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CONTENTS

WORLD ISSUES

- On the Struggle for Peace** *S. Karaganov* 1
- Back to the Russia-U.S.-China Triangle?** *S. Trush* 12
- Switzerland's Relations With the EU:
Integration Without Membership** *O. Trofimova* 21
- Libya: The Burden of Transition** *A. Frolov* 37
- The Latin American Region and the "New Normal":
Where Do We Fit In?** *V. Davydov, V. Tayar* 57
- From Global to Regional Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism:
The CIS ATC's Experience and Prospects** *A. Arefyev* 70

VIEWPOINT

- In Defense of Westphalian Principles** *K. Gajiev* 75

INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY

- Basic Principles of Russian State Policy
on International Information Security:
Regulation and Implementation Mechanisms** *S. Boyko* 89
- Cooperation or Confrontation: Which Way
Will the World Powers Choose to Confront
Global ICT Threats?** *N. Romashkina* 99

ROUNDTABLE

Russia and the Islamic World

*A. Oganesyanyan, R. Abdulatipov, K. Shuvalov,
Hussein El-Shafi, Albir Krganov, S. Vorobiev*

COMMENTARY AND ESSAYS

“Sick” States and How to Cure Them	<i>V. Vorobiev, R. Iliev</i>	123
Education in the Field of Nonproliferation: Russia’s Interests and Resources	<i>V. Orlov, A. Margoev</i>	134
Maritime Freight in the Mediterranean Countries of the European Union	<i>M. Kolesnikova</i>	146
Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Goods and Measures Against It	<i>M. Oreshina</i>	159
“I Do Not Feel Like a Stranger When I Am in Russia”	<i>Abdel Hakim Abdel Nasser</i>	173
Russian-Language Radio Broadcasting by Stations Outside Russia	<i>A. Bystritsky, A. Sharikov, V. Berezhnaya, A. Shchennikov</i>	177

OPINION

Bringing the Spirit of Openness to the World	<i>Li Hui</i>	192
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RUSSIA AND OTHER NATIONS

Russia and Iceland: Strengthening Ties in Keeping With Tradition	<i>A. Zaitsev</i>	201
Russia and Guinea: 60 Years of Diplomatic Relations	<i>A. Bregadze</i>	208

HISTORY AND MEMOIRS

Consular Services of Russia in the Second Quarter of the 19th Century	<i>O. Lebedeva</i>	215
The Disaster of the Frigate <i>Alexander Nevsky</i>: Tragedy or Rescue Story?	<i>M. Vanin</i>	230
The Reburial of the Remains of Suvorov Army Soldiers in the Chapel of the Dead on Switzerland’s St. Gotthard Pass	<i>K. Nefedov</i>	236

IN MEMORIAM

A Final Bow: In Memory of Baron Eduard Falz-Fein	<i>N. Danilevich</i>	241
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On the Struggle for Peace

S. Karaganov

THE U.S.'S WITHDRAWAL from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) may prove useful – however, only if it gets normal people throughout the world and, most importantly, many of us Russians to come out of years-long hibernation. This hibernation could be described as strategic parasitism.

There has not been a large-scale war in the world for more than 70 years now. Over the past three decades, relative peace has been accompanied by a rapid increase in living standards for billions of people. People have begun to think that this state of peace is not only normal but will also stay with us forever.

Meanwhile, 95% of it is the result not of our responsibility and peacefulness, but the fear of a nuclear apocalypse and hope for mutual nuclear deterrence. However, reliance on it is becoming increasingly fragile. In recent years, strategic stability (this term usually refers to the level of the threat of nuclear war) is rapidly deteriorating. I will venture to say that the current level of threat is comparable to the time right after the Cuban missile crisis that almost led to a global catastrophe. Prior to it, in the 1950s, the situation was perhaps even worse than it is now: an uncontrolled arms race and bitter hostility. Nevertheless, the vector of development is toward the 1950s. Russia's policy needs reviewing. The struggle to avert war should become the most important vector of this policy.

A New Strategic Situation

I WILL BEGIN by describing not military and technical, but political and psychological factors. During the first four decades after World War II,

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states were ruled by people who remembered its horrors and were really afraid of war, especially a nuclear war, with reckless adventurers and radicals being consistently sidelined. As a person who has studied the history of the Cold War, I can affirm that after the 1940s, the most menacing doctrines were a bluff, albeit a dangerous one, designed to enhance the deterrence effect and intimidate the adversary, and of course, serve the interests of military-industrial complexes. I can even prove that the Americans, despite all of their statements, had no plans to use nuclear weapons in the event of war in Europe so as not to provoke a retaliatory strike against their territory.

Soviet military plans have not yet been declassified, but I am convinced that they were primarily aimed at avoiding war. N.S. Khrushchev was replaced not least because he brought about the Caribbean crisis. The Soviet leadership, which had emerged from the Great Patriotic War, was doing all it could to avoid such a repetition. (They even overdid it, turning the USSR into a mechanism for servicing a giant military machine, which in the end overstrained it.)

You can mock that generation's "struggle for peace," but it kept the peace. These days, the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of those who fought are at the helm; the fear of war is increasingly disappearing, and there are more and more bellicose statements. Taking peace for granted, forgetting the horrors of war, and the seemingly innocuous computer war games or certain TV serials – all this is also weakening the resistance of societies. The disturbing uncertainty that exists in the minds of both the elites and the masses encourages simple solutions.

The situation is aggravated by the sharply deteriorating quality of the ruling classes over the last two or three decades, especially in the West. The American problem is out in the open, for all to see. As for Europe – it is enough to compare the Old World leaders of 30-50 years ago with current ones. The situation is only partially helped by the generally higher standards of emerging "new" actors. However, so far, they are not playing a leading role in defining the vector of development with regard to international security, except in Russia.

The unprecedentedly rapid changes in the lineup of forces in the world that have occurred over the past 15 to 20 years are a powerful destabilization factor. Until just recently, it seemed that the West won the final victory. However, at present, it is on the defensive. The U.S. is trying to counterattack, pursuing an "America First" economic policy and undertaking a major rearmament program. It looks like the slogan of past

decades – “How to deal with the rise of the new” – has to give way to another slogan: “How to deal with the decline of the old.”

Two globalist ideologies of the 20th century – communism and liberalism – have collapsed. The vacuum is being rapidly filled by nationalism. This trend is being intensified by the rise of Asia, a continent of nation states. Old conflicts are being unfrozen

there or new ones are emerging right before our eyes: Japan and its neighbors, China and India, Pakistan and India, and Sunni monarchies and Iran.

The situation in the military-technical sphere is disturbing. There was a new round of nuclear proliferation. A series of attacks against countries that have abandoned nuclear weapons, primarily Iraq and Libya, greatly strengthens the position of those who want to acquire such weapons. Furthermore, this is becoming technologically easier. The U.S.’s withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, its recent exit from the Iran nuclear deal and now also from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) are cutting the ground from under the nonproliferation regime, a key component of which was the commitment to reduce arsenals.

An extremely dangerous cyber arms race has begun. Certain states may already have strategic cyber weapons – i.e., the capability to destroy economies and societies. About 15 years ago, Russia and China proposed that cyber weapons and the entire cyber sphere be placed under control. The United States refused, hoping to maintain its leadership in this area. Now the genie is out of the bottle, and it is unlikely that the situation can be placed under control. Meanwhile, cyber weapons are perhaps the cheapest means of mass destruction. The question is: How will they get into terrorists’ hands and when, and how will it be possible to distinguish between terrorist attacks and attacks by states? And how to deter such attacks, which will most likely be covert?

A new generation of nonnuclear weapons has been developed or is being developed. They are essentially strategic, blurring the distinction between nuclear and conventional warfare. As for the U.S., just as during Cold War years (at that time, there was a bazooka with a nuclear warhead and a “neutron bomb”), it plans to develop and deploy super-low-yield nuclear weapons under the pretext of making nuclear deterrence more

The current level of threat is comparable to the time right after the Cuban missile crisis that almost led to a global catastrophe.

reliable and credible. However, the result is the same – namely, the nuclear threshold is lowered, and the threat of war increases. It is quite likely that this path will be followed or is already being followed by other nuclear powers, which are keeping their projects tightly under wraps.

The ongoing wave of smart robotic weapons programs is highly disturbing. It blurs the line between war and peace and weakens political control and the responsibility of leaders for their actions.

The arms control regime, established in the 1970s and 1980s and extended into the past decade with regard to strategic offensive forces, had certain flaws. It was more beneficial to a party that had a propaganda advantage, setting its own rules. From day one, this was the U.S. Very often, the negotiation process imposed or even provoked the buildup of arms and military spending in order to accumulate so-called bargaining chips. The arms control process was also used to militarize politics and thinking. It was based mostly on an artificial criterion, namely, the parity or numerical equality of the parties' armaments and armed forces. It was particularly senseless in the context of negotiations on the conventional armed forces in Europe, where Napoleon invariably routed large armies and 300 Spartans held back the 100,000-strong Persian army.

However, in the past, the arms control process was generally useful. It helped improve the political climate, was conducive to greater predictability and reduced distrust. At some point (in the 1970s), it helped halt the buildup of strategic potentials, which had long been unnecessary for both parties. (There were tens of thousands of warheads.)

Be that as it may, this process is practically dead now. At first, NATO refused to modernize the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, although the armed forces of the former Warsaw Pact countries, as well as of some Soviet republics, ended up on its side and the bloc gained numerical superiority. The U.S.'s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2002 in the hope of achieving superiority dealt a fatal blow to the process.

This treaty was the foundation of the entire strategic arms limitation concept. Predictably, the US failed to achieve superiority. Russia sprang into action and began to modernize its strategic and substrategic forces, developing a new generation of systems that can assuredly penetrate any conceivable missile defense system. Vladimir Putin spoke about these weapons in his well-known address to the Federal Assembly on March 1, 2018. They preemptively devalue the U.S.'s huge investment plans. There is good reason to say that so far Russia is winning the arms race without even becoming involved in it.

The current administration has once again cast itself in the role of a Herostratus, announcing the withdrawal from the INF Treaty. It seems that the turn of the last strategic arms limitation treaty – i.e., the New START Treaty – will also come, sooner or later. There are several goals. First of all, to try once again to restore military superiority on which the West's 500-year domination in the global political and economic system, as well as in culture and ideology, was based. An even more obvious goal is to pave the way for the planned massive modernization of strategic systems in order to fuel the strategic nuclear weapons segment of the military-industrial complex that has somewhat run out of steam over the past three decades.

