. A significant share of those deliveries from Russia to Belarus is carried out on a preferential or free basis.

The list of Russian imports of military-technical products from Belarus includes electronic components; optical equipment; chassis for

missile systems; spare parts for T 90S, T 72S and T 80U tanks; airborne and infantry fighting vehicles; artillery systems; anti-tank and anti-aircraft complexes, etc.

It should be noted that Belarus engages in military-technical cooperation with 60 states; 70% of products manufactured by the Belarusian defense industry are exported.²⁰

The cooperation of Russian enterprises with such a well-known enterprise as the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant OJSC (MZKT) plays an important role in Russian-Belarusian military-technical cooperation. The nature of its products and technological solutions make this enterprise unique in many ways. Deliveries of multi-axle special wheeled chassis produced by OJSC MZKT are widely used in various weapons systems that play a prominent role in Russia's Armed Forces.

For example, the unified hull chassis of the MZKT-6922 family are used as platforms for short- and medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems. Mobile launchers of modern intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of the Russian Topol-M and Yars mobile ground-based missile systems (MGBMS), which are very important components of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, are mounted on the powerful heavy-duty MZKT-70221 chassis.

MZKT chassis carry Iskander operational-tactical missile systems (OTMS), Bastion and Ball coastal missile systems (CMS), Uran 1M multiple launch rocket systems, self-propelled launchers and mobile anti-aircraft radars of the S 400 Triumph surface-to-air missile system (SAM), engineering support and camouflage vehicles (ESCV) of strategic units of the Strategic Missile Forces, TMM 6 heavy mechanized bridges, and S 300P²¹ air defense system launchers and radars.

Russia generally accounts for about 50% of all MZKT exports (according to several published information sources, a significant share of MZKT products goes to the weapons systems of the People's Liberation Army of China, the PLA). At the same time, components for manufacturing this equipment come from 280 Russian enterprises. The first prototype of the new Russian S-500 "Prometheus" surface-to-air missile system uses a chassis of the MZKT-7930 family.

The well-known Belarusian company Peleng OJSC is collaborating with Russian defense industry enterprises to create modern sights for fire direction systems for armored vehicles created in Russia. In addition, OJSC Peleng is involved in developing a thermal imaging sight for the latest Russian armored personnel carrier (BTR 82A) and creating the

DPU 72A machine gun mount together with the Russian company OJSC KEMZ (in the city of Kovrov). Also, for the orbital group, which consists of the Russian satellite Kanopus-V and the Belarusian Space Apparatus (BSA), plans currently call for creating four spacecraft with improved optical resolution. Peleng OJSC will start producing photography equipment, and the main platform will be manufactured in Russia.²²

The Russian Tunguska surface-to-air missile and gun system uses a tracked chassis produced by the Minsk Tractor Plant OJSC (GM 352 and GM 352M chassis). They are also used in the Tor self-propelled surface-to-air missile systems (GM 35).

Among the military-technical products supplied to Russia by Belarusian enterprises are microcircuits for missiles, including strategic ones (Integral OJSC); displays for military equipment (KB Displei); aerial equipment and high-precision systems for measuring the parameters of flying objects (BelOMO); on-board equipment for MiG 29, Su 27, Su 30, and Su 33 fighters (Ekran OJSC); automated control systems (ACS) for troops, reconnaissance, arms, and electronic warfare (EW) (Agat OJSC), etc.

Components made by Belarusian enterprises are used in Russian tanks, infantry and airborne fighting vehicles, armored repair and recovery vehicles, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and the rockets for them, self-propelled artillery guns and howitzers, surface-to-air missile and gun systems, anti-tank missile systems, and small arms and melee weapons.²³

In Baranovichy, Belarus, a variety of Russian military equipment is modernized and repaired at the OJSC 558 Aviation Repair Plant: Su 25, Su 27, Su 30, MiG 29, and An 2 aircraft, and Mi 8 (Mi 17), Mi 24 helicopters, etc. This plant provides full-cycle repair of airframes and all components, comprehensive upgrades of aircraft equipment and carries out additional preventive measures that increase aircraft reliability.

The Minsk Unitary Enterprise Minotor-Service conducts serial repairs and maintenance of military equipment (tracked combat vehicles) for the Russian Defense Ministry. The enterprise produces such models of military equipment as the 2T Stalker reconnaissance combat vehicle and the 3T transport tracked vehicle (TGM), and also offers modernization projects for the BTR 50, ZSU 23 4 Shilka family of vehicles and the MT LBU multi-purpose tracked chassis. Minotor Service also repairs and maintains such air defense systems as the Tunguska, Buk, Kvadrat, Shilka, and Tor. In addition, work is under way to create joint Russian-

Belarusian service and technical centers for servicing and repairing Russian- and Soviet-produced electronic equipment.²⁴

Both states are working on modernizing weapons and military equipment. One striking example of Russian-Belarusian military-technical cooperation is the interstate industrial group Defense Systems, which includes five Belarusian and 12 Russian enterprises.

Research and development (R&D) in the field of the air forces, defense forces, ground forces, armor, and space is also carried out jointly by the Russian and Belarusian sides. For example, in accordance with the Military-Technical Cooperation Program between the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation until 2020, the following are carried out:

- R&D on “Developing a system of effective information interaction between national ACS of the Air and Air Defense Forces” (code: Dnepr)

- OCD on “Creating an automated control system for a motorized rifle battalion (mobile)” (code: Dvina)

- development of tracked chassis for various types of weapons of the Ground Forces

- development and manufacture of equipment for modernizing existing armored vehicles and outfitting prospective ones, including sights and sighting systems for fire direction systems, test and control-and-diagnostic equipment

- development of filming equipment for the E-Star earth remote sensing spacecraft

- R&D on modernizing aviation technology according to the technical requirements of the Belarusian Defense Ministry

Military and military-technical cooperation between Russia and Belarus relies heavily on the extensive traditions of the Soviet period, when the two countries were part of a single state. Belarusian defense industry enterprises were an integral part of the defense industry of the USSR and occupied a respectable place in it. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was possible to largely preserve the mutually beneficial cooperation chains of Russia and Belarus on many types of military products, as well as develop and deepen military-technical cooperation on a mutually beneficial basis. Military-technical cooperation between Russia and Belarus plays an important role in strengthening the defense capabilities of both countries and the Union State in the face of common external challenges and threats.

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Principal Phases in the Foreign Policy of Post-Soviet Kazakhstan

Arsen Turgambayev

Key words: Kazakhstan, foreign policy, evolution, phases, multidirectionality.

THE COLLAPSE of the Soviet Union together with the emergence of new independent states, a major 20th-century geopolitical upheaval, put a difficult task before Kazakhstan – as one of these new states, it needed its own foreign policy. Despite its 550-year history of statehood, this time Kazakhstan again had to build a system of government from scratch. The new Kazakh state set about building dialogue with the international community, taking international transformations and new challenges into consideration.

Kazakhstan's new foreign policy strategy, which had clear priorities, was determined by the country's international role.

What Kazakhstan has been able to achieve in international affairs since it became independent is a result of a viable and rational foreign policy aimed at cooperation with Russia, China, Central Asian and European Union countries, the United States, and other nations.

Government documents suggest that post-Soviet Kazakhstan's foreign policy comprised four principal phases. Each phase was based on its own concepts, followed its own guidelines, and had near- and medium-term objectives, all of which reflected Kazakhstan's vision of a path it should follow in keeping up with globalization.

A while ago, the president of the country formulated fundamental principles for Kazakhstan's foreign policy, set priority goals for it that reflected the country's place in the international community, and mapped out methods for achieving them [1, p. 108].

Nursultan Nazarbayev stated all this in an article entitled "The Strategy for the Development of Kazakhstan as a Sovereign and

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Independent State” and published on May 16, 1992. This article was in effect the first attempt to set guidelines for the development of independent Kazakhstan in a complicated international environment.

In his article, Nazarbayev argued that the nation should put its national consciousness at the basis of its ideology. He announced that Kazakhstan would pursue a peace-loving foreign policy and seek equal and mutually beneficial relations with other countries.

The ex-president set two key economic objectives – to create a competitive, socially oriented market economy and to elaborate norms and rights to advance the principle of economic self-determination for each citizen.

Nazarbayev announced that a privatization program would be launched with the long-term goal of reducing the total proportion of state-owned property to between 30% and 40%. He proposed indirect regulation for the budgetary, tax and monetary systems and for social policy [2, p. 11]. Today, the article is considered Kazakhstan’s first three-year national development plan, a plan based on powerful presidential authority.

This strategy, which ushered in the first phase in post-Soviet Kazakhstan’s foreign policy history, also involved establishing a government system, including the cabinet, security and intelligence, customs, and diplomatic services. Steps were taken to put the country’s frontiers under strict control.

The second phase was based on the 1995 Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which was approved by presidential decree and was the nation’s first document to declare a multidirectional foreign policy as a condition for the successful advancement of long-term national interests. The Concept argued that Kazakhstan’s geographical position made it a bridge between East and West and set the task of building friendly and fruitful relations with Russia, China, and other countries.

The Concept instructed the Foreign Ministry and other agencies to finish frontier demarcation as soon as possible. The document declared the West to be Kazakhstan’s main partner, one reason for which was Kazakhstan’s accession to NATO’s Partnership for Peace program [3, p. 30].

Kazakhstan has been pursuing a policy of peace ever since it gained independence. It had nuclear weapons that were inherited from the Soviet era and were the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal after the United States, Russia and Ukraine, withdrawn from its territory. Allegiance to the

principle of reduction of weapons of mass destruction during the second foreign policy phase brought Kazakhstan its greatest political and reputational dividends. Kazakhstan is the world's only state to have voluntarily parted with nuclear weapons.

The next version of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which was approved by the Kazakh Security Council on March 15, 2001, marked the onset of the third phase. As the first- and second-phase strategies, the 2001 concept emphasized the multidirectionality principle and insisted that the guiding principles of Kazakhstan's foreign policy should be pragmatism, realism, and a balance between the country's ambitions and what it would be able to achieve [4, pp. 122-128].

This balanced and multidirectional approach was – and still is – criticized by some politicians and political scientists but no one came up with any viable alternative. Kazakhstan stuck to a multidirectional and diversified policy. However, it developed its scale of priorities. The country attached an important role to membership in international organizations. The Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) owed its emergence to a Kazakh initiative. Relations with the EU and the United States were also high on Kazakhstan's agenda.

Although the 2001 concept accurately reflected the realities of its time, in 2005, President Nazarbayev ordered some amendments to it in response to developments such as the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the spread of terrorism. Kazakhstan was confronted with a new task – becoming a regional leader and defending this status. The country began to follow the “economy-before-politics” rule in its foreign policy and chose Russia, China, the United States, the EU, Central Asia, and the Islamic world as its priority partners.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Kazakhstan for the Period from 2014 to 2020 was a blueprint for the fourth phase. This document, approved by the president on January 21, 2014 and based on Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy, was different from the previous concepts in

What Kazakhstan has been able to achieve in international affairs since it became independent is a result of a viable and rational foreign policy aimed at cooperation with Russia, China, Central Asian and European Union countries, the United States, and other nations.

that it reflected a more prominent international role achieved by Kazakhstan by then and addressed new global political and economic trends [1, p. 111].

Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy is a plan for Kazakhstan to become one of the world's 30 most developed countries by 2050.

It stresses continuity as a key principle for Kazakhstan's foreign policy and contains a pledge that objectivity will remain this policy in the unstable global environment [1, p. 111].

The 2014-2020 concept represents a revision of Kazakh foreign policy to address realities caused by the collapse of the bipolar world order and indications of multipolarity in international relations [5, pp. 14-15].

Transparency is a salient feature of the concept. It has two major goals to pursue: to set clear and concrete guidelines to Kazakh diplomats and to enhance public knowledge and understanding of Kazakhstan's foreign policy both at home and abroad.

Transparency is the general spirit of Kazakhstan's information policy – public information about Kazakh domestic and foreign policy and social and economic developments in the country is its main principle. Transparency, besides, precludes any speculation and fact manipulation [6, p. 118].

Clarity of presentation is another feature of the concept – the document is a six-year foreign policy philosophy stated in the form of terse and clear theses.

Kazakhstan's geographical position gives the country geopolitical advantages but simultaneously some geoeconomic problems. Since it lies between two power centers – Russia and China, – its long-term interests require a flexible and balanced policy. At the same time, Kazakhstan is the world's largest country with no direct sea access, and this means logistical and transportation problems. This is another stimulus for Kazakhstan to pursue an intensive and diversified foreign policy.

The 2014-2020 Foreign Policy Concept sets the following priorities reflecting the rapidly changing international political and economic situation:

1. A pragmatic, consistent, and balanced policy
2. Responsibility for security in Central Asia; action to prevent conflicts in the region
3. Support for international initiatives regarding more effective security measures across the world
4. Closer cooperation with various countries and organizations to

boost Kazakhstan's defense capability and make its military deterrence mechanisms more efficient

5. Stronger friendship and closer cooperation with Russia, China, the United States and Central Asian, EU, and Asia-Pacific countries

6. Gradual adoption of a green economy and becoming one of the world's most developed countries

7. Protection of the nation's cultural identity, support for ethnic Kazakh communities abroad, and promotion of the Kazakh language [7, pp. 21-22].

The 2014-2020 Concept is a follow-up to Nazarbayev's 2014 state of the nation address entitled "Kazakhstan Way – 2050: Common Aim, Common Interests, Common Future." The concept pays special attention to the necessity of creating favorable international conditions for the implementation of Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy, stronger cohesion of the country's diverse ethnic groups, high living standards, civil rights guarantees, and a democratic, law-based state. Whereas the previous concepts prioritized national interests, today priority is consistently shifting to public needs, which is essential for a country that has opted for a democratic path [8, p. 118].

Kazakhstan's foreign policy priorities include its relations with other Central Asian countries. The situation in Kazakhstan is directly dependent on its relations with neighboring states. But tensions in the Middle East and the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Ukraine, and Syria are examples of global security systems failing to work.

Central Asia tops Kazakhstan's external security agenda. Security in Central Asia is essential for Kazakhstan's economic and political relations with other Central Asian states. Kazakhstan seeks stability in Central Asia, wants to combine forces with other states in the region in handling new threats and challenges, and continues to put a lot of effort into regional integration. President Nazarbayev has stressed repeatedly that it is only by joining forces with neighboring Central Asian countries that Kazakhstan would be able to resolve its water, energy, transportation, and frontier demarcation issues.

Kazakhstan believes that regional integration involving more intensive trade and wider transportation networks would provide the Central Asian nations with the most effective ways to solve their economic, social, and environmental problems. Kazakhstan has made several attempts to initiate integration in Central Asia. However, for various reasons none of them has materialized.

These reasons have included the Central Asian countries' different economic development levels, different foreign policy priorities, and opposition to integration from some of the presidents – in each Central Asian country it is the head of state that is the main home and foreign policy decision-maker. However, integration seems more likely since the inauguration of Shavkat Mirziyoyev as president of Uzbekistan in December 2016.

The 2014-2020 Concept pays special attention to multidirectional diplomacy and to activities in organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Kazakhstan has also been more active in CICA where chairmanship will transition from China to Russia in 2019-2020.

Kazakhstan's unambiguous position on arms control and global security issues has consolidated its reputation as one of the leaders of the non-proliferation movement. The 2014-2020 Concept emphasizes the continuity of the country's security policy. Nazarbayev has instituted a prize named the Nazarbayev Prize for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World and Global Security, which will be awarded annually on August 29, the International Day against Nuclear Tests.

The problems that triggered the global financial crises of 2007-2008 and 2011 remain unresolved, and so the world is not safe against new financial and economic upheavals. To make itself less vulnerable to them and not to be defeated in today's tough international competition, Kazakhstan needs more intensive economic diplomacy, stronger economic positions, and better opportunities for foreign investors. Kazakhstan has instituted an office of investment ombudsman to help foreign investors resolve potential disputes in the country.

Kazakhstan also continues to work for Eurasian integration, making serious efforts to enlarge the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). However, the EAEU is a relatively ineffective organization since Kazakhstan and Russia have different views on Eurasian integration. National sovereignty, pragmatism and mutual benefit should be the principles underlying relations among countries involved in any EAU-type integration project, Kazakhstan insists.

Kazakhstan's regional integration efforts could not have produced any results if the country were not a member of the World Trade

Organization (WTO). Kazakhstan became the WTO's 162nd member on November 30, 2015, after 19-year-long negotiations. Membership in the WTO entitles Kazakhstan to a duty of 6.5% on exports to other WTO member countries. The EAEU uses a tariff of 10.4% for trade among its member countries.

Safeguarding Kazakhstan's cultural and linguistic identity is one of the nation's foreign policy priorities. The country has legislation prescribing the use of soft power to promote Kazakh culture and the Kazakh language abroad.

Kazakhstan puts substantial resources into its international image. It runs various image-building projects, which despite public concerns about their financial aspects, bear fruit. They include the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, which has been held in Astana once in three years since 2003, Winter Universiade 2017 in Almaty, the Expo 2017 international exhibition in Astana, and the launch of the Astana International Financial Centre in 2018.

Membership in regional and global organizations is one more way for Kazakhstan to boost its international prestige. Many Kazakh initiatives have received global support, serving to enhance the country's image and its role in the United Nations. For instance, due to its peace-brokering efforts such as mediating in the 2015 Russian-Turkish conflict and organizing the Astana process to resolve the crisis in Syria, Kazakhstan was elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the 2017/18 period.

This non-permanent Security Council membership became a milestone in Kazakhstan's foreign policy. The years when the country held its Security Council seat saw global transformations and the deterioration of relations between key partners of Kazakhstan – Russia, on the one hand, and the United States and the EU, on the other.

Those two years were also a test period for the multidirectional character of Kazakhstan's foreign policy: on various occasions, the country was able to stick to its principles in advancing its interests without running into conflicts with any of its chief partners – Russia, China, the United States, and the EU.

The soured relations and the war of sanctions between Russia and the West indirectly affect Kazakhstan and thereby reduce its room for maneuver. At the same time, they can stimulate Kazakhstan to pursue an even more balanced multidirectional policy.

Kazakhstan's adequate foreign policy directly contributes to domes-

tic social stability, which means that the country integrates its foreign and home policy. Many experts see Kazakhstan's foreign policy as based on a thoroughly verified set of principles [9].

Today, the main task facing the government, political scientists, and economists in Kazakhstan is to make objective and accurate assessments of the country's geopolitical, economic, energy, and military interests and its intellectual and cultural potential. Long-term national development is impossible to map out without such assessments.

Conclusion

KAZAKHSTAN has traversed a difficult path since it gained independence. A land with practically no demarcated frontiers, engulfed in an economic crisis and plagued by vast-scale unemployment and hyperinflation, has become the most dynamically developing country in Central Asia. It still has numerous economic and social problems to solve and must deal with geopolitical issues stemming from its geographical location between Russia and China, each of which has its own interests in Kazakhstan.

But Kazakhstan aspires to the reputation of a large regional state seeking to create a zone of good-neighborliness, security, and respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all the nations constituting it.

Kazakhstan's foreign policy has been through four principal phases, with each of them determined by the specific nature of national interests during it. The 2014-2020 Concept is likely to be a program for a fifth phase.

Which way Kazakhstan was going to go came back on the agenda when Yelbasy Nazarbayev announced in an address to the nation that he was resigning as president after having held the post for nearly 30 years. Under the constitution, the office of president provisionally went over to Senate Chairman Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.

Tokayev's presidency has brought about no change in the foreign policy line. Nazarbayev remains authorized to make strategic domestic and foreign policy decisions: under the constitutional law "On the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan – the Yelbasy," he heads the Security Council and the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, is a member of the Constitutional Council, and remains leader of the Nur Otan (Radiant Homeland) ruling party.

It cannot be ruled out that the early presidential election of June 9,

2019, was the starting point of a new, the fifth, phase of Kazakhstan's foreign policy with its own characteristics.

Tokayev, who, as expected, won the presidential election, receiving 70.13% of votes, has a five-year mandate to formulate guidelines for this phase.

A Sinologist who was educated in Moscow and was director-general of the UN Office in Geneva from 2011 to 2013, Tokayev will undoubtedly bring a lot of novelty into Kazakhstan's foreign policy. However, any of his potential innovations will definitely be consistent with the course set by the first president of Kazakhstan, Yelbasy Nursultan Nazarbayev.

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“God Is in Heaven, the Earth Is Hard, and Russia Is Far Away”

Aleksandar Vulin

Key words: Kosovo, Serbia, President Vucic, NATO, Russia’s military-technical assistance.

International Affairs: Mr. Minister, thank you for finding the time to talk to us at such a difficult time for Serbia, when the Kosovo problem has gotten worse again. In your opinion, what is the reason for that?

Answer: They are pushing for a military response from Serbia. If that happens, the Kosovo authorities will go to their NATO sponsors and beg for protection. Their aim is to punish Serbia by using NATO as a cat’s paw, since they realize that they cannot go ahead with an armed conflict on their own. The Kosovars are trying to provoke a conflict and unleash a war through violence against Serbs and Russians (consider the brutal beating of UN employee Mikhail Krasnoshchekov).

I would like representatives of NATO member countries to heed what I am saying.

Q: How did KFOR respond to the provocation in Kosovo and Metohija?

A: KFOR’s response to that provocation was very disappointing. Serbia was not notified about the police operation. However, when KFOR representatives got in touch, they said it was a political act and had nothing to do with KFOR. Then they claimed that we were notified but via the media. I think official institutions should be in direct contact, not through the media. They did not call us until after President Vucic ordered that the Army be put on alert. They asked us about our intentions and what we were going to do and how.

Aleksandar Vulin, Defense Minister of the Republic of Serbia

The interview was conducted by **Mikhail Kurakin**, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of *International Affairs*.

KFOR's mission is to deter hostilities, not act when something has already happened. In this particular case, they failed to prevent violence.

Serbia has no other negotiating partners except KFOR, and they are not telling us the truth and are not in fact a neutral side.

Q: How is Russia helping Serbia?

A: Russia is a great power and it has its own interests. However, when it comes to Serbia, it takes our interests into consideration. We highly value that. First of all, I would like to thank Russian President Vladimir Putin, Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu

Serbian people say: We will do almost anything to ensure peace, but we will do absolutely anything to be free.

and the Russian people. And of course, also thank Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who uses every opportunity to speak out in Serbia's defense at all forums. Russia always stands by us, at all international platforms, and we simply cannot ask for anything more.

We will never forget that in 2015, Great Britain put forward a resolution at the UN accusing Serbia of genocide and proposing that the massacre of Muslims in Srebrenica be deemed genocide. After two world wars, the Serbs should be considered a people subjected to genocide! If Russia had not used its veto power, today my children would be taught that the Serbian people organized and practiced genocide. For that alone, we will forever be grateful to you.

However, there are many other things as well. Economic cooperation with Russia is very important for us, and it keeps growing. The deeper this cooperation is, the stronger we will be.

Q: How is military-technical cooperation between Moscow and Belgrade developing?

A: Military-technical assistance is very important for us. In 1999, the Serbian Air Force was destroyed. Thanks to Russia and Belarus, we now have MiG-29 fighter jets. We are also buying other weapon systems and military equipment from Russia and receiving assistance in personnel training. That is of major importance to us. As a matter of fact, to a very large extent, this is the reason why we are a regional power.

Q: Your closest neighbors – Montenegro, Macedonia and Croatia – have joined NATO. What do you think about this idea?

A: As long as Aleksandar Vucic is president and I am defense minister, Serbia will never participate in anti-Russian sanctions or campaigns, and of course, Serbia will not join NATO.

I have to say that it pains us when various expert and intellectual communities in Russia accuse us of seeking to join the North Atlantic alliance. I would like to point out that Serbia, together with Bosnia, which has a large Serbian population, are the only European countries that have not imposed sanctions on Russia. This decision is of great political importance. Major Western powers regard this as disobedience. We have chosen the path of military neutrality and respect for our friends. I believe our position should be appreciated and valued.

We are often criticized for buying a lot of weapons. However, that's only what our critics say. We are a neutral country that is surrounded by NATO member states. If it comes to some conflict (and as you know, the Balkans are a place where a conflict can easily erupt), no one will be able to come to our aid.

Q: What about Russia?

