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On Victory Day

***Sergey Lavrov,
Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation***

Key words: Victory Day, fascist aggression, Immortal Regiment, Russophobia

THE MONTH OF MAY and its fireworks are now behind us. The country and the world celebrated Victory Day, which is a holiday of war veterans, home front workers, and all the people of Russia and other victorious nations. There was a grand parade on Red Square and a wreath-laying ceremony at the tomb of the Unknown Soldier. The march of the Immortal Regiment – a civil initiative that has acquired a truly global dimension – took place again not only in Russia, but in many other countries as well, with the participation of hundreds of thousands of Russians, our compatriots abroad and citizens of other countries – all people who cherish the memory of Victory and the memory of those who worked to bring it closer.

There's another date ahead – June 22, the day of memory and grief for those who died during the Great Patriotic War. We will be remembering those who fell in battle, were tortured to death in captivity and concentration camps, or died of hunger and the toils of war. Preparations are beginning for celebrating the 75th anniversary of Victory in 2020, which, of course, will be held at a level appropriate to the scale of the feat and the greatness of the spirit of the heroes of that war. One can't help thinking about it: What does May 9 mean for the peoples who were on the verge of annihilation, and why do some people loathe this holiday today?

As someone who is part of the first post-war generation and who grew up on the stories told by war veterans and family tales about the war, I believe the answers to these questions are obvious. The peoples of the Soviet Union and other countries became the object of the inhuman ideology of Nazism, and then the victim of aggression on behalf of the most powerful, organized and motivated war machine of that time. At the cost of terrible sacrifices, the Soviet Union made a decisive contribution

to defeating Nazi Germany and, jointly with the Allies, liberated Europe from the fascist plague. The victory laid the foundation for the post-war world order based on collective security and interstate cooperation and paved the way to creating the UN. These are the facts.

Unfortunately, however, the memory of Victory is not sacred to all around the world. It is regrettable that there are individuals in Russia who picked up the myths spread by those who want to bury this memory, and who believe the time has come to stop solemn celebrations of Victory Day. The higher the anniversary numbers become, the more we come face to face with the desire to forget.

Bitter as it is to witness, we see the attempts to discredit the heroes, to artificially generate doubts about the correctness of the path our ancestors followed. Both abroad and in our country, we hear that public consciousness in Russia is being militarized, and holding Victory Day parades and processions is nothing other than imposing bellicose and militaristic sentiment at the state level. By doing so, Russia is allegedly rejecting humanism and the values of the “civilized” world. Whereas European nations, they claim, have chosen to forget about the “past grievances,” come to terms with each other and are “tolerantly” building “forward-looking relations.”

Our detractors seek to diminish the role of the Soviet Union in World War II and portray it if not as the main culprit of the war, then at least as an aggressor, along with Nazi Germany, and spread arguments about “equal responsibility.” They cynically equate Nazi occupation, which claimed tens of millions of lives, and the crimes committed by collaborationists with the Red Army’s liberating mission. Monuments are erected in honor of Nazi henchmen. At the same time, monuments to liberator soldiers and the graves of fallen soldiers are desecrated and destroyed in some countries. As you may recall, the Nuremberg Tribunal, whose rulings became an integral part of international law, clearly identified who was on the side of good and who was on the side of evil. In the first case, it was the Soviet Union, which sacrificed millions of lives of its sons and daughters to the altar of Victory, as well as other Allied nations. In the second case, it was the Third Reich, the Axis countries and their minions, including in the occupied territories.

However, false interpretations of history are being introduced into the Western education system with mystifications and pseudo-historical theories designed to belittle the feat of our ancestors. Young people are being told that the main credit in victory over Nazism and liberation of Europe

goes not to the Soviet troops, but to the West due to the landing in Normandy, which took place less than a year before Nazism was defeated.

We hold sacred the contribution of all the Allies to the common Victory in that war, and we believe any attempts to drive a wedge between us are disgraceful. But no matter how hard the falsifiers of history try, the fire of truth cannot be put out. It was the peoples of the Soviet Union who broke the backbone of the Third Reich. That is a fact.

The attacks on Victory Day and the celebration of the great feat of those who won the terrible war are appalling.

Notorious for its political correctness, Europe is trying to smooth out “sharp historical edges” and to substitute military honors for winners with “neutral” reconciliation events. No doubt, we must look forward, but we must not forget the lessons of history either.

Few people were concerned that in Ukraine, which gravitates towards “European values,” the former Poroshenko regime declared a state holiday the day of founding the Ukrainian Insurgent Army – a criminal organization responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of civilian Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, Poles and Jews (although in Israel, whose people survived the Holocaust, May 9 is an official holiday, Victory Day). Other glaring examples from neighboring countries include Nazi Germany-like torchlight processions of neo-Banderites along the main streets of the Hero City of Kiev, and the marches of veterans and supporters of Waffen-SS in Riga and Tallinn. I would like to ask those who do not like the tears of our veterans during parades and who criticize the “militarized” events in honor of Victory: how do you like this kind of “demilitarization” of consciousness in a European way?

No one will admit this, of course, but here are the facts: The United States, NATO and the EU let their junior partners, who are using blatant Russophobia to build their careers, get away with quite a lot. These guys get away with everything, including glorification of Nazi henchmen and hardcore chauvinism towards ethnic Russians and other minorities for the sole purpose of using them to keep Western alliances on anti-Russian

Our detractors seek to diminish the role of the Soviet Union in World War II and portray it if not as the main culprit of the war, then at least as an aggressor, along with Nazi Germany, and spread arguments about “equal responsibility.”

positions and to reject a pragmatic dialogue with Moscow on an equal footing.

Occasionally it appears that the purpose of such connivance on behalf of the West is to relieve of responsibility those who, by colluding with Hitler in Munich in 1938, tried to channel Nazi aggression to the east. The desire of many in Europe to rewrite that shameful chapter of history can probably be understood. After all, as a result, the economies of a number of countries in continental Europe started working for the Third Reich, and the state machines in many of them were involved in the Nazi-initiated genocide of Russians, Jews and other nations. Apparently, it is no accident that the EU and NATO members regularly refuse to support the UN General Assembly resolution on the inadmissibility of glorifying Nazism, which was advanced by Russia. The “alternative vision” of World War II among Western diplomats clearly does not stem from the lack of historical knowledge (although there are problems in this department as well). As you may recall, even during the Cold War such blasphemy did not exist, although it would seem that an ideological face-off was a perfect setting for it. Few dared to challenge the decisive role of the Soviet Union in our common Victory back then and the standing our country enjoyed during the post-war period, which our Western allies recognized without reservations. Incidentally, it was they who initiated the division of Europe into “areas of responsibility” back in 1944, when Churchill raised this issue with Stalin during the Soviet-British talks.

Today, distorting the past, Western politicians and propagandists want to make the public doubt the fair nature of the world order that was approved in the UN Charter following World War II. They adopted a policy seeking to undermine the existing international legal system and to replace it with a certain “rule-based order.” They want to create this order based on the principle of “he who is stronger is right” and according to the “law of the jungle.”

This primarily concerns the United States and its peculiar perception of 20th century history. The idea of “two good wars” is still widespread there, as a result of which the United States secured military dominance in Western Europe and a number of other regions of the world, raised confidence in its strength, experienced an economic boom and became the world leader.

Just as enthusiastically as the Europeans, the Americans are creating an image of “militaristic Russia.” However, most of their own history is a sequence of endless wars of conquest. Over 243 years of “American

exceptionalism,” interventionism has become an integral part of Washington’s foreign policy. Moreover, the U.S. political elite think of the use of force as a natural element of “coercive diplomacy” designed to resolve a wide range of issues, including domestically.

Not a single election campaign in the United States is complete without the candidates trying on a toga of a commander-in-chief in action. The ability to resort to the use of force for any reason is proof of an American politician’s prowess. There are many examples of such stereotypes being implemented under various “plausible” pretexts: Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, Yugoslavia in 1999, and Iraq in 2003. At the same time, America honors its fallen soldiers regardless of what cause they fought for. Memorial Day is celebrated in May, and no one has any suspicions of “militarism” when naval parades and air shows with the participation of military equipment take place in various U.S. cities.

We are essentially accused of preserving the memory of our fathers and grandfathers, who laid down their lives in a sacred liberation war, giving them military honors, and celebrating Victory Day widely and with pride. Was it Russia or the Soviet Union that unleashed two world wars? Is it us who today operate an extensive network of military bases that were created to control the entire world?

For diplomats and politicians, May 9 is also a good occasion to recall that the Allies referred to themselves as the United Nations in 1945. They stood shoulder to shoulder during the war, conducted Arctic convoys and fraternized on the Elbe. French pilots in the Normandie-Neman fighter regiment fought the enemy on the Soviet-German front. Awareness of the common threat in the face of the inhuman ideology of National Socialism had helped the states with different political and socioeconomic models to overcome differences. The belief that the defeat of Nazi Germany will mark the triumph of justice and the victory of light over darkness was the unifying factor.

After the war, the Allies built a new architecture of international relations based on the ideal of equal cooperation between sovereign states. The creation of the UN was supposed to warrant that the sad fate of its predecessor, the League of Nations, will not be repeated. The founding fathers learned the lessons of history well and knew that without the “concert of the great powers” – that is, the unanimous consent of the leading countries of the world which hold permanent seats at the Security Council – the world cannot enjoy stability. We must be guided by this commandment today as well.

This year, as we took part in Victory Day celebrations, we once again told everyone willing to listen: “Yes, just like our ancestors we are ready to decisively repel any aggressor. But Russians do not want war, and do not want to go through horror and suffering again.” The historical mission of our nation is to guard peace. The peace we are trying to preserve. Therefore, we are offering a hand to anyone who wants to be good partners to us. Our Western colleagues have long had our proposals which open realistic ways to overcoming confrontation and putting up a reliable barrier to all those who allow for the possibility of a nuclear war. These proposals were further reinforced by an appeal made by the CSTO member states to the North Atlantic Alliance in May to begin a professional depoliticized dialogue on strategic stability issues.

I am confident that the citizens of Russia and other countries will be watching parades in honor of the 75th anniversary of the Great Victory on May 9, 2020 and joining the ranks of the Immortal Regiment with St. George ribbons attached to their lapels and with thoughts of peace in their minds. The memory of those who fell in battle fighting the enemies of the homeland, the enemies of civilization, will remain alive as long as we mark the great holiday of victorious nations, the holiday of salvation and the holiday of liberation. And there is no need to be embarrassed about the grandiose scale of this celebration.

Russia in the Middle East and the Palestinian Problem

B. Dolgov

Key words: Middle East, Palestinian problem, Russia, Turkey, Syria.

THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM is one of the worst headaches of the Middle East and one of the greatest geopolitical challenges.

The Soviet Union/Russia, which was present when it originated, was one of the countries that tried to resolve problems related, among other things, to Israeli and Palestinian statehood and the fact that Palestine is the cradle of three world religions – Christianity, Islam and Judaism.

The Middle East in Russia's Foreign Policy and Its Relations With Turkey

AT ALL STAGES of Russian history, the Middle East occupied an important place in the foreign policy of Russia. Its interest dates to 988, when Russia adopted Christianity; in the 11th-16th centuries, it was interested in Palestine as the Holy Land where Christianity had appeared. In 1001, Prince Vladimir sent an embassy to the Middle East; in 1062, monk Varlaam of Kiev performed pilgrimage to the holy places in Palestine. By the 12th century, pilgrimages became more or less common.¹ *Khozhdenie igumena Daniila* (Travels of Hegumen Daniil) describes how in 1106-1108 Hegumen Daniil together with other pilgrims from Russia traveled across the Holy Land, spoke to monks and princes and as a representative of Russia was received with attention and respect. There are travel notes of merchants Trifon Korobeynikov and Yury Grekov whom Czar Ivan IV dispatched to Tsargrad (Constantinople), Jerusalem and Antioch to commemorate his son Prince Ivan.

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In the 17th-18th centuries, Russia had no choice but to gain a foothold on the Black Sea coast and liberate Crimea, the place used by the Crimean khans, vassals of the Ottoman Empire, to plunder Russian possessions. Russia needed an access to the Azov, Caspian and Black seas and, later, to the Mediterranean controlled by the Ottoman Empire. The process began with the Azov, Prut and Persian campaigns of Peter I. He liberated Azov in 1696, founded the Azov Fleet and set up Taganrog as its base, captured Derbent, Resht and Baku in 1723, and spread Russia's jurisdiction to the southwestern coast of the Caspian.

It was under Catherine II (1762-1796) that Russia was especially successful in the pursuance of these aims. In 1769-1770, the Russian army, having rebuffed another attack of Crimean khans, defeated Turks in Moldavia in the battle of Larga, and occupied Khotin and Yassy. In June 1770, having moved from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the Russian squadron defeated the Turkish fleet at the Chesma Bay and the Chios Island. In 1771, the Russian army led by Prince Potemkin liberated Crimea.² In 1773, Russian troops led by Alexander Suvorov continued to press the Turks and routed the Turkish army in Moldavia.

In 1774, having suffered a series of defeats, the Ottoman Empire had no choice but conclude a peace with Russia in Küçük Kaynarca. In 1787, however, in an effort to return the lost territories, the Turks landed on Kinburn Spit (near the city of Nikolaev) but were again defeated by Russian troops. Later, the Russian army led by General-in-Chief A. Suvorov routed the Turks once more on the River Rymnik in Moldavia; in 1790, Russians took the Turkish fortress Izmail; in 1791, they captured Anapa. The Russian navy under Admiral Ushakov routed the Turkish fleet in the battle of Cape Kaliakra (Bulgaria). The naval base in Sevastopol allowed the Russian Empire to control the Black Sea basin and the Straits.

In 1783, the East Georgian Kingdom highly impressed by Russian victories and seeking protection against incessant Turkish invasions signed the Treaty of Georgievsk with Russia. From that time on, the Georgian nobles enjoyed all the privileges of Russian nobility while Georgian merchants were free to trade in Russia. Early in the 19th century, Russia's successful actions led to the Treaty of Gulistan with Persia that placed the rest of Georgia, Dagestan and Northern Azerbaijan under Russia's jurisdiction.

In 1827, having defeated Iran that Britain persistently incited against Russia, the latter added the Erivan and Nakhichevan khanates to its terri-

tory. Russia, the members of the imperial family, nobles and even lower classes extended financial assistance to Eastern patriarchs who were invariably greeted with honors and invited to attend local councils of the Russian Orthodox Church.

In the first half of the 19th century, the so-called Eastern Question, a product of the crisis of the Ottoman Empire and of rivalry between the main European powers – Britain, France and Austria – for the influence in Eastern Mediterranean, that nominally belonged to Turkey, developed into one of the key issues of the international political agenda. Russia confirmed its great power status during the reign of Catherine II and acquired, under the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty, the right to patronize all Orthodox Christians living in the Ottoman Empire.

Complete liberation of the Christians of the Middle East as well as of Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia required more efforts from Russia. Until the late 18th and throughout 19th centuries, it remained in the center of Russia's Middle Eastern and Balkan policies. In response to the request of the Greeks to extend military assistance to their national-liberation struggle against the Ottoman yoke (1821-1830), Russia made several military and diplomatic moves that helped Greece become independent; by the same token Serbia and other Christian Balkan states widened their autonomous rights.

The Eastern Question was further exacerbated by the Franco-Russian rivalry over control of the Christian holy places in Jerusalem which the Ottoman government had transferred to France in 1853. Supported by France and Britain, the Ottoman sultan refused to fulfill Russia's demands to return control to the Orthodox Church. In October 1853, the Ottoman Empire declared a war on Russia. Known as the Crimean (or Eastern) War of 1853-1856, it began with several victories of the Russian army that crossed the Prut and occupied the Danubian Principalities. In November 1853, the squadron of the Black Sea Fleet under Admiral Ushakov defeated the Turkish fleet. In December 1853, Russian troops defeated Turks in the Caucasus, between Kars and Adrianople. At this

Today, when the United States can no longer be viewed as an objective mediator, since it acts on the side of Israel, Russia's role in the fair settlement of the Palestinian problem has considerably increased and is increasing.

point, Britain and France joined Turkey, and the war ended in the defeat of Russia.

In the 19th century, Russia, nevertheless, continued to play the main role in liberating the regions of the Balkan Peninsular with primarily Christian populations and to confirm the rights of Christians in the Middle East. It was on Russia's initiative that in March 1877 six great powers met in London to sign a protocol that demanded of Turkey to improve the position of its Christian subjects. Turkey's refusal ignited another Russo-Turkish war. The Russian army crossed the Danube to liberate Bulgaria. In 1877, it moved into the fortified regions of Shipka and Plevna in the Balkans and into Ardagan, Sukhumi and Kars in the Caucasus. In January 1878, Russian troops supported by Bulgarians and Serbs, entered Sofia and Adrianople (Edirne). This opened the road to Istanbul that left the Turkish government with no other choice but peace talks. Under the Russo-Turkish peace treaty, Serbia, Montenegro and Romania became independent while Bulgaria became an autonomous principality. Under the treaty, Russia returned its lost possessions in South Moldavia and consolidated its control in Ardagan, Bayazid, Batumi, and Kars.

The Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society did a lot to support the Orthodox population of Palestine and figured prominently in the Middle East and in Russia. First, it organized Orthodox pilgrimages to Palestine and to Mount Athos; second, it supported Orthodoxy and its followers in Palestine and Syria; third, it disseminated reliable information in Russia about the past and present of the Holy Land and was engaged in scholarly studies of the region. It also pursued an important task of consolidating Russia's positions in the Middle East.

From 1868 onwards, Russia remained tied to the Holy Land by spiritual threads. Russian pilgrimages to the Holy Land were going on for a millennium. Starting with the mid-19th century, the Russian government worked hard to create the best possible accommodation for Russian pilgrims in Jerusalem and consolidate Russia's presence in the biblical region. In 1847, a Russian Spiritual Mission was opened in Jerusalem; in 1858, there appeared a Russian consulate. In 1864, there was a Russian Compound in Jerusalem with the Holy Trinity Cathedral, Russian hospital, buildings of the Russian Spiritual Mission (Duhovnia), and the Russian consulate, the Marianskaya Women's Hospice and Elizabeth Men's Hospice.

The number of pilgrims was steadily increasing; the courtyards could

no longer accommodate them all. In 1871, Vasily Khitrovo (1834-1903) of the Naval Ministry, performed pilgrimage to the Holy Land; he initiated the Imperial Russian Orthodox Palestine Society and for many years remained one of its officials. The organization designed to look after the pilgrims and local people took its final shape after a decade of persistent efforts.

In 1882, Emperor Alexander III signed the decree on the foundation of the Orthodox Palestine Society; his brother Grand Prince Sergey Alexandrovich (1857-1905), Governor General of Moscow, became its first chairman; after his assassination, his wife Grand Duchess Elizaveta Fedorovna (1864-1918) replaced him as the Society's head. In 1888, the couple had visited the Holy Land to attend consecration of the Church of Mary Magdalene in the Garden of Gethsemane built by the Society. Today, it is the site of the Grand Duchess' relics. In 1889, the society acquired the honorary title of Imperial Russian Orthodox Palestine Society.

It was called Palestine because it was set up to work on the territory of Palestine of the Gospels. Other countries acquired their Palestine societies approximately at the same time – The Palestine Exploration Fund was set up in Great Britain in 1865 and Deutsche Palastinaverein in Germany in 1877. The two latter limited their activities by scholarly tasks while the Imperial Russian Orthodox Palestine Society was a non-governmental public organization open to all from aristocrats to peasants who could pay membership fees and shared its aims that are still highly topical.

USSR/Russia and the Palestinian Problem

BETWEEN the October Revolution of 1917 and the end of World War II, the Middle East did not figure prominently in Soviet foreign policies. The Soviet Union acquired a great role to play in Mid-Eastern politics in the latter half of the 1940s when the Palestinian Question was gradually coming to the fore.

There were several militarized organizations set up by the Zionist movement in Palestine – the Haganah, Palmach, Irgun (Etzel), and the Lehi Group that later detached itself from Etzel, the Betar Youth Movement, etc.³ Their leaders, the leader of Etzel in the first place, were convinced that their armed struggle was indispensable for establishing control over Palestine and creation of a Jewish state. At first, these groups

were fighting Arabs; later, in 1939, when the British government published the White Book that took into account, to a great extent, the interests of the Arab states⁴ (colonies or semi-colonies of the British Empire or those that followed British policies), the British Empire became the main enemy of militarized Zionist groups.

In June 1946, Haganah blew up 10 out of 11 railway bridges in Palestine. In July of the same year, Etzel fighters organized an explosion in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing 91 and wounding 45 British, Arabs and Jews. In May 1947, an attack at a prison let out over 200 inmates. In the course of time, the scope of terrorist acts in Palestine was increasing which forced the British authorities to tighten their grip of the mandated territory by more efficient antiterrorist struggle and more efficient administration.

There were plans to divide Palestine into provinces ruled by the central government headed by a supreme commissar. In February 1947, there appeared the Bevin Plan (named after the British Foreign Secretary) that envisaged a five-year period of transfer under British control to independent united Palestine concluded by elections to the assembly with an Arabic majority entrusted with the right to settle the question of an independent state. However, this plan was rejected by the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency.

In February 1947, in an effort to disentangle itself from the crisis, the British government transferred the Palestinian Question to the UN. The Soviet Union, relying on the Resolution of the UN General Assembly of November 29, 1947, was one of the initiators of setting up a Palestinian and an Israeli state as a way out of the dead end. The resolution suggested that two states – Jewish and Arab – should be set up in Palestine, while Jerusalem should be treated as an international zone. The British mandate expired on May 15, 1948; it was expected that the British armed forces would be moved out by August 1, 1948. As tension continued to rise, the British government decided to pull out its troops by May 14, 1948.

It was on this day that Israel became an independent Jewish state on its own right. The Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949 allowed Israel to occupy part of the territory the UN had allocated to the planned Palestinian state. The Gaza Strip was placed under the administrative control of Egypt; the West Bank of the River Jordan was transferred to Jordanian jurisdiction; Israel established its control over the western part of Jerusalem while Jordan controlled the eastern part of the city. Contrary to the UN plans, the Palestinian state was not created, while over 800,000

Palestinian Arabs had to abandon their homes to become refugees.

Later, significant political changes became obvious in the Middle East and in the geopolitical situation as a whole. In 1950-1960s, there appeared a bloc of socialist states led by the Soviet Union, a successful rival of the Western bloc led by the United States. Despite the Cold War between them, the blocs achieved military parity. National-liberation and anticolonial revolutions won in many Arab countries; some of them opted for socialism. At the same time, the Non-Aligned Movement appeared to play an important role in the world divided into two blocs.

These changes were responsible, to a great extent, for the emergence of the Palestinian resistance movement for the right of Palestinians to set up their independent state in accordance with the UN GA resolution of 1947. The movement opposed Israel that went on with annexations of parts of the territories reserved for the Palestinian state. At that time, the Soviet Union was actively supporting the Palestinian resistance movement in its struggle for the Palestinian state. Moscow was on the side of the Arab states in their confrontation with Israel that relied on the Western bloc headed by the United States.

In October 1956, when Britain, France and Israel began their military aggression against Egypt in response to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by the government of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Soviet Union resolutely demanded that the military aggression should be discontinued otherwise strikes at military bases of the aggressor states could not be excluded. Britain, France and Israel stopped their military actions and removed their troops from the territory of Egypt.

In June 1967, Israel attacked Egypt, Syria and Jordan and occupied part of the territory identified by the UN GA as a territory of a future Palestinian state. Thanks to the Soviet Union's political and diplomatic efforts, Israeli aggression was stemmed while the UN defined the territories captured by Israel as illegally occupied. In 1968-1969, while confrontation between Israel and Egypt and Syria continued (the so-called War of Attrition), the Soviet Union helped these Arab states restore their military potentials. By their successful actions, the Soviet air defense units dispatched to the region inflicted considerable losses on Israel and forced it to end its air raids on Egypt.

By the 1960s, the Palestinian resistance movement developed into the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that united 12 ideologically different organizations, the most influential of them being the Palestinian

National Liberation Movement (Fatah), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Between 1969 and 2004, the PLO was headed by Yasser Arafat, one of the prominent leaders of the Palestinian resistance movement and head of the Fatah. Starting in 2004, the latter was headed by Mahmud Abbas.

In 1993, the negotiations in Oslo were concluded with an agreement to transfer the Gaza territory and part of the West Bank to the newly formed structures of Palestinian power. Later, after general elections, the HAMAS movement came to power in Gaza.

In the 2000s, Russia restored its role as a world power and revived its geopolitical activities in the Middle East. While recognizing Israel's security interests, Russia insisted that the legal rights of the Palestinians to create their own state should be observed and realized.

Russia and the Arab Spring: The Syrian Crisis

IN THE 2010s, the Middle East became a scene of massive social protests that came down to history as the Arab Spring. Ruling regimes in some Arab countries were removed; political Islam (including its most radical forms) rose high on the wave of protests; armed conflicts flared up and produced an avalanche of refugees. Social protests as the first stage of the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain were caused by domestic factors: economic crisis, corruption, arbitrariness and nepotism of people in power who remained there too long, and an absence of real democratic freedoms behind the so-called façade democracy.

In Syria and in Libya that had their share of internal problems the protracted crisis was caused mainly by external factors.⁵ From the very beginning, that is from March 2013 the presence of external forces in the Syrian crisis transformed it into a global military-political conflict. Certain external actors, including the Gulf monarchies, the U.S. and its allies (Turkey including) were actively involved in building up an armed Syrian opposition composed mainly of Islamist groups. Thousands of Jihadists from over 90 countries created a seat of radical Islamism in Syria and contributed to the emergence of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS or Daesh, banned in Russia) and its expansion across the region.

It should be said that on the eve of the conflict the social-economic situation in Syria was much better than in Tunisia and Egypt; it could not,

therefore, stir up a vast internal conflict and armed opposition. In 2010, for example, the GDP per capita (PPP) in Syria was \$5,260⁶ which is higher than in many Arab countries. The unemployment level that rose from 8.4% in 2010 to 14% in 2011⁷ was lower than in Tunisia and Egypt where 50% or even more young people below 30 had no jobs. In Syria, unemployment was lower than in Spain, Greece and Portugal, all of them EU members, where it reached 24%.

Protests began in March 2011; they were stirred up by police arbitration⁸ in the city of Daraa (100,000 inhabitants) at the border with Jordan and Israel. They spread to other Syrian cities: people demanded better living, social and economic conditions. In some places, protests led to clashes with law enforcement forces. President Assad announced that reforms in the social-economic and political spheres would begin soon. Later, rallies and manifestations in support of Assad were organized in Damascus and other big cities.

Protests, however, continued. The bloodiest clashes with the police accompanied by calls for regime change took place in the cities (Hama, Homs and Jisr ash-Shugur) known as seats of the opposition, supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements in the first place. These forces actively supported by the leading NATO countries, including Turkey and Gulf monarchies, that helped knock together armed anti-government groups.

It should be said that the United States and its leaders look at Syria as a hostile state because of its allied relationships with Iran and contacts with the Lebanese Shi'a movement Hezbollah. Syria is opposed to Israel, one of Washington's strategic allies; the United States points at Damascus as a supporter of "international terrorism" by which it means Palestinian organizations fighting for an independent Palestinian state and Hezbollah. Syria's allied and confessional relations with Iran go back to the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. America and Israel, on the other hand, look at Iran as a hostile state that should be weakened and the influence of which in Iraq should be wiped out while the Syrian regime should be changed or at least the country should be divided into several quasi-states. This is what Washington and its allies perceive as their strategic aim.

The Sunni Gulf monarchies, in their turn, stand opposed to Shia Iran as a potential threat; this goes back to the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Saudi Arabia and Qatar that have considerable influence in the League of the Arab States (LAS) spare no effort to support the Syrian Sunni Islamist opposition, bring it to power and remove Assad who is an

ally of Iran. This means that the interests of the Gulf monarchies correspond to those of the main NATO members. On the other hand, Algeria, Egypt and Lebanon, all of them LAS members, supported albeit half-heartedly the Syrian leaders.

Turkey has its own interests in Syria: the Turkish leaders who pose themselves as successors of the Ottoman Empire are pursuing the policy of neo-Ottomanism and try by all means to spread Turkish influence to all regions that formerly were parts of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey claims leadership of the Muslim Sunni world (of which Syria was part) that belonged to the Ottoman Empire for 400 years (from the 16th to the early 20th century). This explains the expansionist Syria-related trends in Turkey's foreign policy.⁹

In this context, the role of Russia in the struggle against radical Islamism and in settling the Syrian crisis looks especially important. The friendly relations between Syria and Russia and their economic, military, political, and cultural cooperation are part of their histories. Today, it is the only Russia's real ally in the Middle East. Late in September 2015, upon the official request of the Syrian government, the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) started delivering missile and bomb strikes at the positions of the ISIS fighters in Syria. They destroyed a number of command posts, weapons depots, training camps, and positions of fighters and military equipment. The Syrian government army began an offensive at the positions of the Islamist fighters near Palmira, Idlib, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo.

It should be said that Russia defends its national-state interests in Syria. It looks at it as the forefront of its fight against radical Islamism. It is absolutely clear that if Islamists come to power in Syria, the terrorist jihad will spread to Russia. The ISIS leaders never concealed their intention to "liberate" the Caucasus and the south of Russia.¹⁰

By 2017, the military-political situation in Syria became favorable for the government armed forces. Supported by Russian VKS, the Syrian army conducted several successful operations against the ISIS fighters in the Deir ez-Zor Province with highly important economically oilfields. The Syrian government army liberated over 60 settlements in the province as well as the bigger part of the central provinces with the cities of Homs and Hama and territories in the country's north. The Russian VKS that supported the Syrian army used Kalibr cruise missiles to deliver strikes at the positions of ISIS. They liquidated several military objects and over 1200 fighters.

Meanwhile, Kurdish units of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), supported by the U.S.-led international coalition, blocked and after protracted bombing took Raqqa, the capital of the Islamic State. This means that practically all ISIS-controlled Syrian territory was liberated and organized resistance of ISIS units suppressed. Approximately at the same time, during the visit of a Russian delegation to Syria, the sides confirmed the earlier plans of postwar cooperation in different spheres and restoration of ruined objects of the industrial infrastructures.

According to the statements made by American defense minister, the U.S. has no intention to pull out its troops from Syria at least until the Geneva talks successfully (from the American point of view) concluded, by which regime change in Syria is meant. At the same time, American policy in the Syrian conflict became more aggressive. In April 2017, on an order of President Trump, American warships delivered a strike with cruise missiles at the Syrian airbase under a false pretext that it had been used by Syrian aviation for a chemical attack at a settlement near Idlib killing over 80 civilians.¹¹

The Syrian government refuted these allegations as unfounded: it pointed out that Syria had no chemical weapons; that they had been removed from the Syrian territory under an agreement between the United States, Russia and the Syrian Arab Republic in 2013, the fact confirmed by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Russia resolutely condemned this act of military aggression of the United States and together with the Syrian leaders suggested that an international expert commission should be set up to investigate this incident on the spot; the United States and its allies refused to join. The allies went even further by siding with the American military action and submitting a resolution to the UN SC that condemned the Syrian government and demanded that international sanctions against it should be adopted. The resolution was vetoed by Russia.

In 2017, Geneva hosted the sixth, seventh and eighth rounds of inter-Syrian talks under the aegis of Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations special envoy for the Syrian crisis. On the whole, all those present accepted the 12-point document suggested by de Mistura and based on UN Resolution No. 2254 on promoting political settlement. No agreement, however, was reached because of numerous disagreements between those who represented the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition (the majority of which belonged to the so-called Riyadh group funded by

Saudi Arabia). The latter forestalled the eighth round of talks by a preliminary condition that Bashar Assad should leave the post of the President of Syria and keep away from the transitory period. The government delegation could not accept that; the eighth round of talks was undermined.

Early in May 2017, that is, approximately at the same time, the sides that met for the talks in Astana arrived at a certain consensus in the form of a memorandum on Syria signed by Russia, Turkey and Iran as guarantors of the earlier ceasefire agreements between the Syrian government army and part of the armed opposition. The document approved by the Syrian government presupposed that four security zones would be set in Idlib, East Ghouta (a suburb of Damascus), at the city of Homs, and in the south of Syria where fierce fighting was still going on; it also envisaged discontinuation of armed clashes and a no-fly zone (reserved for the Russian VKS only). The agreement was not related to ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra and affiliated groups that remained in the area; they were defined as terrorist and as such should be defeated.

To promote political settlement, Russia initiated a congress of the Syrian people in the form of a national dialogue that took place in Sochi in 2018. The meetings and talks that involved about 1400 representatives of different political, confessional, national, and regional organizations set up a workgroup elaborate a draft of constitutional changes with due account of what the participants had to say.

Political settlement of the Syrian crisis is very much complicated because of the external actors (the U.S. and its allies) that are still convinced that Bashar Assad should be removed from his post and that America's foreign policy interests should be realized. The United States has already set up over 20 strongpoints in Syria; some of them can be used as airfields for military and military-transport aviation. They serve as bases of American Special Forces and training camps for militants, who would fight both ISIS and the Syrian government army. At one of such points in the vicinity of Ta'if, American military are building up a so-called New Syrian Army with former ISIS fighters in its ranks mainly to oppose the Syrian government army.

As reported by the BBC, while Kurdish armed units of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) supported by the international coalition led by the United States were liberating Raqqa from ISIS, leaders of the SDF and ISIS concluded a secret agreement that allowed over three thousand ISIS armed fighters and their families leave the city unscathed to be deployed in other regions. According to Syrian drivers who moved them,

there were many foreigners, some of them from France determined to go back and continue fighting there.

The same happened around Abu Kamal close to the border with Iraq where in November 2017 the international coalition, according to the RF Defense Ministry, did not deliver strikes at ISIS fighters who were retreating in scores of lorries and armored vehicles. This gave them a chance to regroup in the SDF territory and deliver a counterstrike at the Syrian government forces. The American military did not allow Russian aviation to attack these units. In this connection, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, "The situation in Abu Kamal was not the first case when the U.S. spared the terrorists in Syria."¹²

It seems that Washington planned to exploit the "Kurdish factor" to remove Bashar Assad or, at least, to divide Syria; it had failed to realize these plans with the help of Islamist groups, and, therefore, moved its support to the SDF and other Kurdish armed units. In 2017, operating under the U.S. aegis, the latter captured part of the oil-rich Deir ez-Zor Province where Kurds had never lived in compact groups.

The SDF leaders want to turn the controlled Syrian territories into a zone of wide autonomy and, sometime in future, into an independent Kurdish state. Determined to prevent this, Turkey is waging a military operation to establish its control over part of the Syrian border territory. Turks explain this operation by the need to protect their territory against SDF fighters whom they consider a "terrorist organization" connected with the Workers' Party of Kurdistan waging armed struggle against Turkey. This means that Ankara is opposed to Washington that supports the SDF. In 2018, however, the United States concluded an agreement with Turkey under which the Turkish Army was allowed to fight for control over this territory including an important city of Manbij.

Early in 2018, tension around East Ghouta in the environs of Damascus increased: it was there where the Syrian government army was suppressing armed Islamist group Jabhat al-Nusra and affiliated units. When ISIS was routed, the situation in Syria allowed the sides to start talking about political settlement. The conflict, however, cannot be settled as long as external forces continue supporting, or rather using in their interests, the armed opposition. The latter makes the process much more complicated and is the main reason why the conflict is going on.

The Arab Spring and the conflicts in Syria, Libya and Yemen split the Arab-Muslim world and, to some extent, pushed the Palestinian problem to the back burner. Israel is exploiting this to perpetuate, to a certain

extent, the status quo; it went as far as declaring Jerusalem capital of Israel; the United States recognized it and moved its embassy there. The Palestinian problem should be resolved on the basis of UN documents; it is a must that fits the interests of the Palestinians and the security interests of Israel. Today, when the United States can no longer be viewed as an objective mediator, since it acts on the side of Israel, Russia is gaining more and more influence in the Middle East; its role in the fair settlement of the Palestinian problem has considerably increased and continues to do so.

NOTES

¹ Veynberg P.I. "Puteshestviya russkikh lyudey za granitsu. Po proizvedeniyam russkoy literatury," *Niva*. 1889. No. 2, pp. 54-58.

² Klyuchevsky V.O. *Russkaya istoria. Book Three*. Moscow: Mysl, 1995, p. 236.

³ Zvyagelskaya I.D., Karasova T.A., Fedorchenko A.V. *Gosudarstvo Israil* / Institute of Oriental Studies, MGIMO (U) MFA Russia. Moscow, 2005, p. 71.

⁴ Certain points of The White Paper, for example, "limited Jewish immigration to 75,000 for 5 years, and ruled that further immigration was to be determined by the Arab majority." Restrictions were put on the rights of Jews to buy land from Arabs so that not to create "a considerable landless Arab population." See: *An Historical Encyclopedia of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* / Bernard Reich (ed.). Westport, Connecticut, 1996, pp. 584-585.

⁵ Dolgov B.V. *Islamistskiy vyzov "arabskoy vesny": predvaritelnye itogi i perspektivy*. Saarbrücken: LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2015, p. 3.

⁶ [http://www.tradingeconomics.com/in/syria/gdp – per capita](http://www.tradingeconomics.com/in/syria/gdp-per-capita). 29.01.2013.

⁷ <http://www.cbssyr.org> in Central Bureau of Statistics. Bulletin of labor force 2010. 29.01.2013.

⁸ Protests erupted when several young men had been arrested in the city of Daraa and mercilessly beaten by the police. According to the protesters, they had done nothing more than painting anti-government graffiti on the walls. Authorities insisted that they belonged to criminal groups involved in drug and weapon trafficking. In May 2011, the Lebanese journalists previously employed by Al Jazeera Information Agency, which they left because of disagreements with its position on the events in Syria, said at the Euronews TV Channel that from the very first days of the Daraa protests dozens of antigovernment fighters crossed the Jordan border into Syria.

⁹ Raimbaud, Michel. *Tempete sur le Grand Moyen-Orient*. P.: Ellipses, 2015, p. 550.

¹⁰ Dolgov B.V. *Fenomen "arabskoy vesny" 2011-2016 gg. Prichiny, razvitie, perspektivy. Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria, Algiers* / Institute of Oriental Studies RAS. Moscow: Lenand, 2016, p. 131.

¹¹ A sole evidence of this are videos shown by Western information agencies in which members of the White Helmets (a humanitarian organization set up by the Syrian opposition) wearing no gas masks or other protective gear carried bodies of victims of an alleged chemical attack. The joint commission of the UN and the OPCW confirmed that the impact of chemical agents was not a result of an airstrike.

¹² Vesti TV information program. 14.11.2017.

The Blue Economy and the EU

M. Kolesnikova

Key words: maritime activity, ocean, blue economy, marine resources, value, European Union, maritime/ocean economy.

THE UNITED NATIONS General Assembly Resolution “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” adopted on September 25, 2015, defined 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets. Achieving those objectives, which will be pursued by “all countries and interested stakeholders,” should promote human prosperity and at the same time “secure the planet” [1]. A special target area, SDG 14, is devoted to the world’s oceans and contains the phrase: “Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.” It contains seven core objectives. The inclusion of maritime issues on the list of topics of special importance for life-sustaining human activity reflects the desire of the international community to strike a balance between developing maritime activity (economic, scientific research, military) and conserving the marine environment amid the growing impact of human actions.

According to forecasts of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published in 2016, the total contribution of maritime industries to the world’s economic output and employment will continue to increase.

In 2010, it is estimated that the size of the ocean economy [4] reached \$1.5 trillion, or about 2.5% of global gross value added. The number of full-time jobs in the maritime industry totaled about 31 million in 2010. Continued growth could lead to a doubling of the size of the global ocean economy by 2030, up to \$3 trillion, and the number of full-time workers could increase to almost 40 million.

In 2010, offshore hydrocarbon production accounted for a third of the

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total value added of maritime-related industries. The other industries of greatest significance in this regard were maritime and coastal tourism, the marine equipment sector and port activities. Marine aquaculture, wind energy, fish processing, shipbuilding, and ship repair were considered promising growth sectors. A significant increase in the number of jobs is expected in the offshore wind, marine aquaculture, fish processing, and port activity sectors [4].

Blue Approaches to Resource Usage: Oceans and Their Management

MODERN ATTITUDES to using ocean resources are based on the concept of the blue economy – the marine and coastal equivalent of the green economy [2]. The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) defines the latter as an “economy that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities.” The nine principles of the green economy put forward by UNEP include sustainable development, equity, prosperity and well-being, improving the natural world, decision-making, accountability, resilience, sustainable consumption, and production, as well as investing in the future [3].

The term “blue economy” has varying interpretations based on how various actors define it, but it essentially refers to specific approaches to managing maritime activities. According to a World Bank report (2017), it encompasses several “economic sectors” and related areas of activity and determines whether the use of oceanic resources is sustainable [6, p. vi]. Following its approaches is supposed to promote economic growth and social development while ensuring environmental sustainability “of the oceans and coastal areas” [6, p. vi].

Although the concept does not have commonly accepted concrete provisions, it is nevertheless used in various fields. The resolve of a considerable part of the international community to transition to the blue economy in conjunction with relevant actions is bringing about a transformation in the management of marine resources and spaces – for example, in terms of establishing international ocean governance bodies. One step in that direction could be the implementation of a proposal to establish an international association of stakeholder coastal countries to develop “ocean action programs” – a Blue Alliance [7, p. 9]. This recommendation is contained in the 2015 report “Reviving the Ocean Economy,”

prepared by the World Wildlife Fund in cooperation with the Global Change Institute (Australia) and the Boston Consulting Group (USA).

In addition, studies are carried out under the auspices of the blue economy to assess the marine (ocean) economy and determine the value of ocean resources, including the value of nonmarket assets and services (recreational services, cultural values, etc.). According to the

World Bank and UNEP (2015), the new form of understanding the oceans includes not just economic but environmental and social aspects and requires acknowledging and valuing all ocean benefits [6, p. 5]. In this case, coastal countries must “accurately value the contribution of natural oceanic capital to welfare, in order to make right policy decisions” [6, p. ix]. The World Wildlife Fund agrees. According to it, coastal communities and countries must develop complete, transparent and public accounting of the benefits, goods and services that the ocean provides [7]. These actions are among eight measures the international environmental organization proposed in 2015 to safeguard oceanic assets.

In 2015, the WWF analyzed the raw economic value of the ocean and concluded that in terms of volume, it could represent the world’s seventh largest economy. The organization presented a new economic term for assessing the maritime (ocean) economy that is equivalent to gross domestic product: gross marine product (GMP). The new term is not defined and is not widely used, but in view of the above-mentioned developments, it could become a new macroeconomic indicator reflecting the market value of all goods and services produced using oceanic resources.

The WWF considers annual GMP to include direct outputs from sectoral maritime activity as well as income from related activities (adjacent benefits) and totals at least \$2.5 trillion. The total “asset” base of the ocean is about \$24 trillion [7]. The WWF stresses that these estimates are approximate, in part because of the difficulty valuing certain intangible assets.

The above-mentioned actions of international organizations show that the blue economy concept directly impacts the political conditions of ocean use by changing the approaches to ocean management and has specific economic application. This refers not only to developing specific

Modern attitudes to using ocean resources are based on the concept of the blue economy – the marine and coastal equivalent of the green economy.

guidelines for maritime activities but also changing attitudes toward marine resources (including those previously considered to be intangible assets) based on their economic valuation and the transition to economically effective management of those resources.

Together, these measures provide a general idea of the direction the international community will take in developing maritime activity.

It should be noted that the main driver of these global trends in the practical implementation of the blue economy concept is the European Union, which actively supports the development of the concept not only in the EU but all over the world. As one of the main developers and organizers of relevant programs, the EU is cooperating with international organizations and coordinating its actions with them.

One example of such cooperation is a joint project of the World Bank and the European Commission, which is referred to as the Blue Economy Development Framework. The project is to be launched in 2019 in India, Vietnam and Kiribati. The first result of its work is to be an analysis of conditions in these countries for enabling blue growth. An appropriate “road map” will then be developed to come up with policy, fiscal and administrative reforms, and to identify value creation opportunities from blue economy sectors and the amount of necessary financial investments [9].

Thus, the EU blue economy is gradually expanding beyond the traditional framework of the common understanding of maritime activity and acquiring the contours of a global economic project. Such a conclusion can be drawn from its definition, which the European Commission presented in 2018 in the first topical report. It conforms to definitions previously adopted by other international organizations, particularly the World Bank. Given these factors, it is important to consider in greater detail the main issues of the practical implementation of the blue economy concept in the European Union, as well as future sectoral trends for its further development.