The U.S. is making no secret of its intention to get Russia and China involved in the arms race. This would be beneficial for the U.S., which so far is richer. I am convinced that there is also an expectation that by provoking Russia and China into creating new-generation intermediate-range systems, the United States will deepen their mutual suspicions. After all, such systems can be regarded as being directed against each other. A part of the American strategic community also has plans to provoke a new "missile crisis" in Europe modeled on the 1970s and the 1980s, which heightened tensions on the subcontinent and deepened its split.

One such attempt was already made a few years ago, when a number of pro-Atlantic and pro-American European figures proposed the idea of launching negotiations on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, of which Russia has more. (These weapons are necessary to compensate for NATO's conventional superiority, as well as for other purposes.) The plan was to create an artificial gap that would justify the deployment of new U.S. systems and militarize European politics. However, Russia, despite persistent calls from certain domestic arms control experts, who wanted to go back to the good old days, did not walk into the trap.

Maybe there are already genetic weapons, including the capability to covertly infect seed material, causing a catastrophic drop of harvest, livestock losses, and ultimately even to affect ethnic and social groups.

Against the backdrop of these dangerous strategic and political shifts, a vicious propaganda war has been unleashed, with the demonization of the opposing side, especially Russia. This propaganda cannonade is strongly reminiscent of psychological preparations for war, although it may have other roots, primarily domestic. This is particularly evident in

the United States. The sum total of the abovementioned factors points to an unequivocal conclusion: This is an acute prewar situation.

Russia's Policy

IF THIS DESCRIPTION is correct, Russia's policy does not fully measure up to current challenges. Of course, our contribution to international security is more than tangible. In addition, I will venture to say that Russia is its most important source in the world, especially since restoring its active strategic deterrence capability. Let us recall how, during the period of Russia's political, economic, moral, and military weakness, the "defensive alliance of democratic states," i.e., NATO, believing that it had complete freedom of action, like a mad dog on the loose, committed a series of aggressions – against Yugoslavia, Libya and Iraq (with the participation of most of its member countries).

In Syria, Russia stopped a series of "color revolutions" that destabilized entire regions and destroyed the normal life of countries and peoples. In Ukraine, NATO expansion, threatening a big war, was also stopped, albeit belatedly. Through our cooperation with China, we maintain stability, development and peace in Central Eurasia.

However, in recent years, Russia's foreign policy (except for its most important, purely military and Middle Eastern components) has been clearly losing traction. It has lost its fervor and momentum.

Russia has failed to put forward an attractive concept of the world order that it would like to create in conjunction with its partners. The concepts of multipolarity or opposition to the U.S.'s attempts to regain its dominant position are basically correct but pointed to the past, do not lead forward and have no appeal anymore. Russia put forward the idea of creating a greater Eurasia and received formal support for it from Beijing but did not develop it or flesh it out. It may suffer the same fate as the 1990s ideas of creating a new all-European security system based on the OSCE or the new European security treaty initiative of the 2000s. Russia proclaimed them and then drew back, allowing its partners/rivals, who were afraid of change, to bury those ideas.

Together with our partners, we created and launched the Eurasian Economic Union. It made a lot of headway in the first two or three years of its existence, but then it got stuck. It seems that there are no new ideas or the will to promote them. A "pivot to the East," to new promising markets was announced. However, it will also run out of steam if it remains

purely economic, is not backed up by humanitarian, cultural and educational components, remains a development project for just one, albeit important region, i.e., the Russian Far East, and does not become nationwide, unless it includes other Siberian regions.

It is also necessary to review the concept for the development of Russia's eastern regions, taking into account changes on Asian markets. There is a pressing need for efforts to put in place a regional security system in Northeast Asia. We proclaimed our goal and it looked like our partners agreed. But then, we apparently forgot about it. However, relations between countries in the region are strained. Russia is the only country that has more or less acceptable relations with all of them.

Considering the crisis of the European project and the fact that most European elites are preoccupied with its salvation, as well as with their own salvation, not much can be achieved in Europe so far. Nevertheless, it is possible and necessary to work with people, corporations and countries. It is essential to propose long-term co-development projects to the Europeans – evidently in a Eurasian format. One reason for the failure of the previous round of rapprochement with Europe was the lack of a common co-development goal or its lackluster promotion (the so-called four spaces of close cooperation between Russia and the EU).

By contrast, Russia pursued projects that were no longer relevant. This line must not be allowed to continue. Why keep participating in resurrecting institutions from the Cold War era that have outlived their usefulness? We should not get carried away (like the Americans) with destroying institutions and regimes. However, trying to resurrect the dead is also unnecessary and absurd. Even so, the desire to maintain a political dialogue with NATO is completely incomprehensible. Didn't we take our appeasement efforts a bit too far? With our willingness to maintain an empty dialogue in the past, we legitimized an irrelevant alliance that had outlived its usefulness, and helped it endure and expand. They refused to acknowledge that confrontation was its *raison d'être*. So when it goes away, pro-NATO circles try to restore it, and this is what is happening. Holding on to this function and afraid of European members consolidating their position within the alliance, the NATO bureaucracy refused even to deal with the most pressing problems, namely reinforcing Europe's southern borders. Now the latter is paying the price for that.

Another little known, but originally very important function of the alliance is to impose and support regimes amenable to the U.S. and oriented toward it. This function has now come up to the surface again, as

NATO is drawing in countries that do not face any external threat from anywhere even in theory. Are we interested in such orders being imposed?

If at the initial stages of our engagement with NATO we still entertained the hope that we sought cooperation with a “defensive alliance of democratic countries,” how can we now justify our hope for “equal cooperation” with an alliance that has stained itself with bloody aggression? This line is not only morally flawed, but also impractical, since it encourages the worst in our partners. The societies of NATO member countries, as well as of potential members, should be aware that the alliance is guilty of aggression and war crimes.

Another cause for concern is our desire to come to terms with the United States no matter what and go begging for a meeting with Donald Trump, even though he does not have a positive agenda yet and cannot have one in principle. I am also surprised by the extent to which the situation in the U.S. is being discussed in the Russian media. This fascination with America also comes from something that belongs in mothballs, from the time when Soviet people tried to catch up with the U.S. or at least buy blue jeans there, while new Russia in effect treated the U.S. as a model to emulate. Maximum possible detachment, coupled with dialogue between the militaries, would be a far more productive line to follow. In the future, when the Americans no longer have domestic reasons for hostility, rapprochement may be possible.

What's Next?

MANY ANSWERS are contained in the questions that were asked earlier, or they are not a subject of discussion in this article. I will consider some of the most obvious things.

I will not talk about the lack of an accelerated economic development strategy as the most effective response to the Cold War unleashed against us. I will focus on certain foreign policy areas that, in my opinion, are important and viable.

If political dialogue with NATO is to continue it should necessarily include the issue of reparations and compensation to victims of the bloc's aggression – not only and not so much Crimea or the Donets Basin. Military dialogue – far more active than at present – is indispensable: with the NATO Military Committee and the defense ministries of key member countries. Russia's permanent representative to NATO should be a general, with civilian advisers.

It is advisable to scale down military activity in the west and, as far as possible, not to succumb to provocations that are organized and will continue to be organized by circles interested in restoring the pattern of relations of the past Cold War in the Atlantic world, as well as in relations with Russia. (European elites are trying to retain the American “umbrella” while the Americans, who are pulling out and are not willing to pay for it, would like to leave the subcontinent as divided as possible and its Western part as dependent as possible.)

It is certainly inadvisable to play up our rather modest, albeit relatively effective defensive efforts, constantly stressing instead that military spending in NATO countries is almost 20 times higher than in Russia and that they have far more men under arms.

The best approach is mocking detachment. This is the most that our partners deserve so far.

It would be a good idea to propose a European security dialogue to the EU, which is looking for an opportunity to become a key player in this sphere. We have many common and even aligning interests. Dialogue would also be constructive in preventing this vector from slipping into the old course of confrontation with Russia.

Rapid military-technical response to the U.S.’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty is not the best possible option. This step is bad for all. However, the Americans must pay the maximum price for it, becoming in the eyes of the world community what they really are – namely, the main challenge to international security and strategic stability.

If it becomes necessary to respond with additional armaments, they can be deployed later. The same line should evidently be followed in case Washington does not extend the New START Treaty, which is a likely scenario but is not a foregone conclusion.

However, in any case, there will be a change in the general approach toward the role of the arms limitation process in ensuring global security. Restoring it to its old form is impossible: both because of the U.S.’s destructive position and because the military-technical situation has become more complicated. How to count and what to count – this was extremely difficult even in the past. However, today, this is becoming simply impossible because of the complexity of modern weapons systems, the blurring of boundaries between them and the increasing number of strategic players.

It is imperative to move away from the parity principle. A part of the strategic capability inherited from the past – specifically sea- and ground-

launched intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles, as well as strategic aviation – should be maintained, modernized and upgraded. They are needed to maintain the status quo and keep the other side in fear of the inevitability of massive retaliation for aggressive actions. In this context, submarines, i.e., torpedoes with giant warheads that can “sleep” for years off the coast of countries pursuing hostile policies, and new heavy missiles that can counterattack from any direction are highly valuable assets.

Then it is essential to move into the “gray zone.” In theory, openness is useful for avoiding mistakes and making the strategic environment more predictable. However, so far, it is beneficial primarily for the richer party that has the capability to stay ahead in the arms race, setting its pace and its vector. The Soviet Union tried to catch up, among other things, by maintaining “parity,” and overstrained itself. If the other side follows a policy of hostility, once again chooses to pursue the chimera of superiority and disregards the existing agreements, playing by the old rules is counterproductive. It is better to put more emphasis on asymmetric, partially concealed and cheaper options. If it proves impossible to halt the arms race, then it is better to win this race with ability, not with numbers. The concept of “strategic ambiguity” – i.e., a situation where, hypothetically speaking, the opposite side does not know what you will pull out if you reach in your pocket: a handkerchief or a handgun – would also be helpful.

Of course, the proposed course of action is not optimal. It increases risks. Nevertheless, continuing to move further along the old path of the arms race, with its restrictions and limitations, is senseless and prohibitively expensive, especially with partners who cannot be trusted after what they did.

In the future, a partial alternative to the old arms limitation process could be dialogue between Russia, China and the U.S. on international strategic stability measures. Other strategically important powers – nuclear and threshold states – could be invited to join this forum.