A: We count on aid from Russia. Also, from China and other friends. There is a saying that dates back to the Karadjordje era; it is more than 200 years old: "God is in heaven, the earth is hard, and Russia is far away." This is the way we live. Of course, we always count on aid from our friend Russia. However, we are doing all we can not to draw anyone into a conflict. You see, all countries around us are arming themselves. And they are NATO members. Who are they afraid of? Serbia? We must be strong. Therefore, Russian military-technical assistance is extremely important for us. We need peace. However, we must be prepared for anything to achieve it. Serbian people say: We will do almost anything to ensure peace, but we will do absolutely anything to be free.

Q: It is known that you are not only a politician but also an author. Which of your works have been translated into Russian and published in Russia?

A: I am very pleased that you know about this aspect of my life. I have published two books in Russian – *Mrak* [Gloom] and *Krasota* [Beauty].

Mrak is a story of ordinary people whose fate shows the history of the breakup of Yugoslavia, the economic and political situation and the military conflict in Kosovo. *Krasota* is a historical study of the siege and sack of Constantinople by Crusaders, the fall of Byzantine Empire, and the impact of Catholic Rome on the eastern Mediterranean and Serbian lands. I am really flattered by the fact that my books have been published in Russian – the language of A.S. Pushkin, F.M. Dostoyevsky and M.A. Bulgakov.

Concerned Scientists on the State of the World

Yu. Sayamov

Key words: international relations, global problems, World Academy of Art and Science, the Club of Rome.

TODAY, international relations, global problems and the scientific community are much closer connected than at any time in the past. The mounting wave of risks and threats demands scientific studies, analyses and assessments as the starting point for dealing with multiplying crises and defining them. No wonder scientists with adequate knowledge and adequate instruments of research sounded an alarm in an effort to arrest the movement to the point of no-return. Their concerns about the processes and the phenomena that might endanger the very existence of mankind developed into an important factor of international life long before the movement acquired organizational forms and the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) was set up in the United States.

Since antiquity, philosophers and scientists were concerned about the fragility of the world, vulnerability of nature and responsibility of mankind. The real fear for the future of the world, however, was fanned by the realization of those who were working on nuclear weapons that this challenge was the most dangerous. Aware of their responsibility for the future, they tried to stop the mounting nuclear threat. American physicist Leo Szilard wrote a memorandum on the dangers of nuclear weapons that Albert Einstein sent to the U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt.¹ Danish physicist Niels Bohr, who also knew of the nuclear threat, tried to oppose it. He even met with Prime Minister of Great Britain Winston Churchill and President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt to explain his concerns.

Harry Truman, who in 1945 replaced Roosevelt as President of the

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United States, ignored the warnings coming from the academic community and ordered to use nuclear weapons as soon as possible. The tragedy of two Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki and their population against which Americans used atomic bombs, forced the scientists to think again about their responsibility to mankind.

The scientists were called to pay more attention to urgent problems of international relations and join the ranks of those who were fighting against nuclear madness. British scientist Bertrand Russell and the giant of world science and Nobel Prize winner Albert

Einstein published their joint statement, in which they condemned the use of nuclear weapons; it became known as the Russell-Einstein Manifesto.²

Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein and one of the “fathers of the atomic bomb,” Robert Oppenheimer, inspired a wide-scale movement of scientists against the nuclear and other threats to the continued existence of mankind and initiated the World Academy of Art and Science (WAAS). Numerous unions and associations were also created.

The idea of drawing scientists together for the studies of global problems in an independent non-governmental context was prompted by many talks and exchanges of opinions between scholars and intellectuals. After World War II, they realized that scientific thought should advance to the forefront to formulate adequate responses to threats and challenges created by technological progress, destruction of the environment and depletion of natural resources. The First International Conference on Science and Human Welfare held in 1956 in Washington supported the idea of the World Academy and set up an international preparatory committee with Robert Oppenheimer representing the United States.

The World Academy of Art and Science was officially set up in 1960. It is an international non-governmental organization, a worldwide network of people elected to the Academy for their outstanding contributions to the studies of global problems that face mankind. The Academy encourages comprehensive scientific studies based on the recognized moral and spiritual values. It deems it necessary to inform the public about the social and political repercussions of new knowledge and tech-

The report “Come On! Capitalism, Short-termism, Population and the Destruction of the Planet” timed to the 50th anniversary of the Club of Rome became a real sensation.

nologies and ensure leadership in thinking that shows the road toward concrete measures that encourage development. Its members are convinced that Albert Einstein, one of the Academy's founding fathers, put its purpose in a nutshell: "Be creative, but make sure that what you create is not a curse for mankind."

It promotes interdisciplinary dialogues; it generates original ideas and integrated perspectives of dealing with global problems. It is working hard to identify creative and catalectic ideas capable of supporting sustainable and fair development for the present and future generations free from encroachments on human rights and dignity. Registered as an NGO in the United States with the headquarters in California, the Academy has regional offices in Bucharest (Romania) and Pondicherry (India). Its special consultative status at the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) allows it to have representatives at the UN headquarters in New York and the UN offices in Geneva and Vienna.

Its members belong to different cultures, nationalities, professions, and intellectual occupations. They are united by a common interest in global studies and knowledge indispensable for an adequate comprehension of global problems and their solution in the interests of human civilization.

Today, about 750 Fellows and Associate Fellows from over 80 countries represent all branches of art, natural, social sciences and humanities; there are Junior Fellows selected from the most talented young scientists and scholars and cooperating academics, some of them future members of the Academy. There are university professors and lecturers, political leaders, diplomats, and representatives of business circles and international NGOs among the Academy's members. Members are selected on the strength of recommendations of two fellows; they should pass through elections to become members.

On the whole, the majority of the new members become associate fellows; prominent scientists and public figures may be elected fellows, bypassing the status of associate fellow as a token of respect to their services. Those who vote at the elections are guided by scientific achievements, professional skills and leadership in the sphere of global problems, interdisciplinary thinking and the readiness to address the problems of global importance.

The Academy invariably makes emphasis on the universal and comprehensive human-orientated concept of reliable knowledge since the actions prompted by incomplete fragmentary approaches are inadequate:

they are fraught with unpleasant surprises and side effects that might create new and much more complicated problems.

The Academy is concentrated on the advancement of ideas, strategies and initiatives designed to create the humanitarian paradigm of development adequate to the requirements of the 21st century. Today, its programs consist of the initiatives designed to deal with the problems in the main spheres of global concerns:

- in the sphere of nuclear weapons: identification of international legal politics and social strategies for nonproliferation, limiting, reduction and eventual liquidation of nuclear weapons;

- in the sphere of global employment: development of strategies leading to guaranteed employment and creation of the global theory and models of employment;

- in the sphere of global economics: formulation of a new anthropocentric economic theory and politics;

- in the monetary and financial sphere: consistent, responsible and fair financing and crediting, including innovational investment strategies designed to realize the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and upgrading human capital;

- in the sphere of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): elaboration of a strategy of realization of the UN global agenda to 2030;

- in the sphere of global leadership: identification of the key concepts, processes and strategies that promote efficient management needed to successfully address the complex problems of the 21st century;

- in the social development sphere: elaboration of a contemporary theory of social development as trans-disciplinary, integrated and conceptual basis of social evolution;

- in the sphere of education: transition to personalized education in a global and accessible system of acquiring the world-level knowledge that corresponds to contemporary requirements;

- in the sphere of creativity and work of the mind: development of systemic, comprehensive, integrated, and organic methods of thinking, creativity and cognition that go beyond the frames of fragmentary, reductionist, materialistic, mechanistic approaches to the understanding and solution of human problems;

- in the sphere of new technologies: researching social potential and impact of new technologies to elaborate efficient policies to use them for the well-being of all peoples.

In 2018, the nomination and election of this author as a fellow

allowed Russia to widen its involvement in the activities of this highly respected and prestigious international scientific organization.

On March 18-23, 2019, scientists of the School of Global Processes, Moscow State University, attended the joint scientific conference of the WAAS and the Club of Rome at the Inter-University Center in Dubrovnik, the favorite site of many international events. The topic of the discussion, *In Quest of a New Paradigm & New Civilization*, stirred up a lot of interest in the context of activities of the Academy and the Club and realization of a new project, Emerging New Civilization Initiative (ENCI).

The conference discussed the depth and content of necessary social changes, existing ideas about the world order, instruments and mechanisms of civilizational transformations, and the emergence of a new civilization from the extreme state of the civilization as we know it today. Problems of reliability of new knowledge, new global leadership, the program strategies and priorities of the Academy and the Club were debated in the context of a global-development, human-oriented agenda. Most of the Club members are fellows of the Academy, and, therefore, they work together on several joint projects including the Emerging New Civilization project, the main project of the Club of Rome.

The Club's history goes back to 1967, when Aurelio Peccei, a successful Italian industrialist, met Alexander King, an outstanding Scottish scientist. When travelling around the world for business purposes the Italian businessman became more and more convinced that the state and pace of global socioeconomic development, environmental decline and the deepening gap between the North and the South threatened continued existence of mankind.

His ideas were very close to what King thought about the state of the world; this served the foundation of their creative alliance. In 1968, Peccei and King invited about 30 European scientists, economists and businessmen to Rome to discuss global problems. This gave rise to the Club of Rome that acquired worldwide fame after its first report, "The Limits of Growth" (1972). By that time, one of its authors, American scientist Dennis Meadows, had been already closely cooperating with his Russian colleague Nikita Moiseyev.

A year earlier, in 1971, Moiseyev and Meadows participated in the first conference on global problems organized by UNESCO in Venice. Meadows outlined the main points of the report "The Limits of Growth" while Moiseyev suggested that a computer system imitating the interac-

tion between the ocean, atmosphere and biota should be created. Various scenarios of economic development and human activities in different fields should be entered into this system to model social processes.

The cooperation between Moiseyev and Meadows stemmed from Moiseyev's scientific cooperation with Jay Forrester, professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management, whom Meadows venerated as his teacher. The pioneer of system analysis, he wrote the book *World Dynamics*, an attempt to describe the main processes in economy, ecology and pollution of environment in the context of their interaction and mutual dependence. Nikita Moiseyev initiated and edited its translation into Russian.

The book and the computer model of the world created by Forrester's group at the MIT in cooperation with Moiseyev's group in the Computing Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences became, to great extent, the scientific foundation for the conclusions presented in "The Limits of Growth." The authors pointed out that if the present system of the use of natural resources continued, they would be exhausted soon enough. The problem has not lost its urgency.

New reports followed: "Mankind at the Turning Point" (1975) stated the need to create an "organic" or a truly interdependent society as the only way to save the world from the almost inevitable existential threat; "Reshaping the International Order" (1976) discussed considerable economic growth very much needed for fair distribution and improving the well-being of all; "Goals for Mankind" (1977) spoke of the importance of axiological attitudes and cultural realities for development; "Beyond the Age of Waste" (1978) discussed the results of the study conducted by the Club of Rome, which tackled the issues of the depletion of resources and its implications for the world in general; "No Limits to Learning" (1979) placed particular importance on new forms of learning, education and upbringing as indispensable for laying the groundwork to deal with global issues and bridging the gap between the complexity and risks of current global issues and our presently underdeveloped capacity to face up to them. This was the first report to which scientists from countries in the North and the South and the East and West contributed.

The year 1980 was extremely fruitful: four reports on very different or even far-removed subjects were published: "Impact of Microelectronics"; "The Third World" (the umbrella term for the group of developing countries that wanted to be heard and that raised the question about new geopolitics); "Toward More Effective Societies" by Ukrainian

scientist Bohdan Hawrylyshyn (he analyzed the basic components of social orders and showed how the modification of their basic components could ensure better social, political and economic effectiveness of these social orders); "Dialogue on Wealth and Welfare" by Italian Orio Giarini demonstrated an alternative approach to the formation of world capital and its destructive nature and offered deep-cutting analysis of modern economic ideas.

In 1982, the Club returned to microelectronics and its use in the interests of mankind; in 1984, the problems of the Third World were raised in the form of studies whether it could survive without support of the developed countries. In 1986, it published "The Future of the Oceans" where the oceans were discussed as a laboratory of sorts for a new international order based on new ideas about the world. In 1988, "The Barefoot Revolution" promoted a new economic strategy based on an alternative approach through small-scale development projects run by non-governmental organizations.

In 1989, seventeen years after the famous "The Limits to Growth," Eduard Pestel, a German scientist, reminded about the objectives of the Club of Rome in his report "Beyond the Limits to Growth," in which he called on mankind to change its political, social, ecological, and moral thinking to assume responsibility for sustainable development of the world. In the same year, the report "Africa beyond Famine" was published. It was based on the results of a joint project by the Club and the African Academy of Sciences that identified the causes of famine on the continent and the ways of remedying the situation.

In 1991, President Emeritus of the Club of Rome, Alexander King and Secretary General Bertrand Schneider made a presentation "The First Global Revolution," in which they offered a possible solution of the world problems through the transformation of world economy from a military into a civilian one. They demanded that the catastrophic repercussions of the exploitation of the developing countries by the West should be recognized, that the new approaches to the development and role of energy were introduced and the need to reconstruct the environment destroyed by human activities was put on the agenda. A new report, "Taking Nature into Account," that appeared in 1995 was even more blunt about the need to take the ecological factors into account when estimating the world's financial health.

In his "The Scandal and the Shame" published in the same year, Bertrand Schneider used these words to denounce poverty, backwardness,

the widening gap between the rich and the poor and offered a new development concept that included radical changes in funding and aid, anti-corruption measures, education, control of population growth, role of civil society and NGOs and insisted that international organizations and UN member states should pool their forces for essential decisions and their realization.

“The Employment Dilemma and the Future of Work” (1996) contained a critical analysis of the employment mechanisms and pointed to the unacceptable practices of shifting the responsibility on the working people while the states avoided their responsibility to offer their citizens adequate and respectable jobs.

The “Factor Four” report that appeared in 1998 described resource productivity as a new form of progress which showed how at least four times as much wealth could be extracted from the resources mankind used. The second report published in the same year³ returned the Club to the subject of oceans and “governing the seas as a global resource.” The third report of the same year, “The Limits to Social Cohesion,”⁴ discussed the normative conflicts centered on fundamental disagreements over issues of public morality and the identity of a society. But are the characteristics of such conflicts common worldwide? Which institutions polarize such conflicts or can serve to mediate them? Answering these questions is necessary for understanding the cultural fault lines that threaten social cohesion. The fourth report, “La red” (1998, in Spanish), discussed digital society and its impacts on everyday life and predicted many changes in human civilization.

In 2000, German businessman Reinhard Mohn published a report under an optimistic title “Menschlichkeit gewinnt” (Humankind Wins), in which he applied contemporary technologies of leadership to social and political problems and offered new goals and principles to ensure further development.

The first and so far the only meeting of the Club of Rome in Moscow took place on May 29-30, 2000 at Moscow State University to discuss the Sustainable Future of Russia. Today, the prospects for a joint meeting of the WAAS and the Club of Rome at Moscow University within the framework of the next International Scientific Congress “Globalistics” scheduled to be held on May 20-23, 2020 are discussed.

The report “The Art of Interconnected Thinking” (2002) analyzed the steadily increasing complexity of the contemporary world; it can be described as a practical guide for politicians, managers and all others who

had to or wished to think in such contexts. It took up and developed the ideas offered by the earlier report. "The Capacity to Govern," that registered the inadequacies of contemporary forms of governance and proposed changes in values, structures, staffing, public understanding, and political culture to equip governance for the radically novel challenges of the 21st century. "The Double Helix of Learning and Work" (2003) developed within the framework of UNESCO studies in the fields of science and culture; its authors sought to strengthen the relationship between education and employment in order to bring "The Knowledge Society" within reach, drawing inspiration from the double helix structure of DNA.

The report "Limits to Privatization" (2005) was the first thorough audit of privatizations around the world. On the base of this data, its authors provided guidance for policy and action that would restore and maintain the right balance between the powers and responsibilities of the state, the private sector and the increasingly important role of civil society.

The report "The Future of People with Disability in the World" published in the same year reflected concerns of the Club with the issues of the dignity of people with disabilities and the quality of their lives. Such people should have the opportunity to participate in human activities in all regions of the world.

"Global Population Blow-up and After"⁵ (2006) was the first report written by a Russian scientist. Its author, Professor of Moscow State University, Sergey Kapitza, well known as popularizer of science, offered his own model of demographic transfer to stable population strength.

"The Blue Economy," the report that appeared after a gap of three years, described a search for best nature-inspired technologies that could beneficially impact the economies of the world and listed 340 innovations that could function the way ecosystems did; they would add sustainability to world economy and make it ecofriendly.

"Factor Five" that appeared 12 years after "Factor Four" examined the impact of recent industrial and technical innovations and demonstrated that it was possible to achieve 80% improvements in resource and energy productivity. These improvements could retool the economic system, massively boost wealth for billions of people and help solve the ecological and climate problems.

"Bankrupting Nature" (2012) pointed out that humanity was in deep denial about the magnitude of the environmental challenges and resource constraints it faced. It still remained in a "business as usual" mode in the economy built on continuous expansion of material consumption; it was

not sustainable; the growth dilemma should be addressed through a transformation of the economic system; GDP growth as the key objective for development should be abandoned for the sake of transition to indicators of well-being. The report “2052”⁶ that appeared in the same year⁶ was an attempt to provide a forecast for the next forty years. Based on the forecasts of the very first report published 40 years earlier, its author asked dozens of experts to supply their conclusions on the state and prospects of the world. The report “Extracted” (2014)⁷ added new arguments to the subject of depleting natural resources by offering a sweeping history of the mining industry and seeking answers to the questions whether mineral resources would last long and whether it would be possible to reduce pollution of the environment caused by mining.

In his “Change the History, Change the Future” (2015), David Korten called on mankind to leave the path to self-destruction based on the deification of money as the measure of all worth and the source of all happiness and to turn to cosmology and sustainable future for humanity. The report “On the Edge” that appeared in the same year dealt with the health of the world’s tropical forests and threats to the world’s rainforests, the biggest terrestrial repositories of biodiversity and essential regulators of global air and water cycles, which are negatively affected by human activities. Another report, “To Choose Our Future” by Ashok Khosla from India (2015), offered alternative development strategies for his country to build a more prosperous and sustainable future.

In “Reinventing Prosperity” (2016), the authors outlined a radically different approach and some politically feasible, in their opinion, proposals to improve the world – from shortening the work year and raising the retirement age to boosting well-being and redefining views about work – to reducing unemployment, inequality, and the pace of climate change, – and still have economic growth.

The next report, “The Seneca Effect” (2017), stemmed from Seneca’s famous “Fortune is of sluggish growth, but ruin is rapid.” It examined the phenomenon of “collapse” as viewed by many disciplines and as something that occurs “complex systems” with a special emphasis on system dynamics and the concept of “feedback.” On this basis, the author applied the theory to real-world systems, from the mechanics of fracture and the crash of large structures to financial collapses, famine and population decline, the fall of entire civilizations and the most dreadful of all imaginable collapses: that of the planetary ecosystem caused by overexploitation and climate change.

The report “Come On! Capitalism, Short-termism, Population and the Destruction of the Planet”⁸ timed to the 50th anniversary of the Club of Rome became a real sensation. Harsh criticism of capitalism, rejection of financial speculations, materialism, and reductionism and the call to alternative economy, a new age of the Enlightenment, holistic perception of the world and planetary civilization were offered as an agenda for the world. The authors proceeded from the Full World concept formulated by Herman Daly, American ecologist and economist.

Human civilization took shape in the Empty World – the world of unknown territories and excessive resources. The dominant religions, political ideologies, social institutions, habitual thinking are still rooted in the past. Meanwhile, mankind is already living in the Full World with vague prospects of further expansion. If it continues living according to the rules of the Empty World, collapse will come soon.

The Club of Rome believes that in the 1980s capitalism has exhausted itself; financial speculations became the main source of profits. It warns that the “sixth mass extinction” might happen because of a rapid decrease of flora and fauna, unpredictable repercussions of new technologies and a nuclear conflict as well as the use of other means of mass destruction. The authors insist that the younger generation should receive adequate education and “future literacy” and calls on the governments to work together for common good.

The report “A Finer Future” published in the same year said that humanity was racing against catastrophe and that a regenerative economy through a powerful combination of enlightened entrepreneurialism, technology, and farseeing innovative policy was the only chance to avoid it. “Transformation is Feasible,” the third of the reports published in 2018, the jubilee year, discussed The UN Sustainable Development Goals till 2030 as a global turning point: for the first time in human history, the world acquired a coordinated roadmap for humanity’s future along the road of social-economic progress.

“Stewarding Sustainability Transformations” by Petra Kuenkel is the 2019 report presented at the meeting of the WAAS and the Club of Rome in Dubrovnik. The author demonstrated her novel approach to the managing the process of changes in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals and introduced the theory and practice of Collective Stewardship as a management tool that respected the integrity of human and ecological systems. Drawing on the work of transdisciplinary scholars and experienced sustainability practitioners, it showed how transfor-

mative change could be built on life's inherent tendency to generate patterns of vitality and resilience.

In Dubrovnik, I met with Petra Kuenkel, author of Report-2019, and other members of these two world scientific think tanks. As a result of the elections of 2018, co-presidents of the Club Ernst Ulrich von Weizsäcker (Germany) and Anders Wijkman (Sweden), who co-authored the "Come On!" report retired. For the first time in the Club's history, two women, Mamphela Ramphele from South Africa and Sandrine Dixson-Declève of the Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL), were elected co-presidents. In Dubrovnik, the Club's leadership was represented by Mamphela Ramphele and the World Academy of Art and Science, by its CEO Garry Jacobs (he had taken part in the "Globalistics" congress held at Moscow University in 2017). The congress in Dubrovnik was attended by over 40 people, 23 of them members of the Academy and 21 Club members, as well as by several invitees.

The projects, discussions, reports, and publications by the Academy and the Club in their totality present a fairly comprehensive picture of global problems and challenges that cause concerns in the academic community and force its members seek for adequate answers and solutions.

NOTES

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The Russian Economy and Trade Wars

Armen Oganesyanyan,
Editor-in-Chief, International Affairs

TODAY, we're going to raise one of our most acute issues, the sanctions against Russia. I expect that, in the course of our discussion, we'll find out objective trends in the entire phenomenon of sanctions. It's a very important point that sanctions that are imposed on entire sectors of our economy become geopolitical measures. Ratcheting up sanctions may set off a frontal confrontation.

Ivan Timofeyev,
Director of Programs at the Russian International Affairs Council

I'D LIKE TO START by saying a few words about terms and concepts. In Russia, the terms sanctions and trade wars are normally used as synonyms. In my view, this is incorrect. A clear distinction is drawn between sanctions and trade wars in both American and European Union law. Sanctions are a political mechanism. They are economic measures such as various restrictions and the freezing of assets that are used by one country against another to force it to make political changes. Sanctions are launched by politicians, while companies very rarely lobby for them. Trade has other mechanisms – subsidies, budget issues and the like. Companies get involved in those mechanisms. Sanctions that some of these mechanisms include benefit companies. A classic example is the U.S. law of August 2, 2017 that put restrictions on Russian pipelines. That law put it in black and white – I was amazed by this cynicism – that the purpose of those restrictions was to advance the interests of American companies. Nothing of the kind had been done before.

From our point of view, there are different types of anti-Russian sanctions. There are primary sanctions where some of our companies are put on certain lists and deprived of financing. But there also are situations where a Russian company is formally not sanctioned but its foreign counterparty unilaterally severs their contract. The reason is that, in theory,

any Russian company may end up under sanctions and foreign counterparties are afraid of fines they might have to pay if that happens. For instance, the Bank of England and its European branches have had a fine of \$600 million slapped on them. Otherwise, foreign counterparties include risk insurance in their contracts, which means we may pay, say, between \$200 to \$300 for something that actually costs \$100.

There are political and legal factors behind the risk of new near-term sanctions. The main political factor is that the reasons for the sanctions haven't ceased to exist. Nor has a mechanism been developed that

The main political factor is that the reasons for the sanctions haven't ceased to exist.

would make us safe against potential future sanctions. The Skripals case, the provocations in the Kerch Strait, and the conflict in southeastern Ukraine make this obvious. Nor can we control cyberattacks that are attributed to our country. Obviously, political problems will increase if anything.

As regards the legal factors, legal mechanisms that have been launched can't be stopped immediately, not even if there are indications of movement toward a political agreement of some kind. The reason for this is the nature of legal procedures in the United States and the EU. The sanctions have been approved by legislatures, and rolling back the entire process would be extremely difficult. Moreover, both Congress and the administration in the United States have vested interest in the sanctions.

And, besides, the logic of the relationship between Congress and the administration is that the administration goes out of its way to demonstrate that it's on the ball and one step ahead of Congress.