Practical Aspects of the Blue Economy in the EU

THE EUROPEAN UNION considers all sectoral and cross-sectoral economic activities related to the oceans, seas and coasts, including those in the EU’s outermost regions [5] and landlocked countries, to be part of the blue economy. It encompasses maritime economic activities that use marine-based resources in waters and coastal areas (fisheries, aquacul-

ture, marine transport, etc.). This includes marine-related activities that use marine goods and services (seafood processing, shipbuilding and repair, maritime insurance, etc.). The European Commission considers the activity of the public sector “with direct coastal and ocean responsibilities” (national defense, the coast guard, marine environmental protection), as well as marine education and research, to be part of the blue economy. In addition, the EU includes the economic value of natural capital and nonmarket goods and services in the above definition [8, p. 17].

The 2018 report examines economic indicators of the six “established” blue economy sectors. The EU considered these sectors to be the extraction and processing of living resources (including fisheries, aquaculture, fish processing); offshore oil and gas; ports, warehousing and water project activities; maritime transport; shipbuilding and repair; and coastal tourism. In 2016, their total contribution to the EU economy was equal to 174.2 billion euros (Table 1) [8, p. 27]. This represented 1.3% of the gross added value produced in the EU (13,332 billion euros). In 2016, these six sectors employed about 3.48 million people or 1.6% of the EU’s total working population (217.3 million people).

The data presented in the 2018 report do not reflect the full volume of the EU blue economy and are approximate. As such, they represent a summary result of the most developed sectors of the EU’s maritime economic activity. The authors of this report note the difficulty of valuing the actual scope of coastal and marine (ocean) activities, as well as their direct and indirect influence on economic processes, due to the lack of information on specific maritime sectors. A negative role is played by the lack of reliable information on many sectors, especially emerging but promising sectors for development (marine, wind energy, biotechnology, water desalination, etc.), making it difficult to value their contribution to the blue economy. Furthermore, a methodology to value natural capital and ecosystem services has not yet been developed, and there are no relevant data on these parameters.

Thus, the European Union is at an early stage of practically implementing the conceptual foundations of the blue economy, including taking inventory and valuing its offshore assets.

Conclusion

THE BLUE ECONOMY concept is forming the basis of emerging international approaches to the use of oceanic resources. The European Union

Table 1
Employment data (thousands of people) and added value (millions of euros)
of EU blue economy sectors: 2009, 2016

Sector	Number of employed (thousands)			Value added to factor costs, mln. euro		
	2009	2016	2009/2016 (%)	2009	2016	2009/2016 (%)
Extraction and protection of living resources	509	530	4.1	15,209	18,563	22.1
Marine extraction of oil and gas	61	60	- 1.6	28,082	26,398	- 6.0
Ports, warehousing, water projects	257	267	3.9	17,422	19,546	12.2
Maritime transport	238	235	- 1.3	22,897	27,428	19.8
Shipbuilding and repair	309	262	- 15.2	10,674	11,878	11.3
Coastal tourism	2,043	2,127	4.1	64,524	70,41	9.1
Total	3,417	3,481	1.9	158,808	174,223	9.7
EU	213,861	217,348	1.6	11,101,144	13,331,952	20.1

Source: European Commission (2018). The 2018 annual economic report on the EU blue economy, p. 27 // <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/79299d10-8a35-11e8-ac6a-01aa75ed71a1>

an active organizer and participant in promoting the concept in the EU and throughout the world. Its activities are supported by the efforts of certain international organizations that have taken steps in that direction in coordination with the EU.

At present, practical implementation of the blue economy concept is proceeding along the lines of valuing the goods and services produced using the oceans; and determining and itemizing the overall value contributed by various maritime economic sectors, as well as the value of resources that can be used to ensure sustainable development. Once that process is complete, the EU expects to get an idea of the actual economic contribution of maritime economic activity to the EU economy, as well as to objectively assess the volume and value of its marine natural resources.

Thus, the transition to the blue economy will result in an “inventory” of marine natural resources and facilitate the establishment of international oceanic governance bodies, as evidenced by the initiative of the World Wildlife Fund to create the so-called Blue Alliance.

The EU presumably associates implementation of this concept with additional sustainable economic growth opportunities that could be obtained from achieving a leading position in organizing the international management of marine natural resources.

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Strategies for the International Adaptation of Small Countries: Satellitism vs. Finlandization

K. Voronov

Key words: small and medium-sized countries, great powers, balancing, contiguity, satellite/satellitism, Finlandization.

AFTER the bipolar model ended in the 1990s, global politics unequivocally entered an era of chronic instability and reformatting. “Chaos threatens side by side with unprecedented interdependence,” said U.S. foreign policy guru Henry Kissinger.¹ In this context, the emergence of new global “power centers,” regional powers with their conflicting and intersecting spheres of interest, supposes that the mass of small countries* will use more diverse action strategies and various forms and methods of adapting to the variable external environment beyond the binary framework of the “two traditional realistic types of behavior: balancing and bandwagoning.”²

Small states with a limited raw materials base, a one-sided economic structure, a narrow foreign trade potential, and small size in principle seemingly cannot be viable, self-sufficient or successful. They should objectively be part of another powerful state or integration association. Even during the Cold War rivalry between the USSR and the U.S., almost

* Countries with a population of several hundred thousand to 10 million people – i.e., about 87 to 90 countries in the world. The category of medium-size countries consists of about 60 states with a population of 10 million to 50 million; countries in the large category have 50 million to 100 million people (12 countries); and countries in the largest category have over 100 million people (12 powers). There are some 60 to 65 micro or dwarf states and various territories with a population from 500,000 to 1 million people (see, for example: *How Many Countries Are There in the World in 2018?* // <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/how-many-countries-are-there-world-2018>).

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all countries made a geostrategic existential choice about whose side they were on. However, even in that tough and uncompromising situation, some intermediate variants were still sought. For example, there was the distinctive concept of Finlandization as a unique and effective course for small countries to use their political and strategic dependence on a great power to obtain wide-ranging privileged relations both in domestic policy and for expanding international opportunities.

Unlike the bipolarity of the Cold War period or the unipolarity of the 1990s and early 2000s, the current multipolarity (or polycentricity) emerging under the formational unity of primary actors likely implies more variable and dynamic international adaptation models. These trends lead to the fact, mentioned even in a document of the U.S. intelligence community, that today's adversary may be tomorrow's ally together with or vis-à-vis another stronger state.³

Given the marked trend toward a polycentric world order and heightened uncertainty in the world, small partners (which usually also include medium-sized states) are forced to adapt more to the variability of the international situation. Even within the framework of allied policy, they have to "balance while bandwagoning." Various objective factors of the great powers (geography, history, politics, resources, balance of power) naturally determine their interest in pursuing a special policy toward their small neighbors. While Russia borders 18 land states, China borders six and the U.S. only two. The absence of a specific threat from land largely minimizes, for example, China's need to care much about its relations with small neighbors. This geopolitical advantage gives it ample opportunity to use its own resources to expand its maritime power, as it has recently been doing. It is no wonder that Chinese President Xi Jinping apparently announced a Chinese version of the Monroe Doctrine for Asia: Asian security must be ensured by Asians. That is why for China, relations with Russia are acquiring a special, strategic character, where the partners view each other as standing back to back. Beijing in clearly Asian fashion is relying on a special, proven bilateral partnership, not on the peculiar and distant European model of Finlandization.

Something similar can be seen in U.S. policy. Finlandization is not an American tradition, because when Washington needs an amenable partner in its sphere of interest, it regularly carries out either a military coup or an armed intervention. This is convincingly demonstrated by the almost two centuries of experience since the notorious Monroe Doctrine was implemented in Central and South America since 1823. However, histo-

ry does not stand still, of course. If the U.S.-Cuban relationship is now starting to be built on a new basis, having not been denounced by the Donald Trump administration, is it possible to imagine Cuba as a new candidate for Finlandization in the New World?

Can a socialist society, far from the U.S.'s liking, continue to exist 90 miles off the coast of Florida? And on the other side of the U.S., the largest neighbors (Canada and Mexico) are also facing new pressure from Washington: the Trump administration's revision of U.S. policy both within subregional entities (in ex-NAFTA, for example) and bilaterally.

Small countries with limited material and political resources tend to be more inclined to build cooperative relationships with a powerful neighbor, since Finlandization provides great material advantages and political benefits.

Concerns of Small Countries

SMALL COUNTRIES traditionally try to maneuver between superpowers, but the space for maneuver sometimes diminishes rapidly, especially during periods of international political tension or during conflicts or wars. At times, interstate competition becomes less acute and intense, while all other geopolitical parameters remain roughly the same or equal. Hence there is a certain "mutual politeness" of the great powers concerning spheres of influence or each other's immediate surrounding areas. The 2008 five-day war in the Transcaucasus, for example, demonstrated that local interests and balance of forces have a greater impact over the parameters of regional conflicts. Retrospectively, this period became the next visible marker of the end of American unipolarity. This situation was reinforced by an unusual political development in the world: All the great powers (the U.S., Russia,⁴ China⁵) began to openly recognize geopolitics and geoeconomics as fundamental universal values.

The U.S. under Trump chose to take a tough approach to its own geopolitical sphere, most obviously in relation to neighboring Mexico. The American president considers the North Atlantic Treaty to be already "obsolete," with few allies who are paying "what they're supposed to."⁶ In other words, alliance member countries must either pay their bills for security in NATO at the established level of 2% of gross domestic prod-

uct (and in the future, 4%) or pursue more friendly relations with Moscow and reach a special agreement with it.

Finlandization is not, of course, the only potential option for a small state to make changes vis-à-vis a great power. But all small countries face the challenge of adapting further when superpowers must at times ease their mutual relations, defuse tensions or even partner with each other. In these circumstances, small countries become superfluous or even redundant in their intermediary activities. Their own strategic assets lose their former value. Moreover, the erosion of multilateral institutions weakens the position of small partners. In a world where Realpolitik dominates, there is a growing tendency for small partners to reduce their international positions. The “overstrengthening” of bilateral relations to the detriment of multilateralism clearly makes the balance of power even more asymmetrical, preventing small countries from maintaining their relatively significant role and influence.

The policy of equidistance – taking a smaller position in the center of disputes among the great powers – might not automatically entail Finlandization. According to many highly regarded Western⁷ and Russian researchers,⁸ the presence of a small country in the orbit of a great power amid multiple global, regional and domestic conflicts and crises of the international system objectively helps reproduce a course toward Finlandization. It is likely to be the best temporary choice, although it is unlikely to be a permanent solution.

Finlandization could also be a satisfactory choice for those states that are bloc-oriented and may face the unacceptable alternative of local conflicts or civil wars, or unchecked violence and refugee flows. Events in Ukraine (the reunification of Crimea with Russia, the war in the Donets Basin) should seemingly teach the West that Finlandization under president Viktor Yanukovich with respect to neighboring Russia was not so bad from a broader, strategic standpoint.⁹

Finlandization does imply a greater share of opportunism, which on the face of it may appear to be a cowardly and cynical choice. It may entail the devaluation of universal values that can be sacrificed or at least questioned. It also implies that asymmetric bilateral solutions are still better than stalwart resistance or destabilization and anarchy. But in the harsh geopolitical world, Finlandization could be at times a pragmatic solution suitable to all parties despite all its unsatisfactory compromises and half-measures.

The History of Finlandization

THE TERM “Finlandization” derives from the half-century experience of Finland’s foreign policy from 1940 to 1991. Finland twice faced the threat of Soviet occupation but adapted to the policy of defending the fundamental security interests of the Soviet Union in northern Europe while supporting its own version of nonbloc neutrality and guarding its domestic democratic choice. “Finlandization” itself was fiercely attacked particularly by West German and French politicians during détente in the 1970s. It served as a warning to their own countries not to be in the place of “small, subordinate Finland.” In academic terms, “Finlandization” was defined as “adaptive concessions,” which meant that external conditions were offered to the (usually bordering) great power so that the small country could preserve its basic foreign policy principles or social values. However, such concessions are also vastly different from the tough dominance of a strong neighbor that is establishing a puppet regime in a small country.

It is generally accepted that “Finlandization” is a rather fragile international-political construction, since, according to the strategy’s own logic, the concessions that are made become self-reinforcing. Internal or external events could “rock the boat,” and this could lead to overt political or even military intervention by a great power. The latter, because of the stubbornness of the small Finlandized country, may try to install a more suitable “friendly” regime in that country – a scenario fraught with open resistance or even popular revolt when it is no longer possible to return to the former soft scenario of relations. Finland’s unique status was preserved, as is known, thanks to its own skilled diplomacy, the wise leadership of both partners, the defusing of international tensions in Northern Europe, etc. In other words, Finlandization requires a carefully considered and cautious course on this path that is restricted by time and circumstances.

The “revenge of the small countries” took place in the 1990s after the Cold War, when a large group of post-Soviet states was able to profitably barter its sovereignty and other prerogatives to the great powers and alliances of the West by implementing the bandwagon strategy – namely, the two-stage enlargement of NATO and the EU. The first wave of accession included three countries (1999) and the second included seven (2004). With the end of the Cold War and the curtailment of strong-arm politics, Europe became seemingly less fertile for so-called adaptive con-

cessions. Even Finland itself officially abandoned that course. The EU and its member states have said they reject the use of force, although the wars in former Yugoslavia and Libya serve as a mute rebuke to them in this regard. We believe that in its internal relations, the current EU (28 member states) is in effect, with some assumptions, implementing a soft, distinctive model of Finlandization – cajoling and coercing partners who are marching out of step.

Suffice it to mention, for example, how Brussels pressured Austria in 2005-2006 because of the coming to power of a right-wing politician, the leader of the Austrian Freedom Party Jörg Haider. Later, Greece faced veiled threats of being booted from the eurozone if it did not adapt to the EU's budgetary and other restrictions, as well as the requirements of the International Monetary Fund and Germany for reducing the state budget deficit.

Greater Brussels experienced (and perhaps still is experiencing) special problems with respect to Poland after a nationalist coalition headed by the Law and Justice Party (PiS) came to power. Hungary is also feeling overt pressure from Brussels because of violations under Prime Minister Viktor Orban of the EU's norms of "European democracy." These two countries have even taken the first step toward forming a bloc of "recalcitrant" countries in the EU; they are counting on the support of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and to a lesser extent of Malta and Croatia. If the diplomatic *démarche* of the group of "young Europeans" proves successful, another front of dissatisfied partners will informally start forming in the EU.

The increasing pressure of Brussels through stronger regulation of the national budgets of member countries has affected all of Southern Europe. Meanwhile, in preparation for Greek elections in January 2015, the leftist populist party SIRIZA promised to transition to a Keynesian macroeconomic policy if it won the elections. In December 2014, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker warned Greek voters not to support "radical forces." And German Chancellor Angela Merkel made several public statements in an effort to prevent a victory for the Greek left. During the turbulent spring and summer of 2015, Greece undoubtedly came under heavy pressure. The strongest weapon of Brussels against Athens was the constant threat to the country's status as a full-fledged EU member (a threat that has still not been made good on) – its withdrawal from the eurozone.

Russia's Three-Flank Perimeter

WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT under President Vladimir Putin of the power vertical, states in the post-Soviet space gradually became drawn into a sphere of influence that Russia dubbed the “near abroad.” This category, and especially the concept, is not officially recognized in the West, which eagerly joined the battle over the Soviet legacy. In addition to their common Soviet past and proximity to the Russian Federation, these Newly Independent States (NIS) are characterized by the same features of authoritarian rule, a sizeable ethnic Russian population, significant Russian cultural and social influence, etc. There are three distinct geographical areas: the European near abroad (Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova), the Caucasus flank (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) and the Central Asian region (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan).

In the form of eventual reflection, we believe, though it might seem strange to some, that a possible object of hypothetical Finlandization in Europe could be the three Baltic NIS countries: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Although they are firmly part of NATO and the EU, their current economic and social indicators, pace of macroeconomic development and demographic trends mean these countries will likely be depopulated by the middle of this century.¹⁰ A possible solution could be found (of course, only by a democratic expression of popular will) in a somewhat unusual way: their frozen membership in NATO, preservation of EU status (in one of its form or another) and broad, effectual, restorative Eurasian integration.

To stabilize the Baltic states socioeconomically under this option, Moscow probably would have to adopt a kind of Marshall Plan, utilizing the positive experience of being in a single economic complex (including even resuming the publication of national encyclopedias and reconstructing national operas and ballets). The distortions and deformations of the European integration of the NIS Baltic states could probably be smoothed out or minimized by restoring large-scale productive ties with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union (formerly the Eurasian Economic Community).

A classic example of Finlandization in the European “near abroad” could probably be the continuation of the policy of president Viktor Yanukovich in 2010-2014 in Ukraine (even though it naturally falls under the category of a medium-sized country). After the 2010 elections, a more

consistent, Russian-oriented foreign policy was established. A parliamentary-approved presidential bill prohibited Ukraine from joining military alliances, thus placing obstacles on the path to NATO membership and forestalling the worst geostrategic nightmare for Russia. After the chain of well-known events, it is unlikely that Ukraine will be able to pursue its own consistent foreign policy, let alone a Finlandization strategy, anytime soon.¹¹ On the other hand, NATO membership for Ukraine seems unlikely in the near future and in the long run, even though in December 2014, the Supreme Rada passed a bill by an overwhelming majority approving a course toward joining the alliance, and then restated that intention repeatedly in 2018-2019.

We can tentatively suppose that Moldova is a small, belated copy of Ukraine prior to 2014. Russia's military presence in Transnistria – the frozen conflict there – has reduced Moldova's autonomy. For Moldova, NATO membership has always been out of reach, and EU membership is possible only in the long term (mainly because of the amount of work needed to meet Brussels' requirements). When Moldova wanted to sign a cooperation agreement with the EU, Finlandization seemed in jeopardy. The main scandal was related to corruption among pro-Western politicians, but the pendulum swung back when the next presidential election was won by Russia-oriented Igor Dodon.

Belarus is still an ambiguous case. On the one hand, Belarus has little autonomy as a military ally of Russia, participating in an integrated defense system and being part of the EaEU. On the other hand, Belarus is supported by the EU's invitation from 2008-2009 to participate in the Eastern Partnership Program. President Alexander Lukashenko has sometimes played the EU card vis-à-vis Moscow, commenting once that "Belarus flies with two wings: Russia and Europe." However, unsatisfactory national economic development could lead to a loss of independence for Minsk. As Lukashenko recently said: "We are at the front. We will not endure these years; we will disappear. That means we need to join some state or else others will simply wipe their feet on us and, God forbid, unleash a war like the one in Ukraine."¹² Under the current leadership in Minsk, further integration with Russia as part of the Union State of the Russian Federation and Belarus is probably not very likely, thus quasi-Finlandization will probably continue.

In the Transcaucasus, in the near abroad, Armenia is a typical example of Finlandization, when a small country deliberately makes indirect adaptive concessions. This is different from Finland during the Cold War.

Here, Russia is being offered some concessions in exchange for protection from third countries, in this case from neighboring Azerbaijan and Turkey. An alliance with Russia (including Russian military bases in Armenia) guarantees that the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh that was won during the conflict of 1988-1994 can be protected from the vengeful Azerbaijanis. But when Armenia was offered to sign the same cooperation agreement with the EU that was extended to other EU partner countries, Yerevan refused, obviously taking into account Moscow's strategic interests.

Azerbaijan is deftly maneuvering between Russia and the West in its foreign policy, constantly adjusting its course, adapting to the fluctuations of the local balance of forces. When Russia's armed forces grew stronger in the region after the war in Georgia, the Azerbaijanis placated Russia by wisely abandoning plans to retake Nagorno-Karabakh by force. Since 2009, the pendulum of Russian-Azerbaijani relations has swung back to "normal." Azerbaijan has entered into a cooperation agreement with the EU as part of the European Union's Eastern Partnership.

It is not surprising that Russian-Georgian relations were frozen after the five-day war in August 2008. No headway has been made in the Geneva talks on the fate of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The election of a new president after Mikhail Saakashvili has not yet led to a diplomatic breakthrough. The leadership in Tbilisi does not seem to understand that NATO's pledge to offer Georgia full membership is meaningless, since it was done without a "road map." The main NATO powers de facto perceive the Transcaucasus region as Russia's sphere of influence. Nevertheless, Georgia has reached a cooperation agreement with the EU and seems to be the most Western-oriented country among the six post-Soviet countries that are EU candidates. If Tbilisi's relations with Moscow normalize, then Finlandization could certainly bring Georgia more advantages.

In the Central Asian region, five post-Soviet states are more or less successfully maneuvering between the interests of nearby great powers Russia and China. As former Soviet Union republics (especially Kazakhstan), they are closely connected politically, culturally-historically, socio-economically, and mentally-psychologically with the former metropolis. A very difficult situation has recently emerged in Turkmenistan, whose authorities are trying to curb financial and food crises.

Despite China's growing economic influence over the Central Asian

republics and their involvement in a number of profitable Chinese projects – in particular, the large-scale “Silk Road” infrastructure project – diverse Russian ties have a more important long-term existential significance for them. For Moscow, the Central Asian “post-Soviet five” clearly remain the most suitable candidates for applying the adapted course of transformed Finlandization in the 21st century.

Finlandization in a Polycentric World

WHILE unambiguously accepting the insufficiency of their forces and absence of a suitable remote ally, small states must constantly ask themselves: Is the neighboring great power oriented on the status quo or is it hoping for its fatal destabilization? A prerequisite for the successful Finlandization of a small country is a minimal amount of goodwill that is constantly maintained in the capital city of the dominant great power. In addition, it is very important to expect that in the future it will continue to make concessions and give important preferences to its small neighbor.

On the other hand, having some boundless list of expectations and possible desirable concessions is also quite dangerous. An extensive tactic of pressure and concessions was, for example, convincingly demonstrated in the 1960s at Soviet-Finnish talks. President Urho Kekkonen said that “we had to endure terrible suffering before we could reach the conclusion that the best guarantee of safety in relations between Finland and the Soviet Union is good neighborliness based on mutual trust.”¹³

It is paramount that a general change in the political climate leads to an improved political atmosphere between a great power and a junior partner. The great power needs to use Finlandization to try to raise the level of its concessions by declaring its future steps in advance. The replacement of the already formed cabinet in Finland in 1958 after the “night frost” crisis led to the return by the Soviet Union of the Porkkala Udd Naval Base. During Soviet-Finnish negotiations in Moscow (September 16-20, 1955), the Soviet leadership secured the extension of the bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance for a 20-year term. In November 1955, Soviet-Norwegian talks in Moscow led to Norway’s official refusal to host foreign bases and nuclear weapons on its territory. The general result of those steps by the Soviet leadership was undoubtedly the historical improvement of the Soviet Union’s relations with the northern countries and the easing of international tension in Northern Europe as a whole.

Adhering to a policy of Finlandization means abandoning empty formalities, if possible. For example, it would be imprudent to give the weaker side a clear public advantage or the possibility of some choice. Patience and self-restraint are essential qualities of the political advantages of a strong power. Dismantling a puppet regime risks provoking a surge of state nationalism in a small country that would be difficult to counter in the long run. Third powers should perhaps not interfere openly in tacit or formal agreements regarding the Finlandization of a small country out of fear of that the neighboring superpower might ramp up pressure on the small state. During the Cold War, it was wise for NATO to recognize Northern Europe as a region of low tension, without the permanent deployment of foreign troops, nuclear weapons and restrictions on military maneuvers near the Soviet border. In contrast to this situation, the statements that U.S. Senator John McCain made in December 2013 on the Maidan in Kiev were frankly provocative, because rhetorical statements to the crowd that “America stands with you!”¹⁴ only raised false hopes among the Ukrainian elite and broad segments of the population.

Such public declarations also masked the real state of affairs: The U.S. respects Russia’s historical sphere of influence. One person cannot be blamed, of course, for fueling the civil war in Ukraine. More broadly, the well-known U.S.-inspired “color revolutions,” fully undrstandable during the unipolar world, would be dangerous today, since they cannot be supported within the sphere of influence of another great power. “Soft power” can play a huge role. For example, American mass culture was so strong during the Cold War that the Finns felt part of Western Europe. Other tools of state power are the political foresight of leaders, government effectiveness and sustainability, and the support (by both political parties and the public) of domestic unity.

To recap, among the two main adaptation strategies of small countries, there is a wide range of various policies for adapting to the external, mostly unfavorable, environment. Moreover, the two main strategies of bandwagoning and balancing are now perceived not as diametrically opposed but rather complementary. The great powers (the U.S., China and Russia) with varying levels of self-interest use Finlandization in their foreign and diplomatic policy toward their closest small neighbors in the polycentric period. For small states, practical application of this strategy also depends on the existence of a number of specific foreign and domestic circumstances, and the ability of the elite and the ruling leadership to wisely and actively encourage and implement this flexible, challenging

policy. Finlandization is a very tricky strategy for any state because it runs the risk of aligning with a large neighbor or expanding the sphere of influence of another competing superpower. But local asymmetries of power and national interests should obviously be recognized and respected.

Small countries with limited material and political resources tend to be more inclined to build cooperative relationships with a powerful neighbor, since Finlandization provides great material advantages and political benefits. Today, there are many weak states that are in the same position Finland was during the Cold War. We can provisionally put the five Central Asian republics in this category with respect to Russia. They have the advantage that their geostrategic problems are dealt with in large multilateral formats, not just bilateral ones. In a multipolar world where the alternative to stability is sometimes only chaos, violence or war, Finlandization as an effective survival strategy for small countries may be at times the best historical choice, despite its unsavory reputation in Western public opinion and its mediocre assessment by some specialists, experts and political scientists.

NOTES

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BRICS and UNIDO: Points of Convergence

V. Zagrekov

Key words: BRICS, UNIDO, cooperation.

THE BRICS countries attach great importance to cooperation with UNIDO (170 member states) as a specialized agency in the United Nations system that has great potential for expanding and deepening cooperation among the five states in providing technical assistance in promoting advanced industrial technologies and practices, as well as implementing projects to promote and accelerate international development with the participation of other developing countries.

The Ufa Declaration adopted at the 7th BRICS Summit in July 2015 under the Russian chairmanship reaffirmed UNIDO's unique mandate in ensuring inclusive and sustainable industrial development. The Strategy for BRICS Economic Partnership, which was approved at the Ufa Summit, included a provision regarding the creation of the BRICS Consolidated Technology Platform based on a UNIDO project. Speaking at a meeting of BRICS trade ministers in Moscow, UNIDO Director General Li Yong said that his organization was ready to facilitate industrial development cooperation among the BRICS member countries.

Cooperation with BRICS is becoming a high priority for UNIDO and an important factor in strengthening the organization's position within the UN system in the context of global efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This linkage is predetermined by the growing role of the dynamically developing BRICS countries in the international arena (for all the disparity of growth rates), which account for about 40% of the world's population, one fourth of the world's land surface and over a quarter of the global GDP, as well as by the fact that several major Western donors (the

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United States, Britain, France, and Canada, among others) are not UNIDO members. As a result, the BRICS countries account for more than 26% of total contributions to the organization's regular budget.

An important prerequisite for deeper cooperation between the two organizations is the fact that UNIDO missions or offices are present in all five countries, as well as the organization's years-long experience in effective cooperation with each individual BRICS member state.

In particular, Brazil, whose annual assessed contribution is around 4.46 million euros, or 6.37% of UNIDO's regular budget, prioritizes the organization's projects funded by the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the Global Environment Facility (GEF).

Under a \$4.75 million project as part of the Montreal Protocol, 28 Brazilian enterprises are implementing measures to replace hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) with alternative substances that do not deplete the ozone layer in manufacturing refrigerators and air conditioners. A GEF project with a budget of \$7.2 million that is being implemented in conjunction with the International Renewable Energy Agency aims to introduce biogas technologies at small and medium-sized livestock companies in Brazil to ensure self-sufficiency in electricity with a strong environmental component and a view to promoting these technologies in other countries of the region.

In addition, UNIDO is helping Brazil establish two trade and technology innovation centers, one in the state of Santa Catarina and the other focused on renewable energy, in the state of Pernambuco. UNIDO is implementing successful partnership programs with Brazil and Uruguay in introducing layer-by-layer synthesis technology based on 3D printing, mechatronics and robotronics.

Russia, whose annual assessed contribution is about 3.6 million euros, or 5.15% of UNIDO's regular budget, is focused on using the organization's capacity to implement international development assistance projects. Russia's \$2.6 million annual voluntary contribution to UNIDO's industrial development fund (which it has been paying since 2009) has

Cooperation with BRICS is becoming a high priority for UNIDO and an important factor in strengthening the organization's position within the UN system.

helped promote and support large-scale project-related activities. Such funding levels make it possible to develop and implement various UNIDO projects (including large-scale ones) in member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union and the CIS, making a significant contribution to industrial development and integration efforts.

This applies in particular to developing UNIDO's Program for Country Partnership for the Kyrgyz Republic to assist drafting a sustainable industrial development strategy for Kyrgyzstan and a corresponding action plan. Russia's voluntary contribution to the UNIDO's industrial development fund also helps implement projects to introduce cost-effective construction material production technologies and improve the production base to ensure the sustainable development of the tourism sector in the Issyk-Kul region.

Russia's financial participation allows UNIDO to successfully implement a project to introduce best practices at automotive component production plants in Belarus and provide technical assistance to Armenia in introducing advanced technologies in the garment industry and entering international markets. In Tajikistan, UNIDO uses Russian and Chinese funding to help develop the carpet weaving industry.

The geographic reach of Russia's voluntary contributions to UNIDO also includes Latin America (Cuba: assistance in the modernization of chemical fertilizer plants and agricultural machinery), Africa (Sierra Leone: technical assistance in best practice training in catching and processing of seafood) and Asia (Mongolia: a feasibility study for a meat processing plant construction project).

One important element of Russia's cooperation with UNIDO is the provision of UNIDO's technical assistance financed by Russian ministries, enterprises and organizations with their own resources, in addition to Russia's assessed and voluntary contributions. Thus, in July 2019, the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade in conjunction with UNIDO will hold the Global Manufacturing and Industrialization Summit in Yekaterinburg as part of the 10th International Industrial Fair (Innoprom 2019). In addition, the UNIDO Center for International Industrial Cooperation in Moscow is currently implementing a UNIDO project to introduce advanced inulin (prebiotic) production technologies at Russian enterprises with a view to extending it to the EaEU region, a relatively low-budget project funded by the Interstate Development Corporation (\$60,000).

Against this backdrop, as a result of Western sanctions, a very impor-

tant component of UNIDO's cooperation with Russia involving GEF funds is winding down. For instance, this year UNIDO is completing the last two major GEF projects in Russia with a total budget of \$9.95 million. One is to facilitate the implementation of its commitments under the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer and the nonuse of chlorofluorocarbons in inhaler production. The other project, in accordance with the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, involves measures for the safe disposal of polychlorobiphenyls (PCBs) at Russian Railways (RZD) and other Russian enterprises using PCBs.

India, whose annual assessed contribution is around \$0.86 million, or 1.23% of UNIDO's regular budget, is building its engagement with the organization around the promotion of the Make in India initiative. India is at the top of the list of UNIDO member countries in terms of the volume of technical assistance received. Thus, 24 projects with an overall budget of \$96 million were implemented between 2013 and 2017 under UNIDO's country program for India. Furthermore, the Indian government and the Indian private sector provided an additional \$373 million in co-funding. As a result, UNIDO's technical cooperation with India reached \$473 million. This year, there are 15 UNIDO projects in India with a total budget of \$77.26 million.

In addition to its assessed contribution, India pays an annual voluntary contribution of \$1.2 million to the UNIDO industrial development fund, \$1.1 million of which is used for technical assistance to India and \$0.1 million for technical assistance to other developing countries.

The UNIDO regional office in New Delhi is hard at work. In addition to India, it facilitates the organization's engagement with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Republic of Maldives, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka. An international center for inclusive sustainable industrial development has recently opened in the Indian capital, which is also active in other developing countries.

China, whose annual assessed contribution of about \$9.2 million accounts for 13.2% of UNIDO's regular budget, is a major recipient of technical assistance through this organization and a key donor and provider of extrabudgetary financial resources to ensure its project activities in other developing countries.

China is implementing a very ambitious program for 2016-2020 that is comparable only to UNIDO's country program for India. It includes 21 projects with an overall budget of about \$114 million. The program's

main priorities include transition to a green economy, food safety and the promotion of the concept of inclusive sustainable industrial development in countries that are part of the maritime and land components of the Silk Road plan.

The program is funded mainly by the GEF (\$48 million), the Montreal Protocol fund (\$60 million), Italy (\$0.9 million), and China (a total of about \$5 million).

Since the 1980s, China has been making annual voluntary contributions to the UNIDO industrial development fund used as a source of extrabudgetary funding for technical assistance to other developing countries. Initially, these contributions were worth several hundred thousand dollars, but after Chinese national Li Yong was appointed UNIDO director general in 2013, between 2013 and 2016 they increased to \$5 million a year.

China also provides various forms of technical assistance to developing nations through an extensive network of UNIDO centers based on its territory. It includes a regional UNIDO center in Beijing (also facilitating the organization's cooperation with Mongolia and North Korea), two investment and technology promotion centers (Beijing and Shanghai), the Chinese National Cleaner Production Center (Beijing), subcontracting and partnership exchanges in industry (Xian and Cinquin), the International Center for Small Hydropower (Hangzhou), the International Solar Energy Center for Technology Promotion and Transfer (Lanzhou), the International Center for Technology Promotion (Shenzhen), the International Center for Materials Technology Promotion (Beijing), and the International South-South Industrial Cooperation Center (Beijing).

South Africa, whose annual assessed contribution is about \$0.4 million, or 0.607% of UNIDO's regular budget, focuses its cooperation with the organization of technical assistance in various areas within its mandate. For instance, UNIDO is currently implementing nine projects in South Africa with a total budget of \$20.7 million. Their priority areas include renewable energy sources, energy efficiency and the pharmaceutical industry. The main donors are the European Commission, the GEF, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and Switzerland.

Successful bilateral cooperation between the BRICS countries and UNIDO creates objective prerequisites for deepening and expanding industrial development cooperation within BRICS, as well as for projects in the "BRICS plus" format.

The first initiative of this kind was a roundtable meeting in Vienna in 2012 on the sidelines of the 40th session of the UNIDO Industrial Development Board, “Sustained industrial development: BRICS experience in competitiveness, innovation and job creation.” It was followed by a roundtable meeting on the contribution of BRICS countries and other developing economies to the sustainable and inclusive development of less developed countries, which was organized in 2013 in Lima on the sidelines of the 15th session of the UNIDO General Conference.

UNIDO participated in preparing a comprehensive analysis of the role of structural change in the economic development of the BRICS countries with a focus on the role of manufacturing, which was published by Oxford University in 2015. The book examines their economic experiences and structural change in BRICS over the past three decades, identifying both differences and commonalities, and deriving lessons for other industrializing countries.

Russia was the first BRICS country to provide financing for the development and implementation of UNIDO projects aimed at increasing the practical payoff from cooperation within the framework of the group of five through this organization. Thus, Russia financed the Workshop on Strengthening International Alliances in the Global Market in Quito (Ecuador) in July 2015, which was attended, in addition to experts from the BRICS countries, by representatives of export development agencies in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as the Eurasian Economic Union – a total of 75 participants from 32 countries. A special focus was thrown on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as main actors in national economies generating employment and encouraging international development. SMEs benefited directly from the workshop by getting first-hand information on the requirements for import/export in their specific areas.

Russia’s voluntary contribution to the UNIDO industrial development fund also helped finance the project “Partnership between Russia and Brazil in technology and innovation for development of SMEs with extension to other BRICS countries.” This project has helped achieve and implement agreements between Russia’s Novas Engineering and Brazil’s Petro Reconcavo regarding the application of Russian technology for enhancing the recovery of Brazilian oil wells using the plasma-impulse excitation method. Also with UNIDO’s support, Brazil’s Purcom transferred Brazilian technology of rigid polyurethane systems based on methyl formate to the Russian company NVP Vladipur.

Another important achievement of the UNIDO project on technology exchange between Russia and Brazil was the creation of the first Internet portal for technology exchange between the BRICS countries, as well as the selection of new potential partners for expanding technological exchanges.

In particular, in the Republic of South Africa, the Industrial Development Corporation and the South African Technology Innovation Agency have expressed interest in cooperation with UNIDO and other BRICS countries.

In India, 11 organizations, including the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM), the Small Industries Development Bank of India and a number of the country's major research centers, expressed their willingness to join the Russian-Brazilian technology exchange project. ASSOCHAM also said its small industries development portal could be linked to UNIDO's technology exchange platform.

In China, the China International Technology Transfer Center, the provincial authorities of Beijing and Shanghai, and several major scientific research institutions have emerged as possible partners in building an online platform for technology transfers between the BRICS countries. Representatives of BRICS governments were appointed to work on this platform.

After Russia, China became active in promoting cooperation among the BRICS countries via UNIDO. Beijing financed the drafting and implementation of a project to develop e-commerce between China and other BRICS countries. Under this project, e-commerce development workshops were held in China, India, Brazil, and Russia in 2016 and 2017, national reports were prepared, and an online e-commerce training course for small and medium-sized enterprises was developed in cooperation with national experts and other international organizations.

In addition, two UNIDO events in "BRICS plus" format took place. The first was organized by UNIDO in September 2017 in Xiamen (China) as part of the BRICS business forum that was held there. In a video address to its participants, UNIDO Director General Li Yong stressed that the development of e-commerce has great potential for ensuring inclusive growth as part of Silk Road initiative. The second was held on the sidelines of China International Import Expo in Shanghai in November 2018, where UNIDO and the Shanghai Academy of Sciences presented a report on the development of e-commerce at SMEs in the BRICS countries, as

well as a global e-commerce development index that analyzed the relevant statistics on more than 70 countries.

Experience accumulated in technology exchanges and e-commerce, among other areas, could help the BRICS countries use UNIDO's potential more efficiently and effectively. This also applies to new projects, taking into consideration one Russian company's initiative to establish and maintain an online database on technology exchanges among the BRICS countries with UNIDO's assistance.

There are also other project initiatives prepared at the request of the BRICS countries that could be transformed into UNIDO projects, subject to a corresponding level of funding. These include the promotion of cooperation among the BRICS countries in household waste management for electricity generation, as well as assistance in developing measures to harmonize BRICS commodity standardization systems to eliminate trade barriers.

At the same time, there are prerequisites for taking the BRICS countries' cooperation with UNIDO to a qualitatively higher level. In particular, the final document of the BRICS industry ministers meeting in Hangzhou (China) in July 2017 set the goal of expanding cooperation with UNIDO in building a mechanism to support such ministerial meetings. This initiative could become even more wide-ranging in the context of the Chinese-South African proposal to establish the BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR) that was put forward during South Africa's BRICS chairmanship in 2018. It was supported in both the joint statement of the BRICS industry ministers and in the final document of the 10th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg.

The partnership's priorities include NIR policy coordination, cooperation in qualified personnel training programs, sharing information and best practices in digitalization, expanding BRICS potential, implementing projects ensuring inclusive and balanced growth and synergy, in particular in using personnel and financial resources. The work on this partnership will proceed in close contact with the BRICS Business Council.

One key element in establishing the PartNIR is the formation of an advisory group with the participation of BRICS officials, experts and other organizations concerned.

UNIDO could become an effective tool for the BRICS countries in establishing the PartNIR. This role would be fully within the organization's mandate. This would also open broad opportunities for deepening and expanding cooperation between UNIDO and the BRICS Business

Council and the New Development Bank (NDB). There are good prospects for cooperation between the NDB and UNIDO in industrial development research, as well as in project activities related to the establishment of the NDB's Project Preparation Fund.

It is also important that the organization has the essential expertise on the new industrial revolution, as well as the relevant practical experience. In particular, in 2016, at the request of the G-20 Chinese presidency, UNIDO prepared a report on industrialization challenges in Africa and in less developed countries, as well as an action plan to promote inclusive sustainable industrial development on the African continent and take advantage of the new industrial revolution. In addition, NDP related activities were conducted under UNIDO's auspices in various formats in Washington and Johannesburg.

Although the BRICS countries do not have either practical experience in establishing permanent secretariats or any plans of doing so, in the context of organizing the work of the PartNIR advisory group, it may be necessary to establish a mechanism to ensure continuity and consistency in those efforts. In this regard, UNIDO's successful experience as a secretariat for a major international initiative such as the Private Financing Advisory Network (PFAN), which has already mobilized \$1.2 billion for 87 clean energy projects in Asia, Africa and Latin America, may prove useful. PFAN partners and participants include the United States, China, Germany, Canada, Japan, Sweden, and Norway, as well as the Asian Development Bank, and other development institutions and commercial banks.

In closing, it should be said that the BRICS countries have broad opportunities for enhancing the practical impact of their cooperation with UNIDO in the context of their concerted efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, not only through bilateral cooperation with the organization. Significant results could also be achieved by increasing and expanding support for multilateral initiatives at UNIDO in the BRICS and "BRICS plus" format, as well as by using its potential to implement wide-ranging integration plans in the context of PartNIR cooperation.

The Afghan Peace Process: Preliminary Results and Assessments

Omar Nessar

Key words: Afghanistan, talks, peace process, Taliban, Moscow Format, inter-Afghan dialogue.

LATE IN 2018 and early in 2019, Moscow hosted two very important events related to peace settlement of the Afghan conflict which had been going on for over 30 years. In November 2018, the Moscow Format of consultations on Afghanistan brought together delegations of Afghanistan and the Taliban¹; in February 2019, Moscow hosted an inter-Afghan dialogue between representatives of the legitimate political forces and the Taliban.

It was back in 2006 that the need for peace talks with the armed opposition in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA) became obvious. IRA President Hamid Karzai responded to the need with creating the Afghan Peace Commission headed by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, an influential politician and former president. In May 2010, Karzai convened Loya Jirga (traditional grand council of elders) unofficially known as Peace Jirga. The consultative Loya Jirga that attracted 1600 delegates from all provinces recommended that a High Peace Council (HPC) should be set up to consolidate peace process, offered a highly specific reconciliation plan and outlined its organizational structure.

It was a bigger and much more important structure than the Peace Commission and spoke volumes about the political and state importance of reconciliation with the armed opposition. The new Council was staffed with 70 influential politicians from among members of parliament, former Taliban leaders and members of the Afghan civil society. Later, the HPC opened offices in all 24 provinces; funded by foreign states, it had a lot of opportunities.

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Burhanuddīn Rabbani, former president of Afghanistan, Tajik and leader of the Islamic Society of Afghanistan (ISA), became the first head of the Council. This and election of other politicians with anti-Taliban background to the HPC stirred up irritation and a talk about the purely nominal role of the new structure in the peace process: adversaries of the Taliban among the HPC leaders looked as a stumbling block on the road toward peace negotiations. The expert community suspected that Karzai had created this lavishly funded institution to undermine the loyalty of Afghan politicians. The Taliban, in its turn, refused to cooperate with the HPC as a “pro-American structure.”

Assassination of Rabbani in strange circumstances in September 2011 was a serious challenge. The Taliban assumed responsibility for this assassination interpreted as its resolute rejection to continue peace talks. There were different interpretations of the September tragedy; some people spoke of the murder as part of the plot dubbed in the Afghan political circles as “chain murders.”²

The post of the HPC head went to other influential Afghan politicians including Pir Sayyid Ahmed Gailani and Karim Khalili yet the Afghan political class persisted in its far from positive opinion of the structure. Civil society, likewise, repeatedly criticized its activity.³ Regional powers were not alien to shifting responsibility for inadequate security in their territories onto the HPC as a highly inefficient structure. Critics were never tired of talking of its reports about fighters of antigovernment forces that joined the peace process as false.⁴ In February 2016, external donors discontinued funding HRC that can be interpreted as an evidence of its inefficiency.⁵

Elected president of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani changed a lot in the government’s program of reconciliation and the HPC’s activities. At first, the new president staked on Pakistan in a hope to start direct talks with the Taliban. He moved unprecedentedly close to Islamabad that caused a lot of criticism in the Afghan political class. After a year and a half of failed efforts, the disappointed Afghan president changed the course.

On September 29, 2016, President Ghani signed a peace agreement, a product of protracted negotiations, with the leader of the Islamic Party of Afghanistan Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who for more than 30 years had sided with the antigovernment armed forces. President Ghani spoke of the agreement as an “event of historic importance” and pointed to the role and political willpower of the IRA government in reaching a truce with antigovernment armed groups.⁶

The response was far from unambiguous: while certain political figures and political movements protested, the leading political forces and politicians, on the whole, hailed it.⁷ It was expected that, having joined the legal political system, Hekmatyar would lead Kabul's peace process out of the dead end and set an example for the Taliban. This did not happen. Mutual accusations of violations of the conditions of the agreement that official Kabul and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar hurled at each other did nothing good to its reputation.⁸

Three-day ceasefire between the Taliban and the Afghan security forces can be described as another achievement of the Kabul peace process. Between June 15 and 17, 2018, the Taliban stopped fighting on the entire territory of Afghanistan. Its leaders and propagandists claimed this as their initiative; in fact, it became possible when President Ghani had announced on June 7 that Kabul would temporarily discontinue fighting to promote peace process.