Such a format should be backed up by strengthening a network of hot-lines between top military officials and politicians in major powers in order to avoid war, accidental escalation or provocation.

Treaty-based arms limitations and reductions could subsequently be replaced with coordinated unilateral steps.

Efforts should be made to limit certain areas of the arms race, in particular outer space and genetic weapons. Such efforts are unlikely to yield

results but can lay the groundwork for the future. So far, arms control efforts are producing no results. We are at a historical point where “losers” are using all tools at their disposal – military, political, economic, and informational – to stop or reverse the course of history, while “winners” are not sure of their victory, its meaning or its benefits.

The main thing now is to prevent a new large-scale war, which is increasingly likely and can destroy both “winners” and “losers” in the history of humankind.

Therefore, the key policy area for all responsible forces and countries, above all Russia, should be the struggle for peace – through effective deterrence, by establishing multilateral military and political communication systems and exposing forces and countries responsible for escalating confrontation and a new arms race. It is vital to rouse humankind from the lethargy of strategic parasitism, activate its protective functions and form the broadest possible peace coalitions. Naturally, this old/new struggle should be conducted with the use of modern methods and technologies. As for how it should be conducted, I believe PR and propaganda experts should think about that. This struggle is a worthy application of their professional skills. However, the decision to begin it should be made by society and the state, getting as many countries and community groups as possible involved in it. Still, a positive agenda is by far the most important thing here.

At present, the new struggle against the growing threat of war is being urged almost exclusively by worthy “old men” who prevented a nuclear disaster in the past, but also failed to create a reliable security system after the last Cold War, and “lost peace.” New age groups, social and professional groups, which are currently asleep, should be involved in this struggle.

The struggle for peace is not about nostalgia for younger days. I am thoroughly disgusted with Cold War lies and hatred. However, our stupidity, naivety and faith in good luck during the postwar period are equally shameful. These days, our relative passivity against the backdrop of what I regard as a very dangerous situation is also very disturbing. No one except us will be able to protect our interests or vital global interests.

Key words: INF Treaty, AMB Treaty, New START Treaty, co-development goals, dialogue between Russia, China and the U.S.

Back to the Russia-U.S.-China “Triangle”?

S. Trush

FOR SEVERAL MONTHS, the world expert community has been actively discussing the obvious resurgence of the Russia-the U.S.-China “triangle.” This happens every time when the key, or even “sacral,” problem of international interaction – the problem of security – comes to the fore. The high level of confrontation inside two of the three sides of the “triangle” – the U.S. vs. Russia and China vs. the U.S. – predetermined this resurgence against the background of Donald Trump’s non-orthodox and unyielding foreign policy.

He brought to the White House his “no-nonsense” approach to add more prominence to the traditional efforts of American pragmatists to keep Russia and China apart. His obvious preference for Moscow and his clear intention to rely on it to oppose China were defused by an unprecedented attack launched against him by the anti-Trump opposition inside the United States. Due to the internal balance of power, Russia was chosen as the potentially most promising target with the best foreign policy dividends perfectly suited to the task of either pushing the president out of the White House or at least, narrowing down his political leeway.

This attack and the fairly painful Korean issue created a pause in the America-China relations obvious in the first year of the new administration that ended late in 2017 by the “tough and realistic” description in the National Security Strategy of the United States of “revisionist powers of Russia and China... that challenge American power.” This launched an aggressive trade war with China; today, it has become abundantly clear that it is part of the exacerbated systemic confrontation with China over economic, technological and military leadership.

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So far, President Trump has not moved too far on the Russian issue, yet the Russian card remains on the table in the context of his China agenda. As a businessman, he has pushed aside preliminary diplomatic moves. In the format of bilateral talks in Helsinki, he spoke a lot about China's "sins."

In October 2018 in Moscow, John Bolton, the president's national security advisor, did not beat about the bush: he invited Russia to put pressure on China to conclude a new, tripartite treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles (INF Treaty) to alleviate America's con-

cerns. Shortly before that, the U.S. had imposed, within the regime of anti-Russian sanctions, "secondary" sanctions on the Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China (CMC) for buying Russian fighter jets and surface-to-air missiles.

The discussion of the Chinese intermediate-range missiles started by President Trump, as well as of possible tripartite talks on arms control with China's participation, suits Russia's interests as directly related to its concerns caused by the developing nuclear missile potential of China.

The "Triangle" in the Past

AT CERTAIN PERIODS, the "triangular nature" of diplomatic relations between Russia, China and the United States was visible while at others it stayed in shadows.

It was in the late 1960s that the "triangular" approach first surfaced to become increasingly important in the policies of the USSR, the U.S. and China till the Soviet Union's disintegration in the early 1990s. The dominating resources of the three countries and their motivations and risks acutely felt in the security sphere served the cornerstone of the "triangular" approach. The Cold War at its height, Washington's frantic efforts to find a way out of the Vietnamese trap, the centrifugal trends in the communist bloc, and the conflict on the brink a full-scale or even nuclear confrontation between Moscow and Beijing forced the three power centers to start active diplomatic maneuvering.

This maneuvering that was going on along each of the axes of the

already outlined “triangle” for obvious international, internal American and internal Chinese reasons was most obvious in the relations between China and the United States. Indeed, Washington urgently needed a strategy for a pullout of the Vietnam war; the strategic dialogue between the U.S. and the USSR was gaining momentum; the Chinese were “paranoid” about a nuclear strike by Moscow after the Zhenbao (Damansky) island incident; Mao finally liquidated domestic opposition; President Nixon, on his side, needed diplomatic breakthroughs to make up for his problems at home. Hence his historic visit to Beijing and the no less important Shanghai Communique that fixed the compromises on Taiwan and other key issues.

Beijing gained the main prize in the form of guarantees in case of a Soviet nuclear strike. Assisted by Beijing, America managed to wriggle out, more or less painlessly, of the Vietnam war and, what was even more important, to consolidate its positions on the START negotiations.

Throughout the 1980s, the “triangular” motives still figured prominently in the relations between the United States, China and the Soviet Union. Several qualitatively new factors that strongly affected the foreign strategy of the three angles were caused by Gorbachev’s advent to power, reforms of Deng Xiaoping and, to a lesser extent, by President Reagan’s conservatism.

In the early 1990s, the Soviet Union disintegrated, the bipolar world collapsed, China carried out successful market reforms, and globalization was spreading across the world. The old “triangular” approaches and actions no longer fit the much wider range of interests between the United States, China and the Russian Federation. At that time, as distinct from the 1960-1980s, confrontation became less intense and security risks less prominent in the interaction of the three countries. They moved to a much more complicated matrix of competitive, conflicting yet mutually complimentary interests that brought them closer together.

The growing economic and financial interdependence between China and the United States was superimposed on the still prominent contradictions in geopolitics and the military sphere. The “triangular” logic made it hard, if not impossible, to explain the over \$600 billion trade turnover between the rivals or the fact that China kept and continues to keep a considerable part of its GDP in American currency and American securities that makes it dependent, *inter alia*, on Western stock exchange.

The ideological interaction between China and the United States hardly fits, likewise, the “triangular” logic; their mutually exclusive basic

values – collectivism and individualism; state-oriented ideology and human rights – go together with the values of market economy, private entrepreneurship and the ideology of consumerism accepted on both sides of the Pacific. China’s economic development model that both accepts and rejects American experience remains eclectic.

The three capitals demonstrate that the “triangle” has been revived because of the growing security risks for the United States, China and Russia. The American side is talking about it openly and aggressively while Russia and China prefer indirect and reflective responses.

The gradually increasing intensity of military cooperation between China and Russia is the more eloquent confirmation of the above: in September 2018 when its trade war with the United States was at its height, China joined Vostok-2018, the biggest Russian military exercises. The same fully applies to the naval exercises in the South China Sea in 2016 and in the Baltic in 2017; exclusive supplies of Russian arms to China including anti-aircraft weapon system S-400 Triumpf and Su-35. It takes no wisdom to guess which of the current possible targets finds these measures especially “toxic.”

The intensity of this rapprochement is further confirmed by the frequency of summits and personal interaction of the leaders, the developed institutionalized structure of bilateral cooperation stretching from the lowest level to intergovernmental commissions and formats of the SCO and Russia’s biggest foreign trade turnover with China during the last seven years.

The reviving “triangular” diplomacy will change very much in tune with the international background. First, there will be no ideological or axiological components. In the 1960-1980s, pragmatic behind-the-scenes maneuvering Kissinger-style notwithstanding, the fact that the world was divided into two social and economic camps and had two axiological paradigms strongly affected yet did not determine the motivation of actors.

First, the class solidarity with Vietnam that was fighting the imperialist United States with Soviet and Chinese weapons and advisors was the only factor that kept Moscow and Beijing together and that Washington had to consider. The same logic of loyalty to their common ideology did not allow Moscow to move away from the one-China principle and exploit the “Taiwan factor” at the height of its confrontation with Beijing.

Second, as distinct from the past, the military-strategic and especially nuclear might is more evenly distributed today between the sides of the “triangle.” In the 1960-1980s, a possibility of nuclear intimidation and

nuclear retaliation by the People's Republic of China was perceived, in the United States in the first place, as close to zero. Now the situation is different, even if the United States and Russia still dominate the nuclear-missile sphere. In the last decades, China moved the non-nuclear components of its military potential closer to the U.S. and RF. This adds special weight to bilateral coalitions and increases the risks for third parties.

The share of the economic component of Russia's might in the "triangle" became much smaller: 3% of the world's GDP PPP against Chinese 18% and American 15%. Russia's counteragents will never miss a chance to capitalize on this highly negative factor when they need it.

There is another and a no less important nuance of current "triangularity": regional power centers have acquired much stronger military-economic and strategic resources. This is true of nuclear (India, Pakistan and North Korea) and non-nuclear (Japan, Iran and Turkey) regional centers. These regional actors might add new hues to "triangular" security, that is, to multisided, strategic talks of which the United States is talking as probable. Today, when talking about their "triangular" security, China, Russia and the United States will have to consider the risks created by regional actors.

The Missile "Triangle"

IT SEEMS that Donald Trump's recent announcement about his country's withdrawal from the INF Treaty with Russia and his suggestion to draw China into negotiations on a new INF Treaty is the most obvious and peremptory statement in "triangular" tonality. It seems that the political message of the statement made by John Bolton in Moscow consists of several diplomatic layers: (1) it is propaganda; (2) it obviously reflects the objective military-strategic interests of the United States in the APR in the first place; and (3) it appeals to Russia's interests and concerns created by China's missile potential.