Another problem is that, if, from the American point of view, Russia has ceased to violate international law, three years must pass for the sanctions to be lifted. Moreover, Russia would have to provide guarantees that it wouldn't commit alleged violations of international law that triggered the current sanctions. All this suggests that there's no way the sanctions will be lifted any time soon. Intensive work on the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act (DASKAA) – we'll soon see the bill – confirms this. The Americans can hardly be expected to back down.

Legislation on Iran is worth studying too. The Iran theme is a lesson for Russia.

***Dzhakhan Polliyeva,
Candidate of Sciences (Law), political scientist***

I DON'T SEE the sanctions as a purely political instrument. It isn't all that simple. In American doctrines, sanctions are categorized as methods of geoeconomic coercion, which can have broad, and not only political, interpretations. That means that the formula on the protection of companies in the law of 2017 that was mentioned by Mr. Timofeyev was not accidental. It's an essentially protectionist formula as well.

Today's sanctions are similar to trade war instruments, something that isn't spoken about openly in the West. At the same time, Donald Trump has openly and loudly announced a protectionist policy, as if he'd forgotten that protectionism is rooted in colonial times. The crisis in Venezuela has resulted in more frequent references to the Monroe Doctrine, but the United States can't justify its threats against three Latin American countries by citing 19th-century declarations. Diktat aimed at winning unilateral benefits is the essence of American protectionism. No matter what amount of sanctions Congress approves, a large proportion of them will have dubious legitimacy because they will chiefly aim to help the United States retain its monopoly of markets, primarily energy markets. As regards the provocation in the Kerch Strait, which has been mentioned here, that seems to have been a U.S. scheme to make the EU impose sanctions on our shipbuilders and eventually put restrictions on our navigation and hinder Russian exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). But that provocation had little effect, and now sanctions against Nord Stream 2 are being planned.

Over the past 20 years, in spite of the two global economic crises, water routes have stably been used for carrying more than 85% of cargo in world trade, and there is growing demand for sea cruises. All this might exacerbate competition between continents. But why should America compete with anyone if it can take some action to avoid this? America expects this large-scale sanctions campaign to keep bringing dividends for a long time.

For the same purpose, the United States has imposed duties on imports from many countries, including some of its allies. Surely this means defiance of the principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO), especially today, when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has made a negative forecast for the next few years and European industrialists are having a hard time. International mechanisms are frozen, and American

propaganda comes up with increasingly unsustainable arguments to justify new sanctions. The United States is in a hurry, repeating old mistakes and making new ones. Different kinds of restrictions get adopted and may overlap. Experts estimate that by now the United States has more than 60 rounds of sanctions on its record. But this doesn't make America reconsider its sanctions policy because it still sticks to what is old, vulgar protectionism.

The former colonial British Empire, in seeking to monopolize some specific markets, introduced and raised import duties, charged exorbitant process for technologies, thereby hindering the development of commodity-producing countries, and made changes to shipping rules to suit its ends. It is to that long-bygone era that the United States' notorious Jones Act goes back to. The British protectionist measures enabled Britain to run ahead of the Netherlands, speed up its industrial development, and remain the leader in world trade for centuries. It is no accident that the most of Britain's different types of duties survive to this day and have become a means of pressure supplementing sanctions.

The current anti-Russian sanctions affect the interests of numerous countries and are different from former sanctions. It's a big question mark what economic and geopolitical effects they will have and what roles Russia and Europe will play. Forecasting is a difficult task, but we need to foresee potential scenarios because the situation is changing very quickly.

Sergey Zheleznyak,

Member of the Committee on International Affairs of the Russian State Duma

WHAT HAS BEEN HAPPENING was absolutely predictable. I can't quite accept Mr. Timofeyev's point that sanctions and trade wars are essentially different things. In my opinion, sanctions and trade wars are closely interrelated and mutually supportive. Political objectives that are pursued by some sanctions are still usually based on the economic interests of those who impose or support those sanctions. The United States says so openly, without any inhibitions.

Moreover, I believe that the main impact of sanctions are not the effects of actual restrictions that they impose but their toxicity, namely sanctions give rise to prejudices and negative expectations, and consequently governments and companies become reluctant to cooperate with

the sanctioned country or companies. In fact, even before the current anti-Russian sanctions were launched, many Western financial and economic institutions voluntarily avoided deals with Russian entities.

No legal system says anything about this because it runs against free trade principles, although we realize that free trade has been dead for a long time. Today, the media industry, the Internet, and nongovernmental organizations are the fastest channels for toxic effects of sanctions.

Sanctions targeting energy industries need special mention because energy is the key to any production. Another essential type of sanctions are sanctions targeting transportation, including sea shipping. By blocking transportation, you in effect block production.

The crisis of international institutions is the result of a deliberate U.S. policy over the last 20 years. By using its system of financial and political pressure on other countries, the United States has made quite successful extraterritorial use of its law and will do so for as long as it's allowed to. Unfortunately, an overwhelming majority of countries accept this extraterritoriality.

Is it only against Russia, China and Iran that the United States is waging wars of sanctions and trade wars? No, it isn't. Today, all economically developed and rapidly developing countries are targeted. And they include European allies of the United States as well.

The reason is that the United States is aware that the anticipated new technological revolution will give any country a chance for more independent and intensive economic growth unless Washington brings such a country under its control or undermines that country's basis for economic growth.

Therefore, France, Italy, Germany, China, Japan, and Russia are all rivals of the United States. They realize that they won't be able to realize their potential if the United States sticks to its current policy of diktat. In other words, by hindering the emergence of a complex multipolar world, the United States in effect limits self-realization opportunities for other nations.

Stable systemic legal opposition to this from a group of states can be the only effective response to this.

It's obvious that the United States has always based its policies solely on its own interests. All illusions about its good intentions should have been given up back in 2014. Russia has without delay taken every measure to ensure its national security.

***Sergey Markov,
Director, Institute of Political Studies***

AMERICAN extraterritorial law is a fact.

Now let's get down to political logic. I think there will be something similar to the provocation in the Kerch Strait. In the West, it's believed that this scheme worked, and so it would be logical to expect it to be used again. There may be serious sanctions against Russian ships that have called into ports in that region or are registered in them. Most likely, these sanctions will be supported by the European Parliament, which will accuse us of every possible sin.

Let's go further. There will be some developments in Venezuela. Since there are Russian military experts, Russia will be accused of support for the dictatorship and of action that runs against the will of the Venezuelan people.

The crisis of international institutions is the result of a deliberate U.S. policy over the last 20 years.

What's the likely outcome of this? Primarily, more extensive sanctions against Russian banks. One can't rule out additions to the sanctions list of companies owned or co-owned by the state. We should stand ready for it – everything may happen very quickly. There may be seizures of movable property by court order. There have already been quite many court orders to that effect. Gazprom, which is co-owned by the state, Russian ships, aircraft – all of them may be threatened.

Now as regards cyberattacks. The Americans, and NATO as a whole, have decided that a cyberwar is possible. Because of their dominant influence, they don't have any serious plans to get involved in debates on cyberspace regulation. Instead, they're thinking about cyber intelligence and about getting ready for a possible serious strike. A strike of this kind is a matter of the future. But intelligence is a fact, and cyber mines are being developed already. Joe Biden said several years ago that the United States had planted some cyber mines. All this makes me approve of our fast-track passage of the law on Internet stability.

One more point. There need to be alternative international infrastructures. From my point of view, one possible coalition of this kind could bring together Iran, Russia and the rest of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Turkey, China, and Venezuela, and might have points of contact with the European Union.

*Nikita Pichugin,
political scientist*

OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, trade restrictions and sanctions, primarily politically motivated sanctions, have become the main part of the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. They supplement the United States' missile diplomacy and are used where military conflicts are unacceptable. One important distinction between sanctions and trade wars is that sanctions are "personalized" – they target specific actors such as political leaders, businesspeople, and companies, – while trade wars involve whole industries and are hindrances in economic relations in general. But sanctions and trade wars have the same objective of marginalizing their target, generating mistrust in it, and preventing any diplomatic efforts to hamper the implementation of these tasks. International organizations such as the WTO, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the IMF, and the World Bank can't cope with the role of arbiters and are incapable of putting restrictions on the unilateral actions of key players.

According to statistics published by the WTO last year, from mid-May to mid-October 2018, member countries of the Group of 20 applied 40 trade-restrictive measures that covered a total trade volume of \$481 billion. Export and import duties and import bans have become cumulative, coming in waves and undermining trade. It is economically the most developed countries that call the tune in these practices. This scares off investors as business in emerging markets becomes unpredictable due to unreliable deals. Remarkably, the Donald Trump administration has gone back on the idea of mega trade alliances, suspending negotiations on the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and withdrawing its signature from the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, and has slapped harsh demands on the main partners of the United States – Canada, Mexico, and the European Union, – which have to look for alternative trading partners in order to minimize their risks. The EU, for instance, recently announced that it plans a free trade agreement with Japan, which would make the EU and Japan one of the largest economic alliances in the world.

The established extraterritoriality of American law, which, in effect, replaces international law, is scourging practically all countries. It has been provoking so-called secondary sanctions – sanctions that may be imposed on companies that are doing business with firms that are targets

of primary sanctions. This results in the toxicity of a state that is under American sanctions and torpedoes that state's foreign trade. The U.S. administration will have noticed that its secondary sanctions, primarily those against Iran and Russia and especially industrial and technological restrictions, have been effective, and this will apparently persuade Washington to continue its policy of sanctions. The large-scale sanctions against the Chinese company Huawei and the continual attempts to block the construction of Nord Stream 2 suggest that the main potential targets of future secondary sanctions are energy sectors, including LNG projects, and information and communication technologies (ICTs), which is a highly competitive field globally. It can be expected that afterward trade wars and non-competitive restrictions will extend to services industries, transportation, primarily shipping, and innovations, including medical technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) solutions.

In my view, special attention should be paid to the maritime transportation issue. Historically, nations that were global leaders were sea powers. The growing activity in Asia Pacific, which recent American doctrinal documents refer to as the Indo-Pacific, stokes competition among global players. China's Belt and Road Initiative involves laying a shipping artery in the Indian Ocean while Russia is working hard to make its Northern Sea Route an alternative shipping link between Asia and Europe. Neither project can remain unnoticed by someone seeking global leadership. A comprehensive Russian-Chinese partnership and strategic interaction will be constantly tested by trade wars and sanctions.

Vladislav Belov,
Deputy Director for Research, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences

ONE CAN STATE the theme of our roundtable as the five-year period of development of Russian industry under sanctions, March/April 2014 to March/April 2019. It has to be admitted that these five years have largely been lost for the Russian economy. Hopes that Russian companies would make use of the import substitution opportunities and gain competitive advantages haven't come true. Unfortunately, no miracle has happened. There are political sanctions. And there are economic sanctions, which are protectionist measures. The EU, primarily Germany, sincerely believed when they were adopting their sanctions that Crimea had been annexed and international law had been violated. They're still convinced

of this. The Americans aren't. They are cynics. The Germans don't want the Russian economy to cease to be competitive.

They genuinely seek to bring Russia back into the realm of international law. The Minsk II agreements mean a stalemate, of course, but the Germans did want to deal with this problem in some way. They're obviously seeking to get Ukraine and Russia to reach some kind of agreement. This isn't happening.

My forecast is that the sanctions will be extended for new periods. The Germans tightly control dual technologies. For example, no matter what civilian research institute of the Academy of Sciences tries to buy some optical equipment, there'll be a ban on exporting it because it's clear how it may be used. There are heavy losses, and the engineering industry is the worst off.

At the same time, I know from private conversations that many subsidiaries of German companies freely export products that the German authorities prohibit exporting, and that's one way in which American cynicism manifests itself. Such products travel to the United States without any problem because that means tactical interests that have nothing to do with the situation we're talking about.

On the other hand, protectionism reflects strategic interests. The anti-Russian sanctions law came into force on August 2, 2017. That law for the first time mentioned a specific project, Nord Stream 2. Why? The Americans are concerned about resources. Why Nord Stream 2?

They realize that Nord Stream will be put in operation in any case. They're aware that the Third Energy Package puts 50% restrictions on deliveries through this pipeline, but they don't care. The Americans gloss over the fact that within the next 15 years oil and natural gas production will go down. They're just arguing about Nord Stream all the time. Nord Stream is nothing. In June 2017, the then chancellor of Austria, Christian Kern, and the German foreign minister, Sigmar Gabriel, wrote an indignant letter with an impressive number of exclamation marks in it. They said that Europe has its own economic sovereignty and its economic security is its own responsibility. There was zero reaction in the U.S. Congress.

What explains the sanctions against our shipbuilding industry, which were launched in 2018? The reason for them is that nobody had expected Novatek to start supplying LNG so early, ahead of all the schedules. Novatek needed icebreakers but didn't have any of its own. So, what did Washington need to do? To sanction the company that was making ice-

breaker components. Unlike pipelines, LNG doesn't come under the Third Energy Package.

It's clear that in any case pipeline gas will be cheaper and will be supplied.

Georgy Petrov,
adviser to the President of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry

I'D LIKE TO START on a positive note. Mr. Belov is right that five years is a kind of jubilee. But one normally celebrates a jubilee by reporting achievements.

In 2018, Russia was under full-scale sanctions, but its foreign trade showed a record turnover. Exports grew by 20% and imports by 6%. Let's look at the structure of our trade, which is a more important indicator than statistics. There was a larger proportion of non-commodity goods in our exports while investment-based goods – machinery and industrial equipment – made up the bulk of our imports. We live under sanctions. Everything looks good.

In 2018, Russia was under full-scale sanctions, but its foreign trade showed a record turnover.

In my opinion, there have been two phases of sanctions. The sanctions of 2014 were extremely useful for us. Sorry for this pragmatism, which borders on cynicism. The sanctions of 2014 dispelled a thinking stereotype that was dominant in our country in the 1990s and early 2000s – it's not a big deal that we aren't protecting our industry, we'll just sell some oil and buy all we need. We used to hear theses of this kind from senior federal officials. It turned out we couldn't buy all we needed.

Did it all start in 2014? No, it didn't. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) was dissolved in 1994, after the end of the Cold War. Deterrence politics were born in the early 20th century but are used to this day. You may remember – there were no sanctions but was Sberbank allowed to buy Opel? It wasn't. Were the Mistral delivered to Russia, although there were signed contracts in place? And there were no penalties either. It was the Americans that stopped us from buying them. We know that it wasn't possible to buy a single supercomputer. And as regards hardware components, we were only able to import

chips that could be used in civilian industries and not in the aerospace or defense industries.

After the sanctions of 2014, we at last got down to import substitution, as has been mentioned here. But import substitution is a mixed blessing because you won't immediately start making competitive goods. Eventually, we took a correct, reasonable option, the localization of production.

It's an option that has enabled us to solve our technological dependence problem and simultaneously maintain sufficient economic sovereignty.

I completely agree with Mr. Timofeyev that sanctions and trade wars aren't the same thing. The stories of Boeing and Airbus are trade war stories. But as regards sanctions, I don't agree that this is the right term to use because sanctions are measures that must be based on Article 7 of the UN Charter while anything else are restrictive measures aimed at political pressure. How many countries are under sanctions today? Seventy. Russia, Iran and North Korea are far from the only ones. That's the action the West is taking against the rest of the world. Not too little.

Literally a few words about energy. Let's not forget that hydrocarbons still make up 60% of our exports. You hit where it hurts, and in our country, hydrocarbons are the main sanctioned industry. Why then our transportation facilities are targeted too? Because the energy industry can't survive without sea transportation. That's clear. What about hitting any other sectors? Those are monitored continuously and are under permanent pressure anyway.

How can we get over the sanctions? The only way is to implement the May decrees of the Russian president, all the 13 strategic projects. There's nothing else, nor will there ever be. We will never reject an opportunity for trade with any partner that accepts equality and mutual benefit as principles for our trade. But there won't be too many of them.

As a follow-up to what Mr. Belov said about the EU, we realize that it's after all Germany that plays the key role in the EU's position. There's no way to avoid this. We've repeatedly heard it said at meetings of the Eastern Committee, we don't like the sanctions, but we are law-abiding citizens of Germany and comply with the laws of our country. And last year Mr. Belov and I participated in a conference called Potsdam Meetings, where the head of one of the Bundestag committees said to us frankly: "Yes, you have annexed Crimea, you are fighting in Donbass, you have violated international law. We had a choice: either to respond

with armed action or to use sanctions against you. We chose sanctions. So, what are you complaining about? It's a lot better, isn't it?"

And we shouldn't forget about the dependence of EU countries on the United States. For instance, the wonderful company Siemens has probably about 20 facilities in Russia, providing equipment for railroads, electricity generation, healthcare, - there are lots of them. Siemens's business in Russia accounts for 1.7% but its business in the United States for 33% of the company's total turnover. What's Siemens going to do? Yes, I think so too. Therefore, we need to focus on our own economy.

As for payment systems, we are aware of all the dangers of settlements in dollars. But so far even introducing the euro into our foreign trade settlements has been a very slow process. It's a good job we've set up our Mir payment system. That happened very recently. You may remember that back in 2001, a Navy captain who was serving in Severodvinsk wrote to President Vladimir Putin: "All my pay gets transferred onto Visa cards, but I don't want New York banks to know how much I'm paid and how I spend my money."

So, after all, despite all their negative effects, the sanctions sometimes stimulate us to address our own problems. In conclusion, can I make one brief comment. If one believes written sources, it was Athens and Sparta that were involved in the first war of sanctions. What was the end of it? A war. Who lost it? Athens. Real wars are lost by those who have introduced sanctions. One should learn from history.

Armen Oganessian

THANK YOU. It has been a very interesting and useful session.

“The Doors of the Nations... Must Be Battered Down”

S. Rybas

Key words: USSR, Germany, Red Army, international treaties.

TODAY, when it has become a humdrum to say that World War III is raging in the space of information, we should look in the mirror of history to ask Clio for hints and clues.

In 1907, the president of Princeton University, future President of the United States Woodrow Wilson, said: “The doors of the nations which are closed against him (the manufacturer) must be battered down. Concessions obtained by financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process.”¹

Having entered World War I with a budget deficit of \$4 billion, the United States made the whole world its debtor and ended the war in 1919 with an \$11 billion surplus.

Early in the 1920s, however, the United States Geological Survey issued a forecast: in less than a decade, the American oil deposits would be depleted and the country would slide into an energy catastrophe. The explored oil reserves were far away, in the Middle East, the zealously guarded mandate territory of the British Empire.

The United States adopted War Plan Red as an answer to a possible quandary: routing the British land forces in Canada and the North Atlantic; there was a plan of suppressing an uprising inside the United States. The U.S. Congress allocated \$57 million to three secret airfields along the Canadian border.

British Defence Scheme No. 1 detailed a surprise invasion by mobile units that would move deep into the U.S. border states to destroy their infrastructure, bridges, railways, and industrial enterprises.

Svyatoslav Rybas, writer and historian, Honorary Member of the RF Academy of Military Sciences

The war was stopped by the division of Iraq Petroleum, with a virtual monopoly on the oil fields of the former Ottoman Empire, between British Petroleum, Shell and Total of France (23.7% of shares each), Standard Oil (Exxon) and Mobil (11.87% each), and Calouste Gulbenkian who made the deal possible (5%). In 1939, the War Plan Red was pushed aside as "absolutely unacceptable" but was not totally abandoned.

Nearly 20 years later, the world actors were confronted by another problem: on August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression agreement known in the history of diplomacy as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. It was at that time that the Soviet Union, the UK and France tried, in vain, to reach an agreement on mutual defense in case of a German aggression. The Polish leaders contributed to the failure by flatly refusing even to discuss a possibility of letting the Soviet troops cross their territory.

The Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army Staff reported that in March 1939 Reich Chancellor Adolf Hitler delivered a speech at a meeting of military, business, economic and party circles of Germany, in which he said that the German people should acquire sources of raw materials indispensable for its well-being. "German survival depended on seizing sources of raw materials and eliminating Germany's enemies, namely the Jews, democracies and 'international powers.' As long as these enemies retain even the tiniest power in any part of the world, they would threaten the German people's peaceful existence.

"The situation with Prague has become intolerable; Prague is badly needed to get an access to raw materials, therefore Czechoslovakia should be occupied not later than March 15.

"Poland will be next. There will be no more or less strong resistance. Germany needs Poland to get access to its agricultural products and coal.

"Hungary and Romania are undoubtedly Germany's Lebensraum. The fall of Poland and a bit of pressure will make them more tractable. In this way, Germany will acquire full control over their vast agricultural resources and rich oil fields. The same can be said about Yugoslavia.

"Realized before 1940, this plan will make Germany invincible.

"In 1940 and 1941, Germany will finally settle scores with France, its

Was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact expedient? The answer is obvious. It saved tens if not hundreds of millions of lives and several states.

eternal enemy. It will be removed from the map of Europe. England is an old and depressed country enfeebled by its own democracy. When France is defeated, Germany will have no problems to establish its domination over England and will be free to dispose of its wealth and its possessions all over the world.

“In this way, having united the continent of Europe according to this new concept, Germany will launch ‘the greatest operation in all history, an attack at the United States.... We will settle accounts with the Jews of the dollar.... We will exterminate the Jewish democracy and Jewish blood will mix itself with the dollars.’ Today, Americans are able to insult our people; a day will come when they regret, even if too late, every word said against us.”

The German strategy was clarified. On the West, Germany was protected by treaties, on the East, no treaties had been signed.

The talks between Moscow and the military delegations of the UK and France failed: The Soviet Union was left unprotected by the lack of agreements with the Western democracies. It was at that time that Moscow signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; assessed by Churchill as “cold-headed, calculating and highly realistic.” He was no Stalin’s admirer.

Contrary to what is said today, the pact perfectly fitted the diplomatic standards of the time; in fact, it was preceded by several international treaties.

The German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact also known as Hitler-Pilsudski Pact, “valid for a period of ten years,” was concluded on January 26, 1934 and spoke of peaceful solutions of all disputes and “in no circumstances, however, will they (both Governments) proceed to the application of force for the purpose of reaching a decision in such disputes.”

The treaty had a secret supplement, according to which Germany promised not to act against Poland either on its own or together with other states while Poland promised to remain absolutely neutral if Germany was attacked directly or indirectly “even if Germany will be obliged under provocation or on its own initiative to start a war to defend its honor and security.”

This explains why in August 1939 Poland did not allow Red Army units to cross its territory, an indispensable condition of the planned military treaty between the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. This was one of the reasons why an anti-Hitler front was not formed at that time.

In his address to the German people, Hitler justified his attack at the USSR by the need to defend Germany against the Red Army.

The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 de facto legalized rearmament of Germany in violation of the international treaties then in force.

In 1938, Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy signed the Munich Agreement that divided Czechoslovakia while Benito Mussolini as its initiator was contemplated as the next Nobel Peace prize winner.

On December 6, 1938, France and Germany signed a non-aggression pact known as Bonnet-Ribbentrop Pact.

On March 3, 1939, Lithuania signed a non-aggression pact with Germany.

On June 7, 1939, Foreign Minister of Estonia Karl Selter and Foreign Minister of Germany Joachim von Ribbentrop signed a non-aggression treaty known as the Selter-Ribbentrop Pact. On the same day, Latvia signed a similar pact with Germany that went down in history as the Munters-Ribbentrop Pact.

To sum up: seven European countries signed non-aggression pacts with Germany. These are the facts.

On August 31, 1939, several days after the signing of the non-aggression treaty with Germany, *Pravda* carried an article about the Borodino memorial that should be put in order, the sooner the better.

What were the “terrible repercussions” if seen through the “alternative history” optics?

Having pushed the Soviet-German border some 200-300 km to the west, these “repercussions” critically affected the course of the Great Patriotic War. Otherwise, the Blitzkrieg could have immense chances of success.

Thanks to the treaty, the German armies were detained by the stubborn resistance of the Red Army in the Baltic, Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine; otherwise, Germans would have found themselves in Kiev and Smolensk much faster; they would have outstripped the Soviet command that needed time to bring reserves to Moscow. This would have permitted the Germans to move tens of their divisions from the Eastern Front and land in England, break through to Egypt and capture the oil fields of the Middle East, the “energy goal” of Hitler’s strategy. Moscow and Leningrad would be destroyed and there would not be the German defeat at Moscow in December 1941. London would have been captured by Germans; the British government would be forced to move to Canada and the Soviet Government would be pushed away beyond the Urals.

God knows for how long the war would be going on; Germans might have used this time to make an atomic bomb. The United States would have been the next target of Germany and Japan as its ally.