Today, the Taliban, which has strengthened its international position, is the main beneficiary of the peace process.

The international community, in particular, the leaders of the UN and NATO, Russia, the United States and some other countries who paid a lot of attention to this experience of "real reconciliation," hailed Kabul's initiative. The Taliban, however, declined President Ghani's invitation to prolong the ceasefire yet these three days in June 2018 deserve special mention: the fact that Taliban fighters strictly obeyed the order of their leaders refuted the idea that the group was torn apart by inner disagreements.

Starting with 2016, external mediators who sought practical steps toward the peace process in Afghanistan and consolidation of their political and diplomatic image became even more active. A four-sided coordination group of Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, and the U.S. became involved in the process against the background of decreasing security and stronger positions of the Taliban. The group started working on a roadmap to end the conflict with the Taliban that had been going on for many years as its main aim. On January 11, 2016, after its first meeting in Islamabad, the group announced that direct talks between the Afghan government and some of the Taliban leaders would begin soon. The Taliban denied this information.⁹ On January 19, 2016, the group of four met for the second time in Kabul. Foreign Minister of Afghanistan

Salahuddin Rabbani opened the sitting and called on the Taliban to join the peace process.

At first, the quartet had been supported by external actors, Moscow included, yet, after its third meeting that took place in October 2017 in Oman after the 16-month-long pause, Russia assessed its efforts as of “limited efficiency.”¹⁰ Approximately at the same time, Russia started working on its own format of Afghan reconciliation that indirectly confirms the U.S.-RF rivalry regarding the Afghan peace settlement.

In 2017, in Moscow after six days of consultations, representatives of Russia, Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, Iran, and India agreed to create the Moscow Format of consultations. “The first round of consultations that took place on April 14, 2017 was attended by deputy foreign ministers and special representatives of 11 partner countries (Russia, Afghanistan, China, Pakistan, Iran, India, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). The representatives of the United States who were invited to take part in the meeting declined, saying that the new U.S. administration lacked an Afghanistan strategy at the time.”¹¹

The first meetings on Afghan settlement in Moscow stirred up protests of Kabul. In particular, the third round of consultations on the regional issues that took place in Moscow on December 27, 2017 and was attended by Russia, China and Pakistan, was condemned by the Foreign Ministry of the IRA since the official Afghan delegation had not been invited.

Later, Kabul’s displeasure was partly subdued by making the government of Afghanistan a co-chair at the Moscow meetings. However, this made it much harder to convene the meetings: they were repeatedly postponed because the Afghan side failed to coordinate technical details.

In June 2017, two months after the first meeting of the Moscow Format, the Afghan government started its own format of reconciliation into which external players were also involved. The first meeting within the Kabul Process took place on July 6, 2017 in the capital of Afghanistan.¹² Parallel formats of international consultations somewhat decreased their importance while certain statements of Russian officials started speculations about the rivalry between Russia and the United States in the Afghan peace process.¹³

The second meeting within the Kabul Process was organized on January 28, 2018 in the capital of Afghanistan; it presented a wide program of reconciliation with the armed opposition. The document said that the Afghan government was ready to recognize the Taliban as a political



The opening speech by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the Inter-Afghan Dialogue forum in Moscow, February 2019

force if it discontinued violence; Kabul promised to liberate its imprisoned members and lift the anti-Taliban sanctions if it signed a peace agreement. The document further stipulated that the Taliban should confirm its respect for human rights, recognize the Constitution of Afghanistan, the authority of the law and order structures and the civilian organizations that obeyed laws, and accept the ban on terrorist and criminal groups.¹⁴

The Taliban that previously promptly responded to all developments needed several days to issue a statement on this initiative of President Ghani. Their document said in part that the initiative contained certain new elements, “yet the talks will remain useless as long as foreign troops are stationed in the country.”¹⁵

The United States, Great Britain, Pakistan, the UN, and NATO supported the new peace offer the Afghan officials made at the Kabul Conference.¹⁶ It was in this context that Zamir Kabulov, special representative of the President of Russia for Afghanistan, skeptically assessed the peace efforts and their results. He deemed it necessary to remind that after the Kabul Conference the Taliban had betrayed no interest in direct negotiations with the Afghan government; he sounded very doubtful about the efficiency of all sorts of international formats: “In this regard,

we consider the Moscow Format of consultations launched by us in early 2017 as the optimal platform for substantive negotiations to promote national reconciliation and establish a constructive dialogue between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban movement.”¹⁷

Kabulov expressed his skepticism about the efforts of other external actors in the Afghan peace process fifteen days before another meeting on Afghan reconciliation was held on March 26-27, 2018 in the capital of Uzbekistan. It was the Tashkent Conference on Afghanistan “The Peace Process, Security Cooperation and Regional Connectivity.” The event chaired by the Presidents of the IRA and the Republic of Uzbekistan – Ashraf Ghani and Shavkat Mirziyoyev – was organized at a higher level than the previous meetings on Afghan settlement.¹⁸ Contrary to expectations, the Taliban preferred not to attend the Tashkent Conference that was one of the first foreign policy initiatives of the new president of Uzbekistan who wanted to consolidate the status of his country as an influential regional power on the eve of his visit to Washington.

The Tashkent Conference adopted a declaration that recognized “the importance of international and regional initiatives to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan” and of anti-terrorist and anti-drug operations as an indispensable condition of restored peace and well-being in Afghanistan and the region as a whole. The participants recognized “the importance of the Kabul Process as a main forum and vehicle under the leadership of the Afghan Government to lead peace efforts to end violence in Afghanistan.”¹⁹

Starting with 2001, American policy on Afghanistan was vague enough. Donald Trump made the vagueness of Washington’s strategy much more obvious, especially in the Afghan peace process.

Late in January 2018, after a blatant terrorist act in Kabul for which the Taliban claimed responsibility, the president of the United States, speaking at a meeting at the White House with representatives of the UN Security Council, stated that his country no longer wanted to talk to the Taliban: “I don’t see any talking taking place. I don’t think we’re prepared to talk right now. It’s a whole different fight over there. They’re killing people left and right. Innocent people are being killed left and right.”²⁰ In July 2018, however, “Taliban representatives met with U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alice Wells in Qatar.”²¹ In September 2018, Washington created a position of Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation and appointed Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad to it. This pushed the talks with the Taliban into the center of the U.S.



Participants in the Inter-Afghan Dialogue forum, Moscow, February 2019

Afghan strategy.²² Later, the U.S. president spoke several times in different formats of successful talks with the Taliban and the need to withdraw the American forces from the IRA.

The war in Afghanistan is America's longest and most expensive overseas military intervention; it is of a huge importance for its domestic policies. There is no doubt that the Afghan campaign will figure prominently in the coming presidential elections in the United States. It is highly important, therefore, for Trump to demonstrate convincing progress in his Afghan policy to earn appreciation of his American voters before the presidential campaign is unfolded. The hypothesis that Washington's new peace initiative realized by Zalmay Khalilzad is directly related to the coming presidential election is confirmed by the "draft agreement drawn up by the influential U.S. think tank RAND Corporation" early in 2019. The document suggests that "the United States and NATO withdraw their military missions in phases over an expected period of 18 months" which coincides with the beginning of the active phase of the presidential campaign in the United States.²³

From the very beginning of his mission, Zalmay Khalilzad announced that the United States was prepared to talk to the Taliban without preliminary conditions.²⁴ In October 2018, as soon as he took office, the U.S. special representative visited Afghanistan, Pakistan, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to discuss the prospects of peace in Afghanistan and the inter-

national efforts needed to achieve it.²⁵ Starting with October 2018, direct talks between the American delegation headed by Khalilzad and the Taliban have been carried out in Qatar, UAE, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.

While the U.S. special representative was talking to the Taliban, Washington made contradictory statements about its intention to pull out of Afghanistan which was interpreted as stronger political positions of the Taliban.²⁶ In October 2018, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, one of the founders of the Taliban (arrested in 2010 in the course of a joint American-Pakistani operation in Karachi), was released from a prison in Pakistan. This and his later appointment as chief of the Taliban's diplomatic office in Qatar were perceived, on the one hand, as a progress in the talks and, on the other, as a higher status of the Taliban delegation.

Meanwhile, on November 9, 2018, the second meeting of the Moscow Format of consultations on Afghanistan, that had been postponed several times, was held in Moscow. The conference was opened by Foreign Minister of Russia Sergey Lavrov and attended by the delegation of the HPC of IRA headed by deputy chairman Hajji Din Mohammad, Ambassador of the IRA in Russia Abdul Kayum Kuchai and representatives of Pakistan, Iran, India, Central Asian countries, and China.

The presence of the Taliban delegation headed by Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, chief of the movement's political office in Qatar, was the main event of the Moscow conference: since the Taliban had never attended the events of this level, the media interest is easy to explain. The second conference of the Moscow Format strongly affected the reconciliation process and signified Moscow's much greater influence. This was also confirmed by the fact that the authors of "Top 10 Negotiations" placed the second conference of the Moscow Format of consultations on the fifth place as the event that started talks between the government of the IRA and the Taliban.²⁷

After the Moscow Conference, the U.S. and NATO announced that coordination with Russia should become closer: by early December 2018, several more countries, Russia among them, were added to the list of countries that Khalilzad planned to visit within his intermediary mission.²⁸

After the second conference of the Moscow Format attended by the delegation of the Taliban and followed by much closer contacts between Russia and the United States within the Afghan agenda, the relations between Moscow and Kabul became noticeably cooler. On December 7, 2018, for example, Mahmoud Saikal, the then Permanent Representative

of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the United Nations, declared that Moscow had failed to observe the rules formulated by the UN SC for the relations with the Taliban. He stated that, even though the meeting in Moscow was a step forward, it was organized contrary to the UN norms that required special procedures to be applied to the trips of people on the UN sanction lists.²⁹

As a result of the Moscow Conference of November 9, 2018, the Taliban expressed its readiness to start talking to the legitimate political movements of Afghanistan while flatly rejecting to negotiate with the government of Ashraf Ghani.³⁰ This created even more problems for the IRA government since the larger part of the country's political forces had moved into opposition to the president. This probably explains why Kabul accelerated its efforts to knock together a group for negotiations with the Taliban. It was staffed mainly with civil officials, some of them close to the president, the fact that raised a wave of sharp criticism in the ranks of the political opposition and deprived the group of legitimacy.³¹

The expert community interpreted the Moscow visit of the U.S. special representative early in December 2018 as a sign that Washington had somewhat readjusted its Afghan policy in favor of closer cooperation with Russia and as a victory of Russian diplomacy.

It seems that the revised opinion of the West of Russia's role in the Afghan issue and especially its recognition of Moscow's stronger role forced other countries to demonstrate their greater influence on the Taliban. Late in December 2018, the Taliban met with the Iranian leaders in Tehran. According to the official version supplied by the Iranian side, the Taliban talked to Deputy Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran Abbas Araghchi. It should be said that the Iranians demonstrated a lot of caution and coordinated their actions with the Foreign Ministry of the IRA. These talks, however, did not change Washington's Iranian policies, while the Afghan officials were very skeptical of the process.

Early in February 2019, on the eve of the planned visit of representatives of the Qatar Office of the Taliban to Islamabad for talks with the Premier of Pakistan Imran Khan and the American delegation, official Kabul complained to the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council. Later, having called off the visit, the Taliban announced that the UN sanctions interfere with the negotiation process.³² It seems that this was done to persuade the countries involved in the peace process in Afghanistan to revise the regime of anti-Taliban sanctions.

The important, later called historic, event took place early in 2019: on

February 5-6, the Russian capital hosted an inter-Afghan forum that brought together, for the first time, representatives of the legal political forces of the IRA and of the Taliban. In Moscow, the political forces of Afghanistan were represented by about 50 people including Kh. Karzai, Yu. Qanuni, Islamil Jhan, A.M. Noor, M.H. Atmar, Z. Rassoul, M. Mohaqiq and others. The Taliban was represented by ten people, all of them members of the Qatar Office headed by deputy chief of Taliban's political office in Qatar M.A. Stanikzai. Some of the prominent Taliban figures, including former Foreign Minister A. Muttavakkil and former Ambassador of the Taliban Movement in Islamabad A.S. Zaif, were also present.

After two days of work, the participants adopted a joint resolution in which they called to "till the ground for a complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the country."³³ It was in Moscow that the sides demonstrated for the first time that they were ready for serious concessions. The Taliban that had resolutely opposed all state institutions adopted a softer approach to demonstrate that it was ready to compromise. Civil society positively responded to this new position. Those who represented other political forces, including the leaders of the former Northern Alliance who were opponents of the Taliban, likewise softened their approaches.

The response of official Kabul to the Inter-Afghan Forum and its results showed that there was no united position; the National Unity Government (NUG) was not united when it came to the "big policy" issues. While President Ghani condemned the Moscow Forum as "inefficient where peace and stability in Afghanistan were concerned," Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Chief Executive (Prime Minister) of the IRA, took a more moderate position by saying that he expected good results from the Moscow meeting.³⁴

It should be said that at all sorts of international and regional forums Afghan officials deemed it necessary to stress that the leading role of the Afghans in this process was one of the main principles of the legitimacy of peace talks. By way of commenting the Moscow inter-Afghan meeting, the Foreign Ministry of Russia stressed: "The event was a graphic embodiment of the principle of 'Afghan-led, Afghan-owned' conflict settlement dialogue, which was widely acclaimed by the world community."³⁵

According to the media, by April 1, 2019, special representative of the U.S. Khalilzad and representatives of the Taliban completed five rounds of talks. According to the Taliban, the complete withdrawal of for-

eign troops from the territory of Afghanistan was one of the main conditions. The Taliban hinted that it was ready to discuss a gradual process. After the fifth round, Khalilzad said that the sides had reached an agreement on a draft withdrawal decision and the guarantees of the Taliban that it would discontinue its contacts with all terrorist groups.

Even though Donald Trump is determined to pull out all Western troops from Afghanistan before the next presidential election, the U.S. expert community doubt that this will be done. European observers, likewise, do not believe that the American troops will be removed from Afghanistan in the next few years.³⁶ This vagueness suggests several scenarios. The optimistic scenario offered by the authors of the analytical report recently published in Moscow speaks of a compromise between the United States, the Taliban and an interim government in Afghanistan.

Irrespective of the practical results of the current peace process in Afghanistan, the road to real peace in the IRA will be long. So far it is hard to say what it will bring to the people of Afghanistan and the Taliban. Today, the Taliban, which has strengthened its international position, is the main beneficiary of the peace process. It is especially obvious against the background of the much weaker positions of the government of Afghanistan,

NOTES

¹ Banned in Russia.

² Reference to a series of assassinations of political and military leaders mainly of the former Northern Alliance, including Mohammad Daud Daud, Burhanuddin Rabbani and others. It was the Taliban that claimed responsibility for the murders, yet the Afghan political circles suspected that they were the outcrops of a long-term strategy pursued by certain external and internal forces. For more detail, see statement by A.M. Noor // https://www.darivova.com/a/balkh_governor_condemned_stanekzai/1509136.html

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Shaping the Image of China as a Responsible Global Power

I. Zarodov

Key words: soft power, responsible power, international image, China, foreign policy, diplomacy, the UN, peacekeeping.

A COUNTRY'S IMAGE in the minds of those who live inside and outside it depends on the logic and goals of its development. In the process of construction, its elements might differ by time and resources needed to create and consolidate them. The result, likewise, may be different where the length of time needed to produce the desired effect and the effect itself are concerned. An image of a country responsible for the development of mankind and its security is time- and resource-consuming to the greatest extent while inevitable contradictions between global responsibility and national interests make it idealistic and unachievable. Many countries, however, claim the status of responsible – either regional or global – powers depending on their scope and development goals.

This image presupposes that the power demonstrates to the world, not only to certain audiences, that it does not intend to grow and develop at the expense of others but in the long-term perspective is firmly determined to create a secure world of equal opportunities.

At first, the Chinese expert community was apprehensive and even fearful of the idea of China as one of the responsible world powers. The West, on its side, was actively trying this role on China and even imposing it. This stirred up mistrust. It was repeated, among other things, that the role of globally responsible power does not fit China's interests; that Beijing is being drawn, contrary to its will, into funding the international system on a grand scale. It should be said that Western politicians tried to persuade China to become a more active sponsor. Later, when the "responsible power" concept had been absorbed and, what is more impor-

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tant, adjusted to the country's interests, skepticism was finally overcome. Between 1999 and 2009, the definition of China as a "responsible power" found its place, with certain readjustments, in the Chinese political vocabulary. Prominent foreign policy experts Wang Yizhou,¹ Yen Shenyi,² Yu Keping³ and Hu Jian⁴ have written a lot about the logical connection between China's development and the development of mankind, between protection of national interests and the need to take international interests into account.

Having appeared in writings of the key Chinese experts in international relations, the term "responsible power" as applied to China was finally accepted during the second period of Hu Jintao in power as "big responsible developing country" while the principle of international responsibility was related to the key principles of China's foreign policy.⁵

China, which follows its own and relatively independent road of development, has its own "adjusted" interpretations of the classical theories of international relations. Such is the Chinese concept of "comprehensive national power" (*zunghe guoli*); there are several variants of its division into components. The most traditionalist of it consists of four categories: basic power (population, resources, national cohesion); economic power (industry, agriculture, finances and commerce, science and technology), national defense power (military might, nuclear weapons, technologies), and diplomatic power (foreign policy, approaches to international affairs, involvement in aid and assistance programs, and relief operations).⁶

Chinese authors invariably point to the regularly emerging "failures" in the contemporary world order: contrary to the theory of realism, greater military and economic might does not upgrade the country's status and extend its prestige.⁷ China's case is different: much is said about the "Chinese threat" and the danger Greater China presents to the region.

Good neighborhood policy was expected to neutralize these negative definitions while foreign policy conditions conducive to economic and political growth were preserved. Traditionally, China relies on the geopolitical division of the world according to the East-West and South-North

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principle and positions itself as a defender of developing countries.

In 1984-1985, Deng Xiaoping singled out two problems out of a multitude of problems typical of the contemporary world as the most acute ones: the problem of peace or the East-West problem, and the problem of development or the South-North problem. He saw the development gap between the South and the North as the key problem. It was at that time that he formulated his message about the need to stimulate harmonious development of the world.

Gradually China was acquiring a system of partner relationships, first with neighbors and later across the world, based on the rejection of the use of force in conflict settlement and the threat of use of force in bilateral relations. Beijing preferred dialogues and compromises, mutually acceptable settlements of disputes and mutually profitable cooperation. After a period of adjustment in the early 2000s, the ideas of partnership were transferred from the sphere of bilateral relations to the theoretical field of multisided international relations. It was at that time that there appeared new interpretations of “big neighborhood of China” that covered all Central Asian, South Asian and the APR countries including the United States, Australia and New Zealand.⁸ In an effort to widen the sphere of its real presence, China has overgrown its territorially limited regional status. Wider sphere demanded segmentation.

In the latter half of the 2000s, expert community in China started talking about shifting accents in Beijing’s foreign policy from the traditional orientation at developing countries toward a fairly small group of countries that claimed a special role in the world. As a category on its own right, they were defined as “new rising powers” (*xingxin dago*).⁹ The discussion was stirred up by the more active cooperation between China, Russia, India, and Brazil which in 2006 took shape as the BRIC group; these countries were defined as *xingxin dago*.

China is actively involved in shaping and developing regional economic cooperation and regional political interaction institutionalized by its involvement in ASEAN Plus One, ASEAN Plus Three (China, Republic of Korea, Japan), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the East Asian Center of World Economy (China, Republic of Korea, Japan), and BRICS. The SCO that developed into an important mechanism of regional security with the name of a Chinese city in its title is an example of a successful image component.

Having successfully held two biggest worldwide events – the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing and EXPO-2010 in Shanghai – China con-

firmed its positive image. This means that new mechanisms or involvement in the already functioning ones do not merely confirm the country's responsibility; they can be described as instruments of foreign policy "marketing" or "branding" and PR devices that add attractiveness to the country's image. Very much like marketing of all other types, this one requires more investments and more efforts.

In case of China, it is not enough to create a new image: the old image should be corrected since a whole series of historical, political, ethno-confessional, and territorial specifics have already produced stereotypes of the country's perception beyond its borders frequently exploited to put pressure on China.

At the end of the 1980s, an event of a purely domestic nature – the use of force on June 4, 1989 to suppress student manifestations on Tiananmen Square – echoed across the world with huge image losses. This invited an opposite trend inside the country: revived isolationist sentiments in Chinese political leadership that survived for two and a half years up to early 1992 when Deng Xiaoping toured the country's southern provinces to explain that China should return to its policy of openness.

Recognition or non-recognition of Taiwan as part of China is the key issue of China's domestic and foreign policies. At the turn of 1996, for example, China organized large-scale military exercises in the Taiwan Strait (Fujian Province) to demonstrate, according to commonly accepted explanation, Beijing's disagreement with the policies of President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Li Denghui as the first general presidential elections on the island were approaching. The world community resolutely condemned China's military exercises as unacceptable one-sided uncoordinated actions that might be perceived as the use of force or the threat of the use of force to settle internal or external contradictions.

The position of official Beijing and the Chinese expert opinion on acute internal issues is traditional and highly typical. For example, discussion of the riots on July 5, 2000 in Urumqi, the administrative center of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), within the foreign policy context suggests the following. First, "the violent episode, which was organized and premeditated, caused tremendous damage to ethnic solidarity and stability in Xinjiang"; second, interference of international forces into China's domestic affairs was unacceptable, while "bringing this very internal Chinese issue before the UN Security Council" was condemned; third, the incident negatively affected and will affect the

country's international image; fourth, Beijing should be prepared to the gradual increase of external support of the destabilizing forces of Xinjiang and Tibet.¹⁰

Ecology and ecologically safe industrial milieu are two key national issues of supranational importance. It was in the 2000s that China began a consistent and efficient ecological campaign, the White Book of the Government of the PRC "China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change" (2008) being one of the program documents. Coal mines were closed one after another; renewable energy sources (wind and sunlight) received much more attention; projects of the world's biggest hydropower stations were adopted and realized; the country began importing electric power from its neighbors of which Russia is one.

In the late 2000s, the world expert community started talking of Chinese nationalism as a threat to international and regional security. In July 2009, speaking at the 11th Ambassadorial Conference timed to the jubilee of the PRC, Chairman Hu Jintao pointed out that Chinese diplomacy should rely on the ideas of peace, development and cooperation; this was intended as an official confirmation that China was not moving toward radical nationalism.¹¹

Hu deemed it necessary to point out that, very much as before, his country would concentrate on consolidating its political influence and economic competitiveness and create a favorable international context for advancing to its aim of building up a modern well-off society and modernizing the country. This confirmed that national interests prevailed in China over international responsibility.

Chinese analysts have concluded that involvement in coordinated international efforts in peacekeeping and consolidating security in the countries with seats of armed conflicts is directly associated with an image of a responsible world power ready to fulfill its obligations and consistently observing the fundamental norms of international law.

In the 2000s, the UN elaborated the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) concept that directly affected the future of the mechanisms of peacekeeping operations. It specified the duties of 'each state in relation to its own population and the duties of the international community to end massive atrocities crimes' if the state is unable to cope on its own with the challenge within its national borders.¹² The new concept was described as a display of responsibility to mankind. In his report "Implementing the Responsibility to Protect," the UN Secretary General said in particular that R2P should be "integrated into each culture and society ... as a

reflection of not only global but also local values and standards.”¹³

In Asian countries, existing interpretation of sovereignty and non-interference stems from their historical experience that outlined strict normative frames; it makes their adaptation to the international norms of interventionism practically unviable. This was amply confirmed in 2001 when during the preliminary discussion of this issue in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) China flatly refused to accept the P2R principle.

Seen from Beijing, it looked as an excuse used by the West, the United States in the first place, to legitimize military interventions in “non-democratic” states. The commission was convened at the time when the memory of the Kosovo developments of 1999 and bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade was very much alive in the world. This bred suspicions that the U.S. had used the Kosovo conflict as a chance to threaten the “rising China.” Some of Chinese foreign policy experts interpreted this initiative “as another step of the United States toward global hegemony.”¹⁴

In case of China, the process of socialization within the international community and its highly pragmatic foreign policy course at the responsible power status, as well as its own considerable economic and political interests in the host countries (in Africa, in particular) forced it after a while to move away from the historical principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs of other states. This was graphically illustrated by its shift from resolute rejection of the UN peacekeeping initiatives to active involvement and support.

Foreign and Russian experts have traced down the interdependence between China’s involvement in peacekeeping operations and the Chinese leaders’ determination to acquire the international status of responsible power. “The status of China as a responsible global power is realized to the greatest extent in peacekeeping operations under the UN aegis.”¹⁵ Starting with the mid-2000s, the subject of China’s wider involvement in peacekeeping as a proof of China’s responsible behavior was actively exploited by the Chinese media and the academic and university communities in publications in Chinese and in international English-language media. This can be interpreted as a graphic example of informational impact on international relations.

It was in the 2000s that the stage of China’s involvement in peacekeeping widened qualitatively and quantitatively. The process is still going on.¹⁶ Until 2003, the biggest group of Chinese peacekeepers (800

military engineers) was sent to Cambodia to support the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) (1992-1993). In April 2003, China dispatched six groups of military engineers and military medical personnel (1,308 military in all) to join the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Starting with December 2003, five military engineer, transport and medical groups (2,700 in all) were put at the disposal of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

From April 2006, two groups of military engineers and one group of military medical personnel (517 members) joined the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); in May 2006, two groups of military engineers, transport and military medical personnel (870 in all) joined the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS).¹⁷ It should be said that starting with 2003 China has remained in the group of top ten countries involved in the UN peacekeeping system where the number of military, police and other forces is concerned; it is one of the top ten countries by financial support and leads the group of the UN SC permanent members as the main donor of peacekeeping contingents.

UN peacekeeping as an instrument of positive international image-making is efficient because it allows the country involved to achieve the aims of soft power by relying on hard power. The majority of peacekeeping operations are held in Africa where China traditionally has wide economic and political interests. This means that its involvement in peacekeeping stabilizes the situation in the region, protects China's economic assets and resources as well as freight transportation routes and provides the PLA with an opportunity to train its skills in "military operations other than war" (MOOTW) and to acquire international experience.

Since the latter half of the 2000s, the Chinese expert community (mainly the military academics) has been saying that China should explore the possibilities of a more active use of its armed forces outside its borders. It was suggested that besides China's involvement in UN military peacekeeping operations that suits the country's national interests to the greatest extent Beijing should contemplate a possibility of using the PLA to rescue Chinese citizens whose lives and safety are endangered beyond the Chinese borders; to be involved in counterterrorist operations; to ensure containment and prevention of threats to China's national security; to set up military bases abroad; secure the sea routes in the Indian Ocean used to bring hydrocarbons and other raw materials from Africa and the Middle East to China as well as to protect national sovereignty

and national security in the Yellow, East China and South China seas.

In the past, the Chinese People's Liberation Army was compared with the Great Wall of China meaning their identical functions: protection of state borders against external threats. Today, while globalization and regionalization are unfolding and in view of big Chinese diasporas in other countries, China's economic interests, assets and investments abroad and the scope of its political impact, the Chinese expert community is pondering on the question about the borders of national interests that should be protected and how China's responsibility for its own interests and the interests of others can and should be balanced out.

When talking about certain additional measures needed to consolidate the country's positive image, we should say that inside the country there is an opinion that to adequately perform its role of a responsible and big country China should develop foreign aid programs of its own; it should formulate its own policy of "official development assistance," extend material aid and non-material assistance by dispatching volunteers, training specialists and setting up its own Peace Corps.

China has similar programs with different mechanisms of their realization, such as assistance within the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Every three years, it holds ministerial conferences, at which Chinese delegations describe in detail how cooperation between China and Africa and development plans of African countries will be promoted. Information about the nature and volume of assistance can be found on the Forum's site and in reports of the Ministry of Commerce of China.

On September 15, 2005, speaking at the United Nations Summit on the occasion of the UN 60th anniversary, Chairman Hu Jintao outlined the program of aid China extended to the poorest countries that included, among other things, zeroing of customs dues for exporters from 39 less developed countries, writing off debts to China of "heavily indebted poor countries", assistance in building up very much needed infrastructures, "upgrading public health capacity" in the first place, in professional training, and granting soft loans

On the road toward an image of a responsible state, China is confronted with the Western interpretation of responsibility, the product of the post-Cold War years, in which "non-democratic states" do not fit the norms defined by the "democratic core." Accusations of revisionism, violations of human rights inside the country, refusal to democratize the domestic political process and of building up military might are heaped on China accompanied by talks about the "Chinese threat."

Chinese diplomacy demonstrates that the country is determined to create balanced and secure conditions for the development of all countries and their mutually advantageous cooperation. Speaking at the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly on September 23, 2009, Chairman Hu Jintao outlined his country's vision of a "harmonious world" and called to "acknowledge differences in cultural tradition, social system and values and respect the right of all countries to independently choose their development paths"¹⁸; his point was that the world should move away from egoistical isolated development, should strive for prosperity and security for all. "Security is not a zero-sum game, and there is no isolated or absolute security." No country can be safe when it places its security interests above security of others.

The world of international relations, as we know it today, can be presented as a sum-total of three dimensions: the world of politics, the world of economics and the world of social relationships.¹⁹ China has become one of the world's biggest economies; throughout several decades, it has been perfecting its experience of international relations. Its internal policy is stable; its foreign policy has gained recognition and respect.

The world of social relationships, however, is lagging behind. Interaction with society in the broad sense of the word inside the country and communication with NGOs on the international scene are two major aims of Chinese diplomacy. It is highly important to understand and master the skills of cooperating with all sorts of social forces: the media, both traditional and new ones, public opinion and different independent organizations. It is important to create and maintain the right image of the country and its foreign policies. Soft power does not mean international influence, yet it can become its source.

NOTES

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The Crisis in Venezuela and Its Prehistory

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Key words: Latin America, Venezuela, Bolivarianism, ALBA, United States, European Union, China, Russia.

THE CRISIS in Venezuela is difficult to understand outside the context of turbulent changes in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).

Around the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, the United States began to lose its positions in LAC. The United States retains considerable political clout in LAC and still plays the key role in its economy, remaining its main source of financing and the chief market for its goods, mainly commodities and food, but the Americans have European Union countries and China snapping at their heels, and, moreover, Russia has been winning back political ground that it lost in the region.

These new factors objectively offer Latin American countries new global opportunities. Import-substitution industrialization and the stronger role of the state in capital-intensive industries have enabled some of the Latin American nations to make significant economic progress and adopt multidirectional and, in some respects, more independent foreign policies. One manifestation of this greater independence was the strengthening of ties among Latin American countries, a process in which the United States has practically played no part.

Washington has been unable to come up with any determined or reasonable policy to reverse those trends, least of all during the years when the Clinton clan and Barack Obama were at the helm. In that period, seeking global domination was the U.S. elite's main concern. Latin America was lower on its agenda.

This changed when Donald Trump became president. His "America

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First” slogan became embodied in a present-day edition of the Monroe Doctrine that means a plan to take full control of the Caribbean. It became obvious quite soon that the Trump team was planning to sort out the United States’ backyard.

It started by replacing the government in Brazil, which is not only Latin America’s largest country but also a member of BRICS. In 2015, the Argentine leadership had been replaced. The center-left governments of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentina and Luiz Inácio

Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil were succeeded by the right-wing cabinets of Mauricio Macri and Jair Bolsonaro. Measures were taken to consolidate pro-American regimes in some other countries.

There has been more than one side to these developments, however. The deep interests of the countries with right-wing regimes are not limited to their relations with the United States. The Latin Americans are pragmatic people and extend their foreign policy scope beyond their region. This a traditional Latin American approach. Some Latin American nations were winning serious advantages for themselves in political haggling both with the Soviet Union and with the United States during the Cold War.

The main target of Trump’s attacks in LAC is its supposed left radical flank. His chief adversary is Venezuela, a country that has joined Cuba in spearheading left-wing trends in the continent. It apparently won’t be long before the United States gets around to Cuba and Nicaragua.

Bolivarianism

FORMER Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez tried to establish a new model of government in his country based on Bolivarianism, an ideology named after Simón Bolívar, the 19th-century fighter for Latin America’s independence from Spanish rule.

Bolivarianism is a mix of ideologies, including Marxism, nationalism and liberation theology [1]. At the end of the day, it represents a rejection of both capitalism and socialism as such and a search for a third path. Chávez had a plan for “capitalism with a human face” – a state-regulated

The main point in Russia’s position is that Venezuela must not become one more instance of removal of an inconvenient government by a foreign government.

market economy [2] and a political system based on broad public involvement in government (participatory democracy) with the poorest strata playing the main role. Subsequently his views evolved into the advocacy of “21st-century socialism” [3]. Chávez’s radical views had various sources, including the Cuban record of building a socialist state, an ideological confrontation with the United States, and a fight against the Venezuelan opposition, which lost a 2004 referendum on a proposition for removing him from office.

The “21st-century socialism” doctrine proclaimed the coexistence of various forms of property ownership and the interaction of private, cooperative and state businesses enterprises. In practice, however, Chávez pursued a policy of boosting the role of the state and drawing small businesses into the economy on a mass scale.

Social programs became one of the main causes of the Venezuelan crisis. Numerous poor Venezuelans were getting used to social security benefits and losing stimuli to work. On the other hand, social programs, including free education and healthcare, needed large state expenditure while the economy was suffering major losses because of plummeting global prices for commodities, mainly hydrocarbons.

The economic crisis was causing political instability and led to an ideological confrontation between Chávez and the opposition. Tensions were also fanned by Chávez’s radical foreign policy. Anti-imperialist and anti-American slogans and condemnation of U.S. political and economic interference in the affairs of Latin American countries were salient features of Chávez’s rhetoric. He coined the phrase “axis of good” to denote an alliance of Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia and applied the phrase “axis of evil” to the United States [4]. His foreign policy essentially rested on the non-acceptance of the neo-liberal world order and the Anglo-Saxon global project. There was no way the United States could have tolerated a hotbed of such sentiments that close to its borders, least of all if they were combined with popular movements against social injustice.

Chavism was largely at the basis of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), founded in 2004 by Venezuela and Cuba, which signed a joint declaration to that effect. Initially, ALBA made considerable progress as an integration mechanism. Today, ten countries are full members of ALBA – Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Nicaragua, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela. The alliance has launched various transnational projects. It set up a bank in 2008 – the



Nicolas Maduro: “We will win!”

Alba Bank, – and attempts have been made to introduce a single currency for the ALBA member countries, the sucre, to replace the U.S. dollar for electronic payments in regional trade [5].

ALBA has even planned to use soft power to earn a positive international image [6], setting up a special body for the purpose, the ALBA Culture Fund.

All these projects had a sound financial basis, being funded with Venezuelan oil export revenues, before the multi-level crisis in Venezuela undermined ALBA politically and organizationally.

Incumbent Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro chiefly bases his policy on Chavism but has been less successful as a strategic thinker and is less charismatic than Chávez was, which has been one of the factors in the crisis along with the above-mentioned social, economic and international political factors.

Venezuela was rocked by a new wave of instability in 2014 as a sharp drop in living standards provoked mass anti-government demonstrations in Caracas. Maduro sent in troops to quell the protests, and the United States accused him of a reign of terror and gave open support to the

Venezuelan opposition. A year later, Washington declared Venezuela a threat to the United States' national security.

U.S.-Venezuelan relations have soured further during the presidency of Trump with the United States renewing sanctions against Maduro's "authoritarian regime" and leveling new accusations at it, including allegations of links with drug traffickers and human rights violations.

The Trump administration ratcheted up pressure on Maduro through the Organization of American States (OAS) and through contacts with individual Latin American governments.

Open support by Argentina, Brazil and Chile for the Venezuelan opposition has been a damaging experience for Maduro. Peru organized a meeting of the foreign ministers of 12 Latin American states in Lima in August 2017 that issued a declaration, known as the Lima Declaration, that condemned violations of democratic freedoms in Venezuela and stated a pledge to deny support to Venezuela in either regional or global affairs.

Another blow came to Venezuela as its membership in MERCOSUR was suspended in 2017 until the restoration of democracy in the country [7]. Two other regional associations – UNASUR (the Union of South American Nations) and CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) – have also refused to support Maduro.

Economic emigration from Venezuela has added fuel to the fire. Between 2015 and 2017, it rocketed by a factor of between 10 and 15 [8]. Illegal immigration of Venezuelans has mainly hit Brazil and Colombia, countries whose geography makes it hard for them to control their borders.

The EU policy toward Venezuela has on the whole been less tough than the U.S. line. By recognizing Juan Guaidó as the interim president of Venezuela, Brussels in principle supports the United States, but the EU countries aren't unanimous – the left-wing ruling coalition in Spain, for example, wants the Venezuelan crisis to be resolved by political rather than military means while Italy has gone further by refusing to recognize Guaidó's interim presidency.

China and Russia are the sources of the largest assistance from outside the American continent. India is in effect avoiding supporting Venezuela and maintains an essentially neutral stance.

China is Venezuela's main creditor and number two trading partner after the United States. Chinese imports of Venezuelan oil are the basis of economic relations between the two countries, but China has also made large investments in various Venezuelan industries.



Venezuela, spring of 2019

Politically, at the outset of the Venezuelan crisis, China was cautious and had contacts with the opposition as well as the government but lately Beijing has been giving Maduro more support. As regards Russian-Venezuelan relations, the two nations concur on many international issues. Most importantly, both reject the unipolar world order. Venezuela, moreover, backs Russia on the Georgia, Ukraine and Syria issues while Russia is against foreign interference in Venezuelan affairs and has reaffirmed its support for Maduro.

The main point in Russia's position is that Venezuela must not become one more instance of removal of an inconvenient government by a foreign government. Russia has to take notice of risks it may face if it actively defends Venezuela's current legitimate regime, but it also needs to be aware of reputational damage if it departs from its commitments as an ally.

Generally speaking, Russia has adopted a position based on a thorough analysis. It has held consultations with the United States and demonstrated readiness to mediate in possible negotiations.

Reflecting, not Forecasting

WHAT WILL HAPPEN in Venezuela is difficult to foresee. The United

States' first blitzkrieg against Venezuela didn't work. However, it's obvious that the Trump administration won't give up efforts to overthrow the Maduro regime, and that, to achieve this, it will employ the entire typical mechanism of pressure – political, economic, primarily financial, and cyber means. One can't rule out sabotage either.

It's unclear whether a direct military invasion is likely. There are people in Trump's entourage who are in favor of it, but Trump himself apparently isn't sure it would get the United States very far. There may be various reasons for his presumed doubts, for instance Venezuela's state-of-the-art weapons and large numbers of Cubans serving in principal Venezuelan military units and security services. Bribing the Venezuelan military top brass, a technology tested out in Iraq and other countries, is not an option – not yet, anyway. Top armed forces officers hold major positions in some of the industries. Moreover, they apparently remember the plight of military officers in Libya, Iraq and some other countries who went for promised American money.

Washington, besides, fears that an armed invasion would trigger guerrilla action, which, with much of Venezuela being forested and mountainous, might spell heavy losses for the invaders.

The United States is trying to get neighbors of Venezuela, mainly Colombia and Brazil, to take part in a potential military invasion, but that has its snags. The Colombian government fears that its involvement in the invasion would spark a new domestic conflict in Colombia, and Brazil can't afford a military operation against an adversary that is better armed and would have more sound motivation to fight.

In any case, attempts at a political settlement appear more likely than an armed invasion. Maduro in principle agrees to a political process and wouldn't object to new parliamentary elections although he does reject the idea of a new presidential election, which he might lose.

Russia has a chance of spearheading a search for a compromise if it succeeds in putting together a group of countries championing a political solution.

In any event, the improvement of the economic situation in Venezuela is indispensable for a definitive solution, but economic improvements are difficult to achieve without economic and political reforms.

Global and regional pressures may force Maduro to make significant concessions to the opposition. Another potential route is a coup and a rigorous authoritarian regime. And the worst of all scenarios is a civil war with an inevitable huge death toll, economic disaster and humanitarian catastrophe.



Supporters of Nicolas Maduro occupied the embassy of Venezuela in the U.S.

Whatever is going to happen, the Venezuelan crisis is already having reverberations that go far beyond the boundaries of Latin America and has assumed a geopolitical dimension.

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How Business Became a Hostage to Geopolitics

A. Borisov

Key words: geopolitics, globalization, war of sanctions.

THE RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY increasingly sees the current state of international relations as a dangerous no-rules game. One comes to this conclusion when one sees the established world order falling apart and international treaties that have done such a good job to so many countries, guaranteeing global security and stability for many decades, being called into question or just ignored. General Charles de Gaulle's quip that "treaties are like roses and young girls" because "they last while they last" isn't very comforting. One is tempted to comment that, after all, stability is better than instability. But it is the global business community that today's transition from the old world order to a new one is hitting particularly hard – it has involuntarily become a hostage to geopolitical games.

Geopolitics vs. Globalization

TODAY'S WORLD is a place where political interests closely intertwine with business interests. International relations have come to amount to competition among countries in which pragmatism pushes ideological considerations into the background. This trend has been particularly obvious after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the onset of the liberal world order.

In public discourse, especially in Europe, some politicians traditionally pledge loyalty to "democratic values," just as the fathers of the church pledged loyalty to Christian dogma in the early Middle Ages.

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However, in the epicenter of liberalism, the United States, the democratic values theme has unnoticeably gone down the drain, especially after the well-known business mogul moved into the White House, although it still is a reserve weapon for the opposition. Needless to say, none of the ascending nations, not even China with its construction of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” sees ideology as dogma. Ideology doesn’t prevent any of those countries from pursuing pragmatic policies while taking the world’s changing geopolitical map into account.

The world has moved into an era when governments throw aside all isms and put their entire power and influence at the service of their country’s business community. This has triggered intense geopolitical rivalries among great powers with consequences that have come unexpected to champions of liberalism and has plunged globalization into a protracted crisis.

After nearly a quarter of a century of “happy globalization,” the world business community has become drawn into a web of geopolitical tensions and uncertainties that is sometimes described as the Second Cold War. This is an effect of the global financial crisis, and to a greater extent, a consequence of the refusal of the West to accept the re-emergence of Russia as a world power and the rise of China. Who will claim today that “politics is a concentrated expression of economics” when time and again there come foreign policy decisions that run against business interests and push the world toward a new economic recession?

What was said at this year’s 49th annual meeting in Davos of the World Economic Forum makes clear that only the most incurable optimists would risk claiming that the fourth (digital) industrial revolution is ushering in a new phase of globalization as the world order built by the United States and its complaisant allies after World War II is falling to pieces. “The mood here is subdued, cautious and apprehensive,” U.S. analyst Fareed Zakaria, author of the book *The Post-American World*, said in describing the atmosphere at the 2019 World Economic Forum. “The great expansion of globalization is over.”¹

Transnational business circles normally don’t need political upheavals, least of all those that undermine markets, break supply chains that have taken decades to build, and lead to tariff barriers, sanctions, and even full-scale trade wars. It is no accident that European capitalism, after reaching maturity back in the 19th century, proclaimed the free trade, open doors, and equal opportunity principles, which paved the way to economic expansion and the conquest of new markets. This doesn’t mean

that armed force wasn't used when agreements proved impossible to reach. "Trade follows the flag" was advice given to descendants by Cecil Rhodes, one of the founders of the British empire, an adventurer, racist and colonizer. Students have recently demanded that the Oxford University administration remove his statue in Oxford.

It is the question of questions how it came about that globalization, extolled by the West as a key to solving global problems, primarily backwardness, poverty and inequality, fell victim to geopolitics, which seemed to have sunk into oblivion and was ousted by revived supremacy struggles among great powers. The answer is

that globalization was thought up as a hierarchical project, as the removal of national borders for transnational, mainly American corporations, as, in a sense, an embodiment of the "end of history" – the final triumph of American universalism, an evasive phrase for the onset of the "American age."

For political simpletons, globalization was portrayed as a blessing for everyone. However, the United States planned to use globalization as a means of advancing its own interests, and least of all did it want a change to the hierarchical world order based on the outcome of the Cold War, and least of all did it want to relinquish its status as the world's only superpower.