For the purposes of propaganda, the United States has suggested that Russia should persuade China to join the talks on a new tripartite INF Treaty in the interests of continued control over the shorter- and intermediate-range missiles. In view of the present high level of cooperation between Russia and China, this suggestion should be defined as an unrealistic and, therefore, impossible mission. Moscow will hardly transform its status of a "strategic partner" of the PRC into a negotiation partner in the "triangular" format or, worse still, an opponent in negotiations on the highly sensitive problem.

This will undermine or even destroy the high quality of interaction between Russia and China. This would have been highly illogical since the relations between Russia and the United States are in an acute crisis confirmed by mutual sanctions and sharp rhetoric. The interaction between Russia and China has been patiently tuned up for the last two decades and as such is highly valued by both capitals living under pressure of the Trump administration.

The propaganda effect of the American suggestion could be explained by the practically 100% assured Russia's refusal that can be used as an unbeatable argument in favor of American withdrawal from the INF Treaty and, potentially, from the Russian-American START Treaty of 2010. Many political forces in the United States want precisely this. Europe that will risk more than the others if the U.S.-Russian INF Treaty is annulled will accept American explanations as absolutely reasonable. Today, in view of certain disagreements on NATO, Trump needs unbeatable arguments to support his decisions.

The objective military-strategic interests of the United States are threatened, to a much greater extent than those of Europe, by Chinese ballistic intermediate-range missiles with the distance of up to 4,000 km and further with non-nuclear and nuclear charges. The same fully applies to Russia's missiles. For geographical reasons and because of real regional threats, Chinese missiles of various types, including anti-ship surface-launched winged missiles, effectively defend China's coastal and inland regions against the American Navy and Air Force. They are highly effective against aircraft carriers and can block an access to China's vitally important marine regions. The intermediate-range missiles cover the western regions of the Pacific up to and including what is known as the second island line (Guam), which means efficient containment of U.S. forces on all vitally important territories including Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Indonesia, the Strait of Malacca, the South China Sea and obviously Taiwan, and the zone of Japan and South Korea, two key allies of the United States.

The discussion of the Chinese intermediate-range missiles started by President Trump, as well as of possible tripartite talks on arms control with China's participation, suits Russia's interests as directly related to its concerns caused by the developing nuclear missile potential of China. It has already acquired intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, while the United States and Russia liquidated them under the INF Treaty of 1987. Chinese missiles are no less, or even more dangerous for Russia than for

the United States: they cover its entire territory while in the United States their range is limited by the periphery areas (Alaska and Hawaii). This means that these missiles, or their latest types, can hypothetically serve the first-strike weapon targeting the territory of the Russian Federation even if the People's Republic of China does not declare and does not recognize the preventive and preemptive strike strategy.

The number of Chinese missiles is unknown. According to different expert assessments (discussing the Asia-Pacific theater in the first place), their number is comparable with the numbers of such missiles at the disposal of the United States and Russia liquidated under the 1987 treaty. According to Russian experts, in the last decades, China created over two thousand intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.¹ Under the INF Treaty, the U.S. and Russia liquidated 846 and 1849 missiles of that class respectively.

Among the three mightiest nuclear states, China is least open about the quantity and quality of its nuclear forces, the total number of nuclear charges and their distribution. As China's closest neighbor, Russia and other neighboring states would have been much safer had China been more open on these issues.

The current political context and the atmosphere of relations between the U.S. and Russia made Donald Trump's invitation to draw China into negotiations on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles unacceptable. However, proceeding from its security interests, Russia might raise the question of bilateral talks with China and nuclear missile forces control agreements and will not avoid tripartite talks if China and the United States acting together invite it to join. Russia, on its side, has the right to initiate such talks if it expects harmonious and useful results.

In 2014, Russian expert Alexey Arbatov discussed a possibility of drawing China into the talks on nuclear-missile weapons in the context of aggravation of the Russian-American relations after the crisis in Crimea: "In future, if the political crisis in the Russian-American relations is finally resolved by diplomatic means and if the dialogue on nuclear weapons control is resumed, China's involvement in the process will totally correspond to Moscow's officially expressed desire to move the nuclear disarmament talks from the bilateral to tripartite format. In any case, Russia should be prepared to a potentially important strategic dialogue between the PRC and the U.S. while following its own line on the nuclear weapons control issue."²

So far, it remains to be seen whether a bilateral or trilateral format of

the talks on the INF Treaty and, in future, on other components of China's strategic nuclear potential, fully corresponds to Russia's interests. Each of the variants has its weak and strong points. Talks are possible; they can be realized when the tone and the atmosphere of bilateral and trilateral relations within the "triangle" become consistently positive.

It should be said that if China's nuclear-missile potential or any of its components (shorter-, intermediate- or intercontinental range) increases, bilateral or trilateral talks will become a must. In an absence of agreements related to comparable potentials of third countries, bilateral control and limitations become useless. In other words, one or several "abstainers" deprive of meaning global control over armaments of any class and the possibility of such control.

As could be expected, China negatively responded to the possibility of U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty. It was stated at the briefing of the Foreign Ministry of China that "unilateral withdrawing from the treaty will cause many negative effects" and that "making an issue out of China on withdrawing from the treaty is totally wrong."³

According to the Chinese expert community, it is highly probable that China might join the talks on the intermediate-range missiles mainly because in an absence of control and limitation regime the U.S. will legally deploy land-based intermediate-range missiles (including their mobile variants) in the APR. This means greater risks of losses and preemptive strikes. From many points of view, Beijing will profit from tripartite talks: this format makes it much easier to seek new limits on ballistic missiles. This fully applies to the United States.

In his article that appeared on the official portal of the Chinese People's Liberation Army "August 1" (the Army Day), Chinese analysts Luo Xi has written: "China will have to conclude new agreements on arms control with Moscow and Washington." The author is convinced that this should be done since "the United States will place intermediate-range missiles in the western part of the Pacific, including Guam, that will inevitably threaten China.... and to cope, China should train skillful negotiators" so that the new treaty signed with China's participation would not infringe on its national interests. Today, says the author, intermediate-range missiles constitute the core of China's nuclear forces, which means that China cannot liquidate them.⁴

By way of summing up, I can say that a new balance and a new "triangular" reality of strategic relations are rapidly taking shape in the sphere of weapons control. Russia should demonstrate a balanced, rather

than emotional, approach to the issue and consider the risks and threats emanating from other countries. It has already experienced them and might potentially be threatened in future.

NOTES

¹ Korostikov M. *Zapreshchennye rakety poselyatsya v Azii* // <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3778575>

² Arbatov A., Esin V. *Perspektivy podklyucheniya Kitaya k ogranicheniyu yadernykh vooruzheniy*. August 25, 2014 // <https://carnegie.ru/2014/08/25/ru-pub-56690>

³ Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference on October 22, 2018 // https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1606198.shtml

⁴ Quoted from: Korostikov M. Op. cit.

Key words: Russia-China-the U.S. triangle, INF Treaty, strategic armed forces, arms control, deterrence potential, preventive nuclear strike, Shanghai Communique, Taiwan factor.

Switzerland's Relations With the EU: Integration Without Membership

O. Trofimova

SWITZERLAND holds a special place in Europe. It has one of the world's most stable and competitive economies, which uses the cluster model of organization and is based on sectors that have traditionally given competitive advantages to Switzerland such as high-tech industries, including the manufacturing of watches and precision machinery, the pharmaceutical industry, the manufacturing of some food products, and the service sector. Switzerland owes these advantages to customization for specific clientele, to a relatively large share of capital-intensive and high-tech products in its total output, to high-standard after-sales service, to its convenient geographical location, and to the effective use of resources, and to the Swiss national character with its self-discipline and sense of responsibility. Switzerland's best-performing sectors are industries that need skilled labor and relatively low inputs of raw materials, and are chiefly export-oriented.

Moreover, Switzerland is a major European financial and banking center. An efficient financial system, use of foreign capital, low inflation, absence of unemployment, and an efficient economic strategy are other strong points of the Swiss economy. Neutrality, which is an important principle of Switzerland's foreign policy, has enabled the country to avoid practically any losses during both world wars.

EU Integration Without Membership

THE COMPARATIVELY SMALL domestic market and limited natural resources have made Switzerland move into foreign markets. The openness of the country, its close links to world markets, and its use of the

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cluster economic organization model have made it an important international economic player. The scale of its foreign trade and movements of capital and persons across its border are direct reasons for its prosperity. Over the past few years, exports have accounted for between 35% and 45% of Switzerland's gross domestic product (GDP).

Switzerland is the only country in the central part of Europe not to be a member of the European Union. This unique status gives advantages to Switzerland, which has close and pragmatic economic and cultural relations with the EU. Opting against accession to the EU (at a referendum in May 1992, 50.1% of Swiss voted against membership in the EU) has put Switzerland in a very advantageous position – while remaining independent, it has access to the EU market. Though it doesn't have to obey euro zone laws, it is involved in some of the EU integration processes. Russian economist Yury Yudanov argues that bilateral agreements with the EU signed by Switzerland as a result of this policy have been highly beneficial for the country.¹ However, recently Switzerland has been forced to comply with EU legislation in many fields, including industry.

Citizens of EU countries can freely travel to Switzerland and vice versa. There are no restrictions on the access of Swiss goods or companies to EU markets except for the Union's services market, access to which is limited. Many Swiss services companies set up branches in EU countries to bypass these restrictions.

“By and large, relatively small highly industrialized states are integrated into the EU more successfully than large or undeveloped countries.”² Though Switzerland is not part of the European Economic Area (EEA), the Swiss make fruitful use of their close ties with EU countries – in 2016, EU countries were the sources of 72% of Switzerland's imports and the destinations of 54% of its exports.³

About a quarter of Switzerland's population are foreign nationals, mostly citizens of EU countries. Hundreds of thousands of foreigners work in Switzerland but live in their own countries and cross the Swiss border twice a day.⁴ Foreign labor is an important factor in Switzerland's economy: up to 40% of its industrial workforce and up to 30% of the personnel in its service sector are foreigners. In 2016, more than 78.6% of foreign employees were EU nationals or citizens of member countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), a four-nation group that, besides Switzerland, includes Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein, 24.2% were German, 20.8% Italian, and another 20.8% Portuguese.⁵ More than 1,000 transnational companies, including Google, eBay and Unilever,

prefer to keep their European offices in Switzerland due to its neutrality.