Was the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact expedient? The answer is obvious. It saved tens if not hundreds of millions of lives and several states.

What can we see in the mirror of Clio? History repeats itself even if the plots are new; the same opponents play the same chess game on the same world chessboard. Those who accuse the Soviet Union of signing the pact are either political ignoramuses (ha-ha!) or deliberately distract attention from their own schemes be it War Plan Red or any other projects.

NOTES

¹ Stone, Oliver; Kuznick, Peter. *Nerasskazannaya istoria SShA*, Moscow, 2014, p. 41.

² See: *Sekrety polskoy politiki 1935-1945 gg. Rassekrechennye dokumenty Sluzhby vneshney razvedki Rossiiskoy Federatsii*. Compiled by L.F. Sotskov, Moscow, 2009, p. 28.

The 75th Anniversary of the RF Foreign Ministry's Financial Service

A. Lysikov

Key words: 75 years, anniversary, Currency and Finance Department.

THE HISTORY of financial services support for foreign policy activity dates back many centuries, and I would like to make a brief digression into the past events preceding the establishment of the Currency and Finance Administration on August 12, 1944. On that day, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs issued Order No. 221 on the reorganization of the Currency and Finance Office as the Currency and Finance Administration (CFA).

In the 15th and 16th centuries, all financial matters, including interstate relations, were the responsibility of the Treasury Department (from which the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) was hived off, among others, in 1549).

The DFA was a mediator between the tsar, the Boyar Duma and foreign ambassadors, and it performed the function of a foreign policy office, that is, mainly engaged in correspondence on foreign relations. At the same time, its purview included matters relating to the foreign ambassadors' presence in Moscow, evidently including certain financial matters.

The DFA was responsible not only for Russia's diplomatic relations, but its trade relations with other countries. It also had the authority to collect taxes from certain territories that were used to pay salaries to the Duma boyars and civil servants. The Office of POW Affairs, responsible for raising funds to ransom POWs, also answered to the DFA.

In the course of the reforms carried out by Peter the Great between 1718 and 1720, the majority of administrative bodies were abolished and collegiums were established. In December 1718, in keeping with Peter

Andrei Lysikov, Director of the Currency and Finance Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

the Great's decree, the Collegium of Foreign Affairs was formed, replacing the DFA.

On February 13 (February 24 New Style), 1720, Peter the Great issued a decree titled "Regulations on the Collegium of Foreign Affairs," a document that essentially became its statute.

The Regulations noted in particular that financial, economic and other matters were to be handled by a special department, namely the Collegium's second division (subsequently called the Public Department). The first division (political) was called the Secret Department.

The decree specified the Public Department's functions: "Other matters, namely, revenues and expenditures; Hetman and Kalmyk charters; letters patent; the bestowing of titles and ranks, as well as other related matters, except for those pertaining to foreign lands, shall be within the purview of the special department and under the direction of Captain of the Guard Gorokhov, with a team of assessors and other assistants, and who shall answer to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs." February 24 (New Style), 1720 can be considered the date of the establishment of the financial services unit at the Collegium of Foreign Affairs.

Under Peter the Great, permanent diplomatic missions and consulates were established abroad. In May 1722, Peter the Great issued a decree setting salaries for Russian diplomatic representatives stationed abroad.

On January 28 (February 8), 1779, Empress Catherine the Great issued a decree on financing the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, setting payrolls and salaries for its central office in St. Petersburg, the Moscow office and the Moscow archive, as well as for missions abroad. It did not specify the number of officials at the central office but allocated a certain amount of money to hire the required number of personnel, whose salaries were to be set "commensurate with working experience and abilities, with the remaining amounts used to pay bonuses as a reward for diligence and success in acquiring and developing appropriate skills and expertise."

Under the new arrangement, the Public Office was divided into three branches (departments) – state affairs (treasury), current affairs and postal affairs. It also included a ceremonial department. The Treasury Department's functions included "treasury management and audits," "processing the funds received under the new arrangement and ensuring the safe storage of those funds... and that specific sums are never interchanged," and "using those funds to pay salaries and other emoluments

as per standing arrangements.” Even now, those provisions have not lost their relevance. Their contemporary equivalents could be as follows: “ensuring that funds are used for their intended purposes,” “paying salaries in accordance with the salary chart,” etc.

In 1802, pursuant to Alexander I's manifesto, eight ministries were established, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, the Collegium of Foreign Affairs remained as the main foreign policy administration body.

At that time, the Collegium consisted of two offices (departments) – the Secret and the Public

Departments. The Public Department dealt with “all of the Collegium's financial and economic matters, as well as its relations with other official bodies.” In 1832, the Collegium of Foreign Affairs was finally abolished.

In April 1832, Emperor Nicholas I issued a decree to the Senate titled “On the Establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” bringing the ministry's new structure in line with that of other ministries. In May of the same year, the Department of Economic Affairs and Accounting started work, with a staff of 254 people. It dealt with all of the ministry's financial and economic matters, as well as human resources at the central office and Russia's missions abroad, including mission and embassy churches. The department consisted of two subdivisions – the executive and accounts sections. The latter was responsible for all financial matters and accounts: keeping financial records, drawing up estimates, doing accounts, tracking costs, doing the books on all financial operations, carrying out audits, and so on.

The duties of department officials were defined as follows: “1) hiring and termination; leaves; recommendation for titles, ranks, other awards and pensions for Foreign Ministry officials in positions at home and abroad, as well as for members of the clergy and ministers of religion stationed abroad; 2) administration and management of all state property belonging to the ministry both in Russia and abroad; the maintenance of

The CFD is responsible for processing and administering federal budget funds, ensuring the implementation of the Russian Foreign Ministry's function, and providing financial services support for the operation of the ministry's central office, regional offices, missions abroad, and subordinate organizations.

the ministry's buildings, including construction, repairs, servicing, lighting, and heating; management of maintenance and service teams; procurement and consumption of office materials, and 3) making cost estimates, auditing accounts and drawing up reports for all of the ministry's facilities in keeping with standing rules and regulations."

In 1868, the Department of Economic Affairs and Accounting was renamed the Department of Personnel and Economic Affairs (DPEA), since personnel records and files from all of the ministry's departments were transferred to it. The DPEA was subsequently referred to as the First Department. It existed until March 1917.

Following the outbreak of the First World War, in the fall of 1914, a temporary bureau of remittances and loans was established within the First Department. The Foreign Ministry took care of Russian citizens who remained abroad due to the outbreak of hostilities, including military reservists, persons subject to military service obligation and prisoners of war. The ministry provided them material assistance, issuing loans and allowances on site and helping people receive money transfers that were sent from Russia to enemy countries and occupied territories at preferential rates (with the help of Russian diplomatic missions and diplomatic representatives of neutral countries).

In March 1917, following the adoption of the Provisional Government's resolution on the reorganization of the Foreign Ministry, the First Department was renamed the Department of General Affairs. In April 1917, the temporary bureau of remittances and loans was reorganized as an independent department reporting directly to a deputy foreign minister.

After 1917, a new stage in the history of national diplomacy began. Pursuant to a decree of the 2nd All-Russian Congress of Soviets, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) was established, headed by L.D. Trotsky.

In June 1921, the Council of People's Commissars approved a statute on the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The NKID was comprised of five departments, including the Administrative Office responsible for financial, personnel, economic and many other matters. In November 1940, the Finance Department was separated from the Administrative Office and reorganized as an independent Currency and Finance Department, with a staff of 25, which was responsible for "overseeing the financial, accounting and budgetary process of the commissariat's entire system."

Yakov Martynovich Martinson, who headed the commissariat's finance department from April 1930 until December 1937, was one of the NKID's first financial experts. He was born in 1892 in Livland Province (today the Republic of Latvia) into the family of a carpenter. At the age of 18, he joined the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party. In 1912 and 1913, Yakov Martinson was repeatedly arrested and was exiled to Tomsk Province. After the February 1917 Revolution, Martinson worked in various positions, including in state security and military intelligence services.

The early 1930s saw the second stage of the recognition of the Soviet state, when diplomatic relations were established with Spain, the United States, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and several other countries. In those far from easy times, Yakov Martinson was appointed to head the NKID's Finance Department. He repeatedly made short-term foreign business trips to organize and oversee the financial and economic activities of Soviet plenipotentiaries in other countries.

In 1937, a wave of reprisals was unleashed against ethnic Latvians, which also affected Yakov Martinson. On January 25, 1938, a commission of the USSR People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the USSR Prosecutor General's Office sentenced Yakov Martynovich to death with the confiscation of property. He was executed on February 3, 1938 at the Butovo firing range near Moscow. On April 30, 1957, the Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court rehabilitated Yakov Martinson.

Viktor Antonovich Rybin was another head of the Currency and Finance Administration. He began his career at the NKID in March 1945 as a senior assistant at the Economic Department. In May 1965, V.A. Rybin was appointed to direct the CFA and headed it for almost 22 years (until his retirement in March 1987). He was awarded two Orders of the Red Banner of Labor (in 1966 and 1971), the Order of Friendship of Peoples (1977) and the Order of the Badge of Honor (1981), among other awards. He oversaw several structural changes, including the creation of the ministry's central accounts department in 1970. In 1977, retraining and advanced training programs were organized for chief and senior accountants at the ministry's missions abroad.

In December 1993, the Currency and Finance Administration was reorganized as the Currency and Finance Department (CFD) as part of the program to improve the organizational structure of the ministry's central office.

I would especially like to highlight the role of the ministry's financial experts, who helped provide timely and sufficient financing for the operation of the ministry's central office, regional offices and missions abroad following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the country's economic decline.

The following also made a significant contribution to that: Yury Aleksandrovich Chulkov, who headed the CFA/CFD between 1987 and 1994; Sergey Ilyich Mareyev, CFD director from 1996 until 2004, later appointed director general of the RF Foreign Ministry (2012-2015); Vyacheslav Anatolyevich Logutov, CFD director in 2004-2010, subsequently appointed Russian consul general in Leipzig (Germany); and Vladimir Vladimirovich Kuptsov, Russian consul general in Varna (Bulgaria) in 1994-1998, prior to that CFD first deputy director.

In 2006, the transfer of certain planning, financing, accounting and reporting functions from the Administrative Office and the Capital Construction Department to the CFD was completed. It could be said that since 2007, the CFD has concentrated financial functions of the ministry, which has significantly improved the effectiveness of the decision-making process.

At present, the CFD is responsible for processing and administering federal budget funds, ensuring the implementation of the Russian Foreign Ministry's function as a budget financed entity, and providing financial services support for the operation of the ministry's central office, regional offices, missions abroad, and subordinate organizations. At the same time, the department ensures that budgetary funds are used for their intended purposes, organizes and keeps budget records, provides reliable accounting data and other information related to budget execution and oversees the use of budgetary funds. This is just a partial list of the department's functions and tasks.

It is important to note that the provision of financial support to missions abroad is one of the department's most complex and multidimensional functions.

Over 250 missions around the world work according to Russian laws, but at the same time comply with the requirements and restrictions in their host countries related to local currency legislation, business management rules, banking regulations, etc. This requires a special approach toward financing, planning, accounting, and reporting. Accountants at Russian missions abroad can rightly be described as versatile financial services experts, since, in addition to accounting, their functions include

planning, procurement and overseeing cost effectiveness and revenue collection.

In addition, it should be noted that Russian missions abroad perform several other highly important functions, such as protecting the interests of Russian citizens, working with compatriots living abroad, implementing military memorial programs, holding elections, and so on. Financial support for these projects is provided in close cooperation with the CFD and other ministry departments concerned. The CFD regularly organizes retraining and advanced training programs for accountants at Russian missions abroad and holds workshops and consultations on financial matters.

I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate CFD veterans and current employees, accountants at the ministry's missions abroad, regional offices and subordinate organizations on the anniversary. They have been doing their job in a responsible and highly professional way, which is very important for ensuring the RF Foreign Ministry's activities.

The Currency and Finance Department: The Heart of the Foreign Ministry

B. Idrisov

Key words: CFD, CFA/CFD veterans, Currency and Finance Department, Currency and Finance Administration.

Question: *Boris Galeyevich, you have worked at the Foreign Ministry's central office, the currency and finance division, and Soviet and then Russian missions abroad. Surely you were lucky enough to work together with Currency and Finance Administration/ Currency and Finance Department [CFA/CFD] legends?*

Answer: Indeed, I have worked with many prominent personalities. V.V. Kuptsov, a CFA veteran, worked there all his life, as they say. A vivid personality. He was party secretary at the Currency and Finance Administration (as it was known in those days), a natural born leader. He could help, scold and punish or reward you, and he was certainly a real expert.

Yu.A. Chulkov joined the CFA in 1987. A lot changed in the administration on his watch. There were significant personnel changes, with many high-level specialists employed, including those with academic advanced degrees. A completely new array of goals was set – not just ensuring the financial and economic operation of the ministry's missions abroad or its central office. A department of foreign policy and economic forecasting was established to study the impact of economic issues on international affairs. Unfortunately, that work ground to a halt in the 1990s. Many people quit. The CFD suffered significant losses.

S.F. Dyatchenko was a unique person, of course. I have known him since 1973. He worked with a magnifying glass because he had poor eyesight. He was an acknowledged expert; there were few people like him.

Boris Idrisov, veteran of the Currency and Finance Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

He had extensive experience of working abroad and in the central office. For many years, he oversaw the most responsible and difficult area of activity – namely, preparing the ministry’s consolidated balance sheets in terms of funding, spending, exchange rate differences, etc. It was a very hard work. At that time, there were no computers, and, as a matter of fact, any such technology was banned. We used Rheinmetall calculators with a carriage. When we worked with big numbers, the office resembled a shop floor: The din was so terrible that we could not hear each other.

At that time, P.P. Korablyov was CFA deputy chief, and he had a thing about scientific organization of labor. He made a willful decision to procure Toshiba computing machines, and silence descended on the CFA.

S.F. Dyatchenko was an amazingly hard-working, very quiet and calm person.

However, once he scolded me. You know, accounts in certain countries are done in several currencies. Vietnam was the first country where a portion of wages began to be paid in U.S. dollars. The question was whether there should be one or two balance sheets. An order was issued: one balance sheet. That resulted in an exchange rate difference of over one million foreign currency rubles. I did all calculations in keeping with those instructions. At that time, I did not have enough experience. I submitted an annual balance sheet on Vietnam with an exchange rate difference of one million rubles. S.F. Dyatchenko became angry and told me off. Later, when we figured out the situation, it turned out that I was right. We held a meeting and decided to do two balance sheets. The exchange rate difference on Vietnam fell from one million rubles to 8,000.

Thanks to V.A. Rybin, in 1973, the CFA began to hire young specialists fresh out of university, mainly graduates of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. That significantly improved the quality of the department’s personnel. By the late 1980s, there were practically no employees without a higher education. Prior to that, there was a large proportion of staff with only a secondary specialized education.

Perhaps the 1990s were the most trying period at the CFD. The Foreign Ministry was underfunded. The ministry’s missions abroad began to search for new sources of revenue. Many missions engaged in self-financing, so to speak.

Moreover, the CFD had some of the ministry's most well-educated and youngest staff members.

Q: You have witnessed epochal changes in the country and the world as a whole. That was bound to affect the Foreign Ministry. What were the most difficult times?

A: Perhaps the 1990s were the most trying period at the CFD. The Foreign Ministry was underfunded. The ministry's missions abroad began to search for new sources of revenue. Major efforts were being made. Many missions engaged in self-financing, so to speak. At that time, I worked at the Russian Embassy in Italy, which, like all Soviet missions abroad, was financed by the Center via an Italian bank. On January 1, 1992, money transfers from Moscow were halted. I returned home in 1995. Not a kopeck had been paid during that period.

What did we live off? We lived off consular fees. They were revised and raised significantly. As a matter of fact, our consular fees were matched to our costs. In other words, the actual costs involved in visa processing and the rendering of other consular services were reimbursed.

The central office had no money to pay wages. Foreign currency was delivered by diplomatic mail from missions abroad and exchanged for rubles, and wages were paid. Thanks to such nontraditional solutions at the CFD, in particular those made by its director, Yu.A. Chulkov, the ministry's diplomatic staff was largely preserved. It is no secret that many experienced, knowledgeable employees quit at that time.

Q: There was also another source of revenue: Foreign Ministry employees working abroad had a portion of their wages taken by the state. Why did that practice stop at the most difficult time for the Foreign Ministry?

A: Beginning January 1, 1992, Russian officials working abroad did not have to report to the Embassy. A legitimate question arises: Was it the right time to get them "off the hook"? Could their money have helped the ministry's missions abroad and the central office in difficult times?

As a matter of fact, the obligation to turn the money paid by the UN over to the state was a violation of the UN Charter. Indeed, we had instructions to equate the status of all international organizations employees to corresponding positions at Soviet missions abroad. They were also paid a 10% bonus for working at an international organization. High-

ranking officials at international organizations turned their money over to the state. As for administrative and technical personnel, for instance, typists, sometimes they cost our state more than they cost the international organization they worked for because they were provided free accommodation. It was expensive to rent an apartment in New York, especially in Manhattan. Typists who worked at the UN Secretariat were provided apartments in Manhattan. Their salaries did not cover those costs. So, we actually ended up in the red.

However, it was an even greater sin to pay extra bonuses to UN employees. Some countries did so to incentivize their citizens to work there. UN salaries were low, by those countries' standards.

Q: Generally, how were salaries at missions abroad set in the 1970s? How did budget commissions work? At that time, salaries were paid in different currencies: French francs, Italian lire, Japanese yen, etc. Now, there is a common denominator – i.e., the dollar.

A: Yes, in Japan, salaries began to be paid in Japanese yen, if memory serves me right, in 1978 and that did not change until the UN compensation system was introduced in 2001. According to it, the material security of employees in all countries is reviewed every three months. The cost of living in each country is constantly monitored. New York was adopted as a standard of reference (100%), and the cost of living in other countries was calculated compared to New York. The lowest salary was in the Soviet Union.

Until 1998, salaries were based on what was known as the budget set. The procedure was as follows. An interagency commission, including CFA and Finance Ministry representatives, would go to Soviet missions abroad. It would examine the standard of living in a country and establish the budget set. It would be wrong to say that it was bad. However, when we compared it to that in France and other developed countries, the Soviet set was 20 times lower. Nevertheless, it was interesting.

It included food, consumer services, theater tickets, clothing, etc. It was standard for all countries. So, when people would go to Africa, and the budget set specified the cost of a winter coat with an Astrakhan collar, they would have to document its value. You could not just write “\$100” – you had to present a receipt from a store or a bill from a tailor's shop.

My last experience with the budget set was in 1993 in Rome. We had

an interagency commission visit us. That budget set never corresponded to reality. For instance, it listed a fixed cost for a tailored suit in Italy. My salary was 1.1 million Italian lire (about \$600). However, a Brioni or Gucci suit cost about 10 million. I went to Brioni on recommendation from a Romanov descendant and asked for the bill. A winter coat, a summer coat or a winter suit there cost 10 million. An unlined summer suit was 12 million, because the material was thinner and more expensive. Had I included all that in the budget set, I would probably have run into trouble.

Of course, the interagency commission tried to be as objective as possible, but that was simply impossible. So, in the late 1990s, the decision was made to transition to a more objective UN system. However, the transition was not complete. Nevertheless, I believe the adoption of a single currency, the U.S. dollar, was a big step forward.

Q: You have witnessed a major change in the CFD work process. How did people master new technology?

A: When I joined the CFA in 1973 (by the way, the subject of my graduation paper was “Current and Calendar Planning in an Automated Experimental Production Management System”), P.P. Korablyov said: “We need to introduce automation technology into our accounting and reporting procedure. Go work on it.” In a sense, I was a pioneer in that field, but in reality, the CFD did not start using automated accounting and data processing technology until 1979 or 1980.

First, automation technology was used to calculate the ruble-denominated portion of salaries paid to employees of the USSR Foreign Ministry’s missions abroad. As you know, our employees’ salary consisted of two parts – one denominated in foreign currency and the other in Soviet rubles. Naturally, the foreign currency portion was paid abroad, and the ruble part was credited by the department and wired to a Sberbank office – I believe it was No. 7978 on Dobrynin Square. Payroll processing for more than 10,000 people was a daunting task. There were three employees handling the job. Then a machine was bought for that purpose. It was put into operation in 1983. That was when automation technology began to be introduced. Mind you, it was not a computer, but a big machine that was installed in a separate room – No. 18, where I worked.

Later, when I was on a business trip to Italy, a computer to automate the accounting process was delivered, but the security service forbade me

even to put it in the office. It was taken down to the basement, where we used it to play preference and other card games.

Sometime in the mid-1990s, when I was working at our mission in New York, three local computer systems were set up – one for diplomats, one for accounting and one for technical staff. Digitization started moving full steam ahead. However, that required forceful decisions.

In this context, I recall the remarks of Minister Counselor F.I. Stanevsky, the charge d'affaires in Rome: "This is progress; you can't stop it; we must move forward." He was right.

Q: What is the CFD like at present?

A: The CFD is the heart of the Foreign Ministry, as it were. Where there is life, there is money, and where there is money, there is life. The operation of the central office would be impossible without the CFD and without material and technical supplies for our missions abroad. The CFD has strengthened its position and consolidated its status. Previously, there were accounting and planning departments at the Capital Construction Administration and the Procurement and Property Office. Granted, I do not think that all of them should have been integrated under the CFD's umbrella: We have been through that. However, such are the legal requirements.

There can be a strong and healthy Foreign Ministry only with a healthy and strong CFD.

Russian-Moldavian Relations Under the First Romanovs

Yu. Bulatov

Key words: Russian State, House of Romanovs, Principality of Moldavia.

HAVING BECOME THE CZAR of All Russia, the Grand Prince Ivan III (1462-1505) defined in a nutshell the foreign policy doctrine of the Russian State: to gather under Moscow's power all lands that had belonged to Kievan Rus.

History conferred the responsibility for this grandiose plan on the Romanovs, the new dynasty on the Russian throne (February 21, 1613 to February 27, 1917). From the first year of its rule, the House of Romanovs officially proclaimed Czar Mikhail Fyodorovich Romanov and his descendants as legal heirs of the Moscow princes of the Rurik dynasty who would continue their foreign policy course. The czarist dynasty should be given its due for managing, during 300 years of its rule, to assemble gradually and consistently the greater part of the Kievan Rus within the borders of the Russian State.

The new dynasty followed in the footsteps of Ivan III: the Romanovs included the lands in the Carpathians and along the Dniester (earlier known as South-Western Rus) into the list of the "lost" territories. In the 10th and 11th centuries, they were part of the Old Rus; in the 12th-first half of the 13th century, during the period of feudal disunity in Rus, they were part of the Principality of Galicia-Volhynia.

During the next 100 years, the population of the Carpathian-Dniester lands lived under the cruel rule of Mongols and Tatars; later, they were no less cruelly oppressed by Hungarian feudal lords and Polish szlachta. The Moldavian Principality that appeared in 1359 in the Carpathian-Dniester region did not improve the lives of common people. After a long

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and unequal struggle against the Porte, they were conquered by the Ottoman Turks and were ruled by Turkish sultans. In 1511, the Moldavian rulers had to officially accept Ottoman suzerainty.

At a huge cost of lost lives and hardships, the people defended and protected their faith, their specific political order and power, albeit nominal in many cases, of the local rulers. Moldavia paid the Sublime Porte official tribute, the main evidence of its vassal status. Its population had to pay to the Turkish treasury all sorts of steadily increasing taxes and dues.

The Turks controlled Moldavia's foreign policy. Its princes could not sign agreements with other states or join unions or coalitions; their independence in international affairs was limited to actions that did not contradict the interests of the sultan; those who deviated from the "general line" of the Sublime Porte were, at best, removed from their posts. Death was another option.

The reunification of Ukraine and Russia that took place in Pereyaslavl in January 1654 was gradually moving the borders of the Muscovite state to the territory of the Principality of Moldavia. New dividing lines separated the Muslim and the Orthodox world changing the political context and the balance of power on the international arena. This gave Russia a chance to become again the main actor in the Carpathian-Dniester region and reunite the lost lands with the historical Motherland.

Inspired by Ukrainian "independence" that relied on Moscow, the Moldavian rulers discussed with their closest advisors the chances of shaking off their dependence on the Ottoman Empire and of joining Russia. In February 1654, a month after the decision passed by the Rada in Pereyaslavl to reunite with Russia, Ivan Grigoryev, a confidant of Moldavian Prince Gheorghe Ștefan, was urgently dispatched to Moscow with the plea to accept Moldavia as one of its subjects. Moscow agreed to start negotiations immediately.¹ Soon after it, in May 1654, Russia was engaged in another war with Poland for Ukraine (1654-1667).