Yet, at the same time, by eliminating ideological antagonisms and putting an end to many of the international conflicts caused by them, globalization has brought about a more favorable environment for economic competition, removing many of the artificial barriers erected during the Cold War. Businesspeople across the world feel nostalgic about those days as a "golden age" when markets expanded tremendously after former socialist countries had gone over to free enterprise and China was reforming quickly. There emerged truly global markets, which many believed offered equal access and equal competition. New power centers emerged that were quickly asserting themselves instead of taking prepared for them rungs in the U.S.-created hierarchical system. Surely the

Transnational business circles normally don't need political upheavals, least of all those that undermine markets, break supply chains that have taken decades to build, and lead to tariff barriers, sanctions, and even full-scale trade wars.

ways of competition, just as any spontaneous forces, are unpredictable and inscrutable.

Consequently, what the United States got wasn't what it had expected – it was caught in a trap it had laid. It had assumed that the developed part of the world, the “golden billion,” would retain its role as the financial, economic, and technological center, naturally under American organizational supremacy and control, and pass over “yesterday's” functions – manufacturing and other – to the rest via an integration and interdependence system that would perpetuate global political and economic inequality. But this is not what has happened.

This quickly came home to the United States, which knows how high a profit needs to be to justify a specific investment, while Europe was still laboring under liberal illusions. The American model of global domination, which seemed immutable after the Cold War, was unexpectedly in danger.

The British, linked to Washington by a “special relationship,” were also anxious. Once again, they launched a policy that reflected their self-centered insular mentality. Britain saw the incipient European Union crisis and European disintegration as symptoms of growing nationalism and protectionism and as a harbinger of an upcoming replacement of world political leaders. The British reacted by pre-emptive action that reflected typical British shrewdness and pragmatism – they hadn't won two world wars to accept Germany as the new European economic hegemon. This pre-emptive action took the form of the Brexit vote, which altered the course of European politics and meant that the British elite wanted freedom in the turbulent times of global uncertainties, though it's not yet clear what effect this hazardous (and possibly disastrous) move will have on the British economy and financial system, and maybe on British statehood as well – Brexit proved impossible to launch on the initially scheduled date and had to be put off by several months.

The election of scandalous billionaire Donald Trump as president of the United States came out of the blue for the entire world. In a sense, it meant that Washington was ditching a strategy that had ceased to work and was launching a new strategy. Actually, Trump's electoral victory was not as accidental as it might have seemed. On the other hand, it's unclear whether the U.S. military-industrial complex, hit by a post-Cold War production decline in the 1990s and the subsequent “peace dividend” period, was instrumental in bringing about this change of strategy. The defense industry, the military, the intelligence community, and the media played a

significant role in the United States' swing from globalization to protectionism and in its stronger defense of American interests under the "America First" slogan.

Government and Business

THE COLLAPSE of a world order has always involved painful processes in international relations, changes of leaders and parliaments, and the agonizing birth of new rules of international behavior. And it is business that has always had the worst time. For companies that didn't directly participate in hazardous governmental projects and managed to avoid bankruptcy, those have been times of serious losses and difficult adaptation to new realities.

In the past, such periods have usually involved economic antagonisms that developed into trade wars and military conflicts some of which evolved into world wars. It's only rather simple-minded people who believe claims by some fashionable authors that World War I was an accidental result of activities by some political "sleepwalkers" and not a clash of the economic interests of European great powers, primarily Britain and Germany, and business elites that were behind those interests.²

Economic interests were to an even greater extent behind World War II as the motivations of those who unleashed it, the Axis powers, mainly Nazi Germany and militarist Japan. Those countries were primarily fighting for strategic resources, such as oil, commodities and labor markets, and living space. The Treaty of Versailles, which put a formal end to World War I, violated the interests of the worst enemy of the Anglo-Saxons, German companies, and it was mainly this and not any anti-Bolshevik ideology that propelled the National Socialists led by Adolf Hitler into power. And it was chiefly the interests of big German companies that the Nazis were serving in their bloody attempts to redivide the world.

Remarkably, as soon as German forces occupied a European country, tycoon Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, a lavish funder of the Nazis, would fly to that country on board his private Messerschmitt to look for assets to include in his empire. It became a state policy to plunder occupied countries, specically to take hold of Jewish capital. For example, Alfred Rosenberg, the chief Nazi ideologist, who was sentenced to death at Nuremberg and executed, said in his diary that the Mendelssohn & Co bank, "which had existed since 1795, was handed over to Deutsche Bank in the course of Aryanization."³

The Ost plan, which was adopted by the Nazis after they launched their invasion of the Soviet Union, involved robbing Slav peoples on a vast scale. In European Russia, the Nazis planned to leave a maximum of 30 million people, according to minutes of a meeting at Hitler's headquarters on July 16, 1941. "As regards German requirements in the East, feeding the German people is undoubtedly our main concern.... But we do not see it as our duty to provide Russians with food from those regions. The Russian people are in for difficult years. It will be decided later to what extent industrial facilities will be preserved there. Crimea must be liberated from all aliens and populated by Germans.... By and large, the point is to intelligently divide a huge pie so that we can, first, possess it, second, manage it, and, third, exploit it."⁴ Such was the role of a criminal state that had put itself at the service of big companies. Present-day demands by Berlin that Russia return property obtained from the defeated Third Reich as reparations with the consent of the Allies seem strange, to say the least.

After decades of ideological confrontation, the world has clearly entered a new era, a period of redistribution of roles among principal power centers, primarily the United States, China, Russia, and the EU. Apparently, the nuclear arsenals of key global powers remain the only brake on their increasingly intense rivalries and mainly limit them to economic competition.

It is surprising that there aren't too many detailed, fact-based, insightful studies that shed light on roles played by intricate relationships between big companies and governments in foreign policy decision-making with all the hidden objectives and behind-the-scenes movements. It's much too important a subject to be neglected. One profound study is the article "Business and Foreign Policy" by Jeffrey Garten, a former U.S. undersecretary of commerce for international trade, that was published in influential American magazine *Foreign Affairs* and explains a symbiosis between the United States' government and business community.

"Throughout most of American history, commercial interests have played a central role in foreign policy, and vice versa," Garten says. "During the next few decades, the interaction between them will become more intense, more important, more difficult to manage..."⁵

Calvin Coolidge, who was U.S. president in the 1920s and was the hero of Ronald Reagan, another former American president and another big friend of American corporations, is the author of the popular aphorism, "The chief business of the American people is business," which

reflects the essence of U.S. foreign policy. The State Department terms this “commercial diplomacy,” a policy to advance the interests of American companies in the world come hell or high water, no matter what political cost of it is and what obstacles may emerge. U.S. foreign policy owes its tough, uncompromising nature to American corporate culture, which was built from scratch and evolved through brutal competition unlike what happened in Europe with its soft movement from feudalism to capitalism, not to mention the 1990s privatization of government property by nomenclatura in Russia.

“For most of the country's history, foreign policy has reflected an obsession with open markets for American firms,” Garten says further on. The United States looked for markets to export “autos and airplanes,” and for “access to raw materials like oil or copper.” Business expansion outside the United States has often been seen as part of a national mission. As never before, the health of the American economy depends on foreign markets, Garten says. The domestic market has ceased to guarantee adequate growth, employment, revenues, and accumulation, he argues. “If the global experiment in democratic capitalism goes awry, the international landscape will be ominous for the United States,” Garten says. Garten, who, besides having been a politician in the 1990s, is a businessman as well as an academic today, makes another interesting point – he criticizes economic sanctions, especially if they are unilateral and argues that they harm American companies and help rivals of the United States. American businesses have always preferred stability to uncertainty, he says.⁶ In other words, “money loves silence,” as the adage goes, and business loves stability. In the words of the unforgettable and outstanding Russian aphorist Viktor Chernomyrdin, stability is better than instability.

How has it come about that the United States threw aside the advantages of stability, abandoned caution and circumspection that are inherent features of business, and embarked on the dubious and dangerous enterprise of seeking to safeguard its dominant positions in the world, challenging increasingly powerful rivals such as China and Russia, and even the EU? What is behind this: a paranoid fear of losing former power? Refusal to adapt to a new reality after being used to be the hegemon? Or justifiable fear that the onslaught of rivals would deprive the Americans of privileges in world markets, or even throw America back to its pre-World War II status with a scale of influence limited to the western hemisphere?

Judging by heated polemics within the U.S. government that spill into

public space, the American elite is generally united, extremely militant and believes that it will be able to reverse history. This belief has got stronger after Trump was elected president and is based on the power of the American economy, the United States' financial and technological superiority bolstered by its military might, and the experience and clout of American transnational corporations. On the surface, this looks like a dangerous gamble with unpredictable consequences for the Americans and the rest of the world.

The War of Sanctions

TODAY'S WORLD political scene is marked by intertwining geopolitics and geo-economics that underlie bitter global antagonisms. Any dispute or conflict, no matter which region is its site, is, at the end of the day, a struggle for resources, especially energy, a clash of the interests of large corporations and governments backing them. Recent developments in Iraq, Libya, Syria, Venezuela, and other hot spots are good examples. After many years of relative stability, those countries were rocked by bitter domestic conflicts with the United States and its main NATO allies interfering in them. These conflicts inflicted heavy losses on rivaling transnational corporations regardless of their jurisdiction. One would have expected Western countries to realize by now that one can never be sure of consequences of any interference in someone else's affairs no matter what noble pretext is used for it. One can't help thinking of the European quip of the days of Napoleon III that the French "are always surprised at the outcome of what they have done."

Many experts believe that, after a relative lull, a new global conflict is looming and that business interests are neglected in this situation. This highlights the issue of interference in internal affairs. American-Chinese antagonisms and the simultaneous American-Russian confrontation are at the epicenter of this brewing conflict. The American-built world order based on the results of World War II, which, it seemed, became definitively triumphant after the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, has sunk deep into crisis because of the Americans' own conduct, and this crisis has spread to what is the "holy of holies" for the United States, trans-Atlantic relations. One has the impression the Americans are deliberately trying to split up the world in order to reassemble it in their own way.

Trump's America with its neo-conservative logic prefers bilateral

relations with each ally to the old multilateral approach that France and Germany still call for. Trump bases his behavior on the tough business logic of everyone taking care of themselves, although this runs against the United States' post-World War II strategy of unifying the Western world under its leadership and setting up political and military alliances, primarily NATO, although the latter's future looks uncertain, to say the least, now that Trump has accused its European members of parasitism.

Focusing on military operations to "liberalize" and "democratize" the world, the United States has been finding it harder to win economic competition both with its allies and partners and with its principal adversaries. American companies, primarily transnational military-industrial, energy and telecommunications corporations that behave as masters and law-givers throughout the world and therefore are geopolitical actors, felt threatened in this competition. The entire world is the scene of these rivalries, all its key regions – Europe, the Indo-Pacific, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America. One can detect geopolitics behind any of these clashes of interests – one just has to scrape the surface.

The international business community is confused. Until very recently, companies had the decisive say in the policies of their governments but today they have been pushed into secondary roles in U.S.-directed dangerous geopolitical games and therefore are forced to accept hazardous rules dictated to them. The United States makes fairly sober-minded near-term assessments of its economic power and the extent of its control of the global financial system and, in view of nuclear-age realities, uses economic sanctions as its chief means of political pressure in dealing both with its adversaries and with its partners.

The United States included sanctions in its political and diplomatic arsenal when it was launching a policy of expansion and, when applying them, sometimes supplemented them with the use of threat of armed force. When the Cold War came to an end, unilateral economic sanctions that didn't have the approval of the UN Security Council, although very damaging to American and European companies, became one of Washington's chief means of political pressure on Russia, China, and even some allies of the United States. According to calculations by American economists Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg, in the 1990s, the United States used various forms of sanctions against 35 countries compared with 20 countries that it had sanctioned in the preceding decade. The United States obtained UN Security Council approval for its sanctions against Iraq in 1990-1991,

the former Yugoslavia in 1991, and Rwanda in 1994 in order to give them legitimacy. However, if coordinated international pressure proved unachievable or failed to make the target country change its behavior, the United States unhesitatingly employed more aggressive unilateral measures, the four economists said.⁷

The declared reason for the current large-scale sanctions against Russia was the reinclusion of Crimea in Russia. However, it was long before that when the West began to consider the use of sanctions as a long-term strategy to achieve a “change of regime” in Russia and force the country to abandon an independent foreign policy if it contradicted Western interests. The hasty introduction of sanctions – first personal and then sectoral – meant that the administration of President Barack Obama had adopted them as a reserve instrument before the conflict in Ukraine, no later than in 2012, the year the “Magnitsky Act” was put into force. This reflected deep disappointment with the results of the “reset” of Russian-American relations – no new edition of Gorbachev’s perestroika came about while Vladimir Putin won a new presidential term in 2012. And it can never be a problem to find a pretext for sanctions, as the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 or the Skripal poisoning case make clear.

The anti-Russian sanctions, which are based on American legislation but run against the UN Charter and international law, have become a permanent factor in international relations, raising major obstacles to trade and investment. They have mainly hit the EU countries, which have thoughtlessly joined the sanctions out of trans-Atlantic solidarity and refused to recognize the right of Crimea’s population to self-determination, which it exercised after ultranationalists took power in Kiev.

Russia’s main trading and business partners in the EU such as Germany or Italy sustained heavy losses. The Russian Foreign Ministry estimates that the sanctions have cost Europe a total of about 100 billion euros. Import substitution measures and exploration of non-EU options whereby Russia reacted to the sanctions irreversibly deprived many European companies of markets in Russia. Being barred from Russia’s agricultural market was the greatest loss for them. Russia meanwhile achieved a breakthrough in grain production. Exports of wheat began to bring Russia higher revenues than its weapons exports and made it one of the world’s main grain exporters. The United States involuntarily created a long-term rival for itself in the world agricultural market.

Only a naïve politician may expect a great power to change its behav-

ior under that external economic pressure rather than looking for an antidote. Several years after the West launched its war of sanctions against Russia, some Western analysts and politicians admit this. An article by David Cohen and Zoe Weinberg headlined “Sanctions Can’t Spark Regime Change” is a good example. “In the last several decades, financial and economic sanctions have become a key tool of U.S. foreign policy. The Trump administration has made particularly heavy use of this tool, especially in its efforts to induce regime change in Venezuela and Iran,” Cohen and Weinberg say. However, they indicate, “the more the United States uses sanctions to pursue policies that lack international support, the more other countries ... will seek alternatives to the dollar and the U.S. financial system. If they find such alternatives, it will be a blow not only to U.S. sanctions policy but to the United States’ position in the global financial system.”⁸

That is true, but the current sanctions are a mechanism with an inertia that’s hard to stop. The United States is unlikely to abandon them in the foreseeable future, even though by sticking to them it will be harming itself and others. That is a reality one can’t avoid. It’s more likely that the EU’s united front will be breached, but even that can only happen if Trump’s policies continue to undermine trans-Atlantic solidarity, which has already become looser due to his efforts. It’s too early to expect European countries to shake off their dependence on the United States, although they have become more independent in decision-making on issues such as the Iran nuclear deal, Middle East policies, European energy security, or relations with China, and put more value on their own interests. Whether this independence trend gains momentum largely depends on how much pressure European companies will put on their governments, on whether European governments will prioritize market advantages, and on how influential Europe’s pro-American circles will be.

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Women of the World: The Role of Parliamentary Diplomacy in Implementing Russian Foreign Policy

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Key words: Eurasian Women's Forum (EWF), parliamentary diplomacy, Women 20 (W20), women's cooperation.

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION has always stood for a polycentric world order and for equal and indivisible security with unconditional respect for the sovereignty of nations and their right to choose their own path of development. At international and regional forums and during multilateral and bilateral negotiations, Russia has consistently promoted a constructive unifying agenda, including an agenda for sustainable social development and equal rights and opportunities for men and women.

As Russian President Vladimir Putin noted at a plenary session of the Second Eurasian Women's Forum (EWF), there are many historical examples of women assuming responsibility for key decisions that have shaped the destiny of entire states and nations. Indeed, Russia's breakthrough development cannot be achieved without full use of the powerful creative potential of Russian women in implementing national projects designed to improve the living standards and quality of life of our citizens and to make life in the country more comfortable.

In today's rapidly changing world, women play an ever more important role in strengthening peace and security and in solving major socio-economic and humanitarian problems.

Women take an active part in the work of the United Nations, where there are already more women than men in senior staff positions. Some of the largest parliamentary organizations, such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, are led by women, and more than 23% of all seats in national parliaments world

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wide are held by women (compared to less than 12% only 15 years ago). Today, women parliamentarians are a serious political force capable of influencing the situation in the world. Women's gift of creation is particularly important in a situation of increasing differences between countries and rising tensions in relations between them.

However, it must be stated that the world is not becoming a safer place, as the potential for conflict has increased significantly. The basic principles and rules of international law, including non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states and respect for the right of nations to choose their own path of development, are being increasingly sacrificed. Unlawful use of sanctions is expanding; economic blockades are being imposed; and more and more people are being denied freedom of movement, the right to exercise their basic humanitarian rights. But it is known that a crisis provides new opportunities, which is why women, because of their heightened intuition, flexibility, and patience, can become a powerful force in resolving conflicts.

An International Community in the Interest of Equality

WOMEN and girls make up half of the world's population, but humanity still has a long way to go before achieving full equality or men and women in terms of rights and opportunities. There are still many problems in the world related to inequality, including gender inequality. Statistics show that 70% of all people living in poverty are women. Women remain disadvantaged in access to economic resources: even though 400 million women work in agriculture and produce most of the food, they own less than 20% of land in the world.

The mandate of the United Nations provides for international cooperation "in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."

Ensuring equal rights and opportunities for men and women is of great importance, including for the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Equality has its own place among the 17 Sustainable Development Goals listed in the 2030 Agenda: Goal 5 is to "achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls."

It is important not only to promote the realization of universal goals in the international arena, but also to develop our own, unifying women's agenda through the promotion of our own initiatives. For example, the

holding of Eurasian women's forums at the initiative of Valentina Matviyenko, Chairperson of the Federation Council, has opened a new page in the history of cooperation between Russia and UNIDO, the main organization of the UN system for industrial development. The parties have been working on a regulatory framework for interaction; a joint declaration on cooperation between UNIDO and the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation has been signed; and a representative of Russia has been appointed, for the first time ever, as UNIDO goodwill ambassador.

In addition, a Russian delegation visiting Vienna in February 2019 presented an integrated model for the development of female entrepreneurship and leadership (Women Empowerment Ecosystem), which provides for the creation of an online digital skills and business tools training program, joint activities in developing women's competencies, and corporate programs that support women's leadership. This model also provides for the development of an investment platform for women's projects and access to markets and finance. Another Russian initiative is to institute a UNIDO international award for projects implemented by female entrepreneurs.

UNIDO's management has confirmed the uniqueness of Russian experience in expanding women's economic rights and opportunities, noting that Russia is a key UNIDO donor and a champion of women's economic empowerment and entrepreneurship. In their opinion, Russia is a leader in fostering female entrepreneurship, while the Russian approach makes the international women's agenda more attractive and interesting.

Next year, it will be 25 years since the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women was held in Beijing. It is planned to hold a special high-level meeting at the 75th UN General Assembly to celebrate this anniversary; it is also planned to adopt a final document for accelerating gender equality and empowerment of women and girls. We hope that our work and Russia's successes in this area will make their contribution, building on renewed, unifying approaches to the solution of common equality problems.

Russia is a key UNIDO donor and a champion of women's economic empowerment and entrepreneurship.

The First Eurasian Women's Forum: New Horizons for Cooperation

ONE MUST ADMIT that the situation with gender equality is steadily changing for the better. Women's influence is increasing in all spheres of life. It is gratifying to know that Russia has achieved positive results in this area. Russia is among the world's leaders in the number of women executives: 47% of top management positions in our country are filled by women, with a 16% increase in the last few years, while the number of women in public service at all levels of government has reached 72%. Today, almost 33% of all business owners in Russia are women, and this is one of the highest figures in the world.

In the world community, Russia has an established image of a pioneer in gender equality, as particularly noted at the Eurasian women's forums.

The First Eurasian Women's Forum (St. Petersburg, September 24-25, 2015) gave new impetus to women's projects and initiatives. After the forum, a National Action Strategy for Women, together with a plan for its implementation, was developed and approved in Russia by order of the president of the Russian Federation. Another significant event was a presidential decree proclaiming a Decade of Childhood in Russia. These two large-scale national programs were defined by the state as priority ones, with women playing a key role in their implementation. One of the main outcomes of the First Forum was the launch of a web portal called "Eurasian Women's Community." In the last four years, it has attracted registered users from more than 100 countries of the world. The portal keeps a register of women's NGOs, which already includes more than 2,000 women's associations operating in Russia.

The Second Eurasian Women's Forum: Reaching Beyond the Continent

THE SECOND EWF, held in St. Petersburg on September 19-21, 2018, not only confirmed the prestige of this major international women's platform for discussion of topical issues, but also continued the tradition of promoting women's projects in every way. During various important events held between the forums, their participants had supported our approach to current topics relevant to women: to move forward by building on the successes we have achieved.

The three-day forum included more than 60 events with a total of

more than 10,000 participants. Platforms for discussion organized jointly with international organizations were real pearls of this forum. There were special sessions with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Bank; a BRICS public-private dialogue on women and the economy; a seminar called “Women and Technology in the Fourth Industrial Revolution of Asia-Pacific Region Economies”; a meeting of the Female Governors’ International Debate Club; and a female diplomats’ summit. The forum also hosted the first-ever session of the Women 20 (W20) group.

It is important to note that the Eurasian Women’s Forum is not just a one-off event held every three years, but an ongoing process that primarily involves systematic work to resolve problems related to gender equality in the country and Russia’s positioning in the world.

As a result, the projects presented at the Second Forum covered a wide variety of topics: from support for female leadership and entrepreneurship to corporate charity and women’s role in the fourth industrial revolution.

Such a wide range of topics and an unprecedented number of participants in the forum even called into question its very status as a Eurasian forum, because it was attended by representatives of more than 110 countries of the world. Considering the importance of the Eurasian Women’s Forum as one of the largest authoritative platforms for enhancing the role of women in the modern world, it was decided to hold the next forum in 2021 with the status of “global women’s forum,” as indicated in the final resolution.

**The Council of the Eurasian Women’s Forum
Under the Federation Council:
Constant Work to Promote Women’s Interests**

PREPARATIONS for the third forum are already underway, and the main task now is to use this systematic work to support women in Russia, develop women’s NGOs, and foster female entrepreneurship. For these purposes, the Federation Council has established a standing expert advisory body, the Council of the Eurasian Women’s Forum, which has already shown itself as a unique presentation platform for women’s projects both in Russia and at the international level. It consists of members of the Federation Council, deputies of the State Duma, and representa-

tives of federal ministries and departments, nonprofit organizations, and business entities.

Let me note that the establishment of the Council was preceded by a massive effort on the part of the Working Group set up after the First Eurasian Women's Forum. The Working Group began its activities by preparing a report on the role of women in modern Russia, which was submitted to the president of the Russian Federation.

In a relatively short period of time, the Council has done a great deal of work in the development of international cooperation, implementation of joint projects on the global women's agenda, participation in implementing the National Action Strategy for Women 2017-2022, and the launch and implementation of Council projects aimed at empowering women in all spheres of life.

Systemic cooperation with international organizations, including those of the United Nations, is a major focus for the Council. For example, it has reached an agreement with UNIDO on holding two special events as part of the women's agenda on the sidelines of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in June 2019 and at the Global Manufacturing and Industrialization Summit (GMIS) in Yekaterinburg in July 2019. UNIDO Director General Li Yong expressed his willingness to take part in a meeting of the EWF Council during his visit to Russia in June 2019.

Along with this, the Council has launched a large-scale effort to promote women's business projects on the platform of APEC forums. Next year, during Russia's chairmanship of the SCO and BRICS, it is planned to hold a women's forum in Novosibirsk with the participation of representatives from all countries of the association.

The Council members are also involved in implementing a joint project launched by the Council of Europe and Russian government agencies to prevent social disadvantage of women and violence against women.

The Council has been working actively to implement sectoral documents of strategic importance at the federal level and has prepared proposals for the plan to realize the National Action Strategy for Women 2017-2022. In its progress report on the implementation of the Strategy in 2018, the Russian Ministry of Labor made special mention of the achievements of the Second Eurasian Women's Forum in expanding women's participation in the country's social and political life.

In addition, the Council has continued intensive work to launch and implement initiatives promoting women's interests. Its members have

already presented 12 projects, including both initiatives that build on the successes of the Second Eurasian Women's Forum and entirely new proposals.

This includes five new projects in the field of mentoring, charity, development of rural areas, and digital economy. Although the Council already has an impressive project portfolio, it continues to quickly respond to the emergence of interesting new initiatives. Take, for example, the project for the development of women's leadership that was presented at a recent meeting of the Council and was supported by Valentina Matviyenko, Chairperson of the Federation Council, during a meeting with women winners of the Leaders of Russia contest.

Another promising area is the establishment of a Eurasian Association of Regional Women Leaders, headed by Natalya Komarova, Governor of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug – Yugra, whose purpose is to pool the efforts of women leaders at the regional, city and local level through a discussion of the women's agenda in different regions of the world.

Women and the Development of Industrial Regions

THE GEOGRAPHY of the women's movement in Russia is steadily expanding. In 2019, major international women's events have taken place in several regions at once, with each of them having its own distinct regional agenda. An international women's forum called "The Role of Women in Developing Industrial Regions," held in Novokuznetsk on March 1-2, 2019, was particularly impressive. Its purpose was to promote the ideas and projects of the Second EWF. At an international expert session organized by BRICS on the sidelines of the Novokuznetsk forum, its participants discussed a set of Russian initiatives, such as the establishment of a BRICS Women's Business Alliance and women's participation in the digital economy and e-commerce.

Live streaming of the forum's plenary meeting and nine sessions multiplied the number of its participants. More than 85,000 women at Kuzbass enterprises and organizations had an opportunity to participate in its work at a distance, to share their ideas and make comments and proposals for the final resolution.

Mother Teresa, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, once said: "Every work done with love and with an open heart always brings a person closer to God." The Russian Federation is willing to freely exchange its solu-

tions in the field of equality, to use the effective experience of other countries, and to work together to create the best opportunities for women's self-realization in order to build a decent future for our children and to improve the world around us. I am convinced that we should do our utmost to eliminate many of the existing stereotypes and career constraints for women, improve access to education for girls, and create an enabling environment for female employees and entrepreneurs so as to help them feel more confident and independent.

France: Attempts at Interculturalism

O. Khodinova

Key words: France, migration, integration, cross-cultural dialogue, interculturalism.

LET ME first share a story I heard from a diplomat of the Russian Embassy in Morocco. This happened in Rabat during the January visit of Foreign Minister of Russia Sergey Lavrov to North African countries. Out of sheer curiosity and trying to understand their motives and their expectations, this man spoke to several refugees moving to Europe. One of them, 27-year-old literary critic (!) from Cameroon, explained: his family was not rich; he had four brothers and a small house with a plot of land. When asked why he was moving to Europe, he answered that he “was hungry” but admitted that he did know how to plant potatoes. He was absolutely convinced that in France he would be accommodated; that there would be enough food; that he would be able to realize his potential and would be welcome probably at the Sorbonne.

According to the latest statistical data, in 2017, France welcomed 370,000 migrants [15], the biggest number in its history; about half of them were not born in Europe. The figures for 2018 will be made public this summer. Most immigrants came from Africa – about 30% from the Maghreb; slightly over 14%, from other African countries [30]. This is logical and predictable process for the country with 100-year-long history of immigration and at least 200-year-long history of colonial possessions in North Africa. For several decades now, France has been struggling with the problems of social and cultural variety created by immigration.

“Welcome From Here”

IN FRANCE, L’Office français de l’immigration et de l’intégration (OFII) is responsible for the immigration and integration of foreigners. The right to

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is responsible for immigration and integration of foreigners. The right to pass decisions on the refugee status belongs to L'Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA); the procedure consists of several stages and is very long and complicated. In October 2018, the OFPRA deemed it necessary to publish a revised instruction of 60 (!) pages [19]. Normally the procedure takes 8 months to be completed.

The new law On Controlled Migration, Efficient Right of Asylum and Successful Integration of September 10, 2018 [24] tightened the procedures and cut down from 120 to 90 days the time within which a foreigner can apply for asylum. Under the new law, repeated applications are possible only if the living circumstances have changed; those who were ordered to leave the country but lodge a complaint might be put under home arrest for 90 instead of 45 days as before. Administrative arrest to define the status of a migrant was prolonged from 16 to 24 hours. Unsanctioned crossing of the country's external borders is punished with detention for one year and a fine of €3,750. Finally, the law envisages a simpler and easier deportation procedure for refugees with the proved status of economic migrants.

At the same time, the law supports the trend of the last few years, viz. selective immigration to attract professionals. From 2016 onwards, residence permit under the Talent Passport was extended to four years while the new variant of the law specifically extended the right to the Talent Passport to employees of innovative companies.

The new law was issued to fight illegal immigration, attract talents and shorten the detention procedure. President Macron supported by 90% of expats during his election campaign because of his slogan "Migration is a chance for France" [28] said recently that France could not receive all poor people [5]. In the fall of 2018, a video, in which French gendarmes dropped off two men, obviously illegal migrants, out of their van and abandoned them in the forest to their own fate, made by Italians from a small town on the other side of the border stirred up a huge diplomatic scandal between the two countries [8]. Thus, French authorities spare no effort to minimize the number of unwanted guests even at the cost of quarrels with the closest EU neighbors.

In 2017, the Ministry of the Interior of France registered a historical high of asylum applications: over 100,000, or 17% more than in the previous year. Here is the much less impressive number of approved applications: one-third of the applicants or 32,000 refugees. About 15,000

were deported from France – 14.6% more than in 2016; 12,000 left France on their own free will [6].

Early in 2018, the then Minister of the Interior Gérard Collomb explained intensified deportations: “We have to do this since at some point we will be unable to ensure the future to all” [4]. This is confirmed by the sad statistics of life in the so-called banlieues. More about this below.

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Integration of Migrants as a Necessity, Interculturalism as an Opportunity for the EU

IT SEEMS that starting with the mid-2000s the European Union has been living under a neon “Integration” sign. For over a decade now, the EU has been working on the rules of integration of third-country nationals, the basic principles of which were formulated in 2004 in The Hague Program [31]:

- Integration is a continuous, two-way process involving both legally resident third-country nationals and the host society.
- Integration includes, but goes beyond, anti-discrimination policy.
- Integration implies respect for the basic values of the European Union and fundamental human rights.
- Integration requires basic skills for participation in society.
- Integration relies on frequent interaction and intercultural dialogue between all members of society within common forums and activities in order to improve mutual understanding.
- Integration extends to a variety of areas, including employment and education.

In France, like in many other EU members for that matter [1], priority is given to those who know French and is financially independent. Everybody who wants to live in France should sign a Republican Integration Contract [7] under which he/she promises to respect the main principles of the republic – Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and Secularism – and assume an obligation to go through a “personalized process of integration into French society.”

The strategic documents of the European Union treated integration as

a “two-sided process” which meant that logic of being of host societies should be also adjusted. In 2008, the Council of Europe issued The White Book on Intercultural Dialogue “Living Together as Equals in Dignity” that provoked a wide-scale discussion in academic, expert and political communities. The document announced a transit to the “emerging intercultural paradigm,” suggesting that peaceful coexistence of different cultures should rely on the liberal concepts of “cultural variety consistent with the universal values of human rights, democracy and the rule of law” as well as “respect for equal dignity of every individual” [26].

Intercultural approach presupposes that to be effectively involved in a dialogue with different cultures Europeans should acquire adequate competences, in particular, “open-mindedness, empathy, cognitive flexibility, communicative awareness, the ability to adapt one’s behavior to new cultural contexts, and linguistic skills” [21, p. 26]. The White Book points out that intercultural “competences necessary for intercultural dialogue are not automatically acquired: they need to be learned, practiced and maintained throughout life” and that “civil-society organizations, religious communities, the media” play “a crucial role in the pursuit of the aims and core values.”

The coverage by the French press of the terrorist act at the *Charlie Hebdo* office is highly illustrative in this respect. “In all the recent coverage, the French media have not made much of the Franco-Algerian background of the Kouachi brothers. There are probably several good reasons for this. The French media, like nearly all French politicians, have been keen not to become entangled in what has been called ‘l’amalgame’ – a confused mixture of race, religion and politics.” Foreign journalists deemed it necessary to point out: “The consensus is that this confusion is both inflammatory and entirely alien to the republican values of French universalism” [17].

Investing in Cultural Diversity and Intercultural Dialogue: UNESCO World Report issued in 2009 treated intercultural dialogue (interculturalism) as a vision for the future [3].

In 2012, the European Commission submitted Action Plan on the Integration of Third-Country Nationals [12] that, very much as before, treats the process of integration as two-sided in which foreigners and receiving societies are equally involved while access to the labor market, education and other services is extended in exchange for respect for EU values. This document concentrates not on the cultural but on the social and economic aspect of integration seen as the key to social cohesion and

economic efficiency and as a means of achieving the maximally great results of immigration. The document offers a set of measures designed to improve the process of integration within the idea of interculturalism:

- pre-departure and pre-arrival measures (developed online tools, for example phone applications, Internet services);

- language integration programs should be provided at the earliest stage possible and access to them should be ensured and promoted as early as possible;

- labor market integration: facilitating validation of skills and recognition of qualifications to ensure that individuals' skills are used to their full potential; promoting and supporting migrant entrepreneurship and funding pilot projects for their dissemination, including through access to existing micro-credit assistance schemes;

- access to adequate and affordable housing and ensuring access to healthcare; training programs for health professionals to upgrade and strengthen the skills and capabilities of first-line health professionals when dealing with foreigners;

- promoting projects of social inclusion (sports and other sections in which immigrants, refugees and local people are involved);

- exchange of ideas and good practices between the member countries.

This is a program and recommendation document since integration of citizens of third countries in the EU belongs to the competences of national states [2]. Interculturalism that relies on local municipal level of integration efforts and targets individuals rather than a group is very different from multiculturalism.

Intercultural dialogue is defined as a “strategy for international cultural relations” [20]. The European Union pours a lot of money into intercultural variety: in 2017-2018, it funded 12 integration projects within the Creative Europe project [1] with the total budget of nearly €1.5 billion. The program covers seven years (2014-2020) and includes educational (Erasmus+) and health protection programs, creation of high-tech workplaces, access to small-business markets, etc. It is intended to improve the quality of life as a whole and social milieu. The European Web Site on Integration regularly informs its audience about intercultural projects across the EU and their realization [14]. Legal immigrants and refugees in the European Union, on the other hand, are still socially unprotected.

Interculturalism French Style: Urban Politics of Our Days

IN FRANCE, social and economic integration of migrants is frequently impeded by administrative and legal barriers and by the social security system, the complexity of which puzzles not only foreigners but also its employees whose duty is to help them. In many cases, newcomers must use legal expert assessment or to go to court to defend their rights. Renewal of residence permit or seeking additional medical aid requires support or even legal instruments. In a broad sense, many migrants of the first or even second generation perceive access to the organizations of common law, to dwelling and employment as “jumping hurdles” [18, p. 133].

Here is what Taieb Ferradji, 53-year-old psychiatrist from Algeria, has to say: “After 24 years in France, I have established the rule: when somebody calls me from Algeria to ask whether he should go to France or not, I invariably answer: Some people are successful, others are not. You must decide yourself. When my friends ask me to help since there is no infrastructure for autistic children in Algeria, I say that medical infrastructure is important, but you should know that in France people are left to their own devices: you are alone when you go to the prefecture, you are alone when you look for a job. Nobody will do this for you. This fact of everyday social isolation is ignored by all potential migrants when they make their decisions” [22].

Here is a story of 38-year-old Essie from Togo, a concierge and a charwoman: “I was 14 when my father sent me to France in expectation that I would go to school. The African family to which I was sent made me a servant to our neighbors. For four years, I remained a slave. Now I work and send money home to Lomé. I live in a room of 8 sq. m with the toilet on the same floor. It costs me €500 a month and nobody at home is interested in my problems. They tell me that in France nobody is starved to death which is true. When I was a child, we survived on dough of corn flour with different dressings. Today, I am 38; I have been living in Paris for 25 years and I have a roof over my head. When I talk to my father, my two sisters and cousins, I know that they keep in mind those of their compatriots who come back from France proud like lords, like the charm of a dream. When I am trying to tell them about my depression, cold and bad dwellings, they start talking about sickle cell anemia, a genetic disease of Africans, of which my 12-year-old cousin died earlier this year” [22].

It should be said that social instability is not only the fate of foreigners and their families. Numerous studies have confirmed that unemployment, anti-sanitary and overcrowded dwellings, no prospects of professional growth, etc. are shared by people of lower social groups.

Back in 2014, under François Holland, 1540 “priority urban quarters”(QPV) [27] were identified. Their total population of 5.5 million consisted mainly of immigrants of the second, third and fourth generations, all of them French citizens. The Law of Lamy that appeared in the same year and laid the foundations of “Le Nouveau programme national de renouvellement urbain” (NPNRU) [25] has already been extended to 2030. It covers the areas with the population of 2 million living in the poorest corners of the country; 200 “quarters of national interest,” 58 of them in the Paris district Ile de France have been already identified. It is planned to spend €5 billion of budget money in ten years and attract €20 billion of local investments to create a “new city” with safe environment, developed infrastructures, good social climate, and 300,000 jobs by drawing people into the process, practicing comprehensive approach to the agglomeration, encouraging private enterprise and private investments, ensuring sustainable development and adequate quality of the environment. In 2016, Observatoire national de la politique de la ville published the following figures: 42.6% of the total population of the “quarters of national interest” is poor with the unemployment level of 25.3% (twice as high as the country’s average) [27].

Emmanuel Macron, in his turn, tried his hand at managing cultural variety at the municipal level. It was on his instruction that former Minister of Urban Politics Jean-Louis Borloo prepared a report “Live Together, Live in a Big Way for National Reconciliation” with a lot of depressing statistics:

- The population of QPV is on average younger than in more prosperous districts; school attendance is twice lower and attendance of preparatory classes three times lower.

- The QPV population is culturally and nationally more varied.

- Access to social services and health protection is limited, there are fewer cultural and entertainment facilities, sport centers and employment agencies; public transportation is less developed.

- The majority (60%) of the apartment blocks are social housing built in the 1970s.

- On the whole, twice as many people feel insecure; three times more people are discriminated against [32].

The author of the report suggested that the local people should be mobilized while 19 programs should be realized to take care of the youngest children, schools, army, health protection, and anti-corruption struggle. Jean-Louis Borloo deemed it necessary to dwell in detail on cultural education, correct perception of and interaction with the culture of the “Other” preached by the European Council: “Better knowledge of the Other is the foundation of an inclusive and coherent society which cements it.... Uncommonness and variety are a chance for our country and its wealth. Education and stakes on future are impossible if this reality is neglected. We should start with the younger generation, otherwise disappointments will heap up; social tension will increase while throwing into bolder relief social, cultural and territorial differences” [32].

For some reason, President Macron rejected Barloo’s plan. Instead, he set up a Presidential Council of Cities and launched a new program of “mobilisation collective” to let all and everyone “obtain his/her dignity in all corners of the Republic” [13]. He suggested that by 2020 the number of police personnel would be increased in 60 districts; a “society of vigilance” would be built up to reduce the terrorist threat and drug trafficking to the minimum; 300,000 places of on-the-job training for young specialists would be created; until 2021, the biggest French companies would be reviewed to make sure that they did not practice discrimination when hiring workers [13]. This means that the social-cultural factor of integration is pushed aside to concentrate on economy and security.

It is too early to assess this strategic prospect as successful. The president spent several months moving across the country and explaining his ideas to mayors. Meanwhile, new refugees were waiting (and still wait) approval of their asylum applications. This means that while the procedure goes on in a “normal order” that takes eight months, these “Others” should be somehow integrated.

At the practical level, some of the French state structures are following European institutions. In May 2017, OFII together with AfpA launched a program Lodging, Orientation, Course at Employment (HOPE) to facilitate integration through learning new skills. Today, the program works in 31 AfpA centers in 12 regions [11] and has already served 1,000 refugees. They live there free of charge, can rely on administrative, medical, social and legal assistance and are paid €300-400 a month. In the evenings and on days off, they are invited to attend theater master-classes, visit bowling allies and sports events. In 2017, 71% of the participants in the program realized in Ile de France and Hauts-de-France

got certificates; 62% had already been employed by the time of graduation [16]. In August 2018, OFII opened a telephone hot line in different languages to help immigrants and refugees. By March 18, 2019, it has been used 397 times by people of 39 nationalities; 16% of them were Afghans, 8%, people from Mali; 8%, citizens of Cote d'Ivoire; 7% from Bangladesh, the similar number from Guinea, 6% were from Pakistan [2].

Conclusion

TODAY, France is engaged in the migration policy of assimilation; it pays special attention to selective immigration and does not hesitate to deport unwelcome social elements. President Macron, a populist politician, claims the role of the EU leader in migration issues. On March 4, 2019, he addressed the EU citizens with an open letter in which he spoke of migration as a challenge to European civilization: "On the issue of migration, I believe in a Europe that protects both its values and its borders" [29] and "We therefore need to rethink the Schengen area." It takes no wisdom to guess that this would resurface as a one of the central points in the context of the migration issue at the June meeting of the European Council.

On the one hand, French are not ready to "start loving migrants as their neighbors"; this was amply confirmed by nationwide condemnation of the draft "La grand nation: pour une société inclusive" prepared by President Olland's adviser Thierry Tuot who suggested, among other things, that all illegal migrants should be legalized, the procedure of citizenship simplified and public prayers permitted [23]. This proved to be too revolutionary. On the other hand, statistics of international marriages says the opposite: nearly one out of three marriages in France is concluded with foreigners, mainly migrants from the Maghreb [9]. Interculturalism is expected to resolve this contradiction in favor of socially preferable coexistence.

Despite continued academic debates about the place of this concept in the integration policies of contemporary Europe [10], we can say that the practice of interculturalism is acquiring more or less clear outlines. Its first steps testify that in adequate infrastructures and adequate management of cultural variety the ideas of interculturalism demonstrate their efficiency. Intercultural approach obviously demands a culturally neutral legal and institutionalized basis as well as institutionalized structures to actively support and encourage the intercultural dialogue. The system of

state structures should take into account the specific requirements of those who represent the cultures of “Others” to avoid their unjustified removal from the life of society as a whole and from the intercultural dialogue, in particular.

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The New Frontier of Japan's Economic Diplomacy

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Key words: Japan, foreign policy, economic diplomacy, world economy, G-20.

ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY as a phenomenon of international life has been attracting numerous analysts as it unfolds against the background of the rapidly changing situation in the world economy and practices of individual countries that suggest their own interpretations and create new instruments.

Conceptual Clothing

FOR DECADES that have passed since its economic miracle, Japan was and remains for many countries, in East Asia in the first place, an example to be followed. Today, improved methods and instruments of economic diplomacy are associated with Japan's quest for a new global role. From the mid-20th century onwards, socio-political discussion has been concentrating on identifying national interests and state strategy as the initial basic elements. Despite the widespread opinion that for a long time Japan lacked comprehensive state strategies,¹ the country's leaders formulated strategic aims and achieved them. Indeed, in the postwar years, Japan not only revived its economy – it has caught up with the economic development level of the West.

In the 1950s, limited in the use of military-political instruments, Japan staked on economic diplomacy to address foreign policy and national security issues, its allied relations with the United States being one of the advantages. Tokyo's postwar economic diplomacy was carried out within the so-called Yoshida Doctrine²: accelerated economic development and a military-political alliance with the United States coupled

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with considerably lower military spending. In the 1990s, China's fast economic growth and America's changing role in Asia forced Japan to reassess its global and regional positions. Later, the basic approaches to economic diplomacy were likewise revised.

In 2011, Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara³ in his program speech proclaimed economic diplomacy the main trend of Japan's foreign policy. Later, this definition appeared in the Diplomatic Bluebook.⁴

Japan looks at international trade liberalization as an element of a broader policy of building up geostrategic architecture in which the "Chinese factor" figures prominently.

Looking for Points of Growth

IN THE 2010S, economic problems became superimposed on the psychological shock caused by the loss, for the first time in about 40 years, of the world's second place by GDP. According to the World Bank, in 2011-2017, Japan was growing by mere 2%. Observers explained the key factors of economic risks by the lower birthrate and population ageing that led to lower purchasing power, contracted market and shortage of workforce. In searching the government for points of growth, the government had to look outside the country. It became signally important to attract foreign investors and highly qualified specialists from other countries and encourage tourism. At the same time, Japan's leaders optimized their approaches to the traditional priorities – liberalization of international trade and protection of business interests.