Switzerland's neutral status and federal structure, the multiethnic and multireligious character of its society, and its advanced economy determine the degree of its involvement in European integration processes. But its neutrality prevents it from having closer ties with the EU. Moreover, the French-speaking and German-speaking Swiss disagree on the idea of membership in the EU. The more left-wing and liberal French-speaking community, which makes up 29% of the total population, is generally pro-EU, while the German-speaking majority is overall more right-wing and Eurosceptic.

Swiss-EU relations are based on bilateral agreements signed in 1999 and 2004. Altogether there are two packages of accords – Bilateral Agreements I and Bilateral Agreements II. The accords are officially referred to as “sectoral agreements” and number a total of 120. Two key factors determine Switzerland's special geopolitical position in Europe and its economic relations with the EU.

On the one hand, Switzerland is a member of EFTA, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and the Schengen Area, has free trade with EU countries, and has had its currency, the Swiss franc, tied to the euro since 2011. On the other hand, it is not a member of the EU, the euro zone, or the EEA (the other three EFTA member countries are EEA members as well), pursues its own fiscal policy, and is independent economically and politically.⁶ Switzerland has less power than the non-EU members of the EEA – Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland – to influence EU decisions that may have direct or indirect effect on Swiss companies, although it is able to monitor EEA activities via EFTA institutions.⁷

Switzerland and the European Economic Community (EEC), the EU's predecessor, formalized their relations by signing a free trade agreement in 1979. In 1989, Switzerland and the EEC signed an insurance agreement that gave non-life insurers the freedom to do business in one another's territory and laid down four fundamental freedoms – free movement of goods, capital, services, and labor.

Switzerland is obviously leaving no stone unturned to salvage its special relationship with the EU without becoming a member of it and is delaying its final decision.

Bilateral Agreements I were seven agreements that were signed in 1999 and dealt with the free movement of persons, with the lifting of technical barriers in trade, with exchanges of agricultural produce, with governmental markets, with ground transportation, with civil aviation, and with scientific research. All the agreements, except the one on scientific cooperation, include “guillotine clauses,” stipulations that any of them could only be adopted if the others were adopted simultaneously, and that the cancellation or termination of any of them would automatically entail the cancellation or termination of the others.

The accords guaranteed Switzerland three quarters of the advantages enjoyed by EU countries. Signing them was a successful move for Switzerland from the point of view of access to EU markets, competitiveness and the simultaneous maintenance of sovereignty in decision-making on economic and monetary policy, state financing, taxation, and foreign trade. In other words, Bilateral Agreements I enabled Switzerland to use numerous advantages of EU markets without being a member of the Union.

Bilateral Agreements II were nine accords signed in May 2004 after a referendum in which 60% of Swiss supported a proposal for signing a trade and economic agreement with the EU. They included an agreement under which Switzerland joined the Schengen Area and the Dublin Area (an area with specific rules on asylum seeking) and accords on the automatic exchange of information in tax matters aimed at combating cross-border tax evasion, on duty-free trade in processed agricultural products, on environmental data, on combating fraud, and on collecting statistics. Brussels and Bern also revised the EU-Swiss scientific research agreement to allow Switzerland to participate in Euratom and other EU programs.

After some Central and Eastern European countries joined the EU in 2004, the Swiss-EU agreement on the free movement of people had to be extended to those countries. A referendum in 2009 added Bulgaria and Romania to the list of countries to which this accord applied, but free Bulgarian and Romanian labor immigration into Switzerland was to be preceded by a transition period. Between 2004 and 2014, in response to a request from the EU, Switzerland transferred more than 1 billion francs to Central and Eastern European countries to support infrastructural projects in them.

Table 1
Sectoral agreements vs. hypothetical accession to EU: pros and cons

	Pros	Cons
Sectoral agreements	Free movement of persons Mutual opening of goods markets Extra economic stimuli Maintenance of neutrality Independent authority to make decisions about scale and intensity of cooperation and integration Maintenance of banking secrecy system by Swiss banks and independence of Swiss banking and financial systems Cross-border cooperation and regional integration	Impossibility of participation in EU programs before 2007, i.e. "passive partnership" Problems of taxation and pensions for EU nationals living in Switzerland Institutional limitation of benefits provided by openness of markets Lack of institutional mechanisms for cooperation Limited decision-making powers under agreements
Accession to EU	Free movement of goods, services, capital, and persons Harmonized customs policy Harmonized foreign trade policy Joint regional policy Full-scale participation in EU institutions and programs Membership in single currency system Being part of common economic space Uniform standards	Range of new commitments Loss of independence in key economic decision-making Lack of protection in trade More intensive competition Losses for import substitution industries Opening of borders for migrants from third countries Loss of regional monopoly status Payments to EU budget and other extra financial burdens

As is clear from the table, EU membership wouldn't have given Switzerland any significant advantages compared to the benefits of Bilateral Agreements I and II. Nor would membership in the EEA and euro zone have made much more sense to Switzerland than having the bilateral agreements with the EU: Switzerland still has free access to EU

and EEA markets, including the two organizations' labor markets, buys commodities at world prices, and Swiss certified products are unrestrictedly sold throughout the EU, and at the same time the country retains complete economic, financial and political sovereignty.

Cross-border cooperation and increasingly close economic ties between Swiss cantons and various regions in EU countries are an important feature of Swiss-EU relations. Switzerland's integration with the EU has a regional dimension besides the supranational and national dimensions. In fact, these regional mechanisms are the main factor in Switzerland's involvement in pan-European integration.

Most of the bilateral agreements established transition periods of up to ten years, which means it is not completely clear what impact they will have on the Swiss-EU integration-without-membership model, but they are obviously powering Switzerland's gradual "Europeanization."

Switzerland's sectoral approach to relations with the EU, which has been defined as a "free selective integration format" or the "Swiss model" of relations between the EU and a non-EU country, began to gradually lose its uniqueness as the EU has been using various mechanisms of cooperation and integration with other neighboring countries. The European Neighborhood Policy is one such mechanism.

By and large, the bilateral agreements have benefited Switzerland, advanced its "unilateral Europeanization," and led to important changes in its political and economic systems. Among other things, they have brought about the redistribution of powers in the country's complex political system by giving more clout to the federal government. Switzerland remains loyal to its direct democracy principle by holding referendums on key issues. At the same time, there has been an element of uncertainty about the sectoral nature of Swiss-EU relations as considerable proportions of Switzerland's political and economic elites had nothing against alternative models for Swiss-EU integration, including Swiss accession to the EU or to the EEA.

Swiss-EU Trade and Investment Relations

SWITZERLAND'S main trading partners are developed countries. Its trade with EU countries has been influenced by characteristics of its economy such as its focus on high-tech and export-oriented industries.

Swiss industry is dominated by highly capitalized transnational companies. They produce about one third of the added value of Switzerland's

GDP and make maximum use of their competitive advantages such as high-standard and reliable products, niche market specialization, export orientation, and “the concept of maximum diversification of foreign economic ties.”⁸ They are mainly active in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries (Novartis, Hoffmann-La Roche), the food industry (Nestlé), the electrical equipment industry (ABB), and the aluminum industry (Alusuisse). Northwestern Switzerland is the home of a biotechnological cluster, the only one of its kind, which includes large chemical and pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities and an extensive network of manufacturers of medical equipment and biotechnological and nanotechnological products.

The successful performance of Swiss industries that are least susceptible to crises such as the manufacturing of precision instruments or turbines and the country’s niche market specialization, for instance the production of top-brand watches and jewelry, have impacted the structure of Switzerland’s exports to the EU – high-tech products make up the bulk of them. Switzerland’s free trade agreements with EU countries and 38 other nations, including China and Japan, and its membership in EFTA save Swiss companies considerable funds.

Due to Switzerland’s free trade agreements with non-EU countries, the proportion of EU goods in Swiss imports fell to 58% in 2016 from 78.6% in 1990 and the proportion of exports to the EU in Switzerland’s total exports dropped to 50% from 69% in the same period as the United States and China among other countries were playing increasing roles as Switzerland’s trading partners. In 2016, Germany was Switzerland’s main trading partner, and then came the United States, Britain and France. That year, Switzerland was the destination of 8.2% of the EU’s exports and the source of 7.1% of its imports.⁹

The data in Table 2 (see below) makes clear that Switzerland’s main trading partners are countries bordering it and Britain. Trade with Germany accounted for more than one third of Switzerland’s imports and exports between 2003 and 2017. France was Switzerland’s number two partner (between 14% and 15% of exports and imports). Then came Italy (between 10% and 15%), Britain and Austria. Between 2012 and 2016, EU imports from Switzerland increased by an average of 3.5% per annum and EU exports from the country on average grew by 1.6% per annum. In 2016 and 2017, just as in preceding years, the strong Swiss franc and the EU’s relatively slow economic growth slowed down the growth of Swiss-EU trade. In that period, the pharmaceutical industry and engineering services were

Table 2
Switzerland's trade with individual EU countries between 2003 and 2017, bn euros

Country	2003		2006		2010		2014		2017	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
EU28	59.2	71.4	71.6	88.6	85.5	110.5	96.5	140.3	110.2	150.8
Germany	20.0	26.0	26.4	33.9	31.0	41.2	36.7	46.0	42.9	53.7
France	8.5	11.2	10.5	10.3	12.3	11.4	15.3	13.0	16.7	15.7
Italy	9.0	9.9	10.3	12.6	10.2	15.8	10.4	19.0	11.2	20.6
UK	4.1	3.7	4.6	6.5	7.9	11.8	8.8	25.3	11.6	18.0
Austria	4.2	4.2	4.5	4.6	7.1	5.3	7.2	6.8	7.9	7.1
Spain	2.7	1.4	3.5	2.6	3.3	3.4	3.5	3.6	3.5	4.1

Calculated on the basis of European Commission: Market Access Database Statistics // <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/switzerland>

vices were the Swiss sectors that had the strongest immunity to price fluctuations. Over the past few years, Switzerland has come to play an important role in transit trade in commodities. In 2016, commodities accounted for about 94% of the country's transit trade. Energy made up about 60%, minerals 20% and agricultural products and timber 15%.¹⁰