In April 1654, Grigoryev came back with a royal document that confirmed Moscow's consent to accept Moldavia. The pro-Russian

The czarist dynasty should be given its due for managing to assemble gradually and consistently the greater part of Kievan Rus within the borders of the Russian State during 300 years of its rule,

Moldavian boyars needed some time before they could close their ranks and discuss, in deep secrecy, the conditions, on which their country could join the Muscovite state. The Russian party among the Moldavian boyars took all precautions to keep in secret the future visit of their representatives to Moscow. Turks were officially informed that the trip to Moscow was a planned one with the goal to develop the contacts between the two churches. This stirred no doubts among the Turks: regular religious and cultural contacts between Muscovy and Moldavia and mutual visits of Russian and Moldavian icon painters and artists were pretty common.

The letter addressed to the Moscow Posolsky prikaz (Diplomatic Department) that the Moldavian envoys brought to Moscow was worded accordingly: "Our Prince bows to you and asks to let us paint certain icons for the monastery our Prince is building."² In spring 1656, when all preliminaries had been concluded, Prince Gheorghe Ștefan asked Czar Alexey Mikhaylovich to receive his representatives to discuss with them Moldavia's accession to Russia.

It should be said that the process of rapprochement of the rulers of both countries was not a chance or a short-lived phenomenon. Interethnic contacts between Great Russians and Moldavians had a long history; the ethnicities had passed through similar development stages. The following confirmed the closeness of histories of the Great Russians and Moldavians:

First, they had common "relatives." The ethnic substrates of Moldavians were Volokhs (East Romanic people, the ancestors of contemporary Moldavians and Romanians), Turkic peoples (Pechenegs and Polovtsy) and Easter Slavs (tribes of Tivertsi and Uliches) who had lived in the Prut-Dniester interfluvium. No matter how small, the "drop of Slavic blood" brought the peoples of the Carpathian-Dniester region and the Russian world closer together;

Second, the Great Russians and Moldavians were united by the Orthodox faith. The Russian and Moldavian religious figures invariably pointed to the spiritual unity between the two Orthodox Churches and two Orthodox peoples. The documents issued by the Constantinople Patriarchate in the late 14th century spoke of Moldavian Metropolitan see as Russovlakhia;

Third, the Orthodoxy determined the common cultural traditions of Russians and Moldavians. Church Slavonic remained the official language of the Principality for several centuries from the late 14th to the mid-17th century when it was replaced with Moldavian. Its literary ver-



The Grand Prince Ivan III

sion was used in official documents, in education and in church services. This shift, however, did not undermine the positions of Orthodoxy in the Moldavian Principality; the Church was highly respected, its authority unquestioned.

This explains why Prince Gheorghe Ștefan appointed Metropolitan Gedeon the head of the Moldavian delegation dispatched to Moscow for talks. After the prince, the Metropolitan was the most important person in the spiritual and secular hierarchy; the Moldavian elite regarded him as an official defender of the interests of all citizens of the Moldavian Principality inside the country and outside it. Secular power likewise was

represented in the delegation headed by boyar Grigory Nyanul. Other members of the delegation played a secondary role in the mission and were, to a great extent, a support group of sorts for the Metropolitan.

The trip was far from easy. Despite the unification of Ukraine and Russia, the Moldavian delegation was stopped by “Ukrainian border guards” in Putyvl. The official letter from Moldavian Prince Gheorghe Ștefan to Russian Czar Alexey Mikhaylovich did not help: they were allowed to continue their trip only on the strength of a letter by Ukrainian Hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky to the Putyvl voevoda (military commander) sent on a request of the Moldavians.³

In Moscow, the Moldavian delegation headed by Metropolitan Gedeon visited Patriarch Nikon to hand him a letter from Prince Gheorghe Ștefan. It was a visit of courtesy, with no official mission or official message to the head of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Moldavian guests were invited to the Posolsky prikaz to inform the Kremlin about the situation in the Moldavian Principality.

The letter the Moldavian officials handed to the Russian czar said: “Our ruler wanted to bow to your great Czardom with all his heart and great joy; he would like to become your vassal but could not do this because we were separated from all countries by unholy Turks and Tatars and other ungodly people and we could not say to all that we want to obey your great Czardom so that Turks and Tatars would not know. At that time, the land of Moldavia did not want to do this because Turks and Tatars would kill our rulers and devastate our land.”⁴

When talking to the Russians the delegates complained: “We deemed it necessary to inform you, the Czar who has been ruling for many years, that we have learned that the Crimean khan with his army intends to help the Poles and wants to involve us as well into a war against your Czarist army. We cannot oppose them and will, therefore, side with him. We do not know how to refuse them because they are strong. They will take us prisoners and devastate our state.”⁵ The Kremlin was not delighted; these “revelations” of the potential ally could have cast doubt on the very fact of the talks. This, however, did not happen.

As mentioned above, the Moldavians came to Moscow to discuss a possible transfer of the principality under Russia’s rule under certain conditions. During the talks with Czar Alexey Mikhaylovich, the Moldavian side specified its conditions: restoration of the order that existed before the Ottoman rule; return of the lands that the Turks had detached from the principality; protection of Moldavian borders by Russian troops while

Moldavians were ready to fight side by side with the Russian army in all wars. The sides discussed in detail the following points of their future agreement: confirmation of the power of Moldavian princes; confirmation of their right to appoint local officials on the territory of the principality; unlike the Turks, Russia would not collect taxes on the territory of Moldavia.

In fact, the elite wanted to preserve the vassal relations with a different suzerain on easier conditions. Mutual financial concessions in the form that today would have been described as “kickbacks” were also discussed. The Moldavians said that they were ready to send “good presents” to the czar every year,⁶ if Moscow agreed not to collect taxes on their territory. The top Moldavian officials were obviously guided by mercantile interests, the noble motives pushed aside.

Despite obvious Moldavian mercantilism, Czar Alexey Mikhaylovich, a highly religious person, was convinced that the Orthodox people could not and should not be abandoned to the mercy of Catholics or Muslims. He did not hesitate: on June 7, 1656, at the Cathedral of the Assumption in the Kremlin, Metropolitan Gedeon swore perpetual allegiance to Russia for himself, Gheorghe Ștefan and the spiritual and secular officials of Moldavia.⁷ The Russian czar handed the Charter of the Transfer of the Principality of Moldavia to Russian suzerainty to the Moldavian delegation. By this sumptuous official ceremony, the “medieval publicists” intended to consolidate the positions of the “Russian party” among the Moldavian boyars.

Even though the handwritten newspaper *Kuranty* read at the czarist court carried no information about the serious changes in the relations between Russia and Moldavia, the Turks learned about the talks in the Kremlin between Czar Alexey Mikhaylovich and Metropolitan Gedeon and Boyar Grigory Nyanul and the decisions they produced. The rulers of the Ottoman Empire did not like what they learned about the pro-Russian feelings among the top Moldavian officials. As soon as the ambassadors returned from Moscow, Prince Gheorghe Ștefan was deposed. The agreement remained on paper. The Turks were not the only side to blame.

It should be said that the talks between the Russian czar and Metropolitan Gedeon did not specify the status of the Moldavian Principality as part of Russia. This point was deliberately avoided by the Russian side; the oath that the Moldavians gave at the Cathedral of the Assumption contained no mention of the issue. It was an oath of allegiance to the Russian autocrat: the Moldavian side assumed an obligation

“to fight all enemies of the czar without betrayal and, in future, never join the Turkish, Crimean or other rulers.”⁸

In fact, the Moldavian project of the vassal relations with Moscow was not welcome in the Kremlin as ill-timed.

The Moldavian delegation arrived on the next day of the Zemsky Sobor (council of Russian nobility) that adopted Sobornoe Ulozhenie (Council Code) of 1649 that paved the way toward absolute monarchy in Russia. Its basic provisions – autocracy, centralism and serfdom – consolidated the relationships of complete (unconditional and unquestioned) subordination of everyone to the supreme ruler. However, the Moldavian side offered something opposite: mutual contacts based on vassalage, that is, a set of rights and responsibilities of the suzerain regarding his subjects. The Moscow rulers preferred the traditional road of unitarism. In view of its experience of Tatar-Mongol yoke, Muscovy wanted to have a centralized state with no analogies in the West. The Moldavian ambassadors spent enough time in Moscow to understand that vassalage under Russian rule was impossible.

It should be said in all justice that vassalage was later practiced by autocratic Russia as an exception rather than a rule and not as a traditional form of the relationships between the center and the periphery. According to the population census of 1897, in the late 19th century, the Russian Empire had four vassalages: the Grand Duchy of Finland, the Bukhara Emirate, the Khiva Khanate, and the Uryankhay Territory, the populations of which had no common civilizational roots with the Russian ethnicity and belonged to different world civilizations.

The Great Russians and the Moldavians belonged to the civilization traditionally defined in the West as Slavic Orthodox, and their common civilizational roots were clearly seen in their history. In the first place, the Great Russian and Moldavian ethnicities are of the same age. The victory of Dmitry Donskoy over the Golden Horde on the Kulikovo Field in 1380 concluded the process of consolidation of Great Russians into an ethnicity. In the history of Moldavians, this happened when the Moldavian statehood appeared in the mid-14th century. According to the teaching of Lev Gumilyov about ethnogenesis, these ethnicities entered the acmatic (the highest) phase of ethnogenesis during the Middle Ages; this means that it happened practically simultaneously.

Not infrequently, the level of Moldavian “passionarity” (the term coined by Gumilyov) proved to be higher than that of Great Russians; the history of the relationships between them contains numerous relevant

examples; the Moldavian nobility, for example, used much better methods of training professional administrators. The process was supervised by Moldavian spiritual hierarchs. In culture and education, they outstripped many countries and were highly respected in Moldavia and outside it.

Peter Mogila, a Moldavian church ideologue, was recognized across the Orthodox world for his Didactic Gospels written in 1616 and respected as the founder of the Slavic-Greco-Latin School (1631) at the Kiev Lavra of the Caves in Ukraine (later the Kiev-Mohyla Academy). Secular power appreciated the initiatives of Moldavian clerics and developed them. In 1640, under Prince Vasile Lupu (1634-1653), a Slavic-Greco-Latin Academy was opened in Yassy, the capital of the Moldavian Principality.

It was half a century later that Muscovy recognized the importance of training secular and church administrators. In 1687, under Princess Sofia, the regent of Ivan V and Peter I, Moscow acquired a similar higher education establishment. The Slavic-Greco-Latin Academy in Moscow trained future top officials and raised the educational level of the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church. Thus, from the point of view of the theory of ethnogenesis, the Great Russian and Moldavian ethnicities were practically equal.

This means that if the Moldavian Principality did become a Russian vassal during the rule of Alexey Mikhaylovich, Moscow officials would have found themselves in a far from simple position. Indeed, they could not accept Moldavia as a vassal; they could offer the traditional politics of paternalism, the relationships between the older and the younger. The Moldavian elite would have been hardly delighted: this meant a low status in the Russian multinational state. History does not tolerate subjunctive mood. So, in 1656 the high contracting parties agreed to temporarily remove the project of making Moldavia part of Russia from the agenda.

Late in the 17th century, the cooperation between the two countries radically changed: they concentrated on foreign policy that was gradually acquiring an anti-Turkish bias. In 1676-1681, Russia was fighting, with mixed results, the Crimean Khanate (a vassal of the Ottoman Empire) and Turkey. In the course of military clashes with Russia, Turkey was more concerned with the fate of its vassal possessions – the Danube principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia – rather than of Crimea.

The Porte strained its forces to keep Russia away from the borders of the Moldavian Principality; its ruling circles feared, and with good rea-

son, that as soon as the Orthodox populations of Moldavia and Russia meet with the help of the Russian army, anti-Turkish sentiments in the Danube principalities would tip the balance of power in the Carpathian-Dniester region. This explains why the Treaty of Bakhchisarai with Russia of 1681 contained the clause that defined the status of the territory in the Bug and Dniester interfluve (Transnistria) as neutral; the sides agreed that they should not be populated.

The Porte that never let Moscow out of sight invigorated its efforts to contract the territories populated by Moldavians and cut down their numbers on the other side of the Dniester in the Prut-Dniester interfluve (the eastern part of the Moldavian Principality). In 1812, it became part of Russia and was called Bessarabia. It should be said that from the end of the 15th century, that is shortly before Moldavian Principality became a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, Turks had preferred the strategy of “crawling expansion” in the region started with capture of Belgorod and Kiliya, two strategically important Moldavian ports.

Later, the Turks captured the southern part of the interfluve that became known as Budjak (corner in Turkish) where they built three fortresses – Izmail, Bendery and Akkerman to control and defend the steppe triangle. They also moved up to the north of the interfluve and captured the area defended by the Khotyn Fortress.

There was another highly peculiar fact: under the Ottoman Empire, the interfluve was conventionally divided into three zones: Moldavian, Turkish and Tatar (Nogai). It was populated by the ethnicities that were in fact national and confessional patchworks. It was practically impossible to outline their ethnic, administrative and state zones; the Porte had no choice but to unite its possessions in the south and north of the interfluve into a single territory. They expected that this would cut down the number of territories under the jurisdiction of the Moldavian Principality and, some time in future, allow them to squeeze Moldavians out of their native lands.

This stirred up a lot of concerns in the Moldavian elite “strongly oppressed, persecuted and devastated by the gentiles”; the local beau monde sounded the alarm; the situation meanwhile became unpredictable: Turkey had poured more money into the war with Russia and Poland in the last quarter of the 17th century than it could afford. The burden was shifted onto Moldavians who were growing poorer, their households were falling apart, the living standards plummeted. The local rulers one after another failed to take the situation under control; the authority



Czar Alexey Mikhaylovich

of the secular power dropped to its lowest while the princes spared no effort to remain afloat by hook or by crook.

In view of the local anti-Turkish sentiments, the elite turned their eyes to Russia. The number of those who wanted closer relations with Russia in the fight against the Turkish oppressors was steadily growing. Very much as before, the local nobility staked on Moscow and, following the tradition, sided with the Moldavian Orthodox Church as a convinced and consistent supporter of an alliance with Orthodox Russia. This forced

Prince Ștefan Petriceicu move aside from his pro-Polish orientation and ask the head of the Moldavian Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Dositheus, for help. In 1674, on his recommendation, Hegumen Fyodor was dispatched to Moscow as an envoy of the Moldavian ruler.

Not an experienced diplomat, he decided to dot the i's and cross the t's from the very beginning by saying that "as Christians we should be guided by the Christian czar rather than be oppressed by the Moslems."⁹ On behalf of the Moldavian rulers, the hegumen asked the top Moscow officials for two favors: to help the Moldavian Principality liberate itself from Ottoman domination and accept it as a vassal of the Russian state.

Czar Alexey Mikhaylovich deemed it possible to personally meet Hegumen Fyodor. In the Kremlin, they talked as equals even though Alexey Mikhaylovich Romanov was the spiritual leader of the Orthodox world while the hegumen stood much lower in the Church hierarchy.

There is an opinion among Russian historians that the talks brought no results.¹⁰ This is not quite true: during his official visit, the envoy of the prince and Metropolitan Dositheus reconfirmed the pro-Russian orientation of the Moldavian secular and spiritual nobility. On his part, the Russian czar obviously sympathized with the spiritual head of Moldavia. He sent Russian troops against the Crimean Tatars and units of Ukrainian Hetman Pyotr Doroshenko that raided the territory of Moldavia and plundered its population at the instigation of the Turkish sultan.¹¹ In 1676, the hetman was taken prisoner by Russians.

At that time, Russia came close to the next war with Turkey (1677-1681) and was maneuvering to prevent an unexpected Turkish attack. Alexey Mikhaylovich's response to Moldavians was deliberately vague: "We have appreciated your desire to move your lands and people under protection of our great czar and autocrat; we praise this desire and tell you that we are looking after all Orthodox Christians."¹²

The results of the Russo-Turkish war of 1677-1681 created a new balance of power between the two countries. The Treaty of Bakhchisarai was concluded for a period of 20 years; during this period, Turkey pledged not to support the enemies of Russia. Turkey and Crimea recognized the sovereignty of Russia over Left-bank Ukraine. The Moldavian issue was kept strictly outside yet the Russian victories in the course of the war inspired the pro-Russian camp in Moldavia.

The Moldavian princes intensified their efforts to obtain help from Russia; the number of letters with this request increased; they no longer beat around the bush but openly insisted on assistance. On January 1,

1684, over 20 members of Moldavian clergy and nobility signed the letter addressed to the czars Ivan and Pyotr, sons of Alexey Mikhaylovich, with their full names and positions in the structures of power in Moldavia. They were no longer afraid of Turkish repressions.

It was not simply a request but impassioned plea to the Russian czars: "Put an end to our troubles; we are pushed to death at the hands of godless Turks and Tatars; they poison us and in their envy and hatred will destroy our land because they know that their power is weakening and shrinking because of the servants of Christ."¹³

Driven to despair, Moldavians sent to Moscow an embassy headed by Metropolitan Dositheus to reveal to the Russians the drama and despondency to which unfettered rule of the Ottomans had driven their country. This visit could have destroyed the precarious truce between Russia and Turkey, yet this did not happen.

Under a pretext of an epidemic, Metropolitan Dositheus and his retinue were stopped at the final stages of the Kiev-Moscow route. On March 3, 1685, in an office in Kiev when asked about the purpose of his trip to Moscow, he explained that the Moldavian rulers wanted to become one of Russia's subjects; he wisely dropped the request to the Kremlin rulers to help Moldavians liberate their land from Turkish yoke. The mission was sent back with a promise that explanation of how Moldavia could become one of Russia's subjects would follow.¹⁴

Moscow knew that this was a signal of distress sent by the Moldavian congregation headed by Metropolitan Dositheus. The Kremlin rulers did not forget the lessons of the Crimean Tatars and Turks, who in the first half of the 17th century, raided Russian lands and captured about 120-200 thousand Russians and Ukrainians later sold at the slave markets in Istanbul. This explains why in 1686, Russia unilaterally ended the truce with Turkey by concluding "eternal peace" with Poland thus joining the anti-Turkish coalition of Austria, Poland and Hungary.

In full accordance with its new obligations, Russia opened military operations against Turkey and the Crimean Khanate, its vassal. In 1687 and 1689, Vasily Golitsyn, favorite of Princess Sofia, led unsuccessful Crimean campaigns. Later, the Azov campaigns of Peter I in 1695 and 1696 were crowned by a short-lived victory; it was clear, however, that Russia could not defeat the Ottoman Empire on its own.

Russia's involvement in the anti-Turkish military campaign waged by European powers of the Holy League stirred up hopes in Moldavian hearts; people expected that very soon they would be liberated from the

Turkish yoke. In 1697, in Vienna, Russia, Austria and Hungary united against Turkey and Crimea. The sides pledged not to sign separate peace treaties with them and fight a well-coordinated war.¹⁵ Seen from Moldavia, Turkey that represented the Muslim world stood little chances in a war with Christian Europe.

These wishes were nothing more than hot air. In 1699, the anti-Turkish coalition of European powers fell apart: Orthodox Russia did not fit the Holy League. At the Karlowitz Congress, Austria, Poland and Venice signed peace treaties with Turkey. Russia refused and found itself in isolation with no adequate diplomatic support of its former allies. Peter I had to be satisfied with a short truce with the Sublime Porte. The peace, one of many between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, was signed in July 1700 in Constantinople.

Moldavia, however, did not want either truce or peace between Russia and Turkey; it was an open secret that in its struggle against Turkey the so-called Russian party in Moldavia counted on Russia in the first place. The secular elite of Moldavia sent to Moscow another mission headed by Savva Konstantinov who was instructed to persuade Russians to build up their efforts in the struggle against Turkey. His secret arrival to Moscow in 1698 coincided with the streltsy uprising followed by squabbles in the czarist family and its closest circles.

The talks, however, did take place. The Moldavian delegation handed Peter I a letter from Moldavian ruler Antioch Kantemir and verbally confirmed that he wanted “to be under protection of the Great Czar together with his Moldavian people.”¹⁶

Discussion of the conditions, on which Kantemir was ready to join Russia, was postponed for objective reasons: the situation inside and outside the country was hardly suitable to negotiations. The Moldavian delegation met the young Russian Czar and became convinced that he, too, was disposed to continued contacts. Peter I gave Konstantinov his letter addressed to the Moldavian Prince in which he assured him that he could count on the good disposition and reliability of the Russian czar.¹⁷

The talks in Moscow and exchange of letters between the rulers of Russia and Moldavia in 1698 summed up, to a certain extent, the progress in the relations between the two countries during the reign of the first Romanovs. It should be said that practically all contacts between the Great Russians and Moldavians revealed mutual complementarity and sympathies.

The talks of 1698 brought new factors into the old practice of bilater-

al contacts. By that time, clergy had lost the right to be involved in political discussions and political decision-making. The talks between Russia and Moldavia became strictly secular.

The pro-Russian feelings of the Moldavians who were close to the Great Russians by their frame of mind and confession not only consolidated bilateral relations but created the foundation on which all Orthodox peoples closed ranks in their struggle against aggressive plans of Turks and their satellites.

The Church and secular contacts between Russia and Moldavia that took place during the rule of the Romanovs were a political capital that could and should be used wisely. Everyday life demanded a new format of relations between the two countries which became possible thanks to the reforms of Peter I and qualitative changes in the developments of contacts between Russians and Moldavians.

NOTES

¹ *Istoricheskie svyazi narodov SSSR i Rumynii v XV-nachale XVIII v. Dokumenty i materialy*. Moscow, 1965. Vol. 2, p. 244.

² *Pod styagom Rossii. Sbornik arkhivnykh dokumentov*. Moscow, 1992, p. 55.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 51.

⁴ March 16, 1656 – Letter of the Moldavian ambassadors of Metropolitan of Suhevitsa Gedeon and boyar logothete Grigory Nyanul to the Posolsky prikaz... // Vinogradov V.N., Ereshchenko M.D., Semenova L.E., Pokivaylova T.A. *Bessarabia na perekrestke Evropeyskoy diplomatii. Dokumenty i materialy*. Moscow, 1996. pp. 44-45.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ July 7, 1656 – Oath of allegiance to Russia by ambassadors of Moldavian Prince Gheorghe Ștefan, Metropolitan Gedeon and boyar logothete Grigory Nyanul given in the Cathedral of the Assumption in Moscow // *Pod styagom Rossii. Sbornik arkhivnykh dokumentov*, p. 57.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁹ *Istoricheskie svyazi...* Vol. 3, p. 14.

¹⁰ Vinogradov V.N., Ereshchenko M.D., Semenova L.E., Pokivaylova T.A. *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Istoricheskie svyazi...* Vol. 3, p. 17.

¹³ January 1, 1684 – Address of the representatives of the Moldavian clergy and boyars to Czars Ivan Alexeyevich and Pyotr Alexeyevich... // *Pod styagom Rossii. Sbornik arkhivnykh dokumentov*, p. 61.

¹⁵ Myasnikov A. *Rossiyskaya letopis*. St. Petersburg, 2001, p. 166.

¹⁶ *Istoricheskie svyazi...* p. 132.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 357, note 67.

The Second Front: A Russian Diary Unknown Recollections of a Soviet Admiral, Observer and Participant in Operation Overlord

S. Brilev

Key words: Normandy, memoirs, landing operation, Molotov, audio cassettes.

EVENTS commemorating the 75th anniversary of the Normandy landing are over. However, the taped dictations of Admiral Nikolai Kharlamov, recently found in his family archive, remind us that Soviet military personnel were present and active in the English Channel and Normandy itself in 1944.