Liberalization of International Trade

LIBERALIZATION of international trade is a permanent priority of Tokyo's economic diplomacy. Japan explains its revival as a big economic power by its skills to extract advantages from the "free and open" global economic system that took shape under the leading role of GATT/WTO.⁵ On the other hand, protection of the free trade principles goes deeper into the history of Japan's foreign policy than its WTO membership.⁶

Between the latter half of the 1960s and the mid-1980s, economic growth was ensured by export to the extent that Japan's active policy on foreign markets caused after a while disagreements with its key partners.

In 1965, Japanese export to the United States outstripped its import for the first time. Starting with the mid-1970s, the negative credit balance in bilateral trade became Washington's worst problem in its relations with the Asian ally. It was at that time that Japan was confronted by protectionist efforts of its partners in the capitalist camp.

Very much in line with the "comprehensive security" doctrine of the first half of the 1980s that concentrated on economy and trying to somewhat defuse the tension in trade and investment relations with its partners, Japan took certain measures to weaken its protectionist zeal. It liberalized its market on its own free will and kept its export at a fixed level.⁷ In the final analysis, this helped Japanese economic operators retain their favorable positions on foreign markets.

An active involvement in formulating norms and rules of multisided trade regulation is one of the pillars of Japan's economic diplomacy. Gradual resurrection of trade wars forced Tokyo to insist on the central role of WTO as a world trade regulator and to support the idea of its reforms. On the key WTO-related issues Japan sides with the European Union and the United States: It acts as a proponent of the market system American style that makes "mutually advantageous" trade possible.

While talking about the need to correct the current imbalances, Tokyo, being one of the Three, is opposed to industrial subsidies responsible for creation of excessive production facilities in the fast developing countries. Tokyo criticizes "non-market approaches" in economic policies, support of state companies and forced transfer of technologies through joint ventures. Observers suspect that what the Three says about reforms of the WTO is spearheaded against China.

The G-7 and G-20 formats, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are actively involved in liberalization of world trade.⁸

Starting with the early 1990s, WTO has been in fact promoting regionalization of world trade.⁹ The AP countries, Japan among them, enthusiastically supported this trend. They deepened regional integration and transferred it into trans-regional forms. Tokyo spares no effort to simplify access to the markets of other countries through free trade agreements (FTA) and economic partnership (EPA). It has bilateral FTA/EPA with 14 countries¹⁰ and two associations (ASEAN and the EU). It is involved in the talks within the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as well as with Columbia and Turkey and in a tripartite format Japan-China-South Korea.

TPP-11 and an Agreement With the EU

JAPAN looks at international trade liberalization as an element of a broader policy of building up geostrategic architecture in which the “Chinese factor” traditionally figures prominently. Strongly motivated by competition with China, the Japanese government is actively involved in setting up trade and economic blocs. In this context, the evolution of Japan’s official position on the country’s participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership initiated by the United States deserves special mention.

The initially cautious approaches of the Japanese political and business communities to the talks gradually developed into an awareness that the country should be involved in formulating new rules of trans-regional trade. In January 2017, when Trump’s administration withdrew from the agreement, Tokyo, mainly persuaded by its partners, Chile in the first place, played the leading role in the preparation of the agreement of 11 countries (TPP-11). The text was promptly coordinated¹¹ and signed in March 2018. This agreement¹² created one of the biggest free trade zones responsible for about 15% of the total volume of world trade with the capacious market of 500 million people. The TPP-11 countries account for about 13% of the world’s GDP. The document envisages zeroing of customs dues by 99% of all tariffs on industrial goods of the countries involved. Today, the norms and rules within TPP-11 are presented as “international standards.”

Protectionist sentiments in the Trump administration pushed Japan and the EU toward a hastily concluded EPA agreement, the talks on which had been going on from 2013. The agreements signed in June 2018¹³ were approved by the Japanese business circles in expectation of chances for small and medium enterprises to export their products to European countries because of liquidation of customs dues on the bigger part of products of agriculture, forestry and fishing.¹⁴

Promoting International Development

TRADITIONALLY, Official Development Assistance (ODA), technical assistance and free grants to foreign states is one of Japan’s most important foreign policy instruments. In the 2010s, ODA became part of Tokyo’s economic diplomacy that added another aspect to its foreign policies, first as an economic means of upgrading its profile and widening its presence on the world scene and, second, as a means of promoting

Japan's economic interests outside its borders. At the same time, Japan lost its monopoly in this sphere in Asia since there appeared its dynamic rivals: China, India and the Republic of Korea. This explains, among other things, the course at optimization of the ODA budget since the 2000s.

Business Interests Abroad

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY of Japan has admitted that previously the government was fairly passive when it came to support to private businesses.¹⁵ Today, Tokyo uses all available instruments, including ODA, to promote the interests of Japanese businesses abroad. The state organizations operating outside the Japanese borders are instructed to support Japanese companies. Diplomatic assistance to private companies is increasing¹⁶: the number of applications rose from 20 thousand in 2013 to 46 thousand in 2016. The number of Japanese firms working abroad is growing by the year.¹⁷ In 2017, there were 75.5 thousand of them¹⁸ operating mainly in China (43% of the total), in the United States (11%) and in India (6.4%).

From 2015 on, practically all Japanese embassies and consulates general have been using a single-window system which stipulates that private businesses are consulted in coordination with other interested ministries and specialized organizations, such as the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), the Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI), and the Japanese Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC). The Ministry of Economics, Trade and Industry plays the key role in Japan's trade and investment policy. JETRO set up in 1958 realizes this policy inside and outside the country; it has 74 representatives in 54 countries and 46 offices inside the country.¹⁹

Indo-Pacific Strategy

IN AUGUST 2016, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe revived the strategy of "free and open Indo-Pacific"²⁰ built around the idea of the "rules-based international order" in the space of two oceans. Approved by the Trump administration, the term Indo-Pacific Region²¹ and the corresponding concept were further developed in the foreign policy discourse of Japan, the United States, Australia, and India. This strategy was adopted as the

White House, having revised the conceptual framework to discard President Obama's legacy, created a new ideological foundation of America's policy in Asia.²²

Russian analysts have correctly pointed out that this concept is rooted in the closely intertwined economic, international-political and military processes.²³ The idea of a "quadrangle" – the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India—designed to check China's military progress in the region is the concept's most typical outcrop. Externally, the Indo-Pacific strategy looks like an attempt to set two Asian giants – India which, as the West sees it, shares its "democratic values," and China developing according to its own highly specific political and economic model – against one another.

As the concept is specified by Washington and Canberra and accepted by New Delhi, Europe and certain capitals of Southeast Asia as well as by small island states of the Pacific, Tokyo readjusts the traditional instruments of economic diplomacy (ODA being one of them) and the comparatively recent ones, in particular, creation of "quality infrastructure," to the realization of its own Indo-Pacific idea. It should be said that as soon as the TPP-11 came into force, the Japanese concept was supplemented with the principles of "free and fair" trade.

Quality Infrastructure

TRADITIONALLY, promotion of infrastructural projects abroad receives a lot of attention. In view of the growing demand for infrastructure in the world, in the rapidly developing countries in the first place, Japan stakes on export of infrastructural systems. According to information supplied by the government, between 2010 and 2014, the total volume of orders nearly doubled, from 10 to 19 trillion JPY.²⁴ In 2011, the embassies and consulates general of Japan were reinforced by officers for communication on infrastructural projects to support the private sector involved in them. In December 2017, 192 Japanese diplomats in 72 countries performed these functions.

In 2017, Tokyo revised the recommendations and principles of promotion of infrastructural projects in line with the Indo-Pacific strategy.²⁵ From that time on, the concept was spread to the institutionalized interconnection and people exchanges inside and between the regions of Asia, the Middle East and Africa by developing "quality infrastructure" that corresponded to the "international standards."

The changes of the Japanese position on China's One Belt One Road

(OBOR) concept (perceived at first as a challenge) look highly indicative. Against the background of developing relations with the People's Republic of China in 2017-2019 and in view of the messages of the Japanese big business that did not want to be left out in the cold if the country moved away from Chinese projects in third countries under political pretexts, the government changed its position.

In October 2018, during the visit of Shinzo Abe to China, it was decided after the talks with Chairman Xi Jinping that Japan should be more cooperative in joint efforts for the sake of international development. The sides set up the Committee for the Promotion of Japan-China Business Cooperation in Third Countries and a corresponding Forum. The first consultations on joint realization of infrastructural projects in third countries took place in Beijing in April 2019 within the fifth meeting of the Japan-China High-Level Economic Dialogue.

This flexibility suggested, on the one side, that the Japanese government wanted to be aware of Beijing's OBOR plans and, on the other, it wanted to be engaged in the projects and countries of strategic importance for Tokyo, in particular, in construction of high-speed railways in India, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines and port facilities in East Africa and Sri Lanka.

The Energy Track

THE POWER PRODUCTION sector is one of the priorities of Japan's economic diplomacy. In 2016, fossil fuels – oil, natural gas and coal – accounted for 80% of its energy balance.²⁶ According to Western researchers, this and the need to ensure sustained and secure supplies of energy resources determined the Japanese government's desire to consolidate its interaction with the resource-rich, mainly developing countries through closer economic relations with them.²⁷

After the large-scale catastrophe caused by natural (an earthquake and tsunami) and technological factors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant on March 11, 2011, all other nuclear plants were closed while the share of fossil fuels in the country's power balance increased from 65 to 85%.²⁸ The country started importing much more liquefied natural gas (LNG), as well as crude oil mainly from the Middle East (over 80% of the total).

According to the International Energy Agency, the level of Japan's energy self-sufficiency is one of the lowest in the OECD²⁹; in 2016, it

was 8.3%. The country is highly vulnerable in this respect; it depends on external markets and the international political situation. The government treats sustainable supplies of energy resources for reasonable prices as a priority and takes all necessary measures including planning.³⁰ It stimulates greater oil and gas market supply and lower prices, in part by involving its companies in extracting energy resources all over the world.

Japan's strategy of international energy security is based on its conviction that the interdependence between the producer and importer countries should deepen. Tokyo postulates that trade and investments in the energy sphere should be free to ensure consistent access to the market for the importer countries³¹ and insists on this in all corresponding international structures. Japanese diplomats in 53 countries gather necessary information, analyze the needs of the producer countries and assess the spheres of closer bilateral relations.³²

Japan maintains traditionally close relations with the Middle East, with the Gulf countries in the first place, and North Africa (MENA). In August 2017, when Taro Kono with good personal contacts in the MENA countries was appointed Foreign Minister of Japan, "Gulf diplomacy" was moved to the fore in Japanese foreign policy. Tokyo invariably presents itself as a neutral player in the region; after the diplomatic crisis around Qatar, it has balanced out its relations with the members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (CCASG).

For basically the same reasons, Tokyo strives to widen its involvement in the energy projects in northern latitudes, including the present and future gas projects in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation. While planning its move to the Arctic, Japan keeps an eye on China's accelerated progress in the same region. In October 2018, Taro Kono, Foreign Minister of Japan, attended for the first time the Arctic Circle Conference in Reykjavík where he said that his country intended to promote the development of the sector of energy resources in the Arctic in cooperation with Russia. He deemed it necessary to stress that in September 2018 the sides had signed the Memorandum on Mutual Understanding between PAO NOVATEK and the Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) that paved the way toward realization of cooperation within the Yamal-LNG and Arctic LNG-2.³³

Export of Peaceful Atom Technologies

AFTER 2011, export of nuclear technologies ran into big problems

caused by the loss of competitiveness in prices because of introduction of the so-called post-Fukushima technologies of higher security. The government of Shinzo Abe looked at the practically frozen branch of nuclear power production as one of the promising elements of economic diplomacy and an economic growth driver. In 2018, it was decided to support the exporters working in the nuclear power production sphere with revived credit lines to JBIC and NEXI.³⁴ This, however, proved to be less efficient than expected and did not improve Japan's positions on the world market of peaceful nuclear technologies.

The much higher costs of nuclear power stations made them unprofitable. In 2018-2019, Mitsubishi in Turkey and Hitachi in the UK left their projects. Earlier, Toshiba had left the nuclear power branch of the United States.³⁵ Local analysts concluded that the loss of all contracts on building nuclear power stations abroad pushed the strategy of official Tokyo in the sphere of export of nuclear technologies to the brink of a fiasco.

Agriculture

THE FOREIGN POLICY SERVICE has set itself the task to widen exports of products of agriculture, forestry and fishing by 20% – from 800 billion JPY in 2017 to 1 trillion JPY (about \$8.8 billion)³⁶ in 2019. Diplomats in 54 countries are working to achieve these aims while their efforts are limited by the restrictions on the export of agricultural products from the zones affected by the nuclear disaster of 2011 that some countries introduced at the time and have not yet lifted. Japanese diplomats are proud of the fact that due to their efforts through bilateral channels and the WTO some of the countries, especially Russia, the U.S. and the EU members, have partially lifted the bans³⁷ and 27 countries removed them altogether.

Tokyo's trade policy in agriculture is one the cornerstones within the PTA/EPA negotiation formats with foreign partners. Having concluded a TPP-11 and EPA with the European Union, Japan removed or considerably lowered customs dues on the overwhelming number of products of agriculture, forestry and fishing. According to the published figures, the amount of agricultural products from the United States sold in Japan dropped considerably (in one year, the amount of meat products from the U.S. sold in Japan dropped by 14%) while supplies from Canada and the EU increased.³⁸ At the same time, Tokyo carefully avoids any disagree-

ments with the United States when it comes to agricultural issues within the WTO and other institutions and, very much as usual, tunes up a constructive dialogue with Washington.

The Country's Image as an Asset

A POSITIVE IMAGE of the country (“image making”)³⁹ can be described as a new trend of economic diplomacy. The recent trends have demonstrated that today Tokyo pays a lot of attention to the economic aspects of the country's image to attract investments and tourists. Much is done to promote the brand “Japan” that rests on “three whales” of human resources, technologies and culture.

It is expected that by increasing the attractiveness of its regions Japan will attract more foreign tourists and more investments. Japan's Foreign Ministry has joined the effort by presenting positive images of the Japanese prefectures to diplomatic corps and foreign firms. In 2017, it launched a project called the Japan House with three Japanese centers – in Los Angeles, London and São Paulo – to disseminate information about and stir up interest in culture, traditions, politics and other aspects of the Land of the Rising Sun.

Foreign Tourism

TOKYO Looks at tourism as one of the pillars of the country's economic welfare. In 2008, the Japanese Tourist Agency (JTA) was set up; relevant laws are consistently improved⁴⁰; medical tourism is encouraged; much is done to modernize the transport infrastructure while the visa-related procedures are simplified.

The image of Japan and its tourist attraction were seriously damaged by the natural and technological disaster of 2011. The affected regions are gradually returning to normal life; there are tasks set to restore confidence in Japanese goods and persuade foreign partners that tourism is safe. The total number of tourists dropped radically: in 2011, Japan received 6.22 million foreign tourists, a drop by nearly 30% against the previous year.

Persistent efforts, however, revived the tourist branch: starting with 2013, every year the number of foreign tourists consistently reaches historical maximums. According to JTA, in 2018, the country received about 31.2 million foreigners, an increase of 9% against the previous year; they

spent the record amount of 4.5 trillion JPY (about \$40 billion),⁴¹ four times more than in 2012.

Experts explain this by the simplified visa procedures for China, Thailand and the Philippines introduced in 2013, a much bigger number of budget airlines in Asia and devaluation of the Yen. According to the World Tourist Organization (UNWTO), in 2017, Japan was the 12th in the list of tourist attractions leaving behind Vietnam, Chile and Thailand. The Abe administration has set itself the task to increase the flow of foreign tourists to 40 million by 2020 and to 60 million by 2030. In view of several large international events – the 2019 world rowing championship, 2020 Summer Olympic Games and EXPO-2025 – the goals look achievable.⁴²

Chairmanship of G-20

THERE is an expert opinion that G-20 is the most efficient format of multilateral cooperation of the leading world economies dealing with the wide range of global financial, social and economic issues. Japanese chairmanship in 2019 looks like a chance to consolidate the country's positions in the key spheres of foreign economic activities and its leading role in promoting the world trade and economic agenda.

The following can be described as the priority agenda of Japanese government: economic growth and sustainable development through the implementation of Agenda-2030, international trade, WTO reform, environmental protection, digital economy, investments in high-quality infrastructure, ageing population, greater role for women, realization of the Society 5.0 conception through the symbiosis of physical and virtual spaces, including digitalization of production processes, development of artificial intellect, big data, and high-speed internet 5G.

Tokyo expects that at the G-20 Summit in Osaka on June 28-29, 2019 the key trends of the format would acquire a “political impulse.” Abe's administration is determined to make a symbolic start of several initiatives in digitalizing economics and data management, struggle against plastic pollution of the World Ocean, promotion of R&D in clean power production, and extend the mandate of the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity.

New Trends

PLANS of the Japanese establishment to create an organ responsible for national strategy in economic diplomacy and security are one of the

recent trends. In March 2019, a group of deputies of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) suggested to the cabinet of ministers to set up a government agency to coordinate internal and external economic policy patterned on the U.S. National Economic Council (NEC) and entrusted with strategic planning in economy, foreign policy and security.⁴³

The Liberal Democratic Party explained its initiative by the need to protect the interests of national companies amid trade and economic wars raging in the world, China's widening influence in internal affairs of third countries through the OBOR project, deeper disagreements between China and the United States in the sphere of high technologies and the rising threats in cyberspace. It was pointed out that the approaches of Japanese economic departments in the context of the American-Japan trade talks launched in April 2019 should be coordinated.

Observers have pointed out that the new approaches formulated by the ruling class were a strategic answer to the "aggressive" foreign economic policy of China promoted by the centralized state.⁴⁴ The deputies are convinced that to improve Japan's foreign economic activities both the government and private sector should revise their approaches.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

IN THE LAST THREE-QUARTERS of a century, Japan's economic diplomacy developed and was institutionalized to become a major trend of its foreign policy. In the 2010s, Tokyo, guided by the patterns created by the Abe administration, abandoned the postwar syndrome, moved away from the lightly armed trade nation concept of Shigeru Yoshida in order to become a "normal state" with an adequate army. Today, Japan claims the leading role in the efforts to protect the world order based on the rules by which its free trade and unhampered marine and air navigation are meant.

In search for a global place, the political establishment stakes on economic diplomacy; it has formulated the tasks of moving to the leading positions when international standards in trade and investments and quality infrastructure have been realized. An active involvement in the practical sphere is seen as the starting point for wider political influence in the world.

By summing up, we can say that among the instruments of economic diplomacy there are traditional means: liberalization of international

trade, official assistance, energy security, and protection of the agricultural sector. New, including not yet tested, instruments are also used, viz. the country's positive image and infrastructural projects abroad. The government together with big business intends to set up a center for coordination of foreign economic activities.

Economic diplomacy has found its place among Russia's foreign policy priorities. In the 2010s, according to the Executive Order on Measures to Implement the Russian Federation Foreign Policy, Russia's diplomatic service acquired weighty economic components very much needed to upgrade national well-being, realize comprehensive modernization of economy that should become innovational, to "promote and protect the Russian business interests in international markets."⁴⁵ In all these respects, Japan's experience may prove useful.

NOTES

¹ According to Yasukhiro Nakasone, prominent state figure and former prime minister of Japan, an absence of state strategy is a traditional fault of Japan's internal and external policy. For more detail, see: Nakasone Ya. *Gosudarstvennaya strategiya Yaponii v XXI veke* / Translated from Japanese. Moscow: NOTA BENE, 2001. Chapter I, pp. 19-46.

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³ In January 2011, at the 177th session of the Parliament, Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara presented the main trends of Japan's foreign policy, including economic diplomacy.

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⁵ Speech of S. Takei, Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the symposium on economic diplomacy, 24.03.2017 // Official Site of the Foreign Ministry of Japan // https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ecm/ec/page24_000859.html (accessed: 15.08.2018)

⁶ Japan has been member of the WTO from its first day, January 1, 1995.

⁷ Verbitskiy S.I. *Yaponia v poiskakh novoy roli v mirovoy politike*. Moscow: Nauka, 1992, p. 130.

⁸ Japan has been member of the OECD since April 28, 1964.

⁹ GATT identifies and, in fact, legalizes two types of treaties aimed at "closer integration between the economies of the countries-parties to such agreements" (Art. XXIV, point. 4, GATT): Customs Unions and Free Trade Zones. The Agreement does not prevent more perfect forms of economic integration. For more detail, see Carreau D., Juillard P. *Mezhdunarodnoe ekonomicheskoe pravo*. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, 2001, pp. 237-238.

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¹¹ Speech of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the W-20 summit and the fifth forum of the

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¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ Official Site of the Foreign Ministry of Japan // https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press4_006071.html (accessed: 25.03.2016)

¹⁸ Ibidem

¹⁹ Official Site of JETRO // <https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/jetro/> (accessed: 10.07.2018)

²⁰ Speech of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the TICAD-VI summit in Nairobi, 27.08.2016 // Official Site of the Foreign Ministry of Japan // https://www.mofa.go.jp/af/af2/page4e_000496.html (accessed: 12.03.2018)

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²² In May 2018, for example, United States Pacific Command (PACOM) was renamed United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM).

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Islamic State's Use of Information as a Terrorism Tactic

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Key words: Islamic State (IS), caliphate, information and communications technology (ICT), terrorism, propaganda, social networking.

ISLAMIC STATE (IS, an organization banned in Russia and also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL) became an actor in world politics quite recently but showed its nature as a threat to international peace and security as soon as it came onto the global political scene. Some scholars, among them Jessica Stern, J.M. Berger,¹ Georgy Mirsky,² Stephen Walt,³ and Alexey Volynets,⁴ see IS as a state-like entity because it does possess (although the past tense would be more appropriate) basic characteristics of a state – it controls a populated territory, has a government system similar to that of any modern state, and maintains relations of some kind with other states.

Yekaterina Stepanova, a researcher specializing in terrorism and violent extremism, believes that IS largely owes its emergence to the indignation of Iraqi Sunnis at their increasing political, social and economic marginalization and at their persecution by the government.⁵ At the same time, according to intelligence reports, there are thousands of nationals of European countries among IS fighters.

French citizens make up the largest European group in IS – they number nearly a thousand.⁶ The fact that, besides marginal elements of Muslim society, the IS's ranks include well-educated people, some of whom come from the West, means that the organization has a solid ideological foundation. In terms of information policy, IS may compete successfully with many countries with highly sophisticated media systems.

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This article is an attempt to analyze what information and communications technologies (ICTs) are used by IS to disseminate its ideology and what are the principles underlying its information policy.

The main premises of IS's ideology are the goal of creating a world-wide caliphate, a state dominated by the pure, righteous, genuine Islam of ancestral times, and the duty of fighting "infidels" – all those who try to prevent the creation of the caliphate. There is nothing new about this – al-Qaeda and other organizations had proclaimed a caliphate as their goal before IS came into being. But IS is more advanced technically – it employs ICT to recruit new members. In its propaganda, IS uses quite simple methods that are essentially no different from those of other terrorist organizations, but it makes much more effective use of them than practically any of the other groups.

Charlie Winter of London-based think tank Quilliam, which focuses on the study of extremism, argues that IS propaganda is based on what he calls "six themes of Islamic State's brand" – brutality, mercy, victimhood, war, belonging, and utopianism.⁷ IS shows off its brutality and militancy, which makes the organization different from other terrorist groups. It uses videos, for example, to publicly report its crimes. Its videos are professional in standard and clearly based on Hollywood techniques. They are made by experienced directors and designers – their general quality makes this obvious. Visual effects are used such as filming at various angles with cameras installed on drones. Some of the videos were terrifying, for example showing executions or the destruction of historic monuments in Palmyra,⁸ and were obviously meant to send messages to enemies of IS and remind them of the organization's power.

On the other hand, mercy and justice are frequent themes in IS media. A video entitled "From the Darkness to the Light"⁹ shows fighters from Jabhat al-Nuṣra, the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian Arab Army, all of whom are said to be former sworn enemies of IS, being pardoned and allowed to join IS. Another video contains footage of havoc, including dying children, wrought by a coalition air raid, and then shows a Jordanian pilot being burned alive as punishment.¹⁰

Much of IS's media content carries the message that it is the duty of every true Muslim to join IS¹¹ and take part in its jihad, a war that is a manifestation of sacred wrath and a path to a more just world order.¹² Play on contrast, the simple idea that revenge is a way to social justice, and religious reasoning have combined to become a simple and affordable means of winning the hearts and minds of millions of Internet users.

IS exploits every opportunity offered by the Internet to enlarge its audience. It has set up a centralized and versatile media system,¹³ which comprises the following elements:

- the al-Furqan Institute for Media Production, IS's chief media outlet;

- the al-I'tisam Media Foundation, a video studio;

- the al-Hayat Media Center, the media wing targeting European audiences; its content included the online radicalization and recruitment magazine *Dabiq*, which was replaced by another magazine, *Rumiyah*, in 2016;

- the al-Ajnad Foundation for Media Production, a foundation for the audio recording of nasheeds (Islamic works of vocal music), recitations of the Koran, and soundtracks;

- Furat Media, the media outlet mainly targeting Russia, former Soviet republics of Central Asia, and Southeast Asia.

Islamic State is itself a very apt choice of name: the words "Islam" and "state" are popular Internet search terms, and so information about IS is generally quite easy to find. Besides, IS has designed a hashtag system that helps find a Twitter account or post.

It normally hashtags the Arabic words and phrases *khilafah* ("caliphate"), *dawla islamiyya* ("islamic state"), *jund al-khilafah* ("soldiers of the caliphate"), *shabakat al-jihad al-alamiiyi* ("global jihad network"), and the names of jihadist websites, for instance *A'maq Ikhbariyya* ("Depth of Information") or *Ansar al-Mujahideen* ("Followers of Fighters"). Quite often, modifying Arabic words are added to key hashtagged words to make it harder for governments to find and block IS accounts.

IS is the first terrorist organization to make extensive use of social networking and messaging services such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Telegram.¹⁴ Social networking sites are becoming the most accessible and efficient channels for information targeting young people, for whom they often replace all official sources of information. IS speaks to a tremendous range of Internet users through social networking sites.

The main premises of IS's ideology are the goal of creating a worldwide caliphate, a state dominated by the pure, righteous, genuine Islam of ancestral times, and the duty of fighting "infidels" – all those who try to prevent the creation of the caliphate.

This audience includes women and children, whom IS tries to use as propaganda vehicles. It has a strategy for the recruitment of women: it looks for gullible or disgruntled women, for instance some who haven't been able to find love, and promises them a better future if they join IS. This is the typical way it works: a woman's account on a networking site is analyzed and after that she receives a friendly request from a man who appears to meet her preferences; after a few psychologically charged messages from this man, who turns out to be a member of IS, she has a marriage proposal from him with a promise of a new life with this "man of her dreams."

IS has also used social networking and messaging services to promptly report its successes. Quite often, key mainstream media groups have looked for such reports in monitoring the organization's activities. Blocking IS networking site accounts doesn't achieve much because blocked accounts resurface on the Internet under new names.

It isn't clear how many accounts are held by IS members. Different sources publish different statistics. According to one publication of the U.S. Department of Defense, about 6,000 IS members have Twitter accounts. At the same time, a joint White Paper of the Department of Defense and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff puts the number of IS users of Twitter at about 46,000.¹⁵ IS members are afraid to use Facebook and Instagram because of account security issues and prefer encryption to protect their correspondence and personal data.¹⁶

IS also sets up television channels, radio stations and PDF magazines.¹⁷ It uses multiple hostings and websites to make its content more difficult to trace and destroy. It has set up its own radio station, al-Bayan ("announcement" or "declaration"), and a satellite television channel besides the above-mentioned Al-Hayat Media Center and A'maq Ikhbariyya website; it has also created its own Android apps.

Its television programs report recent terrorist attacks and the situation on battle sites, and show executions, demonstrations and attacks on enemies of Islamists. There are IS websites that show fragments from popular films or video games where original characters are replaced with IS militants. For instance, IS has released a composition of extremely brutal fragments from the game Grand Theft Auto V and videos showing fragments of the Game of Thrones television series.

The *Dabiq* magazine was a key communication platform for Islamists worldwide. The title was a reference to a historic battle in the Dabiq Plain near Aleppo in 1516 that was won by the Ottoman Empire and enabled

the latter to conquer much of the Middle East, including Syria, and consolidate its power.¹⁸ *Dabiq* was a kind of tabloid with comic strips, catchy headlines and brief articles containing various caliphate-related appeals and slogans. There were little amounts of text supplied with photos showing recent IS achievements.

Yet another instrument of IS propaganda are nasheeds – male-performed songs aiming to win support and intimidate enemies.¹⁹ Nasheeds reflect key points of IS propaganda – the weakness of today's Islam, the humiliated status of ordinary people, the heroism of IS fighters, and the jihad as the only possible path. Nasheeds have a hypnotic effect.²⁰ Although the majority are in Arabic, there have been some in Russian, English, German, and Chinese,²¹ obviously because there are Muslim minorities in Russia, English- and German-speaking countries, and China.

In China, there is a Muslim community in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The North Caucasus is home to the largest Muslim community of Russia. The languages IS has been publishing its propaganda posters in include Japanese – the organization is apparently aware of the innovative use of chemical weapons by some Japanese religious sects.

The IS's methods of online information in Russia deserve special mention. Russia was one of the first countries to declare IS to be a threat to its national security and warned that for this reason it would take part in the civil war in Syria. Intensive Russian air strikes against militants in Syria have forced IS to scale down its online information activity. However, IS said that it would open a branch in Russia's North Caucasus and set about organizing propaganda among Russians.

On VK, Russia's largest social networking service, IS has organized a news group called Islamic State News and a group called ShamToday. IS leaders have opened their pages on VK. The IS groups on VK have been increasingly popular ever since their emergence. By 2015, ShamToday, for example, numbered more than 12,000 users,²² who were urged "not to leave their brothers in the lurch" and go to Syria or Iraq to join in the jihad and make donations to IS through the Qiwi payment service. As a result, Russia shared the fate of the EU in being a target of IS terrorism. In April 2017, an IS militant who was an immigrant from Uzbekistan blew up a bomb in the St. Petersburg subway. Russia is not an exception to IS's women recruitment geography either.

Some analysts²³ argue that anti-IS action may become an internation-

al unification factor, that it may, for instance, result in the improvement of Russian-American relations, which have soured in recent years.

However, Russia and the United States have different definition criteria for terrorism in general and obviously have different goals to pursue in fighting IS. Russian political scientist Fyodor Lukyanov points out that in 2015 France's increasingly popular National Front, which changed its name to National Rally in 2018, wasn't invited to join in a mass demonstration in Paris that followed the January 2015 deadly terrorist raid on the headquarters of satirical magazine *Charlie Hebdo*. Sidelining the National Front by the demonstration's chief organizer, the Socialist Party, meant the latter was putting its own agenda above interests of public unity, Lukyanov argues.²⁴ Since Russia and the United States obviously don't have the same reason for fighting IS, it is unlikely that key world powers will carry out a consolidated strike against the organization any time soon.

There is one more potential weapon against IS – ideology, or in fact anything that Joseph S. Nye terms soft power. In one of his books, Nye argues that young people brought up in the spirit of Western values would be less likely to embrace terrorist ideas.²⁵

But once again practice made fun of theory: IS has proven that it can use practically any soft power channel no less effectively than any government. Extremist ideologies have turned out to be as attractive to the rich as they are to the poor. It is also obvious that higher education is not normally an obstacle to the adoption of extremist views.²⁶ The main reason why IS propaganda works so well is that it promises satisfaction of basic human needs and instincts, whose nature is hard to change.

Coercive methods alone are powerless to do away with terrorism, as the history of Russia, where a century ago terrorism achieved its key objective of changing the political system, makes clear. Anti-IS action should be a combination of prohibitive measures, the monitoring and blocking of IS online activities, and mechanisms to prevent ethnic and religious strife.

If one looks for examples of mechanisms to ensure ethnic and religious harmony, it is Singapore that springs to mind. Singapore is often mentioned in studies of rapid economic growth. Religious and ethnic clashes could have destabilized the political situation and hinder economic reforms in Singapore, and so its first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, launched a strategy to prevent them. This strategy includes measures to cut short any incitement to religious or ethnic conflicts. It is

Islamic organizations that are vested with responsibility for the prevention of religious extremism in Singapore. They receive support from the state and there is a body that presides over the country's Muslim community and is called the Islamic Religious Council, but imams would face expulsion abroad and a large fine for any departure from moderate Islam.

Let us sum up. Despite territorial losses, depleted military resources, and a weakened administrative system, IS remains in a position to produce and publish large amounts of diversified media content and vastly enlarge its audience. IS's recruitment of nationals of European countries has ceased to be a surprising fact in recent years. IS has developed an ICT-based worldwide recruitment system.

IS has an effective propaganda strategy with simple and clear messages that address people's natural feelings and instincts. Although all key world powers try to counter this propaganda and have the overall goal of destroying IS, in practice they take no steps to unite in combating the organization. Each country has to rely on its own logistical resources and its own media in counterterrorism action.

NOTES

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Modern Instruments of “Digital Diplomacy” as a Vital Element of Soft Power

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Key words: digital diplomatic relations, network resources, multilevel channels of communication.

RAPID technological development has accelerated globalization processes around the world, removing borders not only between countries but also between continents. The concept of soft power that America has been actively using in recent decades has exhausted its toolkit and requires new means of expression. This concept emphasizes not the military potential of a state but its cultural values, scientific achievements and diplomatic skill.¹

Digital approaches (diplomatic interaction through the World Wide Web, social networks, etc.) are often used today to realize the latter. Thus, the toolkit for addressing foreign policy matters has been supplemented by modern and effective means and technologies. There have also been changes directly to the term “government.” As Joseph Nye emphasizes, it is now moving from the West to the East, from the state to social institutions.² In particular, this can include local government, various associations of citizens, etc. The traditional “country to country” diplomatic approach that has been around for years is now losing relevance. It is being replaced by new entities that can solve foreign policy issues more effectively.³

Specialist on U.S. foreign policy Natalia Tsvetkova comments that after Barack Obama came to power, traditional soft power tools changed significantly. For example, America’s use of digital technology for diplomatic purposes was manifested primarily in the activization and strengthening of liberals, the launch of a mass propaganda campaign

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against terrorism, and an increase in the information flow about confronting Russia.⁴

The U.S. government is continuing to search for new ways to express the concept of soft power. When analyzing American foreign policy activity after sanctions were imposed on Russia and several reciprocal steps were taken such as shutting down consular and diplomatic missions, experts noted a decline on the American side of the importance of the cultural element. That opinion is based on the elimination of agencies engaged in Russian-American cultural interaction. That position is also shared by Joseph Nye, who stressed that after Donald Trump became president, all projects with Russia and some other countries having to do with education, science and culture were discontinued. In addition, the media have repeatedly stated that human rights, democratic principles and other values that previously were of paramount importance to the U.S. are now losing their significance.

According to scholars from Russia, in addition to technological progress, new methods and tools need to be developed and introduced into the state diplomatic arsenal to analyze soft power. Semed Semedov stresses that digital diplomatic relations can refer to many aspects. In particular, with regard to the U.S., it implies the openness of access to global Internet resources, the ability to use social networks, the availability of means to bypass censorship, and the popularization of democratic views by creating training programs allowing citizens in authoritarian-type states to work on the Internet. It may also include the possibility of using mobile communication systems to exchange data if such work is banned by the state. However, there are also invariably negative aspects to using technology in diplomatic relations; therefore, establishing special protective means for ensuring the security of transmitted information is of great importance.⁵

This issue is also raised by Anatoly Smirnov. He notes that the most dangerous aspect of popularizing instruments of digital diplomatic relations is that they could be used against governments to achieve geopolitical goals.⁶ In the opinion of Ivan Surma, appropriate approaches to social networks need to be developed as technology becomes more widely used in diplomacy and politics. To support this thesis, he points to certain technological developments exploring the peculiarities of using digital data in diplomatic relations and guaranteeing secure data transmission.⁷

One such development is the joint development by scientists from Great Britain and the U.S. of i2P. It is already being used all over the

world, enhancing the protection of information by identifying relevant patterns. Another important development in this area is the American-developed SMISC that can collect information about communication participants, identify their goals, and then calculate the effectiveness of persuasion. Three years have passed since its introduction, and based on the results of its application, another project, SocialSim8, was launched to create new tools to improve the accuracy of software that models behavior on the World Wide Web.

From indicators obtained from the Portland study, conclusions can be drawn about the emergence of previously unknown concepts of foreign policy implementation. They are associated with the popularization of the use of digital instruments in diplomacy. The study used a

comparative method of indexing the soft power strategy of the leading 30 countries in this field. Several criteria were compared: cultural, educational, digital, administrative, entrepreneurial, and the criterion of relations with the international community.

The digital criterion reflects how effectively a country uses technological developments in diplomacy. America remains the perennial leader in this category. Nevertheless, experts maintain that this criterion is in flux, so other leading countries could soon emerge.⁹ This is probably due in part to the fact that the U.S. has recently been focusing on domestic political issues, allowing eastern states to bypass it. In particular, China uses technology in diplomatic relations quite effectively and extensively, having a positive impact on all areas of life in the country.

Because of their “soft” impact, digital foreign policy instruments allow state interests to be unobtrusively disseminated throughout the world. The reach of the Internet is constantly expanding. Some experts predict that in 2020, more than 60% of earth’s inhabitants will be able to use the Internet. That figure coincides with information from the International Telecommunication Union, the specialized UN agency responsible for technological development.¹⁰ In addition, there is speculation that such extensive coverage will give global access even to those who cannot read and write, leading to changes in the procedures for formulating requests.

There is no longer any doubt that a key element of a state’s image is not so much military power, but its technological and scientific capacity.

The global transition to the use of electronic storage media is another reason why searching for approaches to studying digital diplomacy instruments is important. Social networks play a special role in this process. All modern politicians are simply obliged to have their own social media account. Data presentation methods are improving: Pictures or videos are replacing texts. The concept of diplomacy using technology gives everyone the opportunity to publicly express an opinion on a political event and communicate directly with top leaders and be among the first to learn about the most important foreign policy news, etc.

The traditional norms of diplomatic conduct that have already outlived their usefulness are transforming.¹¹ In addition, the vocabulary of communication via the World Wide Web is growing significantly due to the cultural impact of social networks. A lot of so-called Internet trolls have emerged who use provocative statements and opinions in comments or in their own posts to stir up other users. This form of communication is particularly common in political discourse.

After the head of the British government accused the European Union of election meddling, representatives of our embassy commented on this statement on Twitter: “It is good thing Russia is not guilty, as always.” Amid widespread condemnation and complaints about hacker attacks on American programs, such a response was a vivid example of successful trolling that has generated a lot of likes and retweets, and not only by those who support our state policy.¹² However, as domestic experts have noted, extensive use of the latest communication tools on the World Wide Web can negatively affect the overall level of political culture not only within a country but throughout the world. This is most relevant for diplomatic agencies, since their communication level directly affects impressions formed about the states they represent.¹³

Politicians who skillfully incorporate and utilize social media can successfully promote their own ideas to the masses and significantly increase their number of supporters. Argentine head of state Mauricio Macri and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau are examples of politicians who actively use network resources to boost their image.

Skilled use of social networks gave them a leg up in their election campaigns, and Trudeau became known as an “accessible leader” whom anyone can always contact. The social media pages of these politicians feature upbeat and apolitical posts interspersed with profound and significant policy opinions.

In particular, Trudeau posts photos with young people he meets dur-

ing his morning runs, wears embroidered Ukrainian shirts on the appropriate holiday of that country, taking a selfie and telling subscribers about it, addresses refugees from Syria in their native language, etc. And between these democratic and positively spun posts, he shows the world his commitment to expanding NATO bases in East European states.¹⁴

Trudeau uses this favorable and folksy image to popularize controversial and questionable ideas: At home, he is striving to legalize euthanasia, promotes abortion, considers the use of recreational drugs normal and advocates transgender rights, and at the international level, he advocates helping the Ukrainian military, calls for arms purchases, and insists on productive interaction with Russia on Arctic issues.

The significance of social networks in domestic and foreign policy was once again confirmed by the recent presidential election in America. According to a tally by the media, the number of Trump’s posts during the campaign doubled the number of posts by Hillary Clinton. According to Hillary, the dissemination of false and misleading information on the Web was the main factor in her defeat.¹⁵ Thus, it can be reasonably concluded that the impact of digital diplomacy on a wide range of people, regardless of their age, material status and other criteria, is highly effective and broad-based.

The desire to keep pace with rapid technological progress and to continually update the toolkit of diplomatic instruments leads to the fact that the term “digital diplomatic relations” means more than just actively using social networks for diplomatic purposes. There is constantly growing funding for developing and ensuring information security; the world’s technological leaders do not tire of creating new effective products capable of self-learning through built-in artificial intelligence.

Elon Musk, the world-famous inventor, unveiled the next innovation of his corporation: space transport and spacesuits for participants of a future program to colonize Mars.¹⁶ At the same time, anyone can learn about every accomplishment of his corporation by consulting its social network pages, where the latest information is posted.¹⁷ There is no longer any doubt that a key element of a state’s image is not so much military power but its technological and scientific capacity.

Our country first earnestly began implementing digital methods of diplomatic cooperation in 2012. The prerequisite for this was an order of the head of the Russian Federation on augmenting the existing diplomatic arsenal with technological tools.¹⁸ In the same year, AFP for the first

time presented an international list of leaders in the use of digital technology for diplomatic purposes. The U.S. topped the list and our country ranked 14th.

But significant progress was made after four years of diligent efforts on this issue, as confirmed by another study conducted in 2016, where the Russian Federation came in fourth in the same ranking. The top three spots were again held by the U.S., France and Great Britain. To determine the leading countries, the authors of the study used a multistep method involving five criteria to break down the effectiveness of implementing digital instruments. Each criterion was thoroughly analyzed and evaluated, and the results were compared for each of the states.¹⁹

One of the first experts to develop a technological approach for expanding the soft power toolkit was Anne-Marie Slaughter. She has conducted detailed studies of the main points and development paths of the concept. Its first application in U.S. foreign policy was as a complementary method to the “chess board” theory. In the early 2000s, the administrative office of the president shifted to a network format. And in 2010, key objectives of digital diplomacy were enshrined at the legislative level.

Today, Slaughter runs the New America company, which seeks to create and find ways to restore and maintain the image of the U.S. as a great world power. She comments that strong, multilevel channels of communication will be a more effective tool than developed military potential for a state to achieve all objectives.²⁰

When implementing strategic planning, most countries currently include improving technological instruments, developing science and expanding digital resources as key objectives. In particular, to bolster its title as the “world’s factory,” rapidly developing China has come up with a special program that can only be implemented by using technology in the state’s economic development.

Leading Silicon Valley corporations stress that there is not the same need for the services of banks and other commercial organizations today as there was several decades ago. Technological advancements have made it easy to manage financial flows even without their assistance. Electronic money, modern means of storing funds and the ability to instantly transfer money anywhere in the world are part of today’s reality, radically changing the old picture of the universe. The means of digital intelligence to transform “likes, comments and reposts” to meet politicians’ objectives while exporting democratic ideas to the far corners of

the earth²¹ show that the phrase “digital soft power” will be understood much more widely in the future than it is today.

NOTES

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210 Years of the Russian Consular Service

I. Volynkin

Key words: anniversary, consular service, Russian Foreign Ministry.

*Caveant consules ne quid res
publica detrimenti capiat*

EVERY EMPLOYEE of the Russian Foreign Ministry – former, current or future – was, is or will be (in one way or another) involved in consular work, which is an integral part of the diplomatic service. On May 15, 2019, we mark a significant date in the history of the Russian Foreign Ministry – namely, the 210th anniversary of the consular service. This day more than two centuries ago, Emperor Alexander I approved a proposal by the Russian Foreign Minister, Count N.P. Rumyantsev regarding the establishment of the department of consular affairs. It should be noted that by that time (and even before the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Empire was established), there were already over 20 consular offices abroad. Expanding their network and organizing a specialized subdivision within the ministry was dictated by the pressing need to ensure the observance of the legitimate rights and interests of Russian citizens abroad.

The epigraph to this article is an ancient Roman formula: “Let the consuls see to it that no harm come to the state.” As is known, it was pronounced in a solemn setting, when the situation in the Roman Republic for some reason became disturbing and powers were transferred to consuls, who held the highest elected political office of the Roman Republic. Since then, this formula has been repeatedly used in diplomatic correspondence and scholarly works. In this way I am trying to stress the importance of that office. I believe it is no secret that there has long been a view that diplomatic service takes priority over consular service.