According to the Swiss National Bank, in 2015, EU countries were the source of more than three quarters of foreign direct investments (FDI) in Switzerland and the recipients of about half of Switzerland's FDI.¹¹ Growing FDI has benefited Switzerland, whose economy is heavily dependent on foreign markets. The country's policy of encouraging the exportation of capital as a means of economic expansion and the importation of capital as an important factor in the development of various Swiss regions has produced significant results. An annual study by the

A.T. Kearney consulting company puts Switzerland among the world's 20 most investment-attractive countries: in 2016, Switzerland was in 11th place in terms of FDI inflow into the country and in second place in terms of European FDI accumulated within the country. In 2015, Luxembourg and the Netherlands were the main sources of FDI in Switzerland, each of them holding 24% of the total FDI in the country. They were followed by the United States with 12%, Austria (8%), France (5%), and Britain (5%).¹²

Switzerland mainly owes its investment attractiveness to its economic and political stability, transparent legal system, developed infrastructure, reliable financial and banking systems, and various tax concessions, with some of the cantons granting tax concessions for periods of up to ten years. Switzerland's banks provide services for about 40% of the world's private capital and are responsible for 11% of the country's GDP.¹³

In the last ten years, investment trends in Switzerland have differed from those in the EU. Because of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, FDI in Switzerland and EU countries declined. There were 11% fewer investment projects in the EU and 45% fewer in Switzerland, where there were 125 projects in 2008 but only 69 in 2009.¹⁴ By 2016, the number of projects in Switzerland had gone up to 88, still failing to hit the pre-crisis mark. This largely had to do with the strength of the Swiss franc versus the euro and dollar, which meant higher cost of investment. Switzerland's Federal Act on International Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, which came into force on February 1, 2013, eroded the country's bank secrecy system and deprived it of some of its advantages as an investors' destination.

As is clear from Table 3 (see below), Swiss FDI abroad grew continuously, with most of the capital being invested in EU countries. FDI in Switzerland grew as well, with EU countries being the main investors. On the whole, FDI in Switzerland increased steadily with 2013 and 2014 being exceptions, but it was an uneven rise. In 2016, the total volume dropped by 40%, to 47.34 billion from 78.36 billion Swiss francs.¹⁵

Swiss investment abroad has also been growing continuously, especially between 2013 and 2016. Between 2007 and 2016, investment projects more than doubled in number – there were 131 in 2007, 190 in 2011, and 289 in 2016. Over the last 20 years, Swiss projects have led to the creation of about 100,000 jobs in EU countries. Most of the projects have been based in countries bordering Switzerland – in 2016, there were 110 projects or 38% of the total number in Germany, 35 (12%) in France, and

Table 3
Total Swiss FDIs abroad and FDIs in Switzerland, 2007-2016, bn Swiss francs

	2007	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total Swiss FDIs Abroad	730	891	978	1,038	1,088	1,064	1,079	1,124	1,214
Swiss FDIs in EU countries	368	442	418	452	467	452	490	500	634
EU FDIs in Switzerland	397	514	573	642	680	696	767	842	963
Accumulated FDIs of EU countries in Switzerland	300	433	479	500	546	568	601	665	756

Based on: Swiss National Bank. Topic Overview. International economic review. Direct investment. SNB. Zurich. 2018 // <http://data.snb.ch/en/topics/aube#1!/cube/fdichtlanda>

seven projects in Italy. Retail and marketing services were the recipients of the bulk of Swiss FDI in the EU.

Mounting Discord

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS of 2007-2008 resulted in frictions between Switzerland and the EU. The crisis didn't have any significant effects on Switzerland, which in those years diversified its high-tech exports, made use of the stronger points of its economy, and attracted large amounts of foreign capital. However, at that time Switzerland announced that, under those difficult circumstances, it couldn't guarantee jobs to EU nationals if that meant cutting employment opportunities for Swiss citizens.¹⁶ The EU responded that it didn't like Switzerland sitting on two chairs – not joining the EU but enjoying its principal advantages.

Swiss-EU relations got more strained after a 2014 referendum in Switzerland on proposed quotas for immigration from the EU. After the EU's enlargement in 2004, Switzerland began to fear a surge in the inflow of foreign labor. After the expiration of the transition period in 2011, cit-

izens of eight Central and Eastern European countries that had joined the EU in 2004 gained free access to the Swiss labor market. As from 2016, so did nationals of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia. In 2012, Switzerland curbed immigration from the eight Central and Eastern European countries that had become EU members in 2004 by limiting the issue of residence permits to 2,000 per year, and then cut down this quota to 545 per year as from May 2013.

Immigration into Switzerland has some unique characteristics. Firstly, nearly three quarters of labor immigrants come from developed European countries, mainly France, Germany and Italy, which border Switzerland, and Portugal. Only one quarter are nationals of developing countries. Secondly, the majority of European immigrants are high-skilled workers or professionals. Thirdly, there are numerous cross-border commuters, people who work in Switzerland but live in countries bordering it. Most of them are high-skilled workers or professionals. There are members of this category in all of Switzerland's key high-tech sectors. Between 2004 and 2017, their ranks grew from 160,000 to 320,000.¹⁷

At the 2014 referendum, which had a turnout of 56.6%, 50.3% voted against mass immigration. The French-speaking cantons voted against limiting immigration while the German-speaking cantons were divided on the quota initiative. The government was given a deadline of February 2017 to put the immigration restrictions approved at the referendum into force. The European Commission declared the planned restrictions a departure from the principle of free movement of persons between the EU and Switzerland and said that it would study potential effects of the initiative on EU-Swiss relations in general. The returns of the referendum meant that the entire Bilateral Agreements I package would have to be scrapped because of the guillotine clauses: the severance of the agreement on the free movement of people would automatically entail the severance of the other accords.

By the end of August 2017, the number of foreigners living in Switzerland reached 2.1 million with the country's entire population being 8.4 million. About 80% of immigrants came from European countries. According to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, in 2015 there were also 396,000 permanent residents in Switzerland – about 20% of its foreign population – who had been born in Switzerland but were not citizens of it.¹⁸

Ditching the “sectoral agreements” and barring Switzerland from EU markets wouldn't have benefited either side, while a decline in labor

immigration from the EU might have undermined Switzerland's successful economy. Therefore, the Swiss parliament, without waiting for the planned immigration restrictions to take effect in 2017 and for Switzerland and the EU reaching a deal on immigration quotas, passed a bill on December 16, 2016, to effectively reject the quotas.

Nevertheless, EU immigration into Switzerland for permanent residence nearly halved between 2013 and 2017, dropping from 60,957 to 30,799, mainly because of economic improvements in many EU countries. Net immigration from Italy fell by 32%, that from Germany went down by 10%, and more Portuguese left Switzerland than entered it.¹⁹ Despite this, on January 19, 2018, the right-wing conservative Swiss People's Party (SVP) launched what is known as the *Begrenzungsinitiative* ("limit initiative"), a proposal for legislation initiative to curb EU immigration.

Nor do Switzerland and the EU see eye to eye on policies toward Russia. Switzerland has never joined the EU's anti-Russian sanctions except for the Union's bans on exports to Russia of military products and goods that can serve military as well as civilian ends. There also are disagreements on the Ukraine issue. Switzerland wants to remain on good terms with Russia without angering Europe and without earning the reputation of a state that uses political neutrality to make money on war. Switzerland is careful not to violate the anti-Russian sanctions, although the EU insists on the country's full-scale participation in them. Switzerland prioritizes its own interests and is sure that being party to the sanctions would be too damaging to its economy. Its government has promised to ignore pressure from states that are obsessed with the idea of punishing Moscow. This position, it explained, aimed to minimize damage to Switzerland.

More Swiss-EU frictions were caused by a European Commission decision in December 2017 to limit sales of shares in EU-registered companies in Swiss financial markets. The EU demanded signing a "framework institutional" agreement with Switzerland to put their relations on a long-term basis and warned that otherwise the formal "financial equivalence" of EU and Swiss stock exchanges would be annulled in a year's time. The Swiss Federal Council branded the Commission's move as discriminatory and as a threat to Switzerland's investment attractiveness. Some European countries have sided with Switzerland. The 1995 merger of the stock exchanges of Geneva, Zurich and Basel to form the SIX Swiss Exchange, recognized by Brussels as equivalent to EU exchanges,

had simplified Switzerland's access to EU financial markets and vice versa, and EU-based companies were behind about half of the SIX Swiss Exchange's turnover for 2016, approximately 425 billion Swiss francs.²⁰

The Swiss government believes that the EU seeks to weaken Switzerland's status as a financial center and therefore tries to strengthen its own exchanges. Switzerland may respond to the European Commission's decision of December 2017 by revising its 1.3-billion-franc pledge to the European Cohesion Fund (an EU fund aiming to reduce economic and social disparities between countries and stabilize troubled economies) that aimed to help reduce economic and social inequalities and support immigration, education, and employment projects in new EU countries.

The planned institutional framework agreement to be signed in 2018 has been a source of controversies for several years. The disputes have focused on mechanisms for the implementation of bilateral accords and for settling problems that might arise in the course of it. Bern is in no hurry to sign the agreement and constantly puts off debates on it. It is not likely to be signed in 2019 either as there will be elections that year both in Switzerland and in the EU. The framework agreement would set guidelines for EU-Swiss relations and lay down rules for the settlement of potential disputes. All accords regulating Switzerland's access to EU markets would depend on this agreement. In other words, Switzerland has to choose between effectively becoming part of the EU and relinquishing some of its sovereignty and being completely barred from the EU financial markets.²¹ For this reason, in December 2017 the then president of Switzerland, Doris Leuthard, announced a decision to call a referendum on Swiss-EU relations. Switzerland is obviously leaving no stone unturned to salvage its special relationship with the EU without becoming a member of it and is delaying its final decision.

TO SUM UP, the special, compromise-based model for Swiss-EU relations and Switzerland's policy of selective integration with the EU have so far enabled the country to generally avoid pressure from the EU and remain economically self-subsistent and competitive. In June 2016, Switzerland withdrew an application for membership in the EU that it had filed in 1992. The country values its traditional independence, special status in Europe and special relationship with the EU. It was only in 2002

that Switzerland joined the United Nations, later than the majority of the other UN member states, although the organization has had its European headquarters located in Geneva for a long time. Switzerland is completely satisfied with the two packages of bilateral agreements rather than a single accord as the basis for its relations with the EU as this entitles it to EU privileges and enables it to draw significant benefits from relations with EU countries without parting with any of its sovereignty. But the EU is increasingly dissatisfied with this state of affairs.