Strictly speaking, this is not news to specialists. In his memoirs published back in 1983, Admiral Kharlamov, who headed the Soviet military mission in London in 1941-1944, describes how he received a call from the Imperial General Staff, how British Field Marshal Alan Brooke, Chief of the Air Staff Charles Portal and Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham were waiting for him and how the latter, after a fitting pause, said: “Admiral, we asked you to come to hear news of extraordinary importance.... We would like you to be present as an observer from our Russian ally.”¹

Jumping ahead, it should be said that in June 1944, Kharlamov became not just an observer but an active participant in the landing operation, and later he personally set foot on the French coast. And while in the memoirs of American General Omar Bradley he is referred to merely as a “young Russian admiral,”² the diary of General Courtney Hodges speaks quite specifically about Kharlamov, who was stationed with Bradley’s troops on Wednesday, July 26, 1944.³ Incidentally, thanks to Kharlamov’s reminiscences recorded on the family tape recorder, we can now add some details here. According to Hodges, in addition to Kharlamov, the Soviet group included Major Generals Alexander

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Vasilyev and Ivan Sklyarov, as well as Colonel General Alexander Gorbатов.⁴ Kharlamov himself recalled: “I was there, and my deputies were there: Major General Vasilyev, Lieutenant General of Aviation Andrei Sharapov, Major General Sklyarov, and a military attaché. Six or seven of our people.”⁵ In other words, the Soviet military evidently had a rather high-profile presence in Normandy. Besides, unlike Kharlamov, Bradley even writes about several Soviet inspections in Normandy in the summer and autumn of 1944.⁶

Nevertheless, the hand of at least a literary editor is clearly discernable in Kharlamov’s book, published in the Soviet era. When the admiral’s granddaughter, journalist Yelena Burlakova, gave audio cassettes from the family archive to Rossiya TV, the analog recordings were digitized and scrubbed

of background noise wherever possible, which allowed a lot to be verified. On the tapes, the admiral answers questions from two people: the writer Viktor Veselovsky (who helped prepare his book and whose name prominently appears in the publisher’s imprint) and his son, Rear Admiral Nikolai Kharlamov Jr. When speaking with the latter, his responses and language are freer and at times even colloquial, but of course it is not just the admiral’s funny southern Russian accent that adds to the mood. Take, for example, this vivid phrase: “About 40% of all convoys were ‘battle trophies.’ We had to battle to get them [from the government].”⁷

We must not forget that starting with the “blitz” and essentially until the very end of the war, London was under bombing attacks. The area where the Soviet military mission was located was no exception.

D-Day

IN HIS BOOK, Kharlamov recalls what happened after the conversation at the General Staff in London: “At the pier in Portsmouth, a boat was waiting for us from the cruiser *Mauritius*, one of the flagships of the invasion. Rear Admiral Wilfrid Patterson, an energetic Irishman who led the landing of Force D and, as I found out, took part in the landing in Sicily, came to the cruiser’s ramp.”⁸ As we shall see, Kharlamov mentioned Operation Husky, the Allied landing in Sicily in 1943, for a reason.

Kharlamov left Portsmouth, England for Normandy aboard the

British cruiser on June 2, 1944.⁹ The book even indicates the time of departure: 7:30 p.m.¹⁰ In the audio recordings, the admiral in a clipped, military tone clearly recalled: “The landing [on June 6] began at 5 o’clock [in the morning]. The first time around, all the ships returned. It was not good flying weather, so it was impossible to get air cover, air support.”¹¹ Air reconnaissance and air cover were indeed a key element of the grandiose Operation Overlord: “After the unsuccessful Dieppe raid, as well as the Sicilian and Italian operations, [the allies] trained hard in coastal shelling. Particular attention was paid to suppressing ground points of resistance.”¹²

Kharlamov was surprised when planes nevertheless took off and bombarded the coast, but then something strange happened: “After the planes had dropped tons of bombs on the coast and the artillery had pounded away, it seemed like every living thing there surely must have been obliterated. But when the lead landing craft began to approach the shore, shelling broke out from the coast.”¹³ Obviously to avoid offending the former allies too much, in his book, Kharlamov remained laconic: “But the silent shore suddenly started to speak. An ominous whistle of shells was heard in the air. Giant fountains of water spewed up in places.”¹⁴

Later in the book, the exchange between Patterson and Kharlamov was expressed in a very literary fashion:

“ ‘What do you think, Admiral: Where will the next shell fall?’

‘I think right in the middle of the cruiser. Believe me, Admiral, I was once a good gunner. They’ll zero in...’

Patterson rushed to the telegraph.

‘Right helm,’ he barked.

The cruiser veered sharply to the right, and suddenly the whole ship shuddered: A column of water rose about seventy meters astern. Patterson cast a silent glance at me and wiped his brow with a handkerchief.”

The taped conversation seemingly had a slightly different style. The hint is in the transcript of the cassettes: “I’m a gunner. My opinion was this: Hell, I don’t want to drown in foreign waters!”¹⁵

And about that day and analogies with Sicily:

“The lead ship of our convoy was already on the way when it suddenly entered the zone of artillery fire. The ship’s captain turned back, trying to get away from the shore.

‘Tell that blockhead,’ Patterson shouted to the signalman, ‘to land. Or else...’ ”

Or else what?! On the audio tapes, the subsequent dialogue is recorded as follows:

“ ‘If you turn away one more time, I will order you fired upon!’

‘Fired upon?! Admiral, how will he believe that you will open fire on him?’

‘He will! That’s how it was in Sicily.’ ”¹⁶

If you think about it, is this any different from the practice of stationing an NKVD detachment behind Soviet troops? Incidentally, Kharlamov described this episode in more detail in the book,¹⁷ and as far as is known, the British raised no qualms about it. This means that the truth of war is equally harsh everywhere.

Kharlamov ended that day, June 6, 1944, when the German prisoners were brought on board the British cruiser: “They were blindfolded. ‘Don’t lie to us,’ they said. Well, I said roughly: ‘Here you are for show only, but you will be landing in Boulogne-Calais.’ The decision was made to bring them on deck and remove the blindfolds, and then they saw over six thousand ships of all kinds. Then a German prisoner said: ‘Whoa!’ ”¹⁸

In general, the admiral praised the preparations that made it possible to secretly, without leaks, prepare “the largest amphibious operation of the Second World War.”¹⁹ Specifically, Kharlamov wrote: “Many decisions, tactics and methods that were used both during the preparation and during the fighting are, in my opinion, of interest in modern conditions.”²⁰ Bradley noted: Soviet officers poked their nose everywhere, going into all the details of our actions on the bridgehead. Especially [they] were interested in our supply methods; the huge number of trucks amazed them.²¹

But, of course, what has now been discovered in the admiral’s family archives sheds additional light on many aspects.

The Normandy Landing

OMAR BRADLEY spoke of Nikolai Kharlamov as follows: The Russians were very fastidious about rank and greeted us strictly according to seniority. The higher-ranking young admiral went before two Red Army generals. He was prim and pointedly proper, but his face was impassive.²²

After listening to the cassettes of the admiral’s recollections, on the one hand, we can say that he was content: “In general, we rested while at the front. We got a breather from the London V-bombings.”²³ Indeed, we

must not forget that starting with the “blitz” and essentially until the very end of the war, London was under bombing attacks. The area where the Soviet military mission was located was no exception. In particular, the nearby Whiteleys department store, the St. Sophia Cathedral, and many residential buildings were severely damaged. In the days when Kharlamov was in Normandy, there was no such threat.

On the other hand, such calm at the front was not Kharlamov’s manner. It needs to be explained here that toward the end of his life, Kharlamov complained that his English was no longer what it once was (in particular, he spoke to Lord Albert Mountbatten on his trips to Moscow through a translator). But, judging by Kharlamov’s taped speech at a rally in honor of the 24th anniversary of the Red Army in Albert Hall, his English was rather fluent during the war years, albeit not very elegant (spoken with a very heavy accent). That is to say, he was quite capable of speaking with the press. When asked in Normandy to speak to front-line correspondents, he prepared a statement. But when asked to first show the statement to the accompanying British military authorities, the following exchange took place:

“ ‘In order not to confuse the correspondents, I printed 30 copies. I can read it to you.’

‘Please!’

‘The Soviet military mission visited the ground front and reviewed the front line of our allies: the Americans, led by General Bradley, and the British Army group, led by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. We saw a large number of our allied forces, a significant amount of equipment and observed the weak defense of the Germans. And so it is not clear to us, as military people, why our allies are staying put in one place.’

‘We are not satisfied with such an interview.’

‘I won’t give another!’ ”²⁵

Ultimately, the allied authorities canceled the press conference in Normandy. But we know what kind of “interview” Field Marshal Montgomery had with Kharlamov:

“ ‘Admiral, what do you think should be done with the Baltic states?

‘What should be done? Denmark will remain Denmark! Sweden, as a neutral country, will remain Sweden! A piece of Norway, close to the Baltic there, is being liberated; our troops are in the north.’

‘No! I’m not talking about those areas. I’m talking about Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.’

‘We can’t even talk about this! Every pioneer in our country knows

that these are our republics of the Soviet Union! We will be liberating them. And we will not ask [permission of] anyone.’ ”²⁶



Soviet military mission in Great Britain

Molotov's Visit

KHARLAMOV is a valuable witness of the inner workings of the historic visit to the United Kingdom in May 1942 of Vyacheslav Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. It was "historic," because it was then that the "big" Anglo-Soviet agreement was signed: "The treaty between the USSR and Great Britain on an alliance in the war against Nazi Germany and its accomplices in Europe and on cooperation and mutual assistance after the war."

In the current conditions, it is especially worth recalling that Moscow and London agreed back then not to join any alliances and not participate in any coalitions directed against the other side. The duration of the articles on post-war cooperation was set for 20 years. Unfortunately, the expiry of the treaty coincided with the eve of the Cuban missile crisis, which was preceded by the Berlin and Suez crises, not to mention the establishment of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, co-founded by Britain and

the USSR respectively, despite the “big treaty” between the parties. It seems that in 1942, Kharlamov had a premonition of how everything would turn out.

Here, the author of this article, as someone who has for a quarter of a century been associated with television, with pictures, is inclined to switch from the language of words and figures to the language of images. In 1942, a film was released by British government propagandists for the Soviet people. The title was “Our Answer for Russia (A Report from the UK),” which is still in the Russian State Film Fund. The following text that made it through British military censors was read to footage of Molotov’s arrival in Britain: In May 1942, a Soviet plane brought your People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov to Great Britain. His visit strengthened our friendship and made our union lasting and sustainable. Our foreign minister, Eden, along with Plenipotentiary Maisky met him at a station near London, since his visit took place in the strictest secrecy.²⁷

The Kharlamov family archive contains a photograph of the admiral taken in front of railroad tracks, obviously during those days and at that very station. The book describes Molotov’s departure as follows: “For reasons of secrecy, the special train did not leave London but from a small suburban station. We agreed that I would come to escort the People’s Commissar and get all necessary instructions from him. Late in the evening, I set off for the station. An English driver drove me. I figured he would know the road well and would get me there faster. But the opposite proved true. The car circled for a long time around some warehouses, brick houses, along the back streets of the station village [...] And then it occurred to me that the driver was simply leading me by the nose. Had he been instructed to prevent my meeting with the People’s Commissar?”

Kharlamov eventually reached Molotov:

“The entire delegation sat in the brightly lit, curtained luxury car. I hastened to apologize for being late.

‘No need to apologize, Nikolai Mikhailovich. Everything is clear: Opponents of the Anglo-Soviet rapprochement tried to play another trick. But I said I would not leave until I met with you.’ ”²⁸

Was this all because of the peculiarities of the worldview of Molotov, who before the war had talked about Soviet-German “friendship,”²⁹ whose resolutions were on the countless pre-war execution lists, including of “English spies,” and who perhaps had not gotten fully accustomed to the new realities? But, as we have seen, even Kharlamov showed skepticism toward official London.



Soviet Navy mission in Great Britain

Intelligence Sharing

IN HIS TAPED RECOLLECTIONS, Kharlamov explains how he ended up on the British cruiser in the English Channel in June 1944 and with Allied forces stationed in Normandy a month later: “Their [military observer] mission was on the Eastern front and ours was on the Western front. In parallel.”³⁰ We don’t know if Kharlamov knew that such “parallel” missions were being carried out not only by the military but also by the intelligence services. For example, under a cooperation agreement between the NKVD and the British Special Operations Executive, the head of its liaison mission to the USSR, George Alexander Hill, left Moscow for liberated Minsk. In the early 21st century, a corresponding photograph from the FSB archives was printed in the Russian edition of Hill’s memoirs.³¹

However, even Admiral Kharlamov had to deal with intelligence information, if not with intelligence people themselves.

The British National Archives still houses the minutes of weekly Anglo-Soviet meetings on intelligence matters at the Admiralty. For

example, in June-July 1942, British and Soviet officers led by Kharlamov (often in his presence) discussed such broad topics as the location of small Italian ships in Varna, German torpedo boats in the Arctic, new German fortifications in Windau (Ventspils) on the Baltic, etc. Of particular interest is the fact that, not being yet at war with Japan, the USSR was willing to discuss with its British allies issues relating to the naval forces of the Mikado.

For his civilian interlocutors, Kharlamov patiently explains on the audio cassettes that “wrong intelligence data can needlessly overstrain forces, and vice versa.”³² But on the same tapes, he notes with displeasure that “the British – certain intelligence officials – did not always provide accurate intelligence about the Germans,”³³ adding that he had to ask his subordinates to verify British intelligence “with the Yugoslavs, Norwegians, French, Americans, and Czechs.”³⁴

Incidentally, here is an interesting detail: When the admiral’s granddaughter, documentary filmmaker Yekaterina Burlakova, went to the Central Museum of the Armed Forces in Moscow (where her grandfather’s military orders and medals are kept), she was again struck by the fact that although Kharlamov had spent so much time in Britain, the only orders he received from other European states were the Yugoslav “Brotherhood and Unity” and the Polish “Cross of Grunwald.” And although photographs show Kharlamov at the ceremony awarding the Soviet Order of Lenin to Canadian Royal Air Force Colonel Neville Ramsbottom-Isherwood (he was awarded this order in response to the awarding of the highest order of the British Air Force to Soviet ace Boris Safonov), the British never presented Kharlamov himself with any awards. What was the reason for such restraint toward an ally the British spoke with almost daily? Evidently, the root of the problem is that the comradeship of Safonov and Ramsbottom-Isherwood in the Arctic is not the same as service that is both military and political-diplomatic. More precisely, the root of the problem lies in the lack of warmth and sincere trust among the upper classes.

In the tape recordings, the admiral admits that, in particular, on intelligence matters, he had an easier time with emigrant committees and governments based in London than with the British: for example, with the Norwegians, as well as with the staff of Charles de Gaulle and the government of Czechoslovakia in exile. Specifically, about the Czechs in Edvard Benes’s entourage, he said: “There were people there who knew that they needed to [offer their] help in order to win.”³⁵



Soviet military with the allies. Nikolai Kharlamov is the first on the left

Incidentally, an interesting coincidence stands out: The practically perpetual acting charge d'affaires of the USSR to the same emigrant governments in London was not a diplomat but a career intelligence officer, Colonel Ivan Chichayev, head of the NKVD political intelligence liaison mission. Maybe he helped Kharlamov sort out military intelligence information?

“The People Are For; the Government Is Against”

“THE PEOPLE are for; the government is against”: That is the title of a chapter in Admiral Kharlamov’s memoirs. The narrator of the British propaganda film says: Cities, villages and towns are organizing a week of assistance for the Soviet Union. To that end, children are collecting articles for sale in support of the Soviet Union. The collection from the English soccer match will go to the Red Cross Fund. England is playing Scotland. Hundreds of thousands are in attendance. English soccer fans crowd Wembley Stadium. They know where their money will go.³⁶ These words are accompanied by footage of the USSR flag and the Union Jack fluttering over Wembley, and also of Admiral Kharlamov sitting on the stands.

The wife of Admiral Kharlamov, Anna Mikhailovna, was part of a group of wives of employees of Soviet diplomatic and military missions who sorted the gifts that came through the Red Cross from ordinary Britons. For example, on the family tapes, she talks about what they found in the letters and packages: “One pound, two pounds, ten shillings. Or mittens, gloves, socks. Two pieces of soap were donated.”³⁷

Listening to Admiral Kharlamov’s recollections from the family cassettes, you get a deeper sense of how everything was (and probably always will be) in relations between two such amazing peoples as the Russians and the British. After all, aren’t we the only two nations in Europe who use the word “Europe” to refer to everyone else in that space except themselves? We always have our own interests. Nevertheless, Admiral Kharlamov told his relatives that, in his opinion, Lord Beaverbrook was the most consistent supporter in the British establishment of helping the USSR: “Not that he would love the USSR; he looked at things soberly and said: ‘This must be done now, to save England!’ He was forthright. He was not a lover of our country – no! But he was a realist and a sensible person.”³⁸

How can realism be achieved in relations between London and Moscow today? Who knows...? But perhaps someday we will hear a phrase like this one from the 1942 British film: We, the people of Great Britain, have now seen embodied in this treaty our sincere desire: mutual assistance until the final victory and friendship after the war.³⁹

The newly discovered taped recollections of the admiral are a good help. They are truthful.

NOTES

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On the 17th Parallel: Marking the 65th Anniversary of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam

A. Zaitsev

Key words: Vietnam, 65th anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Agreements on Vietnam, International Commission for Supervision and Control of the ceasefire in Vietnam, demilitarized zone, 17th parallel.

ON JULY 20, 1954, an agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam was signed at a conference in Geneva of the ministers of foreign affairs of the USSR, China, the U.S., Great Britain, and France. The conference was convened at the initiative of the Soviet Union at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the USSR, the U.S., Great Britain, and France (Berlin, January 25-February 18, 1954).

Under the terms of the agreement, the territory of Vietnam was temporarily divided (until general, free elections that were to be held in July 1956 but were disrupted by the South Vietnamese side) by a demarcation line that ran slightly south of the 17th parallel along the Ben Hai River. A demilitarized zone was created with a total width of ten kilometers, five on each side. The final declaration of the meeting stressed that it was to “serve as a buffer zone in order to avoid any incident that could lead to the resumption of hostilities.”

While stationed at the Soviet Embassy in Vietnam, I had occasion to visit the 17th parallel ahead of the air war the U.S. unleashed against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This article presents little-known facts and rare testimonies of those whom I spoke with about everyday life in the demilitarized zone during the tense ideological and armed confrontation between the two divided parts of Vietnam.

This trip to the 17th parallel was the last in the prewar period, six months before the first bombing of DRV territory. Flipping through the

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notes I kept is a bit like reliving the events of more than half a century ago.

We left Hanoi early in the morning of February 17, 1964, and by the evening of the next day, after spending the night in Vinh and making several ferry crossings, we reached our final destination: Vinh Linh, at the demilitarized zone, where the group of the International Commission for Supervision

and Control of the ceasefire in Vietnam (which included Poles, Indians and Canadians) was stationed. The Ben Hai River was seven to eight kilometers away. Passage across it and the bridge had been closed since July 1955.

From the numerous accounts of those whom we spoke with – political workers, police officers, local residents, and two defectors from the south – a picture emerged of incessant violations by the South Vietnamese authorities of the demilitarized zone regime established by the 1954 Geneva Agreements. Two battalions of 1,500 South Vietnamese troops had entered the zone the week before our arrival and arrested 34 local residents (under the aforementioned agreements, each side could dispatch no more than 80 to 100 police officers armed only with small arms). In the South Vietnamese half of the demilitarized zone, construction was continuing of military-grade concrete structures under the guise of schools, and shelling from the south bank of the river of fishing boats had become more frequent.

According to those we spoke with, the situation in this area (the nearest liberated area from the demilitarized zone was 30 km to 40 km from it) was affected by a recent uptick in activity by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam together with partisans in neighboring South Vietnamese provinces, especially after the military coup in November 1963 and the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, the president of the puppet government.

Of the recorded accounts that I believe reliably convey the atmosphere in which the active propaganda war was being fought on both sides of the demarcation line, I will cite only three.

The first of them is “The Story of the Banner,” as presented (vocabu-

While stationed at the Soviet Embassy in Vietnam, I had occasion to visit the 17th parallel ahead of the air war the U.S. unleashed against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

lary preserved) by Nguyen Dinh Anh, editor of the *Thong Nhat* district newspaper: “Until 1955, state flags hung on both sides of the bridge on poles five to six meters high. In 1955, an old man from the north bank saw a tall tree and suggested using it to support a banner that was hung at a height of 13-14 meters. A tree that tall could not be found on the south side, so a metal pole was used as a mast. In 1958, residents on the south bank began to say that the tree was crooked and not tall enough for the banner to be clearly seen from the south bank. And then we raised our banner to 36 meters, with a concrete base of 42 meters. It still hangs at that height. In response, they hung their banner on the south bank on a mast two meters higher than ours, 38 meters, with a 45-meter foundation. But our banner was still bigger than that of the South Vietnamese. Now, the population of the north bank is asking us to hang our banner higher, and with a size of 10 by 15 meters.”

No less curious is the story of the border bridge, told by Nguyen Dinh Anh. Here is my notebook entry: “From the outset, it was decided that the sides would take turns repairing and painting the bridge every two years. In 1956, the south side painted the bridge blue (before that, in 1955, it had been painted brown). When our turn came in 1958 and we painted it red, the south side objected, saying that half of the bridge belonged to them, and they immediately repainted it with a bluish-green color. In 1959, we again painted our half of the bridge red and the south side painted their side blue. In 1960, on the eve of their national holidays, both sides again painted their halves of the bridge in the same, different colors: red and blue.

“In 1963, after we decided to paint the bridge the same color as the south side, it painted its half of the bridge with very good American xanh luc (described as something between dark green and deep blue) paint for its ‘national holiday’ on October 26. It then bragged that we could not find such paint. We went to Hanoi, but we could not find a similar paint there. Specialists came to us from the capital and spent a week determining whether it was possible to make such paint from local raw materials. After they failed, this task was entrusted to Master Ki (according to our interlocutors, he defected to our side from the south).”

How events unfolded further is described in the article “Meeting with Workers Painting the Hien Luong Bridge,” which was published in the *Thong Nhat* district newspaper. The newspaper article states: “Can’t we, Ki wondered, make the same type of paint as the famed American paint? Making it from foreign raw materials would mean waiting four to five



On the 17th parallel

months. We needed to speed up the work in order to commemorate the 2nd NLF Congress and the birthday of President Ho Chi Minh. I believe that painting the bridge in one color is of political importance. We cannot paint it with paint of less quality than their paint. Ki handled the task and, after studying the xanh luc color samples, prepared a paint from local raw materials that was just as good as the American paint.”

“In November 1963,” the newspaper article goes on to say, “a team of three painters – one named Tham and two named Huong – painted the

northern half of the bridge the same color as the south half under the direction of Master Ki.” “Since the military coup in South Vietnam in November 1963,” Anh concluded his story, “nothing has changed, and everything is just like it was before.”

No less active and inventive, according to the interlocutors, was the “competition” unfolding in propaganda radio broadcasting. The desire to outdo the other side was clearly visible in the details of the organization of propaganda broadcasting that both sides of the demarcation line were increasingly using to psychologically influence the population living in the demilitarized zone and nearby military units.

“At first,” other political workers told Nguyen Dinh Anh in conversations in Vinh Linh, “due to poor technical equipment, we used only loudspeakers and bullhorns. In 1954, we had only one low-power, 25-watt station, and in 1955, we got another one with a capacity of 100 watts and loudspeakers. In 1956, a radio station was built, but with old equipment installed by a Soviet specialist. In 1958, we used this radio station and another two 600-watt stations for the village’s radio communications and installed loudspeakers along the demarcation line, pointing them toward the south. In 1961, another radio station with a capacity of 10 kilowatts began operating. It was equipped with Soviet equipment that now could cover the entire territory of the demilitarized zone. Along the demarcation line, Chinese-made loudspeakers were hung on posts. By the end of 1963, 40 loudspeakers were installed on each post that could be heard from six to seven kilometers away. Before 1963, they could only be heard from four miles away.

“The South Vietnamese side also installed powerful 1.4-meter loudspeakers on poles along the demarcation line, six to ten per pole. Several masts and poles were placed near the bridge itself; four of them were aimed at the north and the rest at the south. Three pillars with loudspeakers covering a distance of four kilometers were installed on the bank, at the mouth of the river. In addition, the South Vietnamese side had two mobile broadcasting stations on cars.”

In addition to relaying broadcasts of their radio stations, both sides actively organized various propaganda events to psychologically influence residents of the demilitarized zone that were divided into two parts by the demarcation line, showing a lot of ingenuity to avoid being accused of violating its regime established by the Paris Agreements.

For example, according to interlocutors, on the DRV side, the “advantageous” location of a market 150 meters from the river bank was active



A performance of circus artists on the Ben Hai river

ly utilized to hold daytime circus performances that were clearly visible from the other bank.

Beginning in 1957-1958, improvised stages fashioned atop fishing boats that had been lashed together and moored to the shore were used for concerts, which were very popular among residents of the south bank. Starting in 1963, artists began performing right on the beach, on a raised platform. On February 11 and 12, 1964, residents of the south bank for the first time were allowed to watch a performance of circus artists freely and not stealthily, with eyes peeled for the police, unlike in previous years. Performances of Soviet artists and international soccer matches began to be broadcast in 1962.