Ivan Volynkin, Director of the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Photos courtesy of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department of History and Records

Consular activity, which is closely connected to state objectives, has for centuries focused on people – be it the direct protection of citizens' rights or direct contacts with foreigners. A lot has changed since then, including the organization and structure of consular activity, as well as the main documents regulating this activity. However, the purpose of consular activity – i.e., to help and protect – has remained unchanged. If you look up the meaning of these verbs in a dictionary, you will see exactly what the consul does. Broadly speaking, he does everything to ensure a normal life for his fellow citizens abroad.

Nevertheless, those who have read this should not forget that foreign countries have their own laws; their residents have their own traditions that often differ from ours, and the violation of those traditions may incur penalty; in that case, a consular officer will be unable to exempt you from liability no matter how hard he might try. He is not a police officer and he cannot deal with your noisy neighbors; he is not a lawyer and is not authorized to represent you in court. However, he will certainly help you get home if you lose your documents or if you or your relatives are caught up in an emergency. So, throughout all these years, the essence of consular work or the range of services provided has not changed very much, with priority now being given to simplifying the procedure for providing these services to both Russian and foreign citizens.

In the 21st century, almost no area of people's lives can do without digital technology, and if a decade ago online visa or foreign passport applications were in an embryonic stage, today there is every reason to say that the Consular Department is among the most digitalized. Currently, Russian citizens permanently or temporarily residing abroad can make an appointment at a consular office online and avoid queues, receive a duly processed foreign passport by mail without leaving home, get necessary documents issued at a mobile consular office, and so on. Meanwhile, the number of Russian consulates abroad continues to increase in order to provide consular services to more fellow citizens.

At the same time, close consular cooperation with foreign countries has helped significantly ease visa formalities for Russian citizens traveling abroad. More than 70 countries have granted Russian citizens a visa-free regime, based on the principle of reciprocity.

The Consular Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry and Russian consular offices abroad make a significant contribution to promoting tourism in Russia. In this context, it is important to note the rapidly developing e-visa project for travelers to the Russian Federation,



Uniformed consuls of the Russian Empire in Europe

whose geographic reach is due to expand considerably this summer. It is also important to mention the one-of-its-kind-in-the-world Fan ID that foreign guests could use to visit Russia even after the 2018 FIFA World Cup. In keeping with the Russian president's instructions, work is under way to develop effective legal protection mechanisms for Russian citizens abroad, including by involving nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations and associations.

Only a few people know that consular personnel are engaged in activities related to war memorials, performing maintenance on the graves of Russian (Soviet) soldiers and officers abroad, searching for information about the fate of MIAs in other countries and helping the relatives of those killed in the line of duty learn more about the heroism of their predecessors, visit their graves and pay tribute to their memory. I unfortunately must note that from year to year our foreign counterparts methodically politicize this area of bilateral cooperation regardless of universal human values. Obligations under international law arising from agreements on war graves are the principal method of countering these trends. Currently, the Russian Federation has such agreements with 16 countries, plus one wide-ranging agreement with a large number of post-Soviet



Draft of a USSR consular stamp

countries. A significant proportion of them, as well as the mechanism for monitoring their implementation, appeared in the last decade, and work is in progress to improve this area of cooperation.

Regarding the successes of the consular service and recalling its history, we are compelled to mention the tragedy that befell us in the last decade. The untimely death of Russian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Republic of Turkey and former Consular Department Director A.G. Karlov resounded painfully in the hearts of all current or former consular

staff members. The regulatory practice that actively developed on his watch helped establish consular work standards that are still highly relevant. For instance, a large-scale project was carried out, leading to the adoption of the Consular Statute of the Russian Federation, replacing the Consular Statute of the USSR; procedures for the provision of public services abroad were codified, and readmission agreements were signed with dozens of countries, among other things.

In this article, I sought to show that consular service is diverse. Without tiring the reader with all sorts of legal subtleties, it should be noted that the main quality of consular officers is their willingness to help – be it assistance in an emergency or life and death situation or the need to issue a certificate to reassess the cost of housing and utility services provided. Clearly, new times will require new solutions, but there is no doubt that the essence of consular service will always be predetermined by the etymology of the word “consul.” As is known, one of its meanings at the dawn of civilization was “one caring about his country and its citizens.”

Russia's First Mission in Vietnam

A. Popov

Key words: Russian mission, Vietnam, Saigon, Mark Zélim Mottet.

IN THE SECOND HALF of the 19th century, amid a growing rivalry between colonial powers in China and Southeast Asia, the Russian Empire continued to strengthen its positions in the Far East, in particular on its Pacific coast. The newly established Pacific Squadron made long sea voyages. Merchant ships of the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company and the Russian Volunteer Fleet plied between Vladivostok and Black Sea ports. Under those circumstances, the port city of Saigon, a rapidly growing center of French Indochina located at the intersection of the main sea routes, was bound to attract the attention of the Russian tsarist authorities.

St. Petersburg was seriously considering the possibility of establishing its official mission there. In January 1894, Cochinchina Governor Augustin Julien Fourès briefed French Indochina Governor General Léon Jean Laurent Chavassieux on the arrival of the Russian consul from Singapore to explore the possibilities for Russian consular presence in Saigon.¹

The pressing need for that became even more obvious shortly before and right after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Saigon was used as a transit point for the evacuation of 470 sailors from the cruiser Varyag and the gunboat Koreyetz after the Battle of Chemulpo Bay. As there was no consul, Captain V.F. Rudnev had to deal with all matters related to their stay and subsequent return home.²

In addition, there were 17,000 tons of coal in storage in Saigon to take care of. It was unloaded by British steamers, which refused to go on to Port Arthur after the outbreak of hostilities. Consul P.K. Rudanovsky arrived from Singapore to ensure that the coal was properly guarded and then Shanghai Consul Kh.P. Kristi took over. He was in the Saigon port

Alexey Popov, Russia's Consul General in Ho Chi Minh City; cgrushcm@yandex.ru

when the cruiser *Diana* arrived for repairs after the battle in the Sea of Japan at the only dry dock in that part of the world at the time.³

During a little more than a year in Saigon (from August 11, 1904 until October 30, 1905), Count Alexander Alexandrovich Liven (1860-1914), the captain of the cruiser *Diana* interned by the French authorities, not only ensured the ship's repairs, but also successfully performed the functions of the head of Russia's entire mission in the Far East and Indochina. He was highly instrumental in providing reconnaissance and intelligence support for the redeployment of the 2nd and 3rd Pacific Squadrons from Madagascar to Cam Ranh Bay.

After the repairs, the cruiser *Diana* was moored near one of the city's first department stores located in the downtown area on Catinat St. (now Dongkou St.). That was where essential goods were bought for the crew and where officers could relax with a glass of French wine.⁴ Captain Liven established close ties with Mark Zélim Mottet (1863-1943), the head of the company that owned the store.

That Frenchman of Swiss origin, a native of Geneva, who received French citizenship in February 1901, was a well-known person in Saigon. Mark Mottet first came to French Cochinchina in 1889. In March 1891, he was hired as an accountant at Hotel de l'univers, one of the largest hotels at the time, owned by Maison Ollivier. Later, he worked at the Chau-Binh animal theater, travelling to several Far Eastern countries and visiting Europe.⁵ In 1894, on behalf of the Cochinchina authorities, Mottet headed the troupe of the first Franco-Vietnamese theater at the Exposition universelle, internationale et coloniale in Lyon.⁶

After his return, Mottet quickly became Ollivier's partner, and following his death in 1902, inherited not only the hotel, but also the spice shop on Vannier St. (now Ngodycke St.), which he later turned into a large department store (it was located at the site of the modern Grand Hotel).⁷

While the cruiser *Diana* was in Saigon, Mottet frequently carried out some delicate assignments from her captain. Among other things, Maison M. Mottet et Cie provided sea freight services, so Count A.A. Liven used it to charter vessels to provide supplies to the 2nd Pacific Squadron under Rear Adm. Z.P. Rozhdestvensky's command in Cam Ranh Bay during its Far East expedition.

In April 1905, the company chartered the steamer *Quang Nam* to carry out a reconnaissance mission – specifically, to clarify the position of the Japanese military squadron. After the Japanese detained the ship,



The Mottet general store on Catinat street in Saigon where the Russian vice-consulate was located (postcard)

the French police investigated the incident and found out that the Diana captain had made a deposit of 250,000 piasters at the Indochina Bank against the ship's possible loss in the war zone. At the same time, in a conversation with Cochinchina Governor François Pierre Rodier, Count A.A. Liven did not particularly bend the truth when he said that he "did not sign any documents giving cause to suspect him of chartering any merchant ships." The investigation showed that Mottet, who had in fact signed the relevant contracts, assumed full responsibility for the consequences of the operation.⁸ However, since the Japanese did not charge the French with helping Russia, which was at war with them, the case was dropped.

Count A.A. Liven did not forget Mottet's good deeds. Responding to a query from St. Petersburg before the Diana was due to depart, he proposed appointing Mottet as Russia's nonresident vice consul in Saigon, as "a person who has already provided valuable services to our Maritime Department."⁹ The Foreign Ministry of the Russian Empire issued a corresponding order on November 15, 1905. The Diana's captain also granted Mark Mottet a power of attorney, appointing him as his legal representative and authorizing him, "on behalf and at the expense of the Russian Government, to manage and administer all property, affairs and interests, in particular, the coal warehouse established in Saigon."¹⁰

Je soussigné déclare avoir reçu de
M. le Chef du 2. Bureau l'exequatur qui
m'a été accordé par M. le Président du
Conseil, Ministre des affaires Étrangères,
comme vice-consul de Russie à Saïgon
Saïgon, le 25 avril 1906
Mottet

Receipt signed by M. Mottet for an exequatur of the Russian Empire's vice-consul

On February 3, 1906, the Cochinchina governor general's office officially notified Mark Mottet that from that day he could begin performing consular functions. On April 25, 1906, he received a consular exequatur from Paris.¹¹

Mark Mottet did not know anyone either at the Russian Consulate General in Marseilles, to which he answered directly, or at the Embassy in Paris or at the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Empire. Nor did he receive any further instructions from them. So, he stayed in touch with the Maritime Ministry and submitted his reports to it.¹²

In 1910, on account of ill health, Mark Mottet left Saigon and returned to Switzerland. However, he was still listed as Russia's nonresident vice consul until February 15, 1913, when he was officially dismissed by the order of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Before leaving home, Mottet, who was not experienced in diplomatic affairs, failed to inform the Russian Foreign Ministry about that but simply left a power of attorney, authorizing Paul Hauff, the new head of Maison M. Mottet et Cie, to perform consular duties.¹³ The colonial authorities took the reshuffle for granted and considered Hauff as the Russian representative and then Henri Blanc, who replaced him as company head in 1915, although neither of them had received a consular commission from the Russian Foreign Ministry or consular exequatur from Paris.

Not much is known about the consulate's activities. Its principal mission was to promote trade relations between the two countries and to provide assistance to Russian warships and merchant ships visiting Saigon. In particular, in December 1912, when the cruiser Askold, the flagship of the Siberian Flotilla, was on a visit to the capital of Cochinchina, Paul Hauff accompanied its captain, L.K. Teshe, at all meetings and ceremonies arranged by the French colonial authorities.¹⁴

It is also known that Henri Blanc, as Russia's official representative, attended a funeral ceremony for Pvt. Vladimir Andreyevich Shundik of the 1st Regiment, who had fought in World War I and died of pleurisy and acute intestinal inflammation at the Saigon colonial hospital on March 26, 1916.¹⁵

The last reference to the "Russian Consulate" in Saigon on a city map dates back to 1920, which showed its location on the corner of Catinat St. (Dongkou St.) and Turk St. (Ho Huan Nghiep St.) in the building where Maison Henri Blanc et Hauff Saigon – which called itself "successor" to Maison M. Mottet et Cie – had its head office at that time.¹⁶

NOTES

¹ Official telegram of January 24, 1894. State Archives Center No. 2, Ho Chi Minh City. The Archives of the Cochinchina Administration. File No. 4706, p. 22.

² Directive of the Cochinchina governor general, March 5, 1904. State Archives Center No. 2, Ho Chi Minh City. The Archives of the Cochinchina Administration. File No. 6810, Document No. 4.

³ Liven A.A. "Kreiser Diana v Saigone," *Gangut*, 2007, No. 42, p. 122.

⁴ <http://www.diendan.org/phe-binh-nghien-cuu/catinat-dau-the-ky-20-p2/Saigon-Duong-Catinat-dau-the-ky-20-phần-2>.

⁵ Memorandum of Saigon Police Chief Belland to Cochinchina Governor General François Pierre Rodier, January 9, 1906. State Archives Center No. 2, Ho Chi Minh City. The Archives of the Cochinchina Administration. File No. 4706, p. 115.

⁶ <http://www.enterprises-coloniales.fr> Mottet & Cie. Ancienne maison Olliver, fondée 1874.

⁷ When Mark Mottet recovered, he went to the colony again. It is known that during that period, until his final return to France in 1923, he built and managed a spa and wellness center in Cap Saint-Jacques (Vung Tau); established a large laundry facility in Saigon; became a co-founder of the Bainier Auto Hall, an auto dealership and garage complex; and was among the first to bring rubber tree seeds to Indochina and set up natural rubber production there. In 1932, he was awarded the Légion d'honneur for his merits in developing the hotelier and hospitality industry in overseas territories.

⁸ Report by deputy judicial adviser M.P. Marquis to Cochinchina Governor General François Pierre Rodier of August 30, 1905. State Archives Center No. 2, Ho Chi Minh City. The Archives of the Cochinchina Administration. File No. 4609, p. 35.

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¹² Memorandum of Russian Consul General in Marseilles ... L. 51.

¹³ Op. cit. L. 52.

¹⁴ Report of Cochinchina Governor Jules Maurice Gourbeil to Indochina Governor General Albert Sarraut of December 27, 1912. State Archives Center No. 2, Ho Chi Minh City. The Archives of the Cochinchina Administration. File No. 4696, p. 41.

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¹⁶ http://www.commonswikimedia.org/wiki/File:Saigon_map_1920.jpg

Mr. Trump, Lift Your Blockade of Venezuela!

Carlos Rafael Faria Tortosa

Key words: Venezuela, Russia, United States, sanctions, crisis.

Armen Oganessian,
Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs

DEAR COLLEAGUES and friends, this is the first in a series of meetings with ambassadors of foreign countries to Russia that has been organized by the journal *International Affairs* with support from the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I'm pleased to welcome Mr. Carlos Rafael Faria Tortosa, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Venezuela, at this first meeting.

Carlos Rafael Faria Tortosa

FIRST OF ALL, let me thank you for this opportunity to speak about the latest developments in our country and, of course, to answer your questions.

The economic war against Venezuela was unleashed as far back as 2013, when many people and countries, many governments and much of the world media still couldn't see it. That's when there began disruptions with the supply of goods, including the bare necessities, when the distribution of food was getting blocked and some of it was being sent abroad, to Colombia for instance. Today, our country is under sanctions, under a financial blockade that is being coordinated by the U.S. government.

I'd like to cite some statistics on how these sanctions affect the life of our people. Between 2014 and April 2019, the U.S. government passed a law and seven executive orders that are undermining the Venezuelan economy. Our financial assets are being blocked. Accounts that accumulate money belonging to our people are frozen. Let's hope that this is a

Carlos Rafael Faria Tortosa, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to the Russian Federation

temporary measure that won't result in a second edition of the story of Libyan assets. As we know, billions of dollars were stolen there. That money has never been returned to the Libyan people and it's unlikely it ever will be. We are taking legal action to get our money unfrozen, and we will speak about this in every country and at every opportunity until we succeed.

Because of the sanctions, negotiations on loan restructuring for PDVSA, Venezuela's largest oil company, have stalled. PDVSA can't operate the way any other company anywhere in the world does. Because of that, oil production in our country is going down. And, because of the financial blockade, it costs us a lot to ship oil by sea.

Early this year, the U.S. government banned imports of our oil whereas before that about 400,000 barrels had been sent to the United States daily. This provided our economy with money for buying basic necessities. This situation is forcing us to look for other markets.

And when our president announced that gold production was going to be resumed in Venezuela, the U.S. government immediately banned any commercial relations with our gold mining enterprises. Of course, we will be looking for ways to bypass these sanctions, and have already found some.

The Central Bank has also been put under sanctions this year. Namely, the Central Bank can't have any transactions in dollars. Nor can other banks. And there have also been other measures lately.

We'd like to give you an example of how the economic blockade is affecting the economy of Venezuela in general and its population in particular. Sums to a total of \$5.47 billion have been frozen in international banks. That is a huge amount of money, which could be used to buy medications, commodities, industrial equipment, and other essential goods. At the moment, this is impossible. The United States and its allies say that our people need humanitarian aid of some kind. But President Nicolás Maduro has been asking, why don't you give this money back to us and enable our government, our people to provide themselves with all they need? We know that they don't want to do it and won't do it. Their aim is to overthrow President Maduro, stop the political process that he has started, and take control of Venezuela's oil reserves, which are the largest in the world, and other Venezuelan wealth.

I'd like to go back to the problem of frozen accounts in banks across the world. There's more than \$1.5 billion sitting in the Portuguese Novo Banco. All the money of PDVSA passed through that bank. By the way, several weeks ago, our foreign minister visited Moscow and spoke about

social aid for children who were suffering from cancer and were taking treatment in Italy. That program was funded with money that was kept in Novo Banco, and as our money was effectively stolen, it became more difficult to finance the treatment of 23 children and three of them have died. Until we can get this money back, it'll be very difficult for us to continue with this program.

There's \$1.323 billion in gold in the Bank of England. That gold belongs to our people, who thought it was safe. That gold, which, let me repeat, belongs, to our people, is not being given back to us.

From 2015 to 2018, the U.S. economic blockade inflicted damages of an estimated \$130 billion on the Venezuelan economy.

We have money frozen elsewhere as well – \$517 million in Clearstream in London, \$507 million in American outlets of Japan's Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, \$458 million in Citibank, and \$230 million in another American bank, Union Bank. Large sums are stuck in two Belgian firms – \$140 million in Euroclear and \$53 million in Banque Eni. There's \$38 million in France's Banque Delubac. There are yet another 41 banks and financial institutions in 17 countries where Venezuelan money, more than \$654 million altogether, is stymied.

In October 2017, an allocation for vaccines was blocked at the UBS bank in Switzerland. This held up a vaccination program in Venezuela by four months, which had a serious adverse public health effect. Also, in 2017, foreign banks blocked a \$9 million payment for dialysis drugs, and thereby hindered the treatment of 15,000 Venezuelans. In 2017-2018, European and American banks raised obstacles to financial transactions by the Venezuelan government to a total of \$300 million for buying food. By raising obstacles, I mean that we want to make purchases and that we have the money for them but are barred from every possibility of carrying out our plans.

From 2015 to 2018, the U.S. economic blockade inflicted damages of an estimated \$130 billion on the Venezuelan economy. That is a substantial amount of money for our economy, for our country.

The government and President Maduro are locked in an unequal struggle with the world's main economic and military power, the United States. Information is one of the battlefields in this unequal war. The media in the United States and some other countries publishes disinformation about Venezuela.

In conclusion, let me say that the unilateral coercive measures that are called sanctions represent a systematic and deliberate strategy of mass violations of the rights of the Venezuelan people that the United Nations has qualified as crimes against humanity.

I'll be glad to answer your questions now.

Sputnik News Agency

What are the results that Venezuela expects the negotiations in Norway to produce, and how would you comment on the situation with the Venezuelan Embassy in Washington?

Answer: Dialogue is the only solution to the crisis. We need support, but the opposition is looking for other ways in order to take power in our country. Recently, we started a dialogue in the Dominican Republic with the mediation of its president. However, the Venezuelan opposition withdrew from the negotiations as it didn't want any agreement with the government. That was the result of pressure from the United States, which didn't want the dialogue to be successful. Because then there would have been no room for the United States in the Venezuelan strategy. There are reasonable people in the Venezuelan opposition who are aware of the grave consequences a U.S. armed invasion would have.

We are determined to continue the dialogue that has begun in Norway – that is the first act of rapprochement.

As regards the expulsion of our embassy from Washington, it is a violation of international law, a violation of the Vienna Convention. The United States made a similar move vis-à-vis Russia several years ago.

AllRussia Portal

If the government and opposition did reach a compromise, how would they share power in the country?

Answer: That's a question we have no answer to. At the moment, attempts are being made to organize negotiations. The history of other countries shows that even in worse circumstances it has been possible to get to the negotiating table and seek a solution.

But there are points one can't make concessions on. For instance, we won't yield to the demand from the opposition and the United States that

President Maduro leave office because he has been elected by the majority of our population.

We, for our part, would ask the opposition to stop urging other countries to send their armed forces into our country. We would also ask the opposition to avoid appeals for sanctions and for a financial blockade because those harm our population.

What they'll ask for we don't know. We'll see.

Telesur Television, Venezuela

What is the role of Russia in the efforts to settle the Venezuelan crisis? What other countries support Venezuela? And one more question: Could you say a few words about the Venezuelan president's strategy of economic rehabilitation?

Answer: We put a lot of value on the role of Russia in dealing with the problems of the Venezuelan people. Russia demands lifting the sanctions against us. And, of course, every time there is a critical situation in our country, there comes the voice of Russia urging us to exercise restraint and avoid an armed clash. Russia has always demanded lifting the financial and economic blockade of Venezuela. Other countries advocate dialogue between our government and the political opposition.

A similar situation may happen in any other country unless the United States puts an end to this policy. Therefore, we can say that President Vladimir Putin is taking very bold, courageous action. As the president of a great and powerful country, he is doing his best to pre-empt potential negative developments if the United States goes on acting the way it is.

Other countries, including members of the UN Security Council, for example China, also call for restraint and balanced policies and for respect for our constitution and for the rules and laws of our society – our society, let me stress.

We have other allies as well. For example, President Maduro and the president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have developed a friendship that is getting stronger in spite of all the difficulties, in spite of what the U.S. government is doing. We're sure that our cooperation will enable us to find new markets to replace those that we have been barred from. Our presidents are doing their best to overcome the atmosphere of fear that U.S. pressures have brought about.

Possibly, we have to an extent grown unaccustomed to the imperial-

ism embodied by the United States, a country that openly threatens Venezuela.

Any form of support that we receive is extremely important for us.

Now let me go over to measures that have been taken to continue to move our country forward and that our president has spoken about. We have devised a development plan for various industries and will now start putting it into practice. President Maduro calls the oil industry, trade, the pharmaceutical sector, and agriculture the motive forces of our economy. Russia has helped us by providing a team of very authoritative economists who joined our experts in drawing up the plan.

International Affairs

What caused the rolling power outage in Venezuela – a technical failure or a cyberattack?

Answer: A cyberattack. Some people working at the company that is the main power supplier injected a virus into the system. How can 20 turbines break down simultaneously? Anyone with knowledge of these matters will know that this is impossible. It was the first act of sabotage. Two weeks later, somebody opened gunfire on an autotransformer, knowing that it was an important link in electricity distribution. But our workers managed to repair it. There remain some problems, but they aren't as those we had before. There are temporary power cuts in some states in order to supply electricity to others.

I'll disclose a secret to you: we're trying to buy equipment somewhere to replace equipment that's gotten out of order. We've asked some European manufacturers, but they received instructions not to help our country. That's the honest truth. It's hard. But we are coping with this problem as we are with other problems. Our people are very intelligent – they know what is being done, who is doing it, and what for. They trust President Nicolás Maduro and the other leaders. Sooner or later, we'll have all the hardships behind us. We will win!

Many thanks for this meeting.

New Zealand and Russia: 75 Years of Diplomatic Relations

R.H. Winston Peters

Key words: New Zealand, Russia, 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

THE 75TH ANNIVERSARY of the establishment of diplomatic relations between New Zealand and Russia is a chance for us to reflect together on the history of our bilateral relationship to date, and on how this relationship might develop further in our rapidly changing world. Our diplomatic relationship was established at a time when war was raging in Europe and threatening the global community. New Zealand was among the first countries to declare war on Nazi Germany. Our commitment to the war effort in Europe was in no way limited by our geographical distance. Approximately 140,000 New Zealanders – nearly nine percent of our total population at the time – served in the war.

While most of our forces served in North Africa, Europe and the Pacific, hundreds worked to protect the Arctic convoys that delivered essential supplies to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk to help sustain the Soviet war effort. New Zealand deeply appreciates the respect that Russia continues to accord to those who served in the Arctic, including a wreath-laying in their honour each year in Wellington, our capital city.

The Second World War had a profound and wide-reaching impact on New Zealand, accelerating our transition into a fully independent player in global affairs and leading to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with a number of countries outside of the British Commonwealth. Moscow was the second non-Commonwealth capital in which New Zealand opened a diplomatic post, following an exchange of notes completed on 13 April 1944. Former Member of Parliament, Charles Boswell, arrived in Moscow in August of that year as head of the New Zealand Legation.

The Right Honourable **Winston Peters**, New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Second World War was not the first time that New Zealand and Russia had stood side by side on the battlefield. As a dominion of the British Empire, New Zealand was also a Russian ally during the First World War. The Gallipoli campaign in Turkey, which began on 25 April 1915, was undertaken to secure control over a key sea route between Europe and Russia, but ultimately resulted in significant Allied losses, including for New Zealand. Today, 25 April serves as a focal point for remembering New Zealand's war dead.

Contact between New Zealanders and Russians goes back nearly 200 years. In June 1820, men of the ships *Vostok* and *Mirny*, commanded by Russian naval officer and explorer Fabian von Bellingshausen were hosted for eight days by members of the indigenous Māori population in the Marlborough Sounds on their way to Antarctica. The visit was a positive and respectful one, as illustrated by the fact that Bellingshausen and his crew performed traditional Māori war dances (or *haka*) learned during their time in New Zealand to keep their spirits up during their subsequent travels. Collections of objects bartered during this visit are now held in Kazan and St Petersburg and remain of considerable significance to the study of New Zealand's history.

People to people connections have been diverse. The 1926 tour of New Zealand by legendary Russian ballerina Anna Pavlova made a particularly enduring mark on our country. Backed by a 50-strong dance troupe and 22-member orchestra, Pavlova enthralled audiences throughout the country, performing an exhausting 38 shows in 39 days. She impressed Kiwi audiences so much that to this day our national dessert, a light, airy meringue cake, is the *pavlova*, created in her honour. There has also been ongoing engagement in sport: our national football teams met in St Petersburg in the opening game of the 2017 Confederations Cup (following an earlier encounter in the FIFA World Cup back in 1982), and the Russian rugby team was welcomed to New Zealand in 2011 to participate in their first Rugby World Cup. We hope that the next Rugby World Cup, to be held later this year in Japan, will provide the chance for our national teams to meet one another for the first time.

Economic and trade activity has been a key feature of the relationship, especially in the area of agriculture. New Zealand sheep-meat, butter and wool have long been a prominent feature in the Russian market. In the early 1980s the Soviet Union became New Zealand's largest customer for mutton, and in some years the Soviet Union accounted for almost five percent of New Zealand's total exports. Today, Russia



Presentation of credentials by Allison Stokes, Ambassador of New Zealand, to Vasily Kuznetsov, First Deputy of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 1984

remains a valuable market for our agricultural products as well as for a wide range of other products and services, encompassing consumer goods, services, and technology. New Zealand ingredients can also play an important role in ensuring that Russia's food manufacturing industry has access to high-quality inputs in food production.

As the relationship between our countries and our peoples has developed, New Zealand's approach to foreign policy has remained fundamentally the same. As during the Second World War, New Zealand has never viewed its size or remoteness as a reason not to participate actively in global affairs, taking an independent approach notwithstanding our close ties to our traditional allies and friends. We live by the principle that our shared interests can best be secured through global rules and norms. Rules that treat all states – and all individuals – equally and fairly: where disputes are settled peacefully, and on a level playing field.

This is based on our core democratic values and precepts, such as the rule of law, accountable institutions, universal human rights, freedom of

speech and assembly, and free and fair trade. We are proud to have worked alongside the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War as founding members of the United Nations, establishing an international order based on rules and principles, rather than the use of force. Anchored in the UN Charter, this order has helped secure both of our countries' peace and prosperity in the post-war period, and provides the primary lens through which New Zealand and Russia engage with one another to this day.

New Zealand's commitment to strong and functional multilateral institutions is not an abstract matter of principle but one of self-interest. As a small trading nation with an open economy and a mobile, multicultural population, New Zealand's security and well-being depend directly on the stability and prosperity of our region and the world as a whole. Maintaining this stability and prosperity requires a predictable, rules-based framework for the peaceful resolution of differences between nation states. Reliable architecture provides an objective process for resolving disagreements. New Zealand would prefer the global community invested in strengthening the institutions which can help to avoid conflict, rather than relying on resolving conflict bilaterally.

New Zealand foreign policy will therefore continue to seek to strengthen the multilateral system in order to better meet the challenges of our increasingly turbulent world. We count on the full support of the community of nations in achieving this goal, and in doing so note that the privileges enjoyed by the permanent members of the UN Security Council imply a particular responsibility for them to act in a way that strengthens the international order.

Of course, New Zealand and Russia have shown on many occasions that we can work together successfully in multilateral fora to achieve concrete results. One of the most recent examples of this was the creation in 2017 of one of the world's largest marine reserves, the Ross Sea Region Marine Protected Area, by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. New Zealand remains grateful for the positive and constructive role that Russia played in helping to achieve consensus for the creation of the Ross Sea Region Marine Protected Area, which balances environmental protection, sustainable fishing and science interests, and protects important habitats and foraging areas for key Antarctic species.

New Zealand's 2015-16 term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council provided another opportunity to deepen our bilateral



Visit to the Lenin Mausoleum by Geoffrey Palmer, Prime Minister of New Zealand, 1988

dialogue on a broad range of international security issues. Our countries enjoyed a constructive and mutually respectful working relationship. This allowed us to work closely together to help the Council achieve consensus on a wide range of global security issues, despite the fact that we held different perspectives and positions on several of the important and most pressing security situations that the Council considered during that time.

Our time together on the UN Security Council demonstrated that New Zealand and Russia have a robust and mature diplomatic relationship, characterised by a shared readiness to speak our minds frankly and respectfully. This relationship allows us to cooperate successfully wherever our interests and values align. It also requires us to discuss our differences openly, with a view to finding common ground.

New Zealand will continue to approach our bilateral relationship in a similarly constructive and pragmatic spirit in the years ahead. With this in mind we see a number of areas in which we can aim to deepen our cooperation.

First, our shared interest in the strategic and economic stability of the Asia-Pacific region will lead to an ongoing deepening of our dialogue on the issues facing the region. Our common membership of key regional bodies provides a natural framework for us to work together to support the region to build regional prosperity and manage tensions wherever they arise. In particular, New Zealand's role as host of APEC in 2021 will

likely accelerate the tempo of our engagement on regional trade and economic issues. We look forward to this engagement, and to having the chance to host Russian leaders and officials in New Zealand.

Second, there may be a number of opportunities to work more closely together on international security issues. Arms control will be an important focus given New Zealand's upcoming chairmanship of the Missile Technology Control Regime.

New Zealand will also want to work with Russia to improve the global response to other international security issues, including cyber security and counter-terrorism. The utterly callous act of terrorism in Christchurch on 15 March 2019, in which 50 innocent victims were killed whilst attending a call to prayer, underlined once again the interconnected nature of such threats and the need for all states to work together constructively to craft effective global responses.

Third, we can expect environmental issues to be an increasing focus of our bilateral diplomacy in the coming years. Like Russia, New Zealand's security and well-being is deeply linked to the quality of our environment. The same is true of the Pacific region – to which climate change is the greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and well-being of the peoples of the Pacific – and indeed of the world as a whole. New Zealand is proud to have focused the UN Security Council's attention on the peace and security challenges facing small island developing states, including climate change, by convening the first open debate on the issue as President of the Security Council in June 2015. New Zealand has also committed to a range of ambitious domestic measures to reduce our carbon footprint over the coming years.

We welcome the opportunity to work with Russia to address climate issues, noting in addition that the impact of climate change on Polar Regions may merit a deepening of our dialogue within the Antarctic Treaty System.

Finally, the challenges facing the multilateral trade system are likely to create additional opportunities for dialogue in the framework of the World Trade Organisation. There also remains scope for further engagement on bilateral trade issues. We expect that New Zealand's skills and experience as a world-leading producer of safe and high-quality food products, as well as our expertise in agri-technology, will continue to be of particular interest to Russian companies and consumers, while tourism, education and other services also offer opportunities for growth.

Our diplomatic relationship is one of New Zealand's oldest, and has

grown substantially since we joined together to fight fascism in Europe. Our engagement in multiple multilateral fora both under the UN umbrella and within the Asia-Pacific Region exemplifies ways we can work productively together. We will continue to place value on dialogue with Russia on international issues of shared interest for the benefit of both our nations.

The 2nd International Practical Conference “Priorities of International Cooperation in Countering Extremism and Terrorism”

I. Rogachev

Key words: extremism, terrorism, Russian Foreign Ministry, Russian Internal Affairs Ministry, co-chairs' recommendations.

On March 29, 2019, the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry held the 2nd International Practical Conference “Priorities of International Cooperation in Countering Extremism and Terrorism” at the V.Ya. Kikot Moscow University of the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry.

The conference was attended by over 200 people, including experts from relevant Russian agencies, academia and religious circles, heads and senior officials from counterterrorism units of international and regional organizations (the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (RATS SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the CIS Anti-Terrorism Center, and the OSCE Transnational Threats Department), as well as delegations from more than 20 countries (Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Vietnam, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Spain, Kazakhstan, China, Malaysia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Serbia, Tajikistan, France, and Uzbekistan).

The forum was opened by Russian Internal Affairs Minister V.A. Kolokoltsev, Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister O.V. Syromolotov, Moscow IAM University Chief I.A. Kalinichenko, and O.V. Ilyinykh, head of the Internal Affairs Ministry's Chief Administration for Combating Extremism.

The following presented their reports at the conference's two main

Ilya Rogachev, Director of the Department for New Challenges and Threats, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; dnv@mid.ru

working sessions: A.S. Klimenchenok, deputy director of the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring; A.O. Bulatov, head of the Department for Consolidation of National Unity and Prevention of Ethnic and Religious Extremism at the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs; E.Yu. Zaitsev, head of the Department for Oversight of Electronic Communications at the Federal Oversight Service for Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor); A.R. Krganov, mufti of the Spiritual Assembly of Muslims of Russia; O.N. Tisen, senior prosecutor of the Administration for Oversight of Laws Relating to Federal Security, Interethnic Relations, Countering Extremism and Terrorism at the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation; I.Yu. Sundiyev, chief research associate of Scientific Research Center

It is particularly dangerous when support for the spread of extremist ideas, including the direct and indirect justification of terrorism and public calls to commit terrorist acts, occurs openly in the public space and the media, leading to the radicalization of the public.

No. 2 at the Scientific Research Institute of the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry; D.F. Giyosov, director of the Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; A. Surya Bakti, first deputy coordinating minister for political, legal and security affairs of Indonesia; Hazim Al-Yousifi, deputy foreign minister of Iraq; B. Filipovic, deputy foreign minister of the Republic of Serbia; A.A. Sultanov, deputy secretary general of the Collective Security Treaty Organization; H. Maleki, head of the Administration for Countering Terrorism and Extremism at the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran; M.T. Columna Martin, head of service at the Intelligence Center for Counter-Terrorism and Organized Crime of Spain; A.G. Avakov, head of the Action against Terrorism Unit at the OSCE Transnational Threats Department; and O.A. Lanchenko, an officer at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

Two special sessions on topical issues (crimes of the pseudo-humanitarian organization White Helmets in Syria and the initiative for voluntary counterterrorism self-restrictions in the media, as well as for state and government officials) were addressed by M.S. Grigoryev, director of

the Foundation for the Study of Democracy; A.G. Volevodz, head of the Department of Law, Criminal Process and Criminology at the Moscow State Institute (University) of International Relations of the Russian Foreign Ministry; and A.I. Davydenko, first deputy editor-in-chief of *International Affairs*.

At present, all countries are encountering security challenges posed by terrorism. There is growing concern about the escalation of extremist manifestations, which provide breeding grounds for international terrorism. Importantly, the conference focused on Russia's successful experience in promoting and facilitating international efforts to counter extremism and terrorism.

The participants discussed key counterterrorism objectives and the basic principles of international cooperation in countering this threat: ensuring the priority of states and their relevant authorities in combating terrorism and extremism at the national and international levels and taking concerted efforts as part of an international antiterrorism coalition on the basis of international law, the UN Charter, the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council, and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006).

Emphasis was placed on the need to abandon attempts to use the issue of countering terrorism and extremism for interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states. Last year's discussion continued of the non-consensus concept of "countering violent extremism," which is actively promoted by Western countries as a new universal anti-extremism standard, and the unacceptability of using double standards to exempt terrorists and so-called violent extremists from criminal liability under international law.

It is particularly dangerous when support for the spread of extremist ideas, including the direct and indirect justification of terrorism and public calls to commit terrorist acts, occurs openly in the public space and the media, leading to the radicalization of the public.

In this regard, conference participants spoke in favor of closer international cooperation in countering the spread of terrorist and extremist ideology and propaganda. It was proposed giving consideration to developing and introducing the concept of voluntary counterterrorism restrictions for the media, public figures, officials, and politicians at the international and national level.

The forum adopted co-chairs' recommendations, which correspond to the Russian vision of the aims of international efforts to counter terrorism and extremism.

Co-chairs' Recommendations**2nd International Practical Conference "Priorities of International Cooperation in Countering Extremism and Terrorism"
(Moscow, March 29, 2019)**

- Today, all countries in the world are faced with growing security challenges posed by terrorism. However, the fight against terrorism and extremism has not become an absolute priority. The use of double standards has created a disastrous situation in several Middle East and North African countries.

- A successful fight against international terrorism requires bona fide and responsible cooperation; the formation of an antiterrorist front with the participation of all countries, based on a well-defined international legal framework and the recognition of the central role of states and their relevant agencies in countering terrorism and extremism, as well as the abandonment of approaches putting political goals above the goals of fending off common threats. It is important to strictly adhere to the international principle of "either extradite or prosecute" with regard to persons who commit terrorist crimes.

- An effective fight against terrorism and extremism is also impeded by the absence of a universal definition of terrorism and extremism. A discussion, in particular at the UN, focused on identifying and setting priorities in this area could help achieve an international consensus on this issue.

- On a practical level, the use of the generally accepted term "terrorism" can be based on the definitions of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999) and UN Security Council Resolution No. 1566 (2004); with regard to the term "extremism," the SCO Convention on Combating Extremism (2017). It is important to recognize that terrorism arises as an extreme form of extremism, which is a broader phenomenon that includes ideologies and practices aimed at resolving political, social, racial, ethnic, and religious conflicts by violent and other unconstitutional means. At the same time, the use of non-consensus terms such as "violent extremism" at an international level leads the world community further away from understanding the essence of its goals in countering new challenges and threats.

- States should actively expose any sly tricks used by terrorists and extremists, including the false notion that extremism in its violent and nonviolent forms can be a legitimate way of ensuring fundamental values and human rights. We believe that the goals of protecting society against terrorism and extremism, on the one hand, and respect for human rights,

on the other, do not contradict, but on the contrary, complement each other. Extremism and terrorism encroach on the most important human right – i.e., the right to life, which must be protected primarily by the state and society.

- Terrorists and their accomplices cynically abuse the right to “freedom of expression” to cover up their criminal activities. A case in point is the special propaganda project of the pseudo-humanitarian organization White Helmets designed to support terrorists and extremists in Syria. Investigations conducted by independent journalists and civic activists, telling the truth about the White Helmets’ collaboration with terrorists and their crimes, help reveal the true nature of the White Helmets’ activities.

- Any flirting with terrorists and extremists and any attempts to justify their actions for one reason or another (for instance, by the “fight against authoritarian regimes”) can fuel the protest mood in society, creating conditions for the disruption of law and order, the violation of traditions and foundations, and the destabilization of the state and society. Such practices are at odds with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy whereby terrorism cannot be justified under any circumstances.

- The relevant government agencies’ efforts to counter terrorism and extremism should be accompanied by measures to promote an atmosphere of zero tolerance for violence in society as a tool for resolving political, ethnic, religious and other disputes and conflicts.

- The leading role of the state in countering terrorist and extremist threats should be understood in a broad sense, including as a prerequisite for effective cooperation with civil society (i.e., cooperation based on the sharing of responsibility). The prevention of terrorism requires the comprehensive involvement of civil society institutions, in particular prominent public figures, nongovernmental organizations, the media, academia, and the business community. Considering the current trends toward camouflaging terrorist and extremist activities under the guise of pseudo-religious slogans, traditional religious communities and their leaders have a special role to play in these efforts.

- In this context, close engagement with the media, which are used by terrorists for propaganda purposes and often publish materials inciting intolerance and hatred, also remains highly relevant. It is essential to formulate “voluntary counterterrorism restrictions” and codes of conduct for the media, as well as for state and government officials, including the rejection of media content that can provoke radicalization leading to extremism and terrorism.

The Art of Diplomacy: Andrei Gromyko as First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, 1949-1952 (On the 110th Anniversary of His Birth)

A. Sindeyev

Key words: A.A. Gromyko, diplomacy, diplomatic style, Russian diplomatic school, international relations.

THE BASIC OBJECTIVES of diplomacy do not change with the passing of time. Diplomacy is tasked with securing conditions for maintaining and developing the state, society and its inherent culture. This simple assertion requires three clarifications: Diplomats are generally the first to deal with problems and potential conflicts that arise, which means they are the first line of defense of that country's interests; as state officials, diplomats act within set frameworks, and independence and improvisation are a rather rare and perforce exceptions to the rule; national interests are almost always stable and have nothing to do with the political regime in the country.

The First Post-War Transformation of International Relations

THE ACTIONS of diplomats are determined by the history of the country they represent, the institutions that have formed in that country, the current geopolitical situation, and the work of the "concert of world powers." It makes sense to interpret international relations as an unending concert of world powers, without restricting this term to a specific historical context. The division of world orders and systems in academic dis-

Thank you to the family of A.A. Gromyko for providing photographs and accompanying captions.

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course is stipulated by the need to set reality in order. But upon close examination, order is the temporary status quo amid the constant positional warfare being fought by the same concert of world powers, but with a larger degree of calm in the center. The fact that the work of diplomats remains constant confirms that conclusion.

Transformations are the tuning period of the concert of world powers: A change is occurring in the established configuration of relations among the leading countries; there is an adjustment of the bounds of the possible in their mutual contacts, a reformatting of spheres of influence, the establishment of a new role and capacity for small countries. It is important to remember that for the time being, the main participants in the new or old composition will be uncertain of how far they can go before they reach the limits of the freedom of action they have achieved and harm their own interests; adjustments and the accompanying struggle will continue.

The first post-war transformation of international relations was prepared and implemented in 1943-1952. World War II altered the balance of power in the world. Western partners did not want the USSR to grow stronger. Franklin D. Roosevelt's brief attempts to establish closer relations with the Soviet Union were apparently based on the assumption of the limited capacity of certain countries and the importance of establishing general rules of the game. However, any ambitious transformation goals at that time would have required partial modification of the dominant ideological systems, something none of the partners was seeking. While it did not limit options or prohibit tactical moves, Stalin's famous statement from the May 1942 cipher telegram to People's Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov that "We will address issues regarding borders, or rather the security guarantees of our borders in a particular area of the country, by force" [26, p. 157], established different priorities, objectively making securing and preserving the achievements of socialism a strategic goal. In this regard, the proposals of the American side were to some extent consistent with the Soviet strategic approach.

Franklin D. Roosevelt did not take into account many factors: the USSR existed and was developing in a period of isolation; had the right not to trust Western partners; won the war; and, as we read in the once-classic book that Andrei Gromyko served as an executive editor of, "broke through the capitalist encirclement" not to join a game played by others' rules [5, pp. 6-10]. Socialism as an alternative system was starting to bear fruit.

American analysts wrongly viewed Soviet strategy in the context of

fear and traditional isolation. The Soviet Union was in fact starting to open up much more not only in Europe but also in Asia by concluding treaties of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance. However, this was a cautious opening up within the acceptable bounds of Stalinist diplomacy and a search for foundations of mutually beneficial long-term cooperation with friendly states.

The window of opportunity for compromise with Western partners could stay open only for a short time. Problems encountered during the meetings of foreign ministers, the difficulties reaching peace treaties with countries that had supported the Nazis, and the division of Germany at a time when the U.S. was the sole possessor of atomic weapons, along with “proposals” made during disarmament discussions in UN organizations, served as proof that the sides were beginning to view the division of Europe as a *fait accompli*. The struggle for influence in the world was still to come. The term “bipolar” does not apply to the first post-war transformation, since the current bipolarity was nonexistent in 1952.

It was in 1949-1952 that the foundation was laid for the future Gromyko diplomatic school, which still exists and continues to develop.