The current legal basis for Swiss-EU relations faces an overhaul with the EU demanding a framework institutional agreement, which would push Switzerland toward EU membership. The EU argues that sectoral agreements need modernization and adaptation to continually changing EU legislation, and that the growing number of such accords makes it difficult to synchronize EU and Swiss laws underlying bilateral relations. But most likely, this reasoning is a pretext for pressing Switzerland to join the EU. However, membership in the EU would entail changes to the Swiss constitution that would limit Switzerland's independence. As one such change, Switzerland would practically have to give up its direct democracy system – holding referendums in key issues, – a prospect rejected by Switzerland's government, some of its parties and its population. Moreover, Switzerland would have to adopt all EU legal norms whereas today's Swiss law gives priority to national over international law.

Nevertheless, the Swiss government is determined to sign a framework institutional agreement and is continuing to negotiate it with the EU. But Bern is in no hurry about it. The planned agreement would be a political more than an economic accord. It can't be ruled out that, before long, Switzerland will submit it to a referendum. The latter's outcome would be determined by many factors, not only by nationwide sentiments and sentiments in individual cantons but also by external developments such as the migration crisis in the EU, the imposition of the tolerance idea, the bureaucratization of EU institutions, the growing ranks of Eurosceptics in EU countries, the Brexit process, and escalating controversies between EU countries on various issues.

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Key words: EU, bilateral agreements, trade, investment, relations, foreign direct investment (FDI), free movement of people, labor immigration.

Libya: The Burden of Transition

A. Frolov

In Libya, we decimated that country.
Donald Trump

LIBYA AND SYRIA are among the states crushed by the tragic events of the color revolutions of the early 2010s. External invasion, no matter how limited as compared with what happened in Syria, is an instructive factor of recent history of the state and its leader Muammar Gaddafi and a lesson that deserves a space in textbooks. Libya was smashed into pieces and plunged into enmity and rivalry. Anybody wishing to assess the prospects of crisis settlement should turn to the heritage and the integrating principles that kept the country together up to the events of 2011.

The Integrating Principles

IN 1969, when young officers deposed King Idris and came to power in Libya, the problem of its integration was very different. Muammar Gaddafi, the country's new leader, resolved it partly due to his management skills (as American experts have admitted) and partly due to his cautious and shrewd policy when dealing with the tribes. It was the time when the idea of national liberation and independence was high on the agenda of the developing, including Arab, countries. Personally devoted to the ideas of Nasserism, Gaddafi never followed the route leading to a united party of the masses based on the pattern of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) in Egypt. It was impossible in Libya, a country of tribes and tribal order designated to protect tribal territories. A Ba'athist party was, likewise, impossible. Gaddafi formulated the idea of popular governance without political parties realized through local people's committees and people's congresses. Equality of all members of society was declared and accepted by the people as a great achievement.

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Libya's foreign policy acquired a new lease of life in the Arab world. Gaddafi was convinced that his country could do much better than vegetate on the periphery; it could and should play a prominent role in dealing with the most important problems, the Arab-Israeli conflict being one of them. This approach served the bedrock of Gaddafi's strategic depth theory (formulated at his first meeting with his idol, President of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser) and, later, of Libya-centrism that treated Libya as a link between the Arab Mashriq (east) and the Arab Maghreb (west); it was more than a bridge between the ancient Egyptian civilization and Carthage – it was the center of the Mediterranean.

From the very beginning, Gaddafi was pondering on the ideas that could unite Arabs into a powerful Arab state; he invited the presidents, kings and sheikhs to fraternize, to abandon the titles "Your Excellency" and "Your Majesty" and to start calling each other Brother Faisal or Brother Gamal. He sought unity with Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia and even with faraway Syria and Morocco.¹ He was convinced that united Libya, Egypt and Sudan would improve the life of the region's population and turn the desert into a blossoming garden – the idea that brings to mind Communist utopia.

In 1970, Egypt, Libya and Syria signed an agreement to establish the Federation of Arab Republics, a mere formality as it turned out later. Quite often, however, his hectic activities produced results opposite to the expected: Gaddafi quarreled with Anwar Sadat and Gaafar Nimeiry; after the failed attempt at a federation with Tunisia, he sided with the insurgents that forced Habib Bourguiba to seek military help of the United States; in 1977, his conflict with Egypt ended with armed clashes.

The failed unification attempts forced the Libyan leaders to turn to the ambitious projects for Libya: to build up its military-technical potential with the help of France, Italy and later the Soviet Union (even if the quality of its army left much to be desired); to invigorate its foreign policy activities on the African continent (including Chad); even to intervene into domestic affairs of other states; to support all sorts of rebel movements, Arab and other revolutionary radicals; and, to full measure, develop nuclear energy and acquire a nuclear status.

It should be said that this policy, even if not quite effective outside the Libyan borders, inspired the Libyan population. People were proud of their country that figured prominently in North Africa and belonged to the vast Arab world. Libyan nationalism negatively perceived in the West was a source of pride inside the country. The Libyan Revolutionary

Command Council (RCC) passed a decision (seen as wrong by Soviet theoreticians) on Islamization of society (ten years before the Islamic Revolution in Iran). Gaddafi insisted: "Islam is highly important for all of us. We cannot deny that religion is the most important part of life."² The Libyan leader was convinced that "the natural law of any society is grounded in either tradition (custom) or religion. Any other attempt to draft law outside these two sources is invalid and illogical."³

This was more than mere propaganda: as a true Muslim, he was translating the above into practice. Religious organizations acquired the right of decision-making in state administration and other spheres; much was done to liberate society from norms imposed on it from

outside; alcohol was banned, night clubs, bars, and similar places were closed as alien to Islamic culture; the country switched to the Islamic calendar; Arabic became the language of state administration and documentation. In 1973, after the all-Arab conference of muftis that discussed the role of religion in contemporary society, the country adopted many of the Sharia laws including punishments for stealing or robbing (detained criminals ran a risk of an amputated leg or arm).

As the leader of the country divided into tribes, Gaddafi formulated a new role of tribes: "The tribe is a social school where its members are raised to absorb the high ideals which develop into a behavior pattern for life."⁴

The leaders of the Libyan revolution tried to defuse Churchill's "democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others" by building up a better form of government: "Democratically, none of these parties should govern a whole people who constitute a diversity of interests, ideas, temperaments, regions, and beliefs."⁵ Gaddafi was convinced that no party could be an instrument of governance: "Political struggle that results in the victory of a candidate with, for example, 51 percent of the votes leads to a dictatorial governing body."⁶ In other words, the right of decision-making belonged to the people. Gaddafi doubted the efficiency of representative democracy: "Parliaments have been a legal barrier

Today, Russia is the only country that can bring peace and order to Libya: Italy, France and the rest of the EU countries associated with the United States cannot object to the latter's policy, let alone oppose it.

between the people and the exercise of authority, excluding the masses from meaningful politics and monopolizing sovereignty in their place.... The masses are completely isolated from the representative and he, in turn, is totally removed from them.”⁷ Gaddafi challenged European parliamentary democracy with his own invention: two parallel structures at the lower level (people’s congresses and people’s committees) that presented their decisions to the General People’s Congress (General National Congress). This brings to mind the Veche of Novgorod the Great of the 11th-15th centuries.

Starting with 1973, the younger generation gradually replaced the cells of the Arab Socialist Union, the Nasserist political party, the only one in Libya, with people’s caucuses (congresses). Three years later, the Arab Socialist Union was replaced with the General People’s Congress. In 1977, Libya acquired a new name, Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.* Gaddafi, sticking to his idea of equality, rejected his official posts to become “Brother Colonel” for all Libyans. He had never read Russian history; otherwise he would have known that Nicholas II (the last in the Romanov dynasty) was a colonel of the Russian army and never aspired to be promoted. In real life, people’s committees were nothing but talk-shops too cumbersome for decision-making. In extreme cases, order was restored by the so-called revolutionary committees – groups of young people patterned on the Soviet OGPU (secret police) and Committee of Party Control. They took away for “awareness-raising talks” those who failed to lead properly and returned them with bruises on their faces and bodies.

We should admit that under Colonel Gaddafi Libya was a social state. In my line of duty, I met many Libyans who willingly talked about their country, free medical service, free secondary and higher education, and free housing. There were problems, especially in medical service. The problem of shortage of qualified medical staff was resolved by inviting specialists from socialist countries, in particular, from Bulgaria, Hungary and East Germany. There were also considerable achievements: under Gaddafi, for example, Libya resolved the problem of blindness; it was treated in numerous polyclinics and hospitals that used latest equipment.

Foreign currency was freely used by common people, including the military. All Libyans, including those serving in the army, could aspire to be educated in other countries free of charge. Imported (Western) goods

* Translated from Arabic, Jamahiriya means “state of the masses.”

could be bought in big and small shops; the basic industrial branches were controlled by the state while small services were privately owned. Shopkeeping was highly respected. The country acquired excellent highways; the information that everyone willing could get a free car certificate is probably false (rather, the practice was limited to a very narrow circle of the chosen) while petrol was not cheap.

Colonel Gaddafi was not alien to exotics: in 1978, trying simultaneously to build socialism and liberate the working class from exploitation, he decided to reward workers with the products they produced themselves. The point was that this way their quality would be improved. Much was said at the time about the system of wages in general and whether it was justified.

Some of Gaddafi's theories were highly original; convinced that in future black people would rule the world, he paid special attention to the black population of his country. It was a response of sorts to many years of subjugation of the black race by the white race and to the fast pace of growth of the population of the Black Continent. His words were confirmed by the fact that representative of the Black Continent, Barack Obama, was elected, for the first time in America's history, president of the leading world power. The French football team that won the Moscow Mundial was, in fact, a national team of sorts of the African continent.

Gaddafi interpreted the role of women in society in his own way. It was his challenge to the feminism of the West and to those who were assigning to women the tasks (administrative, etc.) alien to their nature. The Libyan leader was certain that the genders had their own specific social functions: women gave birth to children and raised them while men were expected to defend their families. "Not to adhere to these natural roles and to lack concern for their limits amounts to a wanton act of corruption against the values of life itself."⁸

Gaddafi's eccentric behavior irritated other Arab leaders, and in the West Libyan nationalism stirred up negative responses. For example, it contradicted the paternalist policies of Washington, which was considered a replacement of colonialism. Mohamed el-Khawas, for example, writes that the relations between Libya and the United States were undermined by Gaddafi because "shortly after coming to power, he closed American and British military bases in his country."⁹ Gaddafi supported the idea of non-alignment, condemned colonialism and was an enthusiastic supporter of pan-Arabism; he interpreted close relations between Israel and the United States as Washington's enmity towards Arabs and

called for torpedoing the Egyptian-Israeli peace. On the other hand, the West was the main consumer of Libyan oil and the main source of Libyan income, and Gaddafi was lenient toward the Western oil companies which continued working in the country.