On the south bank, where there was no nearby market, performances of dance ensembles and the national theater were held on a platform near the bridge, next to the high mast from which their flag hung.

From Vinh Linh, we returned to Dong Hoi, where residents told us about recent tension in Quang Binh Province from the escalation of subversive activities by the South Vietnamese authorities. Saboteurs were parachuting from the air, landing from ships at night, and even crossing the mountains. In the previous year, in 1963, more than one hundred ille-

gal crossings of the province's borders were recorded; most of the sabotage groups were captured.

The winds of the approaching war were felt everywhere. On August 5, the U.S. launched the first air raid on the territory of the DRV, and on February 7, 1965, regular massive bombardments of settlements in North Vietnam began.

One of the first casualties of the barbaric raids was a thermal power station built with technical assistance from the Soviet Union in the city of Vinh, which I visited during that memorable trip to the 17th parallel. In November 1965, with our delegation, I had the opportunity to again visit this thermal power plant that had been destroyed by the American bombing campaign.

The First Wave

N. Shevtsov

Key words: internment at Gallipoli, first wave of Russian emigration, V.V. Nabokov, General A.P. Kutepov, M.A. Bakunin.

I WAS LUCKY. Early in the 1990s, I was appointed correspondent of the *Trud* newspaper to Benelux. It was in Belgium where I met Russian émigrés of the first wave. As children, they had left Russia together with their parents immediately after the revolution or during the Civil War and never thought that they would never see Russia again. They grew up in foreign lands, started their families and taught their children to love Russia, the country the younger generation never saw.

They were not rich; they worked hard and were respected by those who knew them. None of them complained, and they coped with problems and hardships with a lot of courage.

I decided to write about three of them. They are no longer with us: They were very old when I met them.

Sergey Nabokov lived in Brussels; he was a journalist with an excellent command of Russian, English and French. A first cousin of writer Vladimir Nabokov, he was the chronicler of the Nabokov family and told me a lot of highly interesting stories about his childhood in Russia, life in emigration and the relationships with his famous cousin.

Alexander Bakunin was a great nephew of Mikhail Bakunin, the founder of anarchism; he belonged to another ancient and respected Russian family. His father fought in the ranks of the White Army during the Civil War in Russia; as member of the guard of General Alexander Kutepov and later his personal secretary, he together with the rest of Wrangel's army crossed the Black Sea from Crimea to the Turkish peninsula of Gallipoli. The period known as internment at Gallipoli began. For twelve months, the corps under General Kutepov maintained perfect mil-

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itary order despite huge privations. Alexander told me a lot about Pryamukhino, the family landed estate. I visited it much later and could testify that the memory of all generations of the Bakunin clan was carefully preserved.

I met Anastasia Shirinskaya-Manstein in Tunisia. This courageous woman spent her life in Tunisian Bizerte where she had arrived early in 1921 on destroyer *Zharky* of which her father was captain and which belonged to a Black Sea squadron. She told me a lot about Russian seamen in Africa and the very sad fate of the Russian warships stationed in Bizerte. Her modest flat was a small island of Russian culture in this African country.

All of them went into emigration together with their families from Crimea. They bordered ships in Sevastopol and in Yalta. Crimea was the symbol of the lost Motherland to which they remained loyal throughout their lives.

The Chronicler of the Nabokovs

I MET SERGEY NABOKOV in the early 1990s at a reception in the Russian embassy in Brussels. I was introduced to him by Countess Maria Apraksina. I wanted to learn as much as possible about his life: he was one of the few still living members of the first wave of Russian emigration who had left Russia during the Civil War.

As agreed, several days later, I entered his modest one-bedroom flat in one of the contemporary houses on the Churchill Square with the monument to the British Prime Minister in the center and was greeted by Sergey and his wife who belonged to the noble princely family of Shcherbatovs. “She is one of the Rurikids,” her husband told me. [Rurikids, one of the oldest noble families that ruled Russia till 1610. – *Ed.*]

Despite his age (he was 90 at that time), Sergey looked smart and energetic. He pointed to the portraits of Mikhail Kutuzov and General Pavel Tuchkov, heroes of the 1812 Patriotic War and said: “They are my ancestors. I am also a descendant of another great military leader – the ‘White General’ Mikhail Skobelev. My ancestors were involved in many historical events. They attended the funeral of Emperor Pavel I and saw with their own eyes how high officials crowded around the coffin of the murdered emperor so that nobody could see the traces of cruel beating on his face.”

Sergey's parents bought their estate Batovo at St. Petersburg on the shores of the Oredezh River from the widow of executed Decembrist Kondraty Ryleyev. Vyra, or Vyrskaya myza, the landed possession of Vladimir Nabokov's father, was on the opposite shore. "We lived across the river," said my host with a smile.

He said that Vladimir had sent to him all those who intended to write books and articles about him. "I knew the history of our clan much better than anybody else. Sometimes, he asked me to recollect details of our childhood, of our years in St. Petersburg

and in country houses. I cannot agree, therefore, with those who call Nabokov a cosmopolitan who forgot his Motherland. He was pining for his childhood at home in Russia. This means that he could never let Russia out of his mind. His excellent English is explained by the excellent education he received at home, in Russia. There were always English-speaking tutors who spoke English to the children. His brilliant literary style in English is the result of his huge talent."

In 1920, both Nabokov families were in Yalta; they emigrated from it. In emigration, their meetings were few and far between: Vladimir spent many years of his life in the United States while Sergey remained in the Old World. Their correspondence, however, was consistent. When Vladimir returned to Europe and settled in the Montreux Palace Hotel on the shores of Lake Geneva, the meetings became more frequent. Sergey told me that Vladimir's relationships with relatives had been contradictory.

"When we met for the first time after a long separation, he was on the brink of crying even though he had never before betrayed sentimentality. Later, during what turned out to be our last meeting in the hotel, Vladimir, obviously aware that he would never see me again, met me with traces of soap on his face probably to avoid last kisses."

Years passed and, when in Switzerland, I decided to have a look at the Montreux Palace Hotel, where the Nabokovs had met for the last time. I asked whether the luxury suite occupied by Vladimir Nabokov survived. "Yes," said the receptionist. "I can accompany you there. It is not occu-

It was in Belgium where I met Russian émigrés of the first wave. They grew up in foreign lands, started their families and taught their children to love Russia, the country the younger generation never saw.

ped.” The suite that anyone could rent was preserved intact since the last days of Vladimir Nabokov. I stood looking around with a great deal of sadness and thinking about the last meeting between the Nabokov cousins.

Sergey cherished the years spent in Mitau (today, Jelgava, a city in Latvia), which was the best part of his childhood from 1912 to 1915 when his father was the governor (the last governor, as it turned out) of Courland. The family occupied the palace built by the great Rastrelli for Duke von Biron, the omnipotent favorite of Empress Anna Ioannovna. The tomb of the Biron clan was nearby. Sergey recollected how it had been opened on a request of historians engaged in writing the Duke’s biography.

All those who gathered at the tomb could see the well-preserved remains of a handsome and not very tall man. It was easy to guess why Anna Ioannovna had been fascinated with him. My host told me that he had been greatly impressed. “I could not sleep for several nights – the Duke was always nearby. After the revolution, the body was removed from the tomb once more and the Red Army soldiers ripped it with bullets.” By the way, at his time, his father was categorically against creating Latvian regiments considering them highly unreliable. This premonition was fully confirmed later. Today, the palace hosts the local university.

In the 1930s, Sergey moved from Greece to Belgium where for many years he was employed as correspondent by the Reuters news agency and later by *The Daily Telegraph* newspaper. In Belgium, he earned the fame of one of the best journalists very popular among Belgian and Russian readers. It should be said that many émigrés were highly critical towards Germany’s aggression against the Soviet Union and refused to cooperate with the Nazis.

Nabokov was one of them even though it was dangerous. Having declined the invitation of the occupational authorities to head one of the Russian-language newspapers published on German money in the occupied Soviet territory, he was warned that this might cost him dearly. He remained firm; for about a month, he expected arrest and deportation to Germany, to one of the forced labor camps. The Germans, however, never repeated their attempt. “Yes, I refused. Some of the Russian émigrés were too frightened to refuse. Others were tempted by Nazi money.

“There were those who hated socialism and were ready to cooperate with Germans. To my mind they were traitors. Germans hired highly pro-

fessional Russian-speaking journalists to work in newspapers and on radio. It is highly important to understand that we (I count myself, together with the Soviet people, an enemy of fascists) were confronted in the information sphere, as well as on the battlefield, by an experienced enemy who, in the final analysis, was successfully rebuffed in Russian newspapers and journals and on radio.”

Having learned that I would spend my annual holiday in Moscow, Sergey told me with a lot of barely concealed sadness: “Please give my best regards to the capital. I saw it for the last time in 1915.”

The Descendant of the Great Anarchist

WHEN I VISITED Countess Apraksina to thank her for introducing me to Sergey Nabokov, she told me about Alexander Bakunin, another member of the first wave of Russian emigration. “I think that this meeting will be as interesting as your meeting with Sergey Nabokov. He is a grand nephew of Mikhail Bakunin, founder of anarchism. His father was in the guard of legendary White General Kutepov. In October 1920, the Bakunin family boarded a ship in Sevastopol to leave Russia forever.”

I immediately phoned Alexander Bakunin to fix an interview. On the appointed day and hour, I was greeted in a Brussels flat by a grey-haired old man with a cane who presented himself as “Bakunin, the last in the Bakunin lineage, the last on the male line.” He told me that the Bakunins were an ancient family; first mentioned in chronicles in the late 14th century.

The great anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, the famous representative of the clan, was born on May 8, 1814 in Pryamukhino, the family landed estate in the upper reaches of the Volga. This was the family nest that remained in its possession till the 1917 revolution. Alexander Pushkin visited it when he stayed in the neighboring estate Bernovo at his friends Wulfs. Alexandra, sister of Mikhail Bakunin, was married to Gavriil Wulf. Famous writer Ivan Turgenev, who stayed in Pryamukhino together with critic Vissarion Belinsky, was in love with her sister Tatyana. On the eve of his departure, he recited to her his new poem “Grey is the morning, the morning is misty...” that later became very popular. Alexander Bakunin told me that composer Sergey Rakhmaninov had also visited Pryamukhino. “My father frequently told me that he had been amazed by his long and slim fingers.”

The Bakunin family carefully preserved the ancient cartel clock as a

memory of Pryamukhino that they had managed to smuggle from the house in 1931. Today, it can be seen on the wall of their flat in Brussels. At first, everything I heard about Pryamukhino sounded rather abstract. Having left Russia at the age of eight, Alexander never got a chance to go back to the family house. He did not know its exact location; he did not know whether the house or any of other buildings survived. When in Russia I tried to locate it by following the route indicated by Alexander. I started at the village of Bernovo (Staritsa District, Tver Region) with its magnificent Pushkin Museum. Having traveled several kilometers along a dirt road, I turned back: the rest of the road was impassable. I started thinking of Pryamukhino as a dreamland of sorts.

Later, on the road from Torzhok to Ostashkov, the capital of the Lake Seliger area, I was overjoyed when saw the road sign to Pryamukhino. I turned where it pointed and, after some ten kilometers, found myself in the estate I wanted to see so much. There was an amazing church built by famous architect Nikolay Lvov, as well as a park and some of the out-buildings. The main house disappeared. The Bakunin Museum in the local school was unfortunately closed.

During our next meeting, we were talking about the famous internment at Gallipoli of the remnants of the White Army, of which Alexander had personal experience. He shared with me his memories of these days: "We arrived in Crimea shortly before evacuation of the army from Northern Taurida where my father had been fighting. At first, we traveled by an armored train, then by wagon. Early in November, we left Sevastopol on a transport ship *Kherson*. The city was shaking from the explosions in the armory. Cavalry horses were shot so that the Reds would not get them. The dock was crowded; when we climbed the ramp, my brother carried the primus stove (used to boil water for children) on his back but lost its support legs in the jam. On board there were not only civilians but also military, soldiers and officers of the famous Drozdovsky Rifle Division.

It took them a week to reach Istanbul where they spent several days on board the ship that dropped anchor offshore. Foodstuffs were rapidly disappearing. Passengers started trading their watches, jewelry, gold and silver coins to the Turks, who approached the ship on their boats, in exchange for fruit, bread and vegetables. Alexander, who was eight at that time and who had just recovered from typhus, got an orange his mother acquired this way. This taste remained with him all his life.

The remnants of the White Army that arrived in Turkey on several



The Russian memorial in Gallipoli

ships were assembled into a First Army Corps of 26,596, not counting the civilians, and settled on the Gallipoli peninsula. “At the beginning was hard,” said Alexander. “No wonder the Russians started calling Gallipoli ‘goloe pole’ (bare land). We came there at night; it was raining; there were no buildings around. Children and women were protected with tarpaulin. Families and some of the single officers were quartered in the town of Gallipoli half-destroyed by British bombs. Even today I can remember our old house in Gallipoli and my mum boiling galushki outside it. Many buildings had no roofs or windows, stoves were in shambles.”

Aleksandr showed me a photo of a middle-aged man with a beard and mustache and a stern look inscribed “To Lieutenant Bakunin, General Kutepov.” His father, Lieutenant Bakunin, was one of the general’s guards and, later, became his personal secretary.

It was thanks to Kutepov that the corps became a highly disciplined and battleworthy unit. He knew that strict discipline was indispensable; he never forgave anybody, including those who were close to him. Once Colonel Kutepov, brother of the corps commander and neighbor of the Bakunins, started a drunk brawl in one of the illicit joints in Gallipoli.

When General Kutepov learned about it, he was infuriated and rushed to search for the offender. He burst into the flat of Bakunins and asked Alexander's mother: "Where is Colonel Kutepov?" First, she was at a loss yet encouraged by the winks of the guards who accompanied the general and behind whom the colonel was hiding answered that he had not yet returned. When enraged, the general could have executed his brother on the spot as a lesson to others. On the next morning, the culprit turned himself in and got away with time in the guardhouse.

The guardhouse was in the old Turkish fortress where Turks had kept Russian Cossacks taken prisoner. In October 1921, a witty Russian officer while under arrest in the guardhouse recalled what Wrangel had said a year earlier: in about a year's time, by autumn rains, the corps would return home with victory. So, he wrote in a leaflet that the rains falling on Gallipoli were not autumn rains. For this, he had to spend even more time under lock.

The memory of those who died of wounds, illnesses and privations in Gallipoli was commemorated with a monument made of stones gathered on the peninsula that looked like Monomakh's Cap. "We, schoolchildren, were also involved," said Alexander. "We gathered 24 thousand stones." Alas, the monument consecrated on July 16, 1921 did not survive an earthquake. By that time, the Russians had already left the peninsula. Its smaller copy can be seen at the Sainte-Geneviève-des-Bois Russian Cemetery in a Paris environ. In post-Soviet times, it was restored on Aeroflot money. Alexander Bakunin did not live to learn this: he had died several years earlier.

As a friend of the Bakunin family, I was invited to celebrate Orthodox Christmas; there was kutia (traditional Russian Orthodox dish) on the table; people were exchanging presents. Alexander's children and numerous grandchildren who gathered to congratulate their father and grandfather were talking French among themselves. As if guessing my thoughts, Alexander smiled and said: "They are true Belgians while we, the old generation, lost our Motherland and never acquired another."

Invited by the organizers of the Bakunin Readings, I visited Pryamukhino for the last time on the next day after the 200th birth anniversary of Mikhail Bakunin. The event followed a memorial service in honor of all members of the famous Bakunin clan, including Alexander. The male line of Bakunins ended with his death in 2002. There was one of the clan's descendants by the female line – Georgy Tsirg who had done a lot to preserve the memory of Bakunins. There was a del-



The monument to the Bakunin family in the village of Pryamukhino

egation from the embassy of Switzerland since Mikhail Bakunin was buried in Bern. I spoke about my meetings with my good friend Alexander Bakunin who loved his Motherland and cherished the memory of it.

In Faraway Bizerte

I MET Anastasia Shirinskaya-Manstein in Africa. I came to Tunisia to write an article about the fate of the Black Sea Fleet of Russia that after

a long voyage ended its days in the Mediterranean port of Bizerte. I learned from Russian diplomats in Tunisia about a Russian woman who had come to Bizerte as a small girl together with her relatives on one of the warships and was still living there.

I arrived in Tunisia straight from Brussels, left my luggage in the hotel and went together with Russian diplomats to the airport to greet Anastasia who was coming back from Nice where she had visited her daughter and her cousin. I saw a fragile old woman with the eyes that betrayed her strong willpower. She kindly agreed to share with me her childhood memories about the dramatic odyssey of Russia's Black Sea Fleet.

Later, we traveled together to Bizerte located in the country's north where Anastasia lived and where she was highly respected. While we were walking along the street, local people (all of them Arabs) approached her to demonstrate their respect to their math teacher; one girl even kissed her. We were talking in the shadow of the trees on the embankment which offered a magnificent view of the sea where in the past, the battleship *Georgy Pobedonosets*, a temporary home for Anastasia and her family, had been anchored.

"As you know, I was born into a family of a naval officer. My father Alexander Manstein graduated from the St. Petersburg Naval Corps. He took part in the rescue operation in Messina after a huge earthquake that destroyed the city. During World War I, he commanded the courier ship *Nevka* that traveled between Revel and Helsingfors. During the Civil War, my father together with the family moved from Revel to the south where he fought on the side of the White Army. Late in 1918, he was appointed commander of the destroyer *Zharky*. In Sevastopol, we lived on the southern shore of the Sevastopol Bay (the so-called *Korabelnaya storona*). While our father was fighting, our mother looked after us. As young children, we were not aware of what was going on and never suspected that very soon we would leave our Motherland forever and move into the unknown. We loved playing 'giant steps' (*gigantskie shagi*) in front of the monument to General Lazarev."

When evacuation began, the family moved to the destroyer; the damaged ship was tagged to Constantinople by repair ship *Kronstadt*. The crossing remained in Anastasia's mind forever. People slept where there was space; storms never ended; the ship was rolling; the tow cable that connected the destroyer with *Kronstadt* broke several times planting fear in the minds of all 'Will the tugboat find us?' All the time people were



The author with Anastasia Shirinskaya-Manstein

constantly watching the searchlight. Thank God, the destroyer reached its destination.

“Strange as it may seem,” said Anastasia, “only one ship perished in the Black Sea with its crew and 250 officers that had boarded it in Crimea. By the irony of fate, this destroyer was called *Zhivoy* (Living).”

Having unloaded their civilian passengers, all warships were organized into a squadron and, according to the agreement with the French, moved to the Tunisian port of Bizerte. It took the squadron a lot of time – about two months (from December 1920 to January 1921) – to reach its destination (much depended on the state of the ships). Anastasia and her family and the families of other seamen stepped on the African shore from the transport ship *Velikiy Knyaz Konstantin*. Over 15 ships reached

Bizerte, including the battleship *General Alexeyev* (earlier known as Emperor Alexander III), the battleship *Georgy Pobedonosets*, the cruiser *General Kornilov*. Cruiser *Almaz* that reached Bizerte together with the others had survived in the hell of the Battle of Tsushima, escaped Japanese warships and reached Vladivostok. Ten destroyers, one minesweeper, four submarines, transport and other ships finally came to Bizerte. Few crewmen imagined that it would be their last port of call.

The Russian ships were moored in the area of the French naval base. At first, Anastasia and her family lived on *Zharky*; later, all families were moved to *Georgy Pobedonosets* transformed into a floating inn that dropped anchor at the city embankment. They lived on board for four years; the school that Anastasia attended was also there; she kept photos of her school friends and teachers.

There were festivities organized on board the ship; every year adults and children were waiting with impatience for November 6, the day on which the St. Petersburg Naval Corps had been founded. At one of the balls, Anastasia, still an 11-year-old girl, danced with Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Mikhail Berens.

With time, it was becoming clear that France could no longer fund the squadron; sailors were gradually leaving the ships: In 1921, there had been near 7 thousand of them; by 1924, about 700, and by 1925-1926, there were only about 150 Russians in Bizerte. People left for Europe; those who remained in Tunisia found employment as teachers, doctors or land surveyors or found jobs at railways or port facilities. On October 28, 1924, France recognized the Soviet Union and started discussing transfer to it of the ships moored at African shores. Nothing, however, happened: The French feared that they only would strengthen the Soviet navy. Anastasia still remembered the ghost ships, a very sad sight. The ships remained in Bizerte for six more years before they were scrapped in the 1930s.

When Tunisia became independent in 1956, many Russian emigres left the country with French passports. Anastasia's father declined an offer of French citizenship: he wanted either Russian citizenship or none at all. True to her father's principles, she lived with the Nansen stateless person passport practically till the end of her life when she got the Russian passport at a solemn ceremony. The icon of the Savior her father had brought from the destroyer *Zharky*, when he went on shore, was her most precious relic.

Her friendship with Ivan Ilovaysky lasted for many years till his death



Estate of the Nabokov family in Rozhdestveno

in 1985. His father, a Cossack officer, had sat for the picture “Reply of the Zaporozhian Cossacks” by Ilya Repin. He can be seen there in military uniform. Shortly before his death, Ivan Ilovaysky brought Anastasia a box with family heirloom and a reproduction of Repin’s picture glued on the top: “Do your best to save the box and the reproduction, this is the only portrait of my father.” After the death of her husband, Ilovaysky’s widow moved to Europe and left the keys to the Orthodox Church of Alexander Nevsky to Anastasia. When the squadron had been dismissed, the sailors who were still living in Tunisia decided to collect money to build a church. Anastasia’s father was a member of the committee that supervised the project. The church was opened in 1937.

I visited the church together with Anastasia; inside there was a memorial plaque with the names of all warships that had were stationed at Bizerte. I was very much impressed with the St. Andrew flag at the entrance embroidered by Russian women married to Tunisians and living in Bizerte. They closed ranks around Anastasia as church warden and formed the core of the parish. For many years, Anastasia Shirinskaya-Manstein preserved the center of Russian spirituality and culture on African soil.

Her services were appreciated by the Russian Orthodox Church with the Order of St. Olga; she also received a high state award – the Order of Friendship.

While accompanying me around Bizerte she showed me the local Christian cemetery and was very much aggrieved by the broken grave-stones on the burials of Russian sailors – Vice-Admiral A. Gerasimov and Rear-Admiral V. Nikolya who had supervised the departure of Wrangel's troops from Crimea. It should be said that she had done a lot to preserve the burials of Russian sailors and to organize restoration of the church in Bizerte.

We also visited the Ras al-Abyad (White Cape), the northernmost point of Africa (it got its name from outcrops of white rock). Russian sailors were frequent visitors there: Russia seemed much closer from this point.

ON MAY 28, the Museum of Russia Abroad was opened in Moscow. Its exposition included the internment at Gallipoli, the evacuation from Crimea, the Russian squadron's stay in Bizerte and many other pages of Russian emigration. The ceremony in the Alexander Solzhenitsyn House of Russia Abroad attracted descendants of the first wave emigrants. Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov addressed the audience: "Today, no matter what, we will retain our sovereignty, ensure our national security and defend our citizens, history and our civilizational identity. Of course, we will always be able to defend the rights and dignity of our compatriots. I have no doubt that that the Museum will become an important spiritual and intellectual center that will help us preserve and promote the Russian national heritage abroad, as well as a useful site for conducting effective dialogue with our compatriots around the globe. It will help ensure historical continuity, link ages and generations and perpetuate the names of those who, while living in foreign lands, did not forget their homeland."

Geopolitical Processes in Latin America

Ya. Burliyay

Key words: foreign policy, geopolitics, Latin America, international relations, Russia.

GEOPOLITICAL ANTAGONISMS besetting various parts of the world are a much more serious problem today than ever before due to globalization. One of the scenes of clashes of geopolitical interests is Latin America, which lays claim to being a sovereign actor in world politics. Geopolitical issues in Latin America are a subject that is being investigated by many Russian scholars, mainly researchers working at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Led by the consulting director of the institute, Vladimir Davydov, they have spent quite many years exploring these problems [1; 2; 4]. However, some interesting work has been done by other Russian scholars as well.

One of them is Anton Yemelyanov, an associate professor at the political science department of the Moscow State Linguistic University and the university's academic secretary [3]. Yemelyanov's study of the genesis of the civilizational identity of Latin America and geopolitical impacts of the origins of this identity on that part of the American continent as an entity in modern international relations is especially important since civilizational identity is a key factor in the political development and integration of nations.

After analyzing principal theories of civilization, Yemelyanov describes principal characteristics of Latin American civilization and examines Latin America's special role in the construction of a polycentric world [3, pp. 16, 69].

In his book, *The Geopolitics of Latin America*,* Yemelyanov argues that civilizational identity is just a sum of national political identities and

* A.I. Yemelyanov. *Geopolitika Latinskoy Ameriki. A Monograph*. Moscow, Moscow State Linguistic University, 2018. 220 pp.

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other factors but that quite often it may also possess cultural characteristics of its own [3, p. 21].

When it comes into contact or openly conflicts with the political identities of other international actors, civilizational identity changes its essence. It is no accident that some leading theorists of international relations base their research on civilizational analysis.

The identity of Latin American civilization, which is different from Western civilization, certainly deserves close attention. Globalization quite often manifests itself in the spread of some of the worst products of mass culture, and this is justly rejected by nations that are keen to preserve their identity. Yemelyanov argues that, since Latin America has for a long time remained within the orbit of the United States, anti-globalization sentiments there typically take the form of rejection of the American way of life [3, p. 28].

Various actors are fighting for access to Latin America's resources and for geopolitical control of the region, and for this reason it is essential to understand the role of Latin America's civilizational identity in world politics.

Yemelyanov makes a detailed description of Latin America's geopolitical potential, which manifests itself in rich natural resources. Struggles for Latin America's natural wealth hinder regional integration processes [3, p. 35]. Moreover, there remain ideological antagonisms that fuel tensions between some Latin American countries.

Those adversities are counteracted by civilizational self-identification that is based on the historical, cultural, and linguistic ties of Latin American nations. Latin America's civilizational identification is a response to the neo-colonialist policies of the United States and other economically developed countries [3, p. 51]. The Geopolitics of Latin America includes a valuable study of the genesis and essence of Latin Americanism, which is a component of various Latin American ideological movements.

Yemelyanov analyzes 353 sources of various kinds, including archive records, empirical studies, and reports by influential Latin America-focused research institutions.

Other strong points of Yemelyanov's book are his methodology, his extensive use of Russian and foreign research, and his attention to various theories of civilization. His logic of exposition gives the reader an insight into geopolitical trends in Latin America and worldwide.

Yemelyanov reflects on reactions in Latin American countries to the

expansionist policies of the United States and other Western nations. He emphasizes that Latin America's new civilizational identity is a synthesis of Western civilization and pre-Columbian cultures [3, p. 57]. He argues that Latin America has maintained region-wide cultural traditions that enable Latin American countries to act together as a single civilizational unit in international affairs.

The subjects raised by Yemelyanov include interaction between Orthodox civilization and Latin America. In his view, Latin American countries and Russia have the potential for closer bilateral relations and for more extensive cooperation on various international problems [3, p. 150].

One of the tasks Yemelyanov sets himself is to examine geopolitics in Latin America through the prism of subregional integration processes. He comes to the conclusion that, to some extent, the civilizational identity of Latin America as part of the American continent affects integration processes in it and puts forward the thesis that Latin American states have collective civilizational interests in the international arena.

Yemelyanov proves – and this is one of his most important conclusions – that it is not only political elites but also ordinary people in Latin America that consider the latter a civilization with its own identity.

Works such as *The Geopolitics of Latin America* are substantial contributions to knowledge about Latin America in Russia. They stimulate the emergence of centers of Ibero-American studies in our country and shed light on aspects of Russia's relations with Latin American countries that remain poorly known, helping strengthen those relations. *The Geopolitics of Latin America* would be a great help to any scholar or diplomat specializing in Latin America.

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Regions in the Maelstrom of Change

G. Kosach

Key words: Middle East, Central Asia, megatrends, “hybrid regimes.”

EACH NEW BOOK by Irina Zvyagelskaya* is groundbreaking – and for good reason. The author of the newly published monograph “The Middle East and Central Asia: Megatrends in the Regional Dimension” is a well-known specialist in international affairs whose academic interests, although broad, include two leading research areas related to the regions featured in the title of this monograph – the Middle East and Central Asia. However, to consider a book groundbreaking, we must ask: What is it about, and can the author’s conclusions be considered a qualitative contribution to the development of the branch of scientific knowledge the author specializes in? Does Zvyagelskaya’s new research project meet the requirements?

Yes, absolutely. That is because the author of the monograph set an important objective: to determine how the current evolutionary trends (megatrends) of the modern system of international relations are affecting the Middle East and Central Asia. This statement of the problem is itself fundamental: Russian researchers are more interested in the situation forming in this regard in other regions of the modern world, leaving aside (relatively, of course) the situation in the region that is home to the states of the Arab world and Israel and the region of the former Soviet Union. This means that this new work, in closing an existing gap, makes an important contribution to further understanding processes encompassing the whole world. But what does the author mean by “megatrends”?

When identifying them, Zvyagelskaya writes about the “growing challenges of modern statehood” and “the evolution of sovereignty in the

* Irina Zvyagelskaya. *Blizhny Vostok i Tsentralnaya Azia: Globalnye trendy v regionalnom ispolnenii*. Moscow, 2018, 218 pp.

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post-Westphalian world”; about the “further regionalization of international relations” and, as a consequence, the “strengthening role of local players”; and about the modern “instability of familiar concepts” that is manifesting itself in the “phenomenon of hybridization.” Megatrends not only imply but manifest “cross-border terrorism,” the significant realignment of conflicts, revolutionary changes “against the backdrop of evolutionary development,” and the transformation of the “balance of modernity, traditionalism and the archaic” both in the Middle East and Central Asia (pp. 4-5).

While the statehood existing in these two regional spaces was largely the result of external recognition (although, of course, the endogenous factors of its formation can in no way be denied), this did not mean that statehood was “self-sufficient.” Having arisen within borders delimited by external forces (Great Britain and France in the case of the Middle East, and the Russian Empire/Soviet Union in the case of Central Asia) and on a basis that most suitably met their interests, Middle Eastern and Central Asian statehood fit poorly with the principles underpinning the local way of life. Local communities were not only fragmented (ethnically, religiously and regionally), but struggled to “survive and function in a traditionally structured environment” (p. 5).

When drawing this conclusion, the author by no means extends it to all states of both regions. While in the case of one region she points to the existence of an “exception” in Israel; in the case of the other, she points to almost all the Central Asian states. They are united by the same role of an external factor (albeit in a specific framework). While the Zionist/Israeli project was decisively influenced by European nationalism and developed within the framework of the British mandate, Central Asian statehood grew out of Russian-imperial/Soviet modernization, including the “national demarcation” carried out in the 1920s and 1930s that laid the foundation for the local statehood that finally formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Just as in Israel, where “dominant ethnonationalism” complicates the “process of constructing a single civic identity” (p. 20), a feature of the contemporary existence of the post-Soviet Central Asian states is the “ethnonational dimension” that creates “difficulties” for ethnic groups incorporated from the outside (and also sometimes for locals with a different religious affiliation than the majority of the population) who are unable to “fit into changing social relations” (pp. 23-24).

Ethnonationalism, the author writes, engenders myth creation. In

many forms, of course. Its source in the case of Israel is the “spiritual and religious tradition” of Judaism (p. 20); in the case of Central Asia, it is the idealized “heroes and conquerors” of the past (p. 24). Zvyagelskaya does not extend the phenomenon of ethnonationalism and accompanying myth creation to the Arab world, but the tendency to act in that vein is also evident there, manifesting itself more in relation to the socially fragmented republican states and appearing only today in the monarchies seeking deeper socioeconomic transformation. In any case, the collapse of the “nationwide” idea that followed World War I, leading to the creation of local “country” states, demanded that these states be given the needed legitimacy, asserting their seamless connection with antiquity (Sumerian-Babylonian Iraq, Pharaonic Egypt, Phoenician Lebanon, and Queen Zenobia’s Syria, which fought the Romans). Nevertheless, one has to agree with the author that the “renaissance” of the same “nationwide” idea in the 1950s and 1960s gave rise not to civil society in the Arab world (at least in the presidential republics) but to authoritarian regimes reliant on military and security agencies.

But can we talk about the existence of full-fledged sovereign states in the Middle East and Central Asia? To be sure, within the Middle East regional space, “external forces have traditionally been assigned a special role” (p. 31). It was these forces that, in the context of the global Soviet-American confrontation, “with varying success formed the political face of the Middle East” (p. 34). Already these circumstances call into question the notion of full-scale Middle Eastern state sovereignty.

The current situation and its “numerous conflicts” allow us to assert that sovereignty has “all but disappeared in this region,” which is confirmed by many facts. The current development of events allows us to say that this “disappearance” is not only and not so much the result of the actions of global powers but also the result of the policy of regional states “openly neglecting the sovereignty of their neighbors” (p. 41).

The Middle East region is becoming increasingly unstable. An increasing number of “failed” states is appearing, and the “virus” of anarchy they produce is spreading to neighboring countries and territories, contributing to a rise in the number of nonstate actors and an increasing “de-sovereignization” of countries that have become the object of intervention by external forces – both global and regional.

Does this apply only to the Middle East? No, the author rightly believes. External forces “played a decisive role in forming statehood” in Central Asia, and the Soviet model of national-territorial demarcation

“created the problem of divided ethnic groups and exacerbated the struggle for resources,” raising the issue of settling border disputes. However, in contrast to the Middle East, the Central Asian regional landscape, which is experiencing the impact of megatrends, looks more “peaceful.” Despite the challenges to local sovereignty presented by “cross-border terrorism and crime, the activities of nonstate actors” and the struggle between local “power centers,” the process of the “de-sovereignization” of regional states is more a “possibility” than the current reality (pp. 48-50). But how likely is that “possibility”?

Speaking about modern international terrorism and its influence on the Middle East and Central Asia, Zvyagelskaya proceeds from the “ISIS example,” not forgetting about the existence of other terrorist groups that have operated (or are operating) in both regions. Nevertheless, ISIS is significant to her because this organization was “at the center of the international agenda” (p. 57). The author is interested in the reasons for the appearance of the organization and the expansion of its influence, which does not imply a detailed study of its origins and development in her book; a considerable number of published works are already devoted to that subject.

The author highlights “the attractiveness of the medieval archaic,” noting that the issue by no means comes down to secularism, seemingly categorically rejected by Islamists (p. 61). Are not secular principles of governance, she observes, strange to political systems appealing to religious dogma? (The Iranian and, it should be added, Saudi systems are increasingly progressing down this path.) Didn’t elections (“as an instrument of democracy”) pave the way to power for the Egyptian, Tunisian, Palestinian, and Turkish Islamists?

ISIS proposes an “alternative to national states” (p. 61). The organization casts itself as a “new global state-building project, devoid of the costs generated by faithlessness and deviation from the canons.” The campaign for this project “justifies any nonnormative methods.” This is a clear and unquestioning conclusion complemented by an equally valid remark: “The ideas it promotes [despite the military defeat in Syria and Iraq] remain appealing in various societies where the demand for justice is high and there are practically no prospects for satisfying that demand” (p. 63). In other words, in light of that conclusion, should the discussion be only about Islamism? Or might there be movements and organizations derived from the denominations of other religious doctrines with whose help it would be possible to identify actions identical in spirit and method

whose adherents exist far beyond the borders of the mainly Muslim Middle East? And for that matter, even in the Middle East itself, which is by no means painted in the same Islamic monotone?

What about Central Asia? The collapse of the Soviet Union opened this region to the globalized outside world. International Islamic groups invariably saw it and its predominately Muslim population as a “valuable resource” (p. 65). Having Afghanistan as a neighbor became a fundamentally significant challenge for all Central Asian states. The author’s conclusion again leaves no doubt: “In recent years, the radicalization of youth ... has become more pronounced.”

The background of this “radicalization” was the “hopelessness caused by the lack of prospects,” and its outcome was “consolidation in the public mind of primitive proposals for social reorganization” (p. 66). The flow of young ISIS sympathizers to Syria and Iraq was growing. The tangle of state and internal contradictions in the Fergana Valley, the complete elimination of lawful religious parties and movements – all these are more significant radicalization factors than the return home of ISIS militants.

A separate chapter of the work is devoted to “hybridization in war and politics.” The author bases her definition of a “hybrid conflict” on the already stable assertion that it involves both regular and irregular military forces, and “state and nonstate actors united by a common political aim” (p. 81). In light of this statement, she examines the classic example of such a conflict, the “second Lebanese war of 2006,” the large-scale military operations of the Israeli Army against the Hezbollah movement, as well as the participation of paramilitary groups of this organization in the fighting in Syria.

According to the author, “hybrid conflicts” are fraught with the increasingly obvious trend toward the further “fragmentation” of conflicts, since “private armies, mercenaries and volunteer units on a commercial basis” are involved in them much more than ever before, carrying out even “military tasks” (p. 88). Is the role and importance of regular armed forces a thing of the past? Zvyagelskaya by no means suggests that this conclusion is irreversible; she merely analyzes one of the aspects of the influence of megatrends on the situation in the Middle East.

The author also discusses “hybrid regimes,” which feature not only an “authoritarian, rigid power vertical” but also “elements of democratic institutions,” including those formally bearing “all signs of being democratic” yet “restrict the rights of certain population groups” due to the spe-

cific character of domestic political development or a special “understanding of threats” (p. 89). Zvyagelskaya (while expressing various reservations) considers the regimes of all Middle Eastern and Central Asian states to be “hybrid.”

For all the uniqueness of its situation, Israel is no exception with respect to the foregoing: The quality of “ethnic democracy” puts it more on par with its Arab neighbors. However, another circumstance is more significant. Zvyagelskaya carefully explores a more significant process: volatility and fluctuations in the “correlation between authoritarianism and democracy” in the evolution of “hybrid regimes” (p. 91) determined by the desire for modernization, on the one hand, and the inevitability of the integration of traditional institutions into the modern system of governance, on the other. The result of her analysis is that the hybridity of Middle Eastern and Central Asian regimes is “long-term,” due “not only to opportunistic considerations but also the basic cultural characteristics of societies,” and “its results may prove unexpected” (p. 105).

That conclusion inevitably requires the author to address the issue of archaization and traditionalism in modern-day Central Asia and the Middle East. While noting that the states of these regions are “resurrecting traditional practices, images and elements of the past culture,” Zvyagelskaya considers it impossible to speak of a “return to antiquity.” On the contrary, she sees such a resurrection as “an effective means of mobilizing and consolidating society in the face of uncertainty” (p. 109). This is obvious both for the Middle East, “which entered the second decade of the 21st century in a state of fragmentation and general instability” (p. 113), and for Central Asia, where the appeal to the archaic “was directly related to the search for a national identity” (p. 125).

Archaization is predicated by both “public demand from below” and the desire of the ruling elites to “manipulate society” when both circumstances can coincide (pp. 117-118) and leaders who wield power (for the author, the example of Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman is important in this regard) in a traditional society are “forced to act within the framework of a model that is familiar and understandable to society” (p. 122).

To what extent can we now speak of revolution and evolution as opposite ends of the development spectrum? Are the processes of revolutionary and evolutionary transformation blurred today (under the influence of the same megatrends)? This is a rather pertinent question.

There are good reasons for raising it: Both the Middle East and

Central Asia experienced (and perhaps are still experiencing) sharp transitions from showing “complete servility to widespread opposition” in the 21st century (p. 135): the “Arab Spring” and ensuing bloody conflicts and humanitarian crises, the 2010 interethnic clashes in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, and the 2011 social protests in Zhanaozen, Kazakhstan, are examples of this. However, the history of both regions includes other, earlier evidence of the eruption of domestic tensions: endless (and bloody) coups in the Arab world and the inter-Tajik conflict of 1992-1997.

The causes of the upheavals have been largely identified: Societies in both regions are in transition, the transition period is fraught with a major disconnect between the ruling classes and their subjects, and there is evident frustration within entire social groups and a struggle for the redistribution of power. Modernization strengthens the state apparatus, which ignores the law and is formed on the basis of clan and land groups. In the case of the “Arab Spring,” it was about the “surge in the number of young people in society, the emergence of educated people unable to find opportunities to apply themselves, poverty” and the marginalization of rural residents who had relocated to cities (pp. 135-137).

The Arab world altered former conceptions of a revolutionary coup. The “Arab Spring” did not at all presuppose the existence of “conspiratorial groups” or party leaders. The events in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen did not produce any leaders. The pattern of the coups looked like “a jolt leading to mass demonstrations and then the overthrow of the head of state.” Subsequently, everything depended on the ability of the ruling elite to compromise and on the “readiness of regional and outside actors to intervene” (p. 142). In general, that pattern proved true for events in Central Asia.

At the same time, the author of the monograph is not inclined to absolutize Middle Eastern and Central Asian social upheavals. The “Arab Spring” did not affect the entire Arab world (and especially the Arab monarchies); the former regime was restored in Egypt and reformed in Tunisia. The Arab regimes remained largely stable thanks to the legitimacy of their rulers, supported by both traditional and modernized institutions.

The change of power in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (in 2017) was also not accompanied by any upheavals. In the case of both regions, the “combination of traditional approaches and modern mechanisms” (p. 149) ruled out truly revolutionary transformations. Nevertheless, local regimes continue to need “verification of their legiti-

macy and public popularity,” although the tools of this “verification” – elections and referenda – cannot look “ideal” in a traditional society (pp. 151-152).

Finally, the last section of Zvyagelskaya’s work examines how the current state of “fuzzy” international relations is affecting ongoing or reemerging conflicts. Turning to the regional space of the Middle East, the author notes the decreasing significance of interstate conflicts, which are being replaced by conflicts “within states, most often on a religious, ethnic or tribal basis,” as well as a “wave of social demonstrations of the ‘Arab Spring’ era that are ultimately also taking shape ... in the framework of traditional identities” (p. 156).

Of course, the basis of the new generation of conflicts is the “vast field of traditionalism,” as well as the coexistence of strong and weak states in the region, when “strong players” are increasing their interference in the affairs of their “weak” neighbors. But the main thing is that today’s internal conflicts are developing in the absence of an “ideologically united opposition,” and ethnic, religious, regional or tribal identity is becoming the basis for creating disparate armed groups that look “fragile” and are not able to confront a common enemy for a long time (p. 158). The conflict in Syria fully bears out that conclusion.

The result of the emergence of the new generation of conflicts is the “collapse of official military structures” or their “weakening” (pp. 159-160) and the emergence of “nonstate armed actors” of varying forms: Hezbollah combines features of a nonstate and state structure, and Hamas performs the functions of “military resistance” and “social” governance (pp. 161-162). The same new generation of conflicts is leading to the phenomenon of field commanders, which manifested itself not only in Libya or Yemen after 2011, but also much earlier: during the inter-Tajik confrontation. But intrastate conflicts also politicize “customary identities” (p. 171) associated with ethnicity and religious or tribal affiliation based on kinship or land ties.

These conflicts are beginning to acquire an increasingly pronounced instrumental character: Outside actors, as well as regional “power centers,” see them as a means of solving their own problems, emphasizing in this regard the idea of ensuring their own security. This is also leading to a new dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the rapprochement of the Sunni monarchies in the region with the Jewish state, further development of which is constrained by the unresolved Palestinian issue.

Conflicts in both regions (and elsewhere) need to be resolved. This is

required by the situation that is emerging under the influence of megatrends in the modern system of international relations. But what could be the formats for such a settlement? Zvyagelskaya makes a reasonable remark in that regard: "Domestic conflicts and civil wars are least subject to settlement" because they are based on "values," "customs" and "other cultural characteristics" (p. 185). These "values" generate "interests" that divide multiethnic and multiconfessional societies. The example of the Middle East conflict cited in this connection, when two nationalities are contesting their right to Palestine, is most revealing. Moreover, the author of the monograph also points to the "asymmetry" of modern Middle Eastern conflicts (citing the example of Syria) connected with the mismatched power capabilities of the government and the opposition. While "military and territorial balance" was achieved in Syria, in her opinion that was due to outside interference and not at all as a result of "the parties' acknowledgement of the futility of continuing the intense military confrontation" (p. 188). Nevertheless, a compromise is necessary, and the search for one can and should become the subject of the "decisive involvement of outside forces in a settlement" (p. 189).

Is there an example of the success of such a settlement? Zvyagelskaya says there is: the political settlement in Tajikistan. Of course, she adds, this example is not universal, but "the principle of the division of power remains the basis for political compromise in civil wars" (p. 195), even if we bear in mind that the subsequent development of events (as evidenced by the evolution of the current Dushanbe regime) could raise the "eventuality" of the opposition emerging on the "political foreground" (p. 196).

As I asserted earlier, Zvyagelskaya's new book is groundbreaking. The author has practical knowledge of the situation in the regions she studies and at the same time carefully takes into account the conclusions of her Russian and foreign colleagues. Will the book be interesting? Without a doubt: The widest possible readership (not only specialists) will find it interesting.

“Oh, Spring Endless and Boundless...”

A. Baklanov

Key words: Arab Spring, Middle East, European Union, ISIS.

IN HIS TIME, Russian poet Alexander Blok, greatly impressed by the ambiguous and tragic events of the uncompleted revolution of 1905, wrote an outstanding poem that began as

Oh, Spring endless and boundless -
Endless and boundless dream!
I discover you, Life! I embrace you!
And I greet you with the clang of a shield!

These words came to my mind while I was reading the latest book of Prof. Alexander Vavilov, one of our best Orientalists, “Cataclysms of the “Arab Spring.”*

The author has analyzed the “endless and boundless” phenomenon of the Arab Spring to point out that the honorable aims and high-flown slogans of those who poured out into the streets of Arab capitals in the turbulent revolutionary days were never realized. In fact, today, the majority of these countries are struggling for survival amid new contradictions, conflicts and splits.

The events went this way. We should accept this as a fact to be carefully studied to arrive at conclusions that might prove useful in future. We should not concentrate solely on negative repercussions but rely on new possibilities made accessible by the routing of the main forces of ISIS.

This is how the author looked at the events of the last few years. He has shared his observations and generalizations with the readers to help them understand the causes and reasons which distorted the results of the

* A.I. Vavilov. *Kataklyzmy “arabskoy vesny.”* Moscow: Biblos konsalting, 2018, 760 pp.
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Arab Spring far removed from the hopes of those who had taken part in rallies and demonstrations.

The negative course and deformations of the unfolding processes were caused by large-scale interference of external forces, the West in particular, that needed weaker Arab countries with impotent governments; unbalanced or non-functioning structures of power and state governance; deepened social and ethnoconfessional contradictions; armed clashes and the use of force as the first steps to a civil war.

Why did the West need destabilization in the region? The author has amply illustrated the fact that the Western countries not only wanted to shatter or completely destroy the unity of the Arab world but also to prevent even the slightest possibility of its unity when talking to the West and voice their economic, financial and trade demands.

The author has relied on the realities of Iraq, Libya, Syria and other countries to point to the fact that the West widely used extremist and terrorist elements and groups determined to elbow out the political leaders of these countries and intimidate their populations to get access to the instruments of political power.

Terrorists and the so-called Islamic State survive on the money acquired by plundering material and cultural values, illegal extraction of oil, and other mineral resources.

The author has analyzed in detail Russia's policy of opposition to terrorism, creation of the conditions conducive to restoration of peace and regional stability. Russia pays a lot of attention to the relations with the Arab states for the simple reason that the Arabs are in the majority in the Middle East with its population of 540 million. The European Union, another closest geographic neighbor of Russia, can boast of the same or even slightly smaller numbers (510 million).

According to forecasts, by 2050, the Middle East will be home to 1.3 billion or twice as much as the total population strength of Russia's Western neighbors.

This speaks a lot about the size and potentials of the market found directly at our borders. To fully reveal its advantages, the region needs peace and stability which are, in fact, Russia's traditional foreign policy aim in the Arab countries.

Russia's reserves combined with the region's nearly 60% of world's oil and 54% of world's gas reserves will considerably increase their total weight on the global hydrocarbon market when the Middle Eastern states harmonize their interests and policies. The conflicts between Saudi

Arabia and Iran and between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the main players on the hydrocarbon market, are stirred up by external forces determined to prevent unwelcome developments.

Today, the Arab states of the Middle East are our most important partners in the efforts to prevent an emergence of a new world order based on sanctions. According to different sources, today over one-third of the countries (71 states or over half of the Earth's territory) is living under sanctions.

We should join our forces to ensure a fairer international political, economic and financial order which means that we should know each other better to achieve an understanding of what should be done and how. Alexander Vavilov's book supplies us with important benchmarks to sort out the far from simple and highly ambiguous processes unfolding in the Arab world.