Within the Framework of Stalin’s Diplomacy

IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, the foreign policy administration system in the USSR was changing. The People’s Commissariat was replaced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which Andrei Gromyko¹ became first deputy to Minister Andrei Vyshinsky in early March 1949. Gromyko’s relationship with him was very complicated.

Work at the Foreign Ministry was conducted within the strict framework of Stalinist diplomacy, which meant being able to hold a line, avoid uncoordinated steps, strictly carry out orders, and not disclose any information about decision-making procedures. Representatives of various countries often heard the following constraining phrases at meetings with Gromyko: “I responded that the documents given me by the ambassador

¹ From 1946 to 1949, Gromyko was a deputy foreign minister of the USSR; until 1948, he was the permanent representative of the USSR to the United Nations. In 1952, he was appointed Soviet ambassador to Great Britain, a post he held for less than a year. From 1953 to 1957, he again worked as first deputy foreign minister of the USSR.

would be carefully examined”; “I said that I was not familiar enough with the issue to say anything substantive”; “I replied that ... we have verified information.”

The scope of Stalinist diplomacy required maximum concentration, self-control and a knack not only for rhetoric but also verbal gymnastics. An illustrative example is Gromyko’s conversation on March 11, 1949, with British Ambassador to the USSR Maurice Peterson, who “asked me to pass on greetings and congratulations to comrade Vyshinsky on his appointment as minister. He said in a half-joking tone that Vyshinsky’s friendly relations with the UK are well known, and then laughed. ‘By that I mean to say,’ Peterson said, ‘that Vyshinsky’s speeches at the General Assembly were not known to be very friendly toward Great Britain.’ In response to Peterson’s comments, I said that Vyshinsky’s remarks at the Assembly were in support of peace, and if he had said things that were unpleasant for some people in England, it is only because the position of the British delegation on the issues that were discussed at the Assembly merited it. As for the remarks of the British representatives at the Assembly, as well as all British representatives at UN bodies, it would not be enough to say that they were simply ‘unfriendly,’” Gromyko wrote in a record of the conversation [15, pp. 11-12].

Diplomatic professionalism also means having a clear understanding of boundaries and being able to delicately manage complex incidents. On April 18, 1950, in connection with the downing by the Soviet Air Force of a U.S. Navy plane on April 8 “near Libau” (Liepaja), Gromyko had a very testy meeting with U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Alan Kirk, which was concisely summarized as follows: “I met with Kirk at his request. Kirk said that on behalf of his government, he was presenting a note in response to the note of the Soviet government dated April 11.... After scanning (deliberately quickly) the text, I said that the note would be studied. Kirk then said that the U.S. government regards this as a serious matter. I replied that the view expressed by the Soviet government in its note dated April 11 and the contents thereof corresponds to the severity of the matter. Kirk then said that he again wanted to make it clear that the U.S. government considers this a serious matter. He especially emphasized the word ‘serious.’ I told Kirk that he had expressed himself clearly on the matter the first time. With that, the conversation ended. During the conversation, Kirk looked sullen and sulky. The conversation between Kirk and me took place in English” [20].

Success in difficult times requires unflinching efforts and the ability to



A.A. Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador in the U.S.A., 1943

address several diverse problems at once – for example, problems associated with Trieste, the Middle East command, Germany, disagreements with Iran. Only some of the challenges and issues in this list that Andrei Gromyko dealt with from 1949 to 1952 will be considered in this article.

The Austrian Question

THE SOVIET UNION advocated a comprehensive settlement of the German and Austrian issues and sought to prolong negotiations if the Allied Powers showed intransigence, hoping, if possible, to achieve concessions that would lead to significant precedents – for example, regarding former German property. The decision of a country's leadership, of course, is carried out by diplomats.

On March 11, 1949, Gromyko met with the British ambassador, and on March 14, he met with the political representative of Austria in the

USSR. At the first meeting, “Peterson said that Austria ... came out of World War I with a head but no torso. ‘The task,’ he said, ‘is to not repeat the same operation with Austria now after the Second World War.’ I replied that, in our opinion, the Soviet proposals envisage leaving Austria not only a head but a torso – corresponding, of course, in size to the head” [15, p. 11]. At the second meeting, Norbert Bischoff sought to lay the groundwork for subsequently making the Soviet Union accountable for the possible consequences. “In conclusion, Bischoff commented that without an agreement, Austria would have a tough time overcoming economic difficulties,” Gromyko’s record of the conversation states [10, p. 14].

On June 2, 1949, during another meeting at the Foreign Ministry, “Bischoff, as if in passing, touched on the question of the Austrian treaty, pointing out that, unfortunately, this issue was still unresolved,” to which Gromyko immediately retorted: “I asked if there was something new in the position of the Austrian government or the position of the U.S., Britain and France on this issue” [11, p. 32].

On December 14, 1949, the response of the first deputy minister regarding the Austrian proposal was very vague: “The new proposal of the Austrian government, contained in the chancellor’s letter of December 5, was a step forward compared to previous proposals and is now being carefully studied by Soviet experts” [12, p. 129].

On January 18, 1950, Gromyko received the ambassadors of the U.S., Great Britain and France. Gromyko wrote about the meeting: “The purpose of their visit was to learn when negotiations between the Soviet and Austrian representatives in Vienna regarding the Austrian treaty would end, as well as the outcome of those negotiations.... Kirk, [David] Kelly and [Yves] Chataigneau tried several times to raise the issue. In response to those attempts, I said that the question posed by the ambassadors and the memos they had sent would be duly considered.... I also commented that regardless of the outcome of the negotiations in Vienna, the deputy ministers in London could discuss some of the articles of the Austrian treaty right now.... In response to the relentless questioning by Kirk, Kelly and Chataigneau about the deadline for the Vienna talks and their results, I noted that since the negotiations were still in progress, it was too early to talk about the results” [7].

The next day, Gromyko spoke with Bischoff, who, after receiving another negative response, “said that he personally was in a very difficult situation and, in fact, had lost face with the Austrian government. ‘I used to inform and assure the Austrian government,’ Bischoff said, ‘that the

Soviet Union is interested in concluding the Austrian treaty, but now I cannot explain the position of the Soviet government.' Of course, such a remark could not remain unanswered: I remarked that Bischoff's doubts were groundless," Gromyko is recorded as saying. Bischoff insisted on getting some information, adopting a different tack: He "asked how he should explain to his government the position of the Soviet government, which for six weeks has not responded to the specific proposals of the Austrian government, and how the Austrian government should explain the delay on the part of the Soviet government to the Austrian people." Gromyko wriggled out of the situation by saying that "the explanation Bischoff gives his government is his own business" [13].

Another very interesting example of Gromyko's negotiating style of that period can be seen in a conversation with Bischoff on March 18, 1950: "Bischoff asked what the situation is with ... the negotiations ... in Vienna and what the Austrian government could do to expedite them. I replied that we had already answered such questions many times, and there is nothing new regarding the issue... Bischoff threw up his hands and said that the information he was receiving from Vienna was not consistent with what I had just told him.... I said that we cannot be in any way accountable for Bischoff receiving wrong information on that issue.... Bischoff asked what the position of the USSR would be [on specific articles].... I replied that this question is hypothetical in nature and that it is too early to discuss it now.... Bischoff said that the answers he had received during this conversation were clear, although it perhaps would be nice to get them in writing, since he had formulated his own questions in writing. Bischoff was holding a paper with the questions he had raised during the conversation. He then handed me the text of the preprepared questions that he had verbalized during the conversation. I told him that I, too, believed that the answers were clear and therefore no written replies were necessary" [14].

Skilled reasoning, cogent adherence to the approved line, and openness to discussing difficult and unpleasant issues deserve the highest praise. It is important to see behind the conventionalism a willingness to develop mutually beneficial solutions. Gromyko's questions about new developments, and references to meeting venues and the responsibility of the parties are not incidental. Any meeting is always a chance – albeit sometimes only a slight one – to start constructive dialogue, to think about the future approach. The Stalin period was no exception to normal diplomatic practice. Gromyko's famous "no," which has been exaggerat-

ed in various accounts, actually meant “no” to oneness and “yes” to what is new and constructive. Partners had to hear this “no” and get used to it before Gromyko became minister of foreign affairs of the USSR.

On the “Third Basket”

AFTER the Second World War, Western countries realized that the human rights issue could be utilized against the Soviet Union. Consequently, their representatives actively and regularly raised the issue of repatriation, even though by 1949, this could refer only to individual cases. Gromyko drew partners’ attention to the political nature of the problem for the USSR: Repatriation also concerned war criminals who had been Soviet citizen and fled with the Nazis to the West.

On July 15, 1949, French ambassador “Chataigneau ... citing Schumann’s appeal to Comrade Vyshinsky during the UN session in Paris and the most recent session of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the issue of repatriating French citizens from the USSR, said that he had once again been instructed to raise the issue ... of 74 French citizens, natives of Alsace and Moselle, about which the French authorities have accurate information. Chataigneau said that he was talking about 74 people, since it was mentioned in Schumann’s letter, and not asking now about the 89 people he had mentioned in a conversation with Comrade Vinogradov on July 9.” The Soviet side countered by citing the difficulties raised by the French authorities. “I remarked in response that we have always felt that Soviet representatives must be granted unrestricted access to Soviet citizens subject to repatriation so that these citizens can freely express their will.... I said that in camps for Soviet citizens in French-controlled territories, there is in fact a campaign of hostile propaganda against the Soviet Union, and measures preventing the repatriation of Soviet citizens are being taken,” reads the text of Gromyko’s conversation [24, pp. 19-21].

On October 13, 1949, Dutch Ambassador Philips Christiaan Visser informed Gromyko that the Netherlands had met its obligations to the USSR: “He said that Soviet citizens are free to leave the Netherlands without a visa, but Dutch citizens need special permission from the Soviet authorities to leave the USSR. He added that the delay in the repatriation of Dutch nationals from the Soviet Union is of concern to the Netherlands and could produce a feeling of ill will toward the Soviet Union, which would have a very negative effect on trade relations between the USSR



A.A. Gromyko and V.M. Molotov at the San Francisco UN Conference, 1945

and the Netherlands.... I said that the Soviet Union had implemented the agreement on the repatriation of Dutch nationals. The repatriation of Dutch citizens from the USSR is nearly complete. This can refer only to a few isolated Dutch citizens. The same cannot be said about the repatriation of Soviet citizens from the Netherlands, where there are many Soviet citizens and no measures are being taken for their repatriation.... To resolve the repatriation issue, the Dutch authorities must take practical steps toward repatriating Soviet citizens,” the official record of Gromyko’s words states [9, pp. 4-6].

On December 12, 1949, the U.S. ambassador “gave a voluminous memorandum regarding case files of U.S. citizens in the Soviet Union...” [6, p. 70]. On February 28, 1950, Gromyko gave the U.S. side “the USSR Foreign Ministry’s response to Kirk’s letter dated October 4, 1949, and a memorandum of the American Embassy dated December 12, 1949” [8].

On November 3, 1950, Gromyko once again “responding to Chataigneau’s question about repatriating French citizens from the USSR ... said that ... this issue could be resolved quickly, provided that the French authorities also take appropriate measures to accelerate the repatriation of displaced Soviet citizens in France and in the French zone of occupation in Germany...” [21, p. 92].

The texts of conversations about repatriation show that the Western countries were working in unison. Human rights had become a means of

pressuring the Soviet Union, of forming a negative image of the Soviet Union in the West through information campaigns in the media. Confidence was undermined by the refusal of reciprocity and comprehensiveness; the reluctance to discuss in detail the problems of war criminals from the USSR hiding in the West; to consider the interests of the Soviet Union and make concessions; and threats to harm trade relations. Gromyko's calls to solve the problem politically went unheeded then.

Formation of the Socialist Camp

THE SOCIALIST CAMP continued forming in 1949-1952. The Soviet Foreign Ministry was asked to help develop diplomatic services, prevent possible conflicts, and make proposals on controversial and current issues – i.e., to work on strengthening allied relations.

Problems could arise even in routine meetings. On October 6, 1949, Hungarian Ambassador A. Sobek forgot to submit copies of his credentials during his first visit. Sobek informed Gromyko that “he was made ambassador of Hungary to Moscow on the initiative of Mátyás Rákosi, who was pleased with his previous work and had now tasked him with comprehensively studying the experience of building socialism in the USSR and to expedite the transfer to Hungary of the experience and achievements of the Soviet Union ... [and] asked to take into account that he is ... an inexperienced member of the working class” [27, p. 181].

The Soviet Foreign Ministry participated in coordinating initiatives prepared for advancement in international organizations. On July 16, 1949, Czechoslovak Ambassador Bohuslav Laštovička, “referencing a conversation with [Gromyko] that took place on July 11 ... asked for an expedited response [to whether the Soviet government would object if the Czechoslovak delegation raised the issue of unemployment at the next Assembly session]” [25, p. 32].

The Soviet Foreign Ministry had to explain the reasons for delay in complying with allies' requests. On May 25, 1949, Romanian Ambassador “Gheorghe Vlădescu-Răcoasa asked to expedite a decision on whether to let 569 Romanian students and 264 postgraduate students study in the USSR” [22]. On June 18, 1949, Gromyko explained that the delay was because “Romania is not the only friendly country making such requests. This issue needs to be addressed as a whole” [23, p. 34].

The Soviet Foreign Ministry served as a mediator in establishing military cooperation. On June 20, 1949, Gromyko told Hungarian

Ambassador Erik Molnár that “the Soviet government had decided to pay 50% of the actual tuition and board costs for Hungarian military studying in Soviet military educational institutions” [2, p. 1]. On July 16, 1949, Bohuslav Laštovička approached Andrei Gromyko about organizing another meeting of the Czechoslovak military delegation with the Soviet military “to clarify issues related to the organization of scientific research in the Soviet Union” [25, p. 32].

The Soviet Foreign Ministry participated in preparing negotiations on outstanding issues. On June 21, 1949, during a meeting with the Czechoslovak ambassador, Laštovička gave Gromyko a Czechoslovak “proposal on the USSR helping pay the public debt of Czechoslovakia in connection with the reunification of Transcarpathian Ukraine with the Soviet Union” [3, p. 38].

Numerous requests from the socialist countries were sent via the Soviet Foreign Ministry and Gromyko on establishing trade and economic relations with the new government of China.

In view of the foregoing, it must be remembered that allied countries were more than just a safety belt for the USSR. More important was the fact that a new social and political model was being built that, as China is proving today, is capable of developing and demonstrating progress. Discussion about democratic choice in socialist countries should not be conducted opportunistically, outside of the historical context. Let us recall how in 1951, pastor Martin Niemöller, head of the external affairs department of the Evangelical Church in Germany, who visited the Soviet Union in early 1952, reflected on the possibility of integrating capitalism and socialism: “I regard the existence of capitalism and socialism as a fact that must some way be reconciled. I am not in favor of either capitalism or socialism. Nevertheless, I believe that here, in West Germany, and even in Western Europe, we could withstand a certain dose of socialism. To some extent, we are all in one room, and we need to arrange things, so we do not deprive each other of air...” [4]. Both the socialist and capitalist doctrines had equal chances of success.

Asian Issues

RELATIONS with China² and resolution of the situation on the Korean peninsula were priority Asian issues of the day. There are many well-

² Gromyko was responsible for talks on an aviation agreement between the USSR and China.

known events about the Korean War. The official position of the USSR was presented in a note that Gromyko gave U.S. Ambassador Kirk on June 29, 1950. That same day, a conversation took place between the head of the Second European Department Vladimir Pavlov and British Ambassador Kelly, after which Gromyko again invited him on July 6 to the Foreign Ministry to ascertain the prospects for a peaceful solution. "I would like to know," Gromyko asked, "if the ambassador's proposal regarding the peaceful settlement of the Korean question is still on the table after all that has happened and been done by America. Kelly said that his proposal was still valid.... Kelly said that he had been instructed to make a general statement and that he had no specific proposals. At the same time, Kelly suggested that the status quo could be restored in Korea with a view to ending the civil war..." [16, p. 24].

On July 11, 1950, contacts with the British side continued. During Kelly's conversation with Gromyko, "he said ... that, according to the British government, it would be premature to put forward at the present time certain proposals due to decisions that had been taken by the Security Council with its participation.... But he, Kelly, was instructed to say that the British government could put forward the following provisional proposals: (1) the cessation of hostilities in Korea, (2) the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel.... In connection with Kelly's proposed ceasefire and the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel, I asked him how to understand his statement that, on the one hand, the British government considers it premature to make specific proposals, but on the other, it is putting forward the above proposals. In response to my question, Kelly said that the current British government considers making certain proposals to be 'getting ahead of the game,' and that the proposal for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel should be considered only as preliminary, bearing in mind that discussion of these proposals would pave the way for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question without prejudice to other possible solutions of issues related to Korea" [17].

On July 17, Gromyko and Kelly met again. Gromyko made a statement that was subsequently quoted by TASS: "I am authorized to tell you," Gromyko said, "that the Soviet government believes that the best way to peacefully settle the Korean issue is to convene the Security Council with the mandatory participation of representatives of the People's Government of China, so that representatives of the Korean people are heard when solving the Korean question. As for the preliminary



A.A. Gromyko signs the UN Charter, 1945

proposal of the British government, the Soviet government believes that in order to avoid moving too quickly, it and other proposals should be sent to the Security Council for consideration” [18, p. 45]. After TASS published the text of the Soviet statement, Clement Attlee had to address the House of Commons to explain the meaning of Gromyko’s and Kelly’s contacts.

On October 10, 1950, when prospects for peace were rather murky, Gromyko had a meeting with DPRK Ambassador Chu Yong-ha, the substance of which was communicated thusly: “The ambassador said that on behalf of his government, he requests that the Soviet government send all Korean students and graduate students studying in the Soviet Union, as well as Korean specialists receiving training at enterprises of the USSR, to Soviet military summer school. The DPRK government also asked that students studying at the Institute of Communications, as well as all Korean female students, be sent to a special Korean radio school...” [19, p. 76].

One of Gromyko’s final conversations as first deputy foreign minis-

ter before leaving for Great Britain took place on April 14, 1952, with Japanese House of Councilors deputy Tomi Kora, who was attending an economic conference in Moscow in a personal capacity. The conversation was unique in that first Tomi talked for a very long time, then Gromyko answered her questions, and only then did he move on to problems of concern to the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

“I then asked Kora,” we read in the document, “the following questions: (1) How do Japanese ruling circles envisage resolving the specific issues Kora spoke about and the issue of normalizing Japanese-Soviet relations in particular? (2) How is normalizing relations with China being thought about, since the Yoshida government is in talks with Chiang Kai-shek about reaching some agreement? (3) What is the mood in Japan, including in broad democratic circles, about the conclusion of a separate peace treaty and the continued U.S. occupation, given that the occupation in no way serves the national interests of the Japanese people and Japan as a nation?”

“Kora responded to those questions thusly: 1. On the issue of normalizing relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, as well as with the People’s Republic of China, Japan believes that since Japan was utterly defeated and ‘bowed its head before the victors,’ it does not have the right to take the initiative on this issue.... Practically, the question of normalizing relations between the USSR and Japan could be resolved ... by declaring an end to the state of war with Japan... Declaring an end to the state of war ... could help Japan free itself of dependence on America.

“2. As for China, Yoshida did not want to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek. He told [U.S. Secretary of State John Foster] Dulles that if the U.S. government insists on a Japanese agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, Yoshida himself would compose the text of the letter, which he did. Yoshida signed that letter.... The Japanese practically do not attach importance to the issue of Taiwan, Kora said...

“3. To my third question, Cora replied that more than half of Japanese understand that the independence extended to Japan under a separate treaty is unrealistic. And that this treaty and administrative agreement would in effect give the Americans control over the Japanese economy. For example, they presuppose that they must receive at least 30% of the profits from their investments in Japan. Japan’s foreign trade is only 40% of its actual capabilities, and with great difficulty. For example, the Japanese sent goods worth 100 million pounds to Pakistan and India. However, the British are not allowing pounds to be exchanged into other

currencies and are forcing the Japanese to make purchases in countries of the sterling area, effectively drawing Japan into its sphere..." [1, pp. 70-72].

It is impossible in one article to review all the events, meetings and issues that Gromyko dealt with in 1949-1952 as first deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union. There is no pause in the work of the Foreign Ministry, and professional diplomatic activity requires, as we know, total commitment. The post-war Stalinist period of Soviet history coincided with a transformation of international relations. Molotov's assertion that "everything was in Stalin's and my clenched fist" could apply to the general line.

The success of the general line was ensured by the everyday, mundane and exhausting work of diplomats. The years 1949-1952 were extremely important for the history of the national diplomatic service and the honing of Gromyko's professional skills. After the war, the Soviet Foreign Ministry began to be more systematically replenished with young staff. For them, Gromyko's approaches eventually became prototypical examples of diplomatic skills.

The post of first deputy foreign minister of the Soviet Union offered the opportunity to gain experience while at the same time solve important problems, to develop skills directing one of the most complex and most important state institutions, and to demonstrate a willingness to constantly be on the front lines of the battle for the interests of the country and the opportunity to realize the socialist experiment and its future success. The ideology that at that time was part of the national interest should not be separated from diplomatic activity. That was the reality. For Western counterparts, their ideological school played a lesser role. However, the belief in communism and its ideals did not mean abandoning rational actions and deliberate steps.

Resolving conflict through diplomatic means requires patience, continuity and strength. Subsequently, Gromyko's experience significantly strengthened the position of the USSR, since none of his partners were as well versed in the subject or had his negotiating skills. It was in 1949-1952 that the foundation was laid for the future Gromyko diplomatic school, which still exists and continues to develop.

With regard to diplomatic tools, attention should be paid to the particular importance for partners of the predictability of a chosen policy, and the willingness to strive for success in all areas and in every situation. Soviet foreign policy was predictable in 1949-1952, making it possible to find a compromise on many difficult issues.

Something else should not be forgotten: A main feature of a transformation period is the mutual distrust of partners. However, it is hoped that history is capable of learning to not forget the glorious aspects of the past and to learn from mistakes.

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Eastern Europe Before World War II: Problems and Contradictions

O. Vishlyov

Key words: Eastern Europe, World War II, national-territorial, economic, and military-political factors.

WORLD WAR I changed the political map of Central and Eastern Europe. In 1918-1919, the breakup of the regionally dominant Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires and a significant weakening of Germany led to the emergence of eight new states in the region: Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. For the five countries of Southeastern Europe that gained independence in the 19th century (Greece, Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, and Serbia) with the disintegration of another great power, the Ottoman Empire, which had lost many territories and emerged as the Republic of Turkey, the conditions of existence changed significantly. Serbia became the core of a new state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, renamed Yugoslavia in 1929.

In 1918-1919, the principle of state sovereignty prevailed throughout Europe ranging from the Aegean Sea in the south to the Barents Sea in the north, and this was undoubtedly a positive event. But the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both newly established and “old” states in the east of Europe proved to be very fragile. Within 20 years, some of them once again disappeared for a time from the map of Europe, while others had their borders redrawn and became economically and politically dependent on neighboring powers. During World War II, the region was one of the main theaters of war. One can also speak of the common history of the peoples of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe in the following period as well.

The issue of state sovereignty and its acquisition, maintenance or loss by the peoples of this region has been inseparable from “big European

politics” for the last three centuries. Without downplaying the role of internal regional forces in the emancipation process, one must say that each new stage in this process, whether progressive or regressive, was somehow connected with the struggle between the great powers and their attempts to realize their geopolitical interests and goals.

The external reasons for the loss of sovereignty by countries in the region shortly before and during World War II are well known. But what are the internal factors behind their inability to resist the expansion of neighboring powers? The traditional explanation – that the regional countries, each on its own, were much weaker than their larger neighbors and, in addition, were disunited

– can be accepted, albeit with significant reservations. But what determined their “weakness” and “disunity”? This question is often overlooked by researchers and politicians. Nevertheless, it requires close attention, and not only for the sake of knowing the past.

The factors behind the problematic condition of the Eastern European region on the eve of World War II, sometimes referred to as Eastern Europe’s “internal crisis,” can be divided into three groups: national-territorial, economic, and military-political.

National-Territorial Factors

THE POLITICAL “LOOSENESS” of Eastern Europe and internal instability in some of its countries were due to a set of ethnic and territorial contradictions rooted in the 1919 treaties of Versailles and Saint-Germain and a number of subsequent international agreements.

The states of the region that were among the losers of World War I (Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria) were left with a feeling of “national humiliation,” because their interests were infringed. These three states lost significant territories, together with their inhabitants, as they were

When speaking of the tragic fate of the Eastern European countries before and during World War II, we must clearly understand that their loss of sovereignty was the result not only of external influences, but also of their own internal weakness, lack of unity, and inability to wage an effective fight for independence.

handed over to nations regarded by the victorious powers (Britain and France) as their allies (Poles, Czechs, Romanians, Serbs, and others). This created the problem of “annexed ancestral lands” and “disputed territories,” stimulated the development of “revisionist” tendencies among the vanquished, and led to tensions in their relations with the victors and their allies, which gradually destabilized the situation not only in the east of Europe, but also throughout the whole European continent.

That was the root cause of contradictions in Germany’s relations with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Lithuania; Hungary’s with Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia; and Bulgaria’s with Romania, Yugoslavia, and Greece. Similar problems arose in relations between some of the newly created states: between Lithuania and Poland, which had captured and annexed the Vilnius Region, and between Poland and Czechoslovakia over Cieszyn Silesia. In both cases, it came to armed conflict.

Largely similar contradictions were evident in relations between the USSR and Poland, because, as a result of the Soviet-Polish War of 1919-1920, a number of regions of Soviet Russia east of the Curzon Line, previously established as Poland’s eastern border by the Supreme War Council of the Allies, had passed to Poland. The same applies to the Soviet Union’s relations with Romania, which annexed Bessarabia in 1918, and with the Baltic states, where the newly proclaimed Soviet republics were crushed with the active support of military volunteer units, which ultimately prevented the return of these territories to Russian statehood as represented at that time by the RSFSR.

When dealing with national-territorial issues, one should note that the ban imposed by the victorious powers on the establishment of a common state by Austria and Germany, despite the desire for a union expressed by them in 1918-1919, significantly complicated the situation in the region. From the beginning of the 1920s, the idea of an Anschluss (union) became a party slogan for many parties in both countries, but any step in this direction met with strong opposition from Britain, France, and Italy.

Territorial claims in the Balkans made by Italy, one of the victors of World War I, which felt that its Entente allies had deprived it of its fair share of territory in redrawing borders in Southeastern Europe, also had a destabilizing effect.

The situation in the region was strongly influenced by the fact that the “titular nations” of the newly created states, many of which turned out to be multiethnic, actually ignored the rights and interests of minorities.

National minorities made up 35% of the population in Poland, 33% in Czechoslovakia, 25% in Romania, 20% in Lithuania, 18% in Latvia, and 14% in Yugoslavia. The “titular nations” sought to realize the principle of “one state, one nation, one language, one culture,” which led to resistance and separatism among the national minorities and stimulated their desire to reunite with the states where these minorities were the “titular nation” or had a strong socio-political position.

This was particularly characteristic of the German national movement in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Romania, and Yugoslavia, the Ukrainian national movement in Poland, and the Hungarian national movement in Romania. Such urges, in turn, destabilized the domestic situation in multiethnic states, strained relations with countries where the separatist-minded minorities were “titular nations,” and provided the advocates of revising the territorial status quo in the region and in Europe as a whole with additional arguments for changes in existing borders. Let us note that in some cases the “titular nations” did not hesitate to use repression against “their own” national minorities (especially in Poland), and this led to further tensions.

The creation of states with several “titular nations” – Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia – had mixed consequences for the region’s future. Relations between peoples brought together in these states were marked by religious, political, and other contradictions, which had deep historical roots. The “smaller titular nations” – Slovaks in the Czechoslovak Republic, who made up only 16% of the population; Croats (30%) and Slovenes (9%) in Yugoslavia – believed that existence within a single state posed a threat to their culture and interests. Like national minorities, they had strong separatist leanings, pinning their hopes on cooperation with “revisionist” countries, primarily Germany. Such processes undermined these states from within and added a further element of instability to the situation in the region. It is no accident that later, after the occupation of Czech lands by the Germans in 1939 and the defeat of Yugoslavia in 1941, the first Slovak Republic and the Independent State of Croatia, established with German assistance, became Germany’s loyal allies.

Ethnic and territorial disputes were the main objective factor that made it impossible for states in the region to join forces in the face of an external threat and helped to turn them into a target of expansion for major powers seeking “restoration of historical justice,” “protection of national minorities,” “reunification of peoples of the same blood,” etc. Although the Versailles system consolidated the state sovereignty of the

region's major nations (and this was its positive side), it did not ensure a true "peaceful order" in Eastern Europe and thus predetermined the crises that followed.

Economic Factors

THE INITIAL economic situation after World War I was very difficult for countries in the region. All of them (except Czechoslovakia) were agricultural countries with relatively low labor productivity and a weak domestic market; all of them lacked investment and were largely dependent on trade with industrial countries. Along with the threefold task facing each of these states (attraction of capital, industrialization, and entry into the world market), there were also country-specific problems, such as creation of a single national economic mechanism using the potential of territories that had previously belonged to different states (Poland); integration of newly acquired territories (Romania, Yugoslavia), and adjustment to the loss of former integration ties (Baltic states, Hungary, Czechoslovakia). The newly created states were also faced with other difficult problems, such as arrangement of their own monetary system, fortification of borders, etc.

Bitter ethnic and territorial disputes and absolutization of the principle of state sovereignty hindered economic cooperation between countries in the region. "Economic nationalism" prevailed as the leaders of most of these countries opted for protectionism in an attempt to modernize the national economy and make it competitive. Naturally, this was not conducive to regional economic integration. Thus, the political contradictions that divided countries in this part of Europe were compounded by economic contradictions.

The region's development was negatively affected by the absence of a "peaceful economic order" in Europe in the interwar period. The victorious powers followed a policy designed to consolidate their influence in the region, seeking to exclude Germany and the USSR from among their competitors, prevent a revival of German plans for creating a *Mitteleuropa* (Middle Europe), and form an alliance of countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe as a military counterweight to Germany and at the same time a cordon sanitaire against Soviet Russia.

In the 1920s, Britain and France sought to achieve these goals, among other things, through an active credit and investment policy in the region, with simultaneous reparation pressure on Germany and a boycott of the

Soviet Union. As a result of this policy, the foreign economic activity of Eastern European states was largely reoriented towards cooperation with the victorious powers. Their historically and geographically conditioned economic cooperation with their immediate neighbors – Germany and the Soviet Union – suffered a serious blow in that period.

The world economic and financial crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s led to a final economic split between Eastern European countries. On the eve of the crisis, they were already financially dependent on the Western powers, because their revenues from foreign economic activity were insufficient to meet their public expenditure needs. The crisis put these countries in an extremely difficult position. It not only led to a cessation of lending by Britain and France, but also to a massive outflow of foreign capital from Eastern Europe. The situation was exacerbated by a sharp drop in prices for raw materials and agricultural products, as well as the introduction of protectionist measures by the industrial powers in support of domestic producers, including in the natural resource and agricultural sectors.

The regional countries tried to mitigate the impact of the crisis through clearing arrangements in trade between themselves and with industrial countries. However, the transition to clearing trade had far-reaching consequences. Whereas Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Baltic republics managed to maintain their relations with Britain and France at a relatively stable level, for the Danube countries (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia) it was Germany that now became their major partner in clearing trade after offering to import their raw materials and agricultural products on relatively favorable terms in exchange for German industrial goods.

Very soon the Danube countries became economically dependent on Germany, as was evident, for example from the German ultimatum to Romania on economic issues in the spring of 1939. The large-scale German economic expansion into Romania and Yugoslavia, in turn, further undermined the system of political alliances in Eastern Europe, making it easier to turn the region into a target of military, and not only economic expansion.

Another point to note is that none of the states in the region (except Czechoslovakia) was able to complete industrialization and thus to create an effective defense industry. In the face of a looming war, they found themselves dependent on arms supplies from industrial countries, and many of them, primarily the Danube states, on German military exports.

This had a direct effect on their defense capability and on the future of the Eastern European region as a whole.

Military-Political Factors

THE STATE SOVEREIGNTY and territorial integrity of the countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe were to be guaranteed by political alliances that emerged in the region after World War I and collaborated with the Western powers, primarily with France. But these alliances were unable to ensure the independence of countries in the region. By the beginning of World War II, some of them (Little Entente, Balkan Entente) actually ceased to exist, while others (Polish-Romanian Alliance, Baltic Entente) proved to be ineffective in times of crisis.

All these national, territorial, and economic contradictions prevented the emergence of a defensive alliance of regional countries, as well as an alliance of regional political groupings, while these groupings themselves failed to develop into military-political blocs. The same factors, combined with socio-political contradictions, also caused the failure of the Soviet Union's attempts to bring together countries in the region under a treaty designed to guarantee borders in Eastern Europe (Eastern Pact).

The functions of existing regional political groupings of states did not include resistance to Germany's expansionist ambitions (as subsequent events showed, the main threat to the countries of Eastern Europe). For example, the purpose of the Little Entente, formed by Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia, was to defend them against the "revisionist" policy of Hungary; that of the Balkan Entente (Romania, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece) – to resist Bulgaria's territorial claims; and that of the Polish-Romanian Alliance and the Baltic Entente – to counter the possible "revisionist" ambitions of the USSR.

A characteristic feature of political alliances in Eastern Europe was that they did not provide for policy coordination across their member states on a wide range of international issues. While expressing their willingness to coordinate their actions towards the state against which the alliance in question was directed, the partners retained their complete autonomy in all other areas, which seriously weakened the alliances and made them fragile. This situation arose, among other things, because the members of political alliances feared that closer coordination of foreign and defense policies would limit their sovereignty (often newly gained), and that they would be drawn into conflict with third countries because of

the latter's disputes with their partners. The history of the creation and activities of the Balkan Entente is a case in point. Latvia and Estonia were very much afraid, for example, of spoiling relations with Poland and Germany because of disputes between the latter two countries and Lithuania over the territorial status of the Vilnius and Memel regions.

Military-political agreements between regional countries and major powers were just as ineffective in ensuring security in Eastern Europe. The Franco-Polish, and then the Anglo-Franco-Polish, Franco-Czechoslovak, Soviet-Czechoslovak, Franco-Soviet-Czechoslovak, Franco-Romanian, Franco-Yugoslav, and other political alliances ended in a fiasco primarily because of the extremely inconsistent policy pursued by the British and French governments, a policy of "appeasing" Germany and Italy while ignoring Soviet proposals to organize effective resistance to aggression on a collective basis. The Eastern European states' prejudice against military-political cooperation with the Soviet Union for fear of their possible "Bolshevization," as well as the openly destructive policy of Poland, which tried to play the role of a great power, also had a negative effect.

At the same time, by the end of the 1930s and especially after the signing of the Munich Agreement of 1938, the regional states were increasingly convinced that they could hardly count on effective protection of their interests by Britain and France and began trying to solve the problem of ensuring their security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity by concluding bilateral non-aggression pacts with Germany and developing political cooperation with Germany and Italy. However, the "bilateralization" of relations between the countries of Eastern Europe and major powers had fatal consequences: the former were totally disunited, while the latter were enabled, by isolating them one by one, to implement a program of territorial and political reorganization of the region that met their own interests.

When speaking of the tragic fate of the Eastern European countries before and during World War II, we must clearly understand that their loss of sovereignty in that period was the result not only of external influences, but also of their own internal weakness, lack of unity, and inability to wage an effective fight for independence. This weakness and lack of unity were the result of flaws in the very design of the Versailles system, on the one hand, and of political mistakes and miscalculations made by the Eastern European states, on the other.

Past experience deserves close attention, especially where it concerns

a part of Europe that in the last century and a half has proved to be particularly prone to social and political transformation. The three knots of contradictions in this region (between the major powers, between the major powers and regional countries, and between regional countries) that fueled and triggered the two world wars and, in large part, the Cold War in its “first edition” have yet to be finally untangled, although in many cases they have loosened or changed their form.

Shoulder to Shoulder With the Red Army: Allied Air Forces on the Soviet-German Front

S. Monin

Key words: “Shuttle” bombing, Operation Frantic, Normandy-Neman Regiment.

WORLD WAR II was a coalition conflict. During the fighting, the troops of the participating 62 states were often mixed, so very often people of different nationalities were fighting alongside each other. And not only on the ground but in the air.

A striking example is the Battle of Britain (July-October 1940). Fascist Italy’s Air Force had limited involvement in it on the Luftwaffe side. The British were masters at mustering all (until the last person) who could be useful to them in the war. During this battle, at least one-fifth of the 2,927 Royal Air Force pilots were non-British. These included nationals from Commonwealth nations (101 New Zealanders and 94 Canadians), from occupied and vassal countries (147 Poles, 88 Czechs and Slovaks, 29 Belgians, and 14 French) or then-neutral countries (10 Irish and seven Americans) and even a Palestinian. Some units were fully staffed by foreign pilots of one nationality: For example, the No. 303 Polish Warsaw Fighter Squadron named after Tadeusz Kosciuszko (recognized as the best squadron of the Royal Air Force), and the No. 310 and No. 312 Czechoslovak fighter squadrons. And often these pilots were not lost in the total mass but were among the best. The top 10 pilots to score 14 or more aerial victories during the Battle of Britain included two New Zealanders, one Australian, one Pole, and one Czech. Poles accounted for about 5% of fighter pilots but shot down about 170 German planes and damaged 36 others, which amounted to about 12% of all Luftwaffe losses.

Britain later continued to make extensive use of foreign pilots. After the U.S. entered the war, the British Isles became the main base of the

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American Air Force in Europe, and the Anglo-American Air Forces began joint operations.

The situation was different on the Soviet-German front. From the German side, not only the Luftwaffe but also the air forces of satellites of the Third Reich participated in operations against the Soviet Union from the very beginning. But it was only in 1943, and especially in 1944, that airplanes from the allied countries started to take to the air alongside Soviet planes.

There was, however, one exception: an operation in the fall of 1941 by British aircraft in the Soviet Arctic.¹ Real combat interaction between the USSR Armed Forces and allied forces on the Soviet-German front began in the air. And the first allied military formation to arrive in Russia for combat was the No. 151 RAF Wing.

This was associated with the start of deliveries of military supplies to the Soviet Union. It was at this time that the first steps were being taken to organize and establish these supplies. On August 25, Soviet and British troops were deployed to Iran to prevent a pro-German coup in the country and ensure the uninterrupted transit of military materials to the Soviet Union along the Persian corridor (Iran's and Iraq's ports in the Persian Gulf-Iran-Soviet Transcaucasia, or Caspian Sea). On August 31, the first Dervish convoy, or PQ-0, arrived in Arkhangelsk with military cargo. Greater air protection was needed for merchant ships and ports.

At first, the British contemplated permanently basing air and sea forces on the Kola Peninsula. A month after the German attack on the Soviet Union, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote about this to the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.² However, British Rear-Admiral Philip Vian, who visited the peninsula in July, concluded otherwise on account of Murmansk's proximity to the front line and the weakness of the Soviet air defense system. Therefore, London limited itself to sending to the USSR with the first convoy the specially formed No. 151 Wing (commanded by New Zealand-born Lt. Col. Henry Neville Gynes Ramsbottom-Isherwood) comprising two squadrons (39 aircraft and more than 500 personnel).

The Vaenga airfield (now – Severomorsk) near Murmansk was chosen to base the wing. Initially, 24 Hurricane fighters were flown over from the aircraft carrier *Argus*. They were subsequently supplemented by 15 more of the same aircraft delivered in dismantled form in containers aboard merchant ships of the first convoy to arrive in Arkhangelsk, where the British assembled them and transferred them to their destination.

British pilots were tasked with taking part in combat operations while at the same time training Soviet pilots to fly the Hurricane fighters; technical personnel were charged with showing the Soviets how to assemble and maintain these aircraft that were to be supplied to the USSR under the lend-lease program.

On September 11, combat flights began. They were to protect Murmansk, support Soviet troops on the front line, intercept German bombers, and escort Soviet bombers. British pilots, who already had combat experience, shot down 15 enemy planes, losing only one of their

own. The wing was subordinate to the Northern Fleet's Naval Aviation Command. It significantly strengthened the Soviet Air Force potential on the Kola Peninsula. By the beginning of the war, the Northern Fleet Air Force had 116 aircraft, including many obsolete fighters like the I-15 bis, I-153 and I-16. Now, even numerically the fighter aircraft of the fleet nearly doubled.

Alongside the British, Soviet aviators fought more confidently on the Hurricanes, and soon they formed the backbone of the 78th Fighter Aviation Regiment of the Northern Fleet Air Force. The commander of this unit was Maj. Boris Safonov, a Hero of the Soviet Union who by then was already a well-known Soviet ace.

The last British sorties took place on October 8, after which flights were halted and the planes transferred to the Soviet side due to worsening weather and the reduction of daylight hours. On November 16, the last British pilots and technicians left Murmansk and soon returned home.³

Following the operation, wing commander Ramsbottom-Isherwood, squadron commanders Anthony Rook and Anthony Miller, and Sgt. Charlton Haw were awarded the Order of Lenin (they were the only British servicemen to receive such high Soviet decorations during the war).

The actions of the British military were appreciated by the Kremlin. The record of Stalin's negotiations with the head of the Polish emigrant government Wladyslaw Sikorski on December 3, 1941, reads: "Comrade Stalin says the English are good pilots. They fought well in Murmansk,

Cooperation between the USSR and the U.S. during Operation Frantic was a unique example of a Soviet-American combat alliance.

where their fighters were. English pilots are good guys, says Comrade Stalin.”⁴

Later, the British Air Force occasionally used Soviet airfields for operations in the naval theater and primarily to strengthen air cover for convoys. For example, after the Germans destroyed the PQ-17 convoy in late August 1942, two squadrons of Hampton torpedo-carriers, a flight of reconnaissance Spitfires and several Catalina flying boats were dispatched to Vaenga. But already in October, those airplanes were transferred to the Soviet side.

The last British Air Force operation launched from Soviet territory was an attack on September 15, 1944, from the Yagodnik airfield near Arkhangelsk, against the German battleship Tirpitz stationed in Norwegian fjords. As a result of the operation, the ship lost the opportunity to go to sea and in November was finally dealt the final blow by the British.

The U.S. gained much more extensive experience than the British from basing its Air Force on Soviet territory. Washington very much wanted to get airfields in the Soviet Far East to use in the war against Japan, but at that time, the Soviet Union absolutely did not want to vex Tokyo and did not show interest in discussing the relevant American proposals. Plans to send aircraft (and land forces) of the Western allies to the Caucasus also were not implemented. But using Soviet airfields in Ukraine was possible.

In 1943, the Americans and the British launched a strategic air offensive against Germany, which became almost their main contribution to the coming victory. As part of this large-scale aerial operation, the idea emerged of “shuttle” or cross-border bombing attacks. Taking off from bases in England and Italy, American bombers were to strike targets in eastern Germany, Hungary and Romania, and then fly further east, landing at Soviet airfields. After rest, repair and refueling, the planes would fly in the opposite direction, bombing the enemy and returning to their home airfields. This plan made it possible to strike any target, no matter how deep in enemy territory, while remaining under the protection of fighters, thus reducing their own losses.

In October 1943, the Americans requested permission to use Soviet air bases for such shuttle flights. Stalin finally gave the greenlight at a meeting with the American Ambassador Averell Harriman on February 2, 1944.⁵ Thus, Operation Frantic was born.⁶

The overall military benefits of this operation were patently evident.



British fighter pilots return from the mission of escorting Soviet bombers

But in addition, each side reaped its own benefits, too – and sometimes on rather delicate matters. The Soviet Union was interested in the American proposal of transferring to the Soviet Air Force the Norden bomber sight that allowed for effective bombing from a height of more than seven kilometers. The Americans were also ready to share their experience of aerial photography and its results, as well as to host Soviet officers to familiarize them with the organization of “shuttle” raids. For its part, the U.S. hoped to gain experience cooperating with the Soviet side in light of their plans for the future bombing of Japan from Far East airfields, to personally keep an eye on the operations of the Soviet air defense system and to take aerial photographs of the western part of the USSR. The latter was very much in demand later, with the onset of the Cold War.

Preparations for stationing hundreds of American aircraft on Soviet territory demanded enormous efforts. The Red Army had no such experience. The size of the American planes was impressive. The four-engine B-17 Flying Fortress bomber had a length of 22.66 meters, a height of

5.82 meters, a wingspan of 31.62 meters, and a maximum weight of almost 30 metric tons. It was not easy to find an airfield with a paved runway that still did not need to be lengthened and outfitted with metal matting specially brought in from the U.S. More or less suitable conditions were found in Poltava, and nearby Mirgorod and Piryatina. That was where the 169th Special Purpose Air Base (SPAB) was established.