Up the Down Staircase

THE GLOBAL SHIFTS at the turn of the 1990s, disintegration of the socialist camp and the Soviet Union, one of the principle players in the Middle East, that made the U.S. the de facto “master” of the region, as well as the impossibility to fulfil its utopian plans, forced Libya to seek better relations with the West and with its closest neighbors.

In fact, the Libyan colonel brought holy hell down on his head by his repentance to the world (Western) community and the United States as the main condition of restored contacts. It turned out, however, that the United States was not a Catholic priest who absolves of sins but a prosecutor who demands death penalty and no limitation period. In August 2003, Libya concluded a long period of talks and consultations with the London and Washington emissaries and submitted a letter to the UN SC in which it accepted responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing of 1988 and agreed to pay compensation (\$7 billion)¹⁰ to the families of the victims and cancel its support of terrorism. Later, Libya fulfilled the second condition of reconciliation by abandoning production of WMD and inviting international inspections.

In December 2003, George W. Bush hailed Gaddafi who “has agreed immediately and unconditionally to allow inspectors from international organizations to enter Libya.” He offered Tripoli far better relations with the United States by saying that “its good faith will be returned.”¹¹ The return was not long to come: in May 2006, the United States excluded Libya from the list of countries that supported international terrorism and fully restored relations between them.

Anatoly Egorin, Russian expert on Libya, believes that it was at that time that Gaddafi became reassured that the storm had subsided and that he had escaped the fate of Saddam Hussein.¹² Later, he never failed to demonstrate his friendliness to the United States and the West as a whole. He visited European countries and signed contracts worth billions. His famous Bedouin tent travelled from one European capital to another: it was seen in Paris, London, Brussels, etc., and only America refused to let his travelling home into the country. Libya offered Western firms excel-

lent conditions: 50% or even more of profits in the production sharing agreements while Russian firms could aspire to 10%. Joint projects were lavished on foreign partners, yet the United States interpreted these conciliatory steps as a weakness and concluded that a weakling should be crushed.

Muammar Gaddafi who had done a lot for the black population of Libya misinterpreted the first black president in the White House. He wrongly believed that with Barack Obama as president the relations between Libya and the United States would restart from a clean page. He even called Obama his “son.” By the irony of fate, it was Obama who destroyed him.

There is no agreement in the expert community about what triggered the revolution. At first glance, Libyans were still well-off, yet any authoritarian regime outlives itself sooner or later. It becomes rigid, dogmatic and unable to change; it grows mossed with unwieldy bureaucracy that slows down normal economic development. People living in today’s information-saturated world can compare different countries and their achievements. According to Egorin, nearly all able-bodied population was employed in the low-productive state sector that made Libya the world’s most bureaucratized country.¹³

Alexey Podtserob, another Russian expert on the Middle East, agrees that corruption in Libya reached unprecedented dimensions.¹⁴ Some of the richest and most corrupt officials and prominent military openly boasted of their wealth. Libya was one of the world’s ten most corrupt countries. On the whole, there always were people dissatisfied with Gaddafi. Those who had aspired and never got power nursed their grudges; others did not like the rules while still others were displeased with the bans on their preferred businesses. Former members of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council removed from power to give space to Brother Colonel’s relatives and close friends never forgave him. For example, Major Abdessalam Jalloud, second most powerful person in the country and deputy chairman of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council, was removed from his post and arrested.

All sorts of grievances developed into a patchwork of political movements and organizations; most of them had no viable ideas and lived on the money coming from the countries that did not like Libyan policy. Anatoly Egorin believes that Libyans did not like that their standard of living was normally compared with Tunisia or Egypt; they coveted the sumptuous lifestyle of the Gulf countries.¹⁵ The opposition included the

Libyan Liberation Organization headed by former Prime Minister Abdul al-Bakkush with the headquarters in Morocco; the Libyan National League headed by M. al-Baraki (stationed in Cairo), the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL) that operated from Sudan and was headed by Mohammed el-Magariaf, who together with Gaddafi had been member of the RCC, and others. On May 8, 1984, NFSL militants took part in a failed coup and attack at Gaddafi's Bab al-Azizia compound in Tripoli. Such organizations were multiplying and changing.

Whether the riots in Libya were inspired from abroad or not remains unclear. More likely than not, there were internal and external factors involved. The unfolding crisis that developed into a revolution was followed by a foreign armed intervention.

Carthago delenda est

ON FEBRUARY 18, 2011, rioting flared up in Benghazi, Libya's second biggest city. A week later, the UN SC passed Resolution 1970 (2011) initiated by the West that demanded "an immediate end to the violence" and called for steps "to fulfill the legitimate demands of the population; to respect human rights and international humanitarian law, and allow immediate access for international human rights monitors; ensure the safety of all foreign nationals and their assets; ... ensure the safe passage of humanitarian and medical supplies, and humanitarian agencies and workers, into the country; immediately lift restrictions on all forms of media." The resolution referred "the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since February 15, 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court"; imposed an arms embargo "to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" and ruled that "all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of relatives and supporters" of Colonel Gaddafi, freeze their capitals and decided "to establish... a Committee of the Security Council for Libya." This sounded like a demand to Libya lay down its arms.

An armed intervention became inevitable: the Gaddafi regime turned out to be much firmer and could rely on the army stronger than expected. Less than a month had been needed to oust President of Tunisia Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak had resisted less than two weeks, but the regime change in Libya took much more time while the army delivered heavy blows at the insurgents here and there.

From the very beginning, the NATO invasion targeted only Muammar Gaddafi; his fate was obviously sealed. Since de facto he was absolved by the West, they piled on him new crimes, including the use of arms against civilian population. The Obama administration preferred to act by proxy, and the “coalition of the willing-2011” was not a small one. French President Nicolas Sarkozy took the lead.*

Armed intervention was sanctioned on March 17 by notorious Resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council; initiated by the U.S., France and the UK, it expressed determination “to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” while “excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.” The resolution was passed with ten voices “yes” and five abstained (Russia and China among the latter). Armed intervention followed practically immediately.

Three schemes were realized. Economic blockade (freezing and blocking bank deposits of Gaddafi and his closest circle) was accompanied by the so-called humanitarian intervention (read: armed intervention under the noble pretext of protecting civilian population) and a no-fly zone (“a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians”) which meant that all aircraft except those that belonged to the West should be downed. The air and naval forces of France, Great Britain, Italy, Canada, Norway, and Denmark contributed to regime change in Libya. In April-May 2011, NATO air force made up to nine thousand sorties and destroyed over three thousand objects on the Libyan territory. As could be expected, the United States did not stay out. In March 2011, its air force and navy launched attacks at objects in Libya using Tomahawks cruise missiles, B-2 stealth bombers, 2000-pound bombs and other types of attack aircraft. According to CBS, attacks at Libya cost the United States \$1 billion. The Pentagon immediately asked the Obama administration to add \$118 billion to the defense budget.¹⁶ All the countries involved were looking forward to apportioning the Libyan oil pie.

Gaddafi and his loyal troops did not retreat under massive strikes at their bases and despite military aid to the insurgents. It was at that time that intermediary missions were set up with relatively good prospects for shifting the conflict from the military phase to negotiations. However, France, and the United States that backed it, never wanted a compromise; this was fully confirmed by the failure of an intermediary mission of

* The fact that Sarkozy’s presidential campaign had been funded by Gaddafi explains why France lost no time to interfere in the Libyan civil war.

South Africa President Jacob Zuma who represented the African Union. Late in May 2011, he put on the table the Roadmap of the AU on Libyan settlement that was a priori rejected by the insurgents. NATO expressed solidarity with their position by four days of carpet bombing of Tripoli. No peaceful settlement was ever contemplated.*

Moscow that was not strong enough to interfere merely distanced itself from the Libyan developments and the fate of Colonel Gaddafi. Libya's geographic location (even farther than Syria) was not the main reason.

In fact, Muammar Gaddafi had never been a Soviet ally, a vassal or a puppet. His personal ideas about the world and social order summed up in his Third Universal Theory contradicted certain concepts of Marxism-Leninism. Nevertheless, he cooperated, sometimes closely, with the Soviet Union guided by expediency and his interests in the spheres in which the two countries shared common approaches.

He preferred to keep his distance from Russia and, on the whole, limited his cooperation to weapons and energy. Anatoly Egorin has written on this score: "Libyans rarely sought our advice on political issues and turned to us with their economic problems only when the rest of the world had refused to cooperate with them."¹⁷ Dmitry Medvedev has specified Russia's position: "Acting on these considerations, Russia abstained on UN Security Council Resolution 1973.... It would be wrong for us to start flapping about now and say that we didn't know what we were doing.... I think that overall this resolution reflects our understanding of events in Libya too, but not completely.... This was a qualified decision not to veto the resolution."¹⁸

Gaddafi was encircled; the noose was tightening; the West was bombing Libya and lavishing money and weapons on Gaddafi's enemies. On October 20, 2011, units of the National Transitional Council of Libya (NTC), that had already declared itself a new legitimate power, surrounded him near Sirte. French aviation delivered massive missile strikes and bombed the city until the defense was broken; rebels stormed inside, they tortured and sodomized the leader who had ruled the country for 42 years. With time, the scenes of cruelty will probably evaporate from memory, yet people will hardly forget the triumphal "Wow!" with which

* These bombardments initiated by Sarkozy were met with a wave of indignation in France. In particular, prominent lawyer Jacques Vergès and former Foreign Minister Roland Dumas announced that they would file a lawsuit against President Sarkozy for crimes against humanity in Libya.

the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reacted to the video of unrivalled cruelty.

Later, Donald Trump minced no words: “We never said to Gaddafi, oh, we’re going to give you protection, we’re going to give you military strength, we’re going to give you all of these things. We went in and decimated him.”¹⁹ The desired result was achieved.

“The Revolution Offers a Beginning...”

BEFORE and during the invasion, the Western coalition wanted to liquidate Gaddafi first and foremost, never bothering about the country’s future without him. Many wanted to dance on Gaddafi’s grave; many wanted to share the glory of the winners. Very soon, however