American servicemen began arriving in April and would eventually total about 1,300. Through joint efforts, all airfield infrastructure was radically reconstructed. The head of the U.S. military mission to the USSR, Gen. John Russell Deane, who visited Poltava, noted that it was worth seeing how American soldiers lived together with the Russian soldiers, how they are digging the same trench, laying the same metal matting on the airfield and eating from the same bowl.⁷

Already utilized lend-lease supply routes were used to import a large amount of various kinds of supplies. A breathtakingly large quantity – by Soviet standards – of high-octane aviation fuel (American aircraft could not fly on any other fuel) was required. One convoy that arrived in Murmansk in April comprised five ships carrying cargo for this operation. Military personnel and a lot of supplies arrived through the Allied-controlled “Persian corridor.”

To manage the “shuttle” operations, the U.S. Air Force Eastern Command was deployed in Poltava. Prior to the start of the raids, plans were made to conduct photo reconnaissance missions led by Col. Elliot Roosevelt, son of U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt.

The first “shuttle” operation took place on June 2, 1944. One hundred thirty-one B-17 Flying Fortress bombers and 70 P-51 Mustang fighters took off from airfields in Italy, attacked targets in Hungary and landed in Poltava, losing only one plane in the entire raid. The crews received a triumphant welcome that included officials from both countries and the press. The newspaper *Izvestia* wrote: “The first American pilots to come to the Soviet Union received a very warm reception from the people and fellow Soviet pilots. A concert was held in honor of the crews of the Flying Fortresses.”⁸ On June 6, the Americans made the return trip. The first raid was followed by subsequent American air raids.

But the Germans learned the location of the “shuttle” base and on the night of June 22 struck a powerful blow to the Poltava air hub. Soviet air defenses were clearly not enough to repel the raid by more than 100 bombers. Forty-four of the B-17 aircraft were destroyed and another 19 were damaged. This was the largest loss for the American Air Force since Pearl Harbor.



Soviet poster depicting combat cooperation between Soviet and American aviators

These events caused some tension in Soviet-American relations. The U.S., while expressing its desire to expand cooperation, also called for the air defense base to be reinforced with night-time fighters and large-caliber anti-aircraft artillery with radar installations. And soon there was the urgent issue of providing air support for rebel Warsaw, for which the Anglo-Saxons asked permission to use Poltava.

Although massive “shuttle” raids resumed, in August, the Soviet leadership informed the Americans of the intention to reconsider the issue of the 169th SPAB. Military-political considerations and Red Army advances far to the West led to the fact that activities at the Poltava air hub began to fade. “Shuttle” operations were halted on November 1 “due to big changes in the military situation.”

In total, as part of Operation Frantic, the U.S. Air Force conducted 18 air raids involving 1,030 aircraft, including 529 Flying Fortresses and 395 Mustangs (68 aircraft were lost). Nearly 2,000 metric tons of bombs were dropped on the enemy. From May to November 1944, 8,916 Americans were stationed at the airfields of the 169th SPAB.

Cooperation between the USSR and the U.S. during Operation Frantic was a unique example of a Soviet-American combat alliance despite ambiguity of some aspects of the story. The remarks that the American command delivered to the soldiers leaving Poltava included the words: "Remember... No other nation has done as much for us as the Russians."

France was another Western ally of the USSR that fought in the air on the Soviet-German front.

On November 25, 1942, a Soviet-French agreement was signed to dispatch a fighter squadron to the USSR with the inclusion of one Soviet Air Force unit.⁹ On November 28-29, the personnel of the squadron (14 pilots and 53 technical personnel) were transferred on Soviet planes from Tehran to Ivanovo, where the squadron was to be formed. The French refused the lend-lease American and British aircraft offered them, preferring Soviet Yak 1 fighters (the French later flew Yak 9 and Yak 3 aircraft). At the request of the personnel, the squadron was given the name Normandy, in honor of the French province that suffered especially from Hitler's occupation.

On March 22, 1943, a squadron of 15 aircraft (commanded by Maj. Jean Tulasne) was dispatched to the Western Front, where it saw combat four days later. On July 5, after getting reinforcements, the squadron turned into a regiment. The three squadrons comprising it bore the names of the main Normandy cities: Rouen, Le Havre and Cherbourg. The regiment took part in the Battle of Kursk and the Belarussian operation. On November 28, 1944, the regiment was given the honorary name Neman, and it became known as Normandie-Nemen for its military accomplishments in the liberation of Lithuania and the forcing of the Neman River. The French pilots ended the war in East Prussia. In June 1945, the regiment returned home in Yak 3 fighters gifted by the Soviet government.

During the fighting on the Soviet-German front, the French carried out 5,240 combat missions, conducted about 900 air battles and scored 273 confirmed victories. The last of them, on April 12, 1945, was won by French pilot J. Henri, who died under fire minutes after landing. He rounded out a list of 42 pilots who did not return from battle.¹⁰ In total, 96 combat flight personnel were involved in combat.



Monument to the pilots of the Normandie-Niemen regiment in Le Bourget

The regiment was awarded the orders of the Red Banner and Alexander Nevsky, as well as French orders. Lieutenants Marcel Albert, Roland de La Poype, Marcel Lefèvre, and Jr. Lt. Jacques André, who shot down between 11 and 23 enemy planes, were made Heroes of the Soviet Union.

Plans to form a mixed “France” air division (the Normandy-Neman regiment, another fighter regiment and a bomber regiment) in the USSR never materialized because of Germany’s capitulation.

The armies of Eastern Europe (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and later Romania and Bulgaria) that fought together with the Red Army put emphasis on ground troops although they did have some aircraft parts and units. The USSR gave them more than 1,600 aircraft. Nevertheless, many of the planes were outdated models or even planes that had once been received from Germany. For example, to provide air cover for their (as well as Soviet and Yugoslav) troops, the Bulgarians flew Messerschmitts that the Germans had given them to repel Allied raids through Bulgaria against Romanian oil fields in Ploeshti. But the Soviet Air Force provided the main air support for Allied troops.

NOTES

¹ Suprun M.N. *Lend-liz i severnye konvoi, 1941-1945*. Moscow: Andreyevsky flag, 1997, pp. 38-40.

² *Perepiska Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR s prezidentami SSha i premyer-minis-*

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³ Suprun M.N. Op. cit., pp. 38-40.

⁴ *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR. 22 iyunya 1941-1 yanvarya 1942*. Vol. XXIV. Moscow: Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, 2000, p. 474.

⁵ Berezhev V.M. *Stranitsy diplomaticheskoi istorii*. 4th edition. Moscow: Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, 1987, p. 444.

⁶ Orlov A.S. "Na aerodromakh Ukrainy," *Vtoraya mirovaya voyna. Aktualnye problemy*. Moscow, 1995; Conversino, Mark J. *Fighting with the Soviets: The Failure of Operation FRANTIC, 1944-1945*. Lawrence, Kan., 1997; Overy, Richard. *The Bombing War: Europe 1939-1945*. The Penguin Group, 2014, pp. 232-233.

⁷ *Sovetsko-amerikanskiye otnosheniya. 1939-1945*. Moscow: Materik: Demokratiya, 2004, p. 507.

⁸ *Izvestia*. June 3, 1944.

⁹ *Sovetsko-frantsuzskiye otnosheniya vo vremya Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, 1941-1945: Dokumenty i materialy: V 2-kh T. Vol. 1. 1941-1943* Moscow, 1983, pp. 128-130.

¹⁰ De La Poype, Roland. *Epopeya "Normandia-Neman."* Moscow, 2018, p. 281.

The Story of Austria Purging Itself of Nazism

V. Kruzhkov

Key words: Austria, denazification, Nazism, neo-Nazism, radical nationalism, xenophobia, national minorities, linguistic rights.

THE WORLD'S main 21st-century objectives include eradication of neo-Nazism and radical nationalism, that harrowing legacy of former turbulent developments.

Since the 20th century, diverse manifestations of this heritage in various countries have often taken violent forms and caused not only multiple interpersonal rows and domestic political frictions but also fierce international conflicts. Hopefully, rich historical experience will help put an end to fanatical nationalism, including in former Soviet republics, just as at various times an end was put to slavery, serfdom, and colonialism. From this point of view, the international experience of measures against Nazism may be an interesting subject to explore.

IN HIS MEMOIRS, former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill describes an interesting scene. He says that, in proposing a toast at one of the dinners during the Tehran Conference in November 1943, when nobody had any doubts that Germany had lost the war, Joseph Stalin suggested shooting 50,000 senior Nazis after the war. This was a piece of the Soviet leader's typical dark humor, but Churchill didn't realize this and protested emotionally – the British Parliament wouldn't approve mass executions, he said. Stalin, glass in hand, persisted, staring hard and meaningfully at Franklin Roosevelt. The American president played along: obviously there needed to be a compromise, he said, – shooting 49,000 Nazis could be a deal, perhaps? At that point, Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov explained to Churchill with a good-natured smile that the whole thing was a leg-pull.¹

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The actual denazification of Germany and Austria was on the whole a humane process. It was certainly quite a difficult and lengthy effort and had its strong and weak points.

The Austrian Path to Nazism

RADICAL nationalistic sentiments had begun to quickly gain momentum in some sections of Austrian society long before Austria became part of the Third Reich in 1938. Ideas based on a mix of nationalism and socialism had gained currency in Austria back in the 1860s, and the Austrian precursor of Adolf Hitler's National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP), the German Workers' Party (DAP), was set up in 1903, in a "golden" era – during the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

After the defeat of Austria and Germany in World War I, various socialist nationalist and pan-Germanic organizations in both countries became much more popular as a result of the political, social and economic disaster caused by collapse of the two empires and the consequent public sense of frustration and mortification in the two countries. Nationalistic sentiments were fueled by humiliating provisions in the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye, both of which were signed in 1919.

It was no accident that the helm in the NSDAP was taken by someone who came from Austria-Hungary, where, as a young man, he had shown a great deal of interest in essays and speeches of Austrian radicals, some of which were anti-Semitic and racist. Admittedly, Nazi ideas came up against strong resistance in Austria, both in society and in government, especially at a time when they became a serious threat to the country's sovereignty and independence. When Hitler took power in Germany in 1933, the Austrian counterpart of the NSDAP, the German National Socialist Workers' Party (DNSAP), was banned.

Austrian national socialists went underground but in 1934 staged a putsch in Vienna. The revolt was suppressed but Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss was assassinated. During the tenure of his successor, Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg, the ban on the DNSAP was lifted under heavy pressure from German and Austrian radicals. With propaganda playing a strong role, ranks of national socialists began to grow quickly in Austria.

The entire legislation of Nazi Germany and its social and political system became binding on Austria when the latter became part of the Third Reich via the Anschluss of March 13, 1938. In 1942, the Austrian

section of the NSDAP had an approximate membership of 688,000, which made up about 8.2% of Austria's total population and about 17% of the adult population.²

The Soviet government refused to recognize the Anschluss despite wide-scale public support for it in Austria, especially in Vienna. On March 17, 1938, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov issued a statement about "the forcible elimination of the political, economic, and cultural independence of the Austrian people." Moscow maintained this line up until Austria's liberation in 1945.

It seems that Austria's rich experience of overcoming Nazi legacy and combating neo-Nazism may be borrowed by countries plagued by radical nationalism, xenophobia, and violations of linguistic rights.

Liberation of Austria

IN A SOVIET-PROPOSED DECLARATION issued in Moscow in October 1943, the governments of the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States described Austria as "the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression." This thesis later formed the basis for establishing an independent and neutral Republic of Austria. The declaration includes another, no less important point: "Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility, which she cannot evade, for participation in the war at the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation."

The population of Austria accounted for 8% of the total population of "Greater Germany," which was a much lower proportion than that of Austrians or natives of Austria in the Third Reich's repressive machine, where they made up 14% of the SS and 40% of the personnel that ran death camps.³

Today's president of Austria, Alexander Van der Bellen, said during a ceremony marking the 80th anniversary of the Anschluss: "Austrians were not only victims but also perpetrators of crimes, often in leading positions."⁴

The German armed forces that fought in World War II included more than 1.2 million soldiers and officers who were Austrian.⁵

Under Stalin's Directive No. 11055 of April 2, 1945, the forces of the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts that were liberating Austria, in contacts with Austrians, were to deny rumors that the Red Army was killing all members of the NSDAP and to explain that the party was to be abolished but that no action would be taken against its rank-and-file members if they were loyal to the Soviet occupation authorities. Liberated localities were to be put under the control of Soviet military governors, but the latter were to appoint interim burgomasters and elders from among local Austrians.⁶

On April 10, 1945, Third Ukrainian Front commander Fyodor Tolbukhin issued an address "To the Population of Austria" that explained the policy of the Soviet occupation administration and urged Austrians to catch Nazi spies, agents provocateurs, and saboteurs.⁷ Afterward, Soviet military governors issued standard orders to repeal all the laws that had come into force after March 13, 1938, and dissolve NSDAP branches and organizations close to the party.

All those who privately possessed weapons and ammunition were ordered to surrender them to military governors or report the places where they were kept.⁸ This was a justifiable measure since, even after the complete victory over Germany, individual Nazis carried out terrorist attacks and acts of sabotage.

Meanwhile, even before the Red Army approached Austrian borders, more and more Austrians were turning away from Nazism. British and American air raids fueled anti-German sentiments. There were spontaneous antiwar rallies throughout Austria, but Austrian and German Nazis usually brutally suppressed them, opening fire on the protesters.

The Austrian provisional government that the Soviet occupation authorities helped set up and that was headed by Chancellor Karl Renner launched its own denazification process under Allied control. On May 8, 1945, Austria brought out a law banning the Austrian section of the NSDAP and all entities linked to it. Under that law, known as the *Verbotsgesetz* (Prohibition Law), anyone who had been a member of any of those organizations between 1933 and 1945 was to undergo special registration and be deprived of voting rights. It was followed up by the Law on War Criminals (*Kriegsverbrechergesetz*), which came out on June 26, 1945. Nazi and pro-Nazi acts criminalized by it included denouncing of dissenters and what was qualified as abasement of human dignity.

The Law on National Socialists (*Nationalsozialistengesetz*) put into force in February 1947, in addition to dealing with war crimes, intro-

duced milder penalties for less serious offenses by former NSDAP members, including limitations on their civil rights.

In April 1948, upon the proposal of the Soviet occupation authorities, Austria passed a law to amnesty former rank-and-file Nazis. As a result, 482,000 ex-members of the NSDAP were given back civil rights, including voting rights, they had been deprived of. This law remains in force to this day with multiple amendments made in subsequent years.

Altogether, as of 1946, more than 536,000 people were registered in Austria as former national socialists. Some of them – 18.3% – had joined the Austrian predecessor of the NSDAP before the Anschluss.⁹ During Austria's occupation by the Allies from 1945 to 1955, the so-called People's Courts (Volksgerichte) were established under the jurisdiction of the courts of Austrian federal states. The first such courts were set up in 1945 in Vienna, which was part of the Soviet occupation zone, and in 1946 in Graz in the British zone, in Linz in the American zone, and in Innsbruck in the French zone. Commissions were also organized to purge the government system of former national socialists. More than 100,000 ex-national socialists were removed from senior posts.

The People's Courts examined 136,829 cases altogether. They issued 23,477 rulings that included only 13,607 with guilty verdicts. Only 43 convicts were sentenced to death. It was only during initial years of occupation, under pressure from the Allies, that People's Courts held intensive trials. Austrian Nazi politician Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Austrian-born senior SS officer Ernst Kaltenbrunner, and Baldur von Schirach, who was "imperial governor" of Vienna from 1940 to 1945, were tried and convicted at Nuremberg.

But not all Nazi criminals received the punishment they deserved. Some Nazi activists saw the Soviet victory over the Third Reich as an existential catastrophe. There was a series of suicides among them when the Red Army was approaching Vienna. Just as German propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels, some of the fanatics killed their families, including their children and elderly parents, before taking their own life, apparently in the fear of vengeance for their crimes.

An estimated 30,000 fled abroad. There was one more category of Nazis that escaped trial – intelligence experts, physicists, and chemists whose knowledge and experience the United States planned to use. Many of them continued their anti-Soviet activities, now on the American side.

Although controlled by the Allies, Austrian denazification wasn't an easy process, primarily because of the Cold War that had begun after

World War II and domestic political struggles in Austria. Principal parties were fighting for votes while government officials seemed to be competing with one another for greater lenience for ex-national socialist fellow citizens.

On March 23, 1950, the Soviet foreign minister received an analytical note from his ministry's Third European Department that expressed concern over problems that Austrian denazification was running into. The Austrian government, the department said, was not just doing nothing to stop the emergence of neo-Nazi organizations but was widely giving governmental jobs to ex-Nazis who had been fired under the denazification legislation.¹⁰ The Soviet occupation administration repeatedly raised this issue at the Allied Control Council.

The Austrian government was usually angered by this criticism and branded it as interference in Austria's internal affairs. This is understandable – after the war, the country was suffering acute shortages of personnel in various sectors, including government and education. Many Austrians had been killed or taken prisoner, mostly in the Battle of Stalingrad. In addition, a comparatively large proportion of the population jobless could have triggered social tensions.

Some of the former NSDAP members considered national socialism an essentially correct doctrine that had been put into practice with the wrong methods. The Soviet occupation administration, Austrian antifascists, and the Communist Party of Austria all registered these attitudes. Communists, including former prisoners of the Mauthausen concentration camp, made a significant contribution to denazification, especially in earlier years of the Allied occupation. Some were recruited by the Austrian police force of the Soviet zone. Some of the Catholic priests were strongly anti-Nazi as well since the former Nazi authorities had persecuted quite many priests.

Present-day Austrian writer and antifascist activist Hans-Karl Steckl believes that giving senior governmental posts to former Nazis was “a great mistake.”¹¹ For instance, the government of Chancellor Bruno Kreisky formed in 1970 included four (!) former national socialists, which outraged antifascist groups. Steckl believes it was “counterproductive and naïve” to hope that ex-Nazis would reform.

For the same reason, it was “irrational” to hire former Nazis in the education sector, Steckl thinks. A chemistry teacher at the school Steckl went to in the 1950s proudly told his pupils that during the war he had served in an army unit responsible for toxic gases. An arts teacher at the



Soviet soldier removes Nazi symbols in Vienna, April 1945

same school, when asked by pupils to take them to a concert of Louis Armstrong in Vienna, said: “In Hitler’s times, it wouldn’t have been allowed to go to listen to that grunting Negro pig, and that was right too.”¹² It’s clear what kind of influence teachers of this kind might have had on their pupils. Today, few ordinary Austrians will know anything about the siege of Leningrad, Nazi atrocities in occupied territories, or the Nazis’ Slavophobia.

Government officials who had built their careers in the Nazi period were spreading anti-Soviet propaganda and organizing protest demonstrations. This was much to the liking of the United States and Britain, which were fighting for their own influence over Austria (later this anti-Sovietism sometimes transformed into blind Russophobia). But at the end of the day, this state of affairs served to lengthen Austria’s occupation since it stirred mutual mistrust.

Austria’s Denazification as Recorded in International Law

THE TREATY for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria (Austrian State Treaty), signed in Vienna on May 15, 1955, included provisions on denazification that became part of international law.

Moscow was closely involved in drawing up those provisions, which were to remain in force for an indefinite time and addressed risks of

revival of Nazism in Austria not only in the foreseeable future but also in subsequent years. For example, Article 6 of the treaty, "Human Rights," reads in part: "Austria shall take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under Austrian jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting."

"Austria further undertakes," the same article reads, "that the laws in force in Austria shall not, either in their content or in their application, discriminate or entail any discrimination between persons of Austrian nationality on the ground of their race, sex, language or religion, whether in reference to their persons, property, business, professional or financial interests, status, political or civil rights or any other matter."

The treaty protected the linguistic rights of Austria's Slovene and Croat minorities living in the states of Carinthia, Burgenland and Styria. These minorities "shall enjoy the same rights on equal terms as all other Austrian nationals, including the right to their own organizations, meetings and press in their own language," the treaty said. "They are entitled to elementary instruction in the Slovene or Croat language and to a proportional number of their own secondary schools; in this connection, school curricula shall be reviewed and a section of the Inspectorate of Education shall be established for Slovene and Croat schools."

"In the administrative and judicial districts of Carinthia, Burgenland and Styria, where there are Slovene, Croat or mixed populations, the Slovene or Croat language shall be accepted as an official language in addition to German," Article 6 reads further on. "In such districts topographical terminology and inscriptions shall be in the Slovene or Croat language as well as in German.... Austrian nationals of the Slovene and Croat minorities in Carinthia, Burgenland and Styria shall participate in the cultural, administrative and judicial systems in these territories on equal terms with other Austrian nationals." The treaty banned "the activity of organizations whose aim is to deprive the Croat or Slovene population of their minority character or rights."

Articles 9 and 10 prescribed removing all remnants of Nazism from Austria. Under Article 9, Austria was to "complete the measures, already begun by the enactment of appropriate legislation approved by the Allied Commission for Austria, to destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations ... and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity and propaganda."

In the same article, Austria pledged “not to permit, under threat of penal punishment which shall be immediately determined in accordance with procedures established by Austrian Law, the existence and the activity on Austrian territory of the abovementioned organizations.” Article 12 of the treaty barred some categories of persons from serving in the Austrian armed forces. These categories included:

- “Austrian nationals who served in the rank of Colonel or in any higher rank in the German Armed Forces during the period from 13th March, 1938, to 8th May, 1945”;

- “persons who at any time belonged to the National Socialist Party (‘N.S.D.A.P.’) or the ‘S.S.’, ‘S.A.’ or ‘S.D.’ organizations; the Secret State Police (‘Gestapo’); or the National Socialist Soldiers' Association (‘N.S. Soldatenring’); or the National Socialist Officers' Association (‘N.S. Offiziersvereinigung’);

- “authors of printed works or scenarios placed by the competent commissions set up by the Government of Austria in the category of prohibited works because of their Nazi character”;

- “leaders of industrial, commercial and financial undertakings who according to the official and authenticated reports of existing industrial, commercial and financial associations, trade unions and party organizations are found by the competent commission to have cooperated actively in the achievement of the aims of the N.S.D.A.P. or of any of its affiliated organizations, supported the principles of National Socialism or financed or spread propaganda for National Socialist organizations or their activities, and by any of the foregoing to have damaged the independent and democratic Austria.”

Under Article 19, Austria undertook “to respect, preserve and maintain the graves on Austrian territory of the soldiers, prisoners of war and nationals forcibly brought to Austria of the Allied Powers as well as of the other United Nations which were at war with Germany, the memorials and emblems on these graves, and the memorials to the military glory of the armies which fought on Austrian territory against Hitlerite Germany.”

In 1957, two years after the treaty came into force, Austria declared one more amnesty, this time pardoning former national socialists who had their civil rights restricted before. Austrian antifascists joked sarcastically that now there was not a single ex-Nazi left in the country.

In later years, Austria took part in various political and legal law initiatives to combat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and ethnic and religious discrimination.

Measures Against Neo-Nazism in 21st-Century Austria

ACCORDING to the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism of the Austrian Interior Ministry, there are marginal underground neo-Nazi groups in Austria that occasionally spread propaganda, mainly through the Internet, and resort to violence such as assaults, arson, flashmobbing, and vandalism, and sometimes terrorism.¹³

Convictions for violating Austria's legislative ban on national socialist propaganda grow in number yearly.¹⁴ There were, for example, 15 in 2014 but 93 in 2018. Obviously, migration and increasingly economic problems in European Union countries stoke radical nationalist sentiments.

The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution has set up a hotline to be alerted by ordinary people about possible neo-fascist activity so that it can take prompt countermeasures. In some government agencies, there are divisions specializing in deradicalization educational campaigns, that include anti-racist and anti-xenophobic activities.

There also exist nongovernmental antifascist organizations in Austria that make serious contributions to studies of effects of Nazism and are instrumental in detecting activists with Nazi views. Austria's antifascist ranks include the Communist Party, the consistently anti-national socialist left wings of the Social Democratic Party and the Greens, Jewish organizations, and representative organizations of national minorities.

Time and again, especially in connection with anniversaries of the end of World War II, Austrian media publish materials about Nazi crimes. Austrian politicians of various views and tiers of government take part in events to commemorate victims of Nazism. There are large-scale annual memorial ceremonies on the site of the Mauthausen camp, where Soviet nationals, including war prisoners, accounted for the majority of inmates and fatalities. International ceremonies supported by the Russian Embassy are held at the Soviet war memorial on Schwarzenbergplatz, a square in Vienna.

Under public pressure from countries that had been victims of Nazism, as a result of lawsuits in the United States filed by Jewish organizations and media groups, and following the example of Germany, Austria brought out a law in November 2000 to set up a fund for paying compensation to people who had been turned into slave or forced laborers by the Nazis. There had been more than 580,000 such laborers in Austria. The fund was made up of contributions by the Austrian federal



Austrian postage stamp, 1945

ing, which is a kind of Mecca for modern admirers of Hitler. Occasional gatherings of Austrian and foreign neo-Nazis outside the building inevitably marred the image of Austria. There was a proposal that it should either be pulled down or house a kind of social service institution. Eventually, in 2016, parliament passed a law for the federal government to buy it out. However, the law set off a lengthy litigation as the owner of the building wasn't satisfied with the sum she was to be paid and brought a suit to the European Court of Human Rights.

It seems that Austria's rich experience of overcoming Nazi legacy and combating neo-Nazism may be borrowed by countries plagued by radical nationalism, xenophobia, and violations of linguistic rights. It also proves that, in principle, even a seriously ailing society can recover and become reformatted.

NOTES

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government, federal states, businesses, and the Catholic church. With support from partner organizations, former laborers living in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the United States were paid small, in a sense symbolic, compensations.

The building in the Austrian town of Braunau am Inn where Hitler was born, which survives to this day, is a separate story. For many years there were debates in Austria about what to do with the build-

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Normalization With China: 30 Years (A Subjective Eyewitness View)

L. Moiseyev

Key words: normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations, 30th anniversary of Mikhail Gorbachev's trip to Beijing.

IN CONNECTION WITH the 30th anniversary of Mikhail Gorbachev's trip to Beijing, some incidents and stories come to mind that took place along the difficult path through historical deadlocks and prejudices that eventually led to the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations.

In my opinion, the lowest point of this relationship was not 1969, when there were bloody clashes on Damansky Island and near Zhalanashkol. Those were provocations that resulted in numerous casualties, but they were nevertheless limited in scale and firmly suppressed after a short period of confusion on our part. They were in fact an extension of an internal struggle within the Chinese leadership and, given the colossal differences in military capabilities, could hardly have escalated into a full-blown war between the two neighboring states. The parties were not ready for such a turn of events. Of course, those events were shocking. But there were no expectations of something irreparable.

I still have an amateur black-and-white photograph that for a long time sat in a bookcase in the office of Mikhail Kapitsa, head of the First Far East Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. It showed a student demonstration in front of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow, organized, if memory serves me right, on March 9, immediately after the Damansky events.

Heavy sleet was falling that day, but hastily written words in large letters can be distinctly made out on the placard through the flakes: "We beat the Germans, we beat the Finns and we will trounce the Hunweibins." Being a student in the Chinese department of MGIMO at that time, I took part in this demonstration and, I must confess, was

Leonid Moiseyev, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

throwing inkwells with red ink at the light-yellow building of the Chinese diplomatic mission on Lenin Hills.

The shock did not last long. Already in September of that same year, 1969, the premiers of the two countries agreed on priority steps to overcome the crisis. It was a kind of first mini-normalization. Not a full-fledged one, but still a *détente* of sorts. Border talks resumed. The events on Damansky Island made it clear that Beijing was willing to stop at nothing to press its conception of the existence of disputed border areas. The Chinese premier prioritized that issue. That was the only basis on which the Chinese side was willing to talk with us. Our position was merely that we would not talk in the vein of issuing preconditions or making territorial claims.

A short while later, during an informal meeting with the deputy head of our border delegation on the tribune on Tiananmen Square, Mao Zedong casually mentioned the need to negotiate well and “solve a few minor issues.” These beautifully translated words of the chairman (which, in my opinion, meant only the need to break the stalemate) was for a few months the subject of fierce scholarly debate among various groups, each of which doggedly defended their version of what a “few minor” meant. Using the favorite expression of our main polemicist, Leonid Ilyichev, the well-known Khrushchev-era party ideologue and at the time the Soviet deputy foreign minister, the groups at that stage were engaged in an absolutely senseless search for “a bone in an egg.”

A similarly absurd situation occurred amid negotiations on normalizing relations when Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Yu Zhan uttered the well-known Chinese expression that “the person who tied the bell on the tiger’s tail must be the one to remove it,” meaning that the aggravation of relations with China was supposedly initiated by the USSR. The translation, “the one who brewed the porridge must be the one to eat it,” literally drove Ilyichev into a frenzy. He launched into a half-hour tirade against Beijing’s policy while constantly coming back to the word “porridge” that had particularly rubbed him the wrong way. The reaction perhaps would have been more restrained had the translator literally translated the Chinese expression that was clearly more graceful than the Russian equivalent that was used. Such episodes clearly confirmed that it would be difficult for the parties to find a common language in both a literal and figurative senses. The dialogue was unsuccessful. A favorite saying of Mao Zedong was “straightening requires bending.” At that time, both sides were earnestly “bending” but not “straightening” anything.

In 1970, an exchange of ambassadors took place for the first time in several years. I had the chance to closely observe Liu Xinquan, the Chinese ambassador to Moscow, and Vasily Tolstikov, our ambassador to Beijing. I got the impression that both were sincerely striving for a breakthrough in relations and both were very worthy representatives of their countries. But it proved impossible to do anything at that time of bitter ideological disagreement.

Official contacts were limited to mutual accusations and protests, to the conveying of endless angry notes and grievances. The lack of intention to at least somehow agree on something is evidenced by the curious diplomatic practice of top-level diplomats preparing a special crib sheet containing permanently fixed stances on key bilateral problems that could under no circumstances be deviated from that was to be used during official conversations. Of course, there could be no question of searching for compromises under such conditions; steps to the left or right were immediately stifled.

A remarkable incident comes to mind. One winter, a minister-counsellor from the Chinese Embassy appeared at our Foreign Ministry in Moscow requesting an urgent meeting. He was promptly received in the First Far East department, and we got ready to hear another protest. However, after the first words of the Chinese diplomat, ministry staff began to raise their eyebrows in surprise. The Chinese appeal was not the usual angry accusation of some actions by "Soviet revisionists," but an exceptional humanitarian request to allow Chinese shepherds in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Area to bring snowbound cattle from Chinese mountain pastures to China via a pass located on the Soviet side of the common border. Of course, after clarifying all the details, we immediately contacted the border guards and secured this passage. Afterward, our whole Chinese department excitedly discussed what had happened. Wouldn't you know it! For the first time in many months of work on Chinese issues, we were dealing not with revilement but an ordinary matter, albeit an urgent one.

In late 1984 and the first half of 1985, Soviet-Chinese economic, trade and scientific-technical cooperation was actively restored at the governmental level. The task of political normalization was coming to the fore with increasing urgency.


There was no progress in relations; ideological disputes only heated up. Both sides accused each other of betraying socialism. Moscow's proposals to mitigate the military confrontation by reaching agreements on the nonuse of force and nonaggression were not well received. In January 1974, the largest spy scandal in Soviet-Chinese relations broke out: Chinese intelligence services expelled five employees of the Soviet Embassy in China on espionage charges; in response, a diplomat of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow was expelled.

Some hopes emerged from the events of 1976 when after the departure of all three top leaders of China (Mao Zedong, head of government Zhou Enlai and head of parliament Marshal Zhu De) the main Chinese radicals in the political arena were arrested and Deng Xiaoping, the only real pragmatist of the older generation of Chinese revolutionaries, took power. He quickly curtailed the Cultural Revolution, disbanded the Red Guards, began restoring the normal functioning of state bodies and started developing economic reforms. However, the Soviet side's signals about willingness for concrete steps to improve relations were ignored. Moreover, it was then that the inertia of the long-standing confrontation resulted in political decisions that led both sides to a dangerous line two or three years later.

The Soviet Union joined a military alliance with Vietnam that overthrew the pro-Beijing regime in Kampuchea and decided to challenge its northern neighbor. Soviet troops were deployed in Afghanistan. China, in turn, called on the U.S. to fight against "Soviet hegemony" and began military actions against Vietnam. Because of the Afghan adventure, which Beijing regarded as part of a strategy to "deter" China, Soviet-Chinese talks on normalizing relations that were initiated in Moscow were interrupted. China, together with the U.S. and Pakistan, began to support the Mujahedin.

In February-March 1979, I had the chance to participate in Soviet-Chinese negotiations on maritime navigation at the border sections of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers for one and a half months. The negotiations were held in Blagoveshchensk on the bank of the Amur, from which the opposite Chinese bank and the small – even by Chinese standards of the day – town of Heihe (now a thriving modern city with high-rise buildings) could easily be seen. The start of the negotiations almost coincided with the hottest phase of the Sino-Vietnamese War, in which the Soviet Union unequivocally supported the Vietnamese side.

To exert pressure on China, Soviet troops along the border were put



Conversation between Deng Xiaoping and M.S. Gorbachev, 1989

on alert. In the immediate vicinity of the border, tank maneuvers were held to provide psychological pressure. The atmosphere in the city was extremely tense. In fact, there was a curfew. During the nighttime hours, spotlights were turned on in the city center. An alarm system was set up on the bank of the Amur River. Walking onto the ice of the frozen river was forbidden. Shortly before our arrival, a young man had been shot dead by our border guards as he tried to run to the Chinese bank. A few bullets hit the Chinese bank and Chinese border guards protested.

Despite a particularly tense atmosphere, our negotiations on maritime navigation were surprisingly calm. The delegations did not have any ideological discussions. And the topic of the border crossing was not raised. The discussion was conducted by professionals who knew their business well and trusted their negotiating partners. There was also mutual interest in harmonizing navigation and dredging principles and practices before initiating navigation. We were duly received as guests on the Chinese bank, which we reached by traveling across the ice on border patrol ATVs. It was then that we started to understand that normalization could become a reality when the priority was concrete practical interests and not ideological dogmas or reciprocal reproaches of “you started it.”

There were some signs that the smooth flow of the river navigation negotiations had started to cause vexation in Moscow. The picture of uncompromising forceful pressure on Beijing with the aim of forcing it to stop the aggression against our ally Vietnam was being smudged. How come that Moscow had put armed soldiers along the whole border and its delegates were talking nonchalantly about navigating the rivers! Every time we reported to the Foreign Ministry via a government connection from the party regional committee building about the interim results of the discussion, Kapitsa impatiently asked: When will you finally finish up? I am being hounded here because of you. Kapitsa needs to be given his due: In this difficult situation for him and the Foreign Ministry in general, he never wavered and did not allow the negotiations to be disrupted, perfectly understanding how important timely open navigation was for those in the Far East.

A symbolic turning point that closed, as it were, the possibility of returning to the two countries' past relations occurred in April 1979, when the Chinese side declared the cessation, effective in April 1980, of the Stalin-era Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and China.

Some signs of a slight thaw in our relations with China began to be felt in 1982. This process was accelerated by Ronald Reagan's tough position on Taiwan and the Solidarity events in Poland (in seven years, China would deal with its own protests on Tiananmen Square). The death in January of Mikhail Suslov, the chief Stalinist ideologue in the political leadership of the country, and Brezhnev's speech in March in Tashkent, in which he declared a willingness to agree with China on mutually acceptable measures for improving bilateral relations, were significant.

A short while later, a policy article addressed to the Chinese leadership offering to rebuild relations appeared in the newspaper Pravda. Written in the bowels of the CPSU Central Committee, it successfully played on Beijing's disappointment in Washington's policy and Chinese fears that excessive rapprochement with the West would lead to the erosion of the regime in China. The Central Committee comrades absolutely correctly accented our main trump card: The USSR, unlike the U.S., never hesitated about Taiwan's affiliation to China, and even in the most difficult years of our relations, it has always stood with China in discussions of the Taiwan problem.

Confirmation of this position, and the Chinese insisted on it constantly, invariably brought us tangible dividends (at the highest level, as a

reproach, sometimes the fact was brought up that it was Stalin in 1950 who disrupted the already prepared landing of the Chinese Army on the island, while giving Kim Il-sung the go-ahead for war in Korea that involved China as well. However, China has never had any serious qualms about our current approach to the Taiwan question).

It so happened that in early 1982, I was dispatched to work at the Soviet Embassy in Japan as a China specialist. A few years before, the leadership of our country decided to send diplomats well-versed in Chinese realities to several key countries in order to keep an eye from afar on processes taking place in China, the nuances of Chinese foreign policy and to report on local assessments of the prospects for the development of Chinese political affairs in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. Our Chinese experts worked in the U.S., and some European and Asian countries. Japan was a very interesting observation point considering the huge Japanese interests in China and its own assessments of Chinese realities that often differed from American assessments.

In Tokyo, I had to process a vast array of information, not only from Japanese sources, but also from Hong Kong and Taiwan, and meet with Japanese specialists on China. In the first months after arriving, it was discovered that the Japanese were noting indications of a change in Chinese approaches to relations with the U.S. and the USSR, and in a very encouraging direction for us. The embassy began to report this to Moscow – very discreetly, of course.

Apparently, our information differed from the assessments prevailing in the center, which was not seeing any positive response from Beijing to numerous Soviet initiatives and seriously feared the establishment of an American-Chinese alliance hostile to the USSR. To ensure the uniformity of information coming to Moscow from abroad, a circular was sent to all “observation points” containing Chinese policy assessments made by the Soviet Embassy in Washington, which clearly predicted further Sino-American rapprochement.

I still do not cease to admire the reaction of our ambassador to Tokyo at the time, the former second secretary of the Moscow City Committee CPSU Vladimir Pavlov, who, realizing that his embassy was “out of synch,” did not immediately snap a salute but asked me during my next holiday in Moscow to ask for a meeting with Oleg Rakhmanin, the chief curator of Chinese policy in the CPSU Central Committee, to get explanations from him about what exactly was “wrong” in our embassy reports. After waiting for a few days in Moscow and never receiving that

meeting, I returned from the holiday and was immediately summoned to the ambassador. He was seemingly very put out by the fact that his colleague from the Central Committee did not deign to provide any explanations, and at the end of the conversation, he told me brusquely: Well then, write what you know!

A year or two later, few people doubted that a real thaw was starting in Soviet-Chinese relations. A *modus operandi* acceptable to the two sides was found at the border talks, the atmosphere improved during negotiations on bilateral relations that began in October 1982, and reciprocal trips became more frequent. China began to remove anti-Soviet provisions from the main party and state documents. However, mutual propaganda attacks continued. China continued to denounce "Soviet hegemony," and our press accused China of abandoning the basic principles of socialism (as amazing as that sounds today!).

The moratoriums on publishing materials critical of China in the Soviet press that we periodically declared to demonstrate our good will could not stop the propaganda momentum for the time being. China did not respond to those gestures. And on our part, mercantile considerations were also part of the mix. A lot of money was paid for propaganda publications, comparable to a monthly salary. Therefore, any break in the propaganda was perceived by some as a blow to their own pocketbook. I recall that during the next holiday, a respectable comrade in a high-level office half-jokingly told me: Your embassy should recommend that it is time to stop the latest moratorium; our fees are drying up.

Perhaps the last flare-up occurred in April 1984, when the Chinese Army began new armed provocations on the border with Vietnam, seeking the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. In those days, during some sporting event involving the ambassadors of socialist countries held at our embassy compound in Japan, the ambassador of Vietnam asked me with great concern whether the border clashes would turn into a new full-blown war with China.

On the basis of the information I had at the time and my own feelings, I expressed my strong conviction to the ambassador that China, which was in the middle of major economic transformations and strongly dependent on foreign investment flows, would not dare start an unprovoked war that would inevitably damage its reputation in the world, put its carefully cultivated image of a peace-loving state in question and seriously hinder the implementation of reforms. And indeed, China halted military actions shortly thereafter.



Students welcome M.S. Gorbachev, 1989

In late 1984 and the first half of 1985, Soviet-Chinese economic, trade and scientific-technical cooperation was actively restored at the governmental level.

The task of political normalization was coming to the fore with increasing urgency. Both sides understood that postponing normalization any longer would significantly narrow their opportunities for maneuvering in world politics and prevent the full utilization of the bilateral potential (for example, in sensitive high-tech areas, which were of particular interest to the Chinese side). However, the leadership of both countries sought to build movement in this direction in a way that would avoid creating the impression of surrendering principled positions or making some decisions under the pressure of the other side. Critically important was the desire to act with extreme caution so as not to disrupt this process that in the early stages was very unsteady and far from irreversible. As a result, the final formalization of the new relationship took three and a half years.

Deng Xiaoping first tested the waters shortly after Gorbachev came to power in the USSR. It is possible to assume that the Chinese political veteran reasoned that the new Soviet leader had not been involved in the Soviet-Sino split, was not involved in decisions to pressure China, was

not familiar with the history of relations between the two countries, and was broad-minded and had obvious political ambitions.

A tempting proposal was made in a message transmitted through Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu: Deng Xiaoping would be ready to meet with Gorbachev personally to discuss normalization and under only one condition: The Soviet Union must get Vietnam to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea. That is, all the other grievances with Moscow (including such seemingly major ones as the military threat from the "1 million" Soviet troops stationed on the border with China and in Mongolia, the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Russia's "seizure" of Chinese territories under past "unequal agreements," etc.) were left for later, as it were. The priority objective for Deng was breaking USSR-Vietnam ties that were very dangerous for China and that offered Moscow the opportunity to exert pressure on Beijing from the north and south at a time when southern China was undergoing very radical economic experiments and receiving the first major foreign investments. Apparently, Deng was also driven by personal motives, since he was the one who had initiated the attack on Vietnam in 1979 and commanded Chinese troops in this rather unsuccessful war for China. Hence the desire to put Hanoi in its place, but this time now with the help of Moscow.

The Soviet side saw this game and reacted predictably: It was willing to meet, but without any preconditions. The tug-of-war continued until the problems dividing the two countries dissolved on their own. In the face of growing détente with the West, Soviet armed divisions began to be withdrawn from Mongolia as part of a reduction of armed forces; progress was noted toward negotiations on military disengagement and confidence-building measures on the Chinese border, with its demarcation proceeding rather smoothly; and preparations were made for withdrawing the Soviet military contingent from Afghanistan. By 1989, progress had been made on the Cambodian issue. As a result, already by late 1988, the parties began practical preparations for a Soviet-Sino summit.

The USSR Foreign Ministry prepared the first drafts of materials for Gorbachev. The task before us was without exaggeration monstrously complex. Everyone was perfectly aware of the enormous responsibility: A tone needed to be found for the forthcoming talks and negotiations that would, first, ensure mutual understanding on a maximum range of problems (and besides purely bilateral issues, the discussions in Beijing could encompass such topics as the world situation, the policies of the U.S.

administration, domestic processes in socialist countries, Indochina, Japan, Korea, etc. And we had to prepare for such a delicate topic as the student unrest in China that had begun in the spring), and second, guarantee the irreversibility of détente by launching large-scale interaction in specific areas.

As May 1989 drew near, a special group of experts from the CPSU Central Committee, Foreign Ministry staff and prominent experts on China was formed that was to put the finishing touches on the documents and materials. To ensure effectiveness and confidentiality, the group worked in a hotel near Old Arbat that was exclusively reserved for the Central Committee. The prepared materials were sent to Gorbachev's secretariat. The head of the USSR also understood the historical nature of the upcoming trip to Beijing. About a week or two before leaving for Beijing, he drastically freed up his work schedule to focus on studying materials for the upcoming talks, negotiations and public remarks.

The key event during Gorbachev's stay in Beijing was a talk with Deng Xiaoping. It was during this talk that Deng's proposed formula of "close the past, open the future" was adopted. Thus, the sides relegated to the past the complex relations of tsarist Russia and imperial China, Soviet Russia's support of the revolutionary movement in China, the Comintern's tutelage of the Chinese Communist Party, the USSR's cooperation with the Kuomintang in the anti-Japanese war, joint participation with China in the Korean War, the anti-Japanese Soviet-Chinese Treaty of 1950, the older-younger brother relationship under Stalin, large-scale Soviet assistance to China after the victory of the Chinese revolution, the ideological disputes of the late 1950s-mid-1980s, border provocations, and much more.

However, Deng nevertheless lectured Gorbachev about this past, but the Soviet leader seemed to think it best not to respond. New prospects were looming: Moscow and Beijing for the first time in the 20th century began to build their relations on a nonideological, pragmatic basis, which just a decade and a half later, in the early 21st century, would allow them to be satisfactorily characterized as the best they have ever been.

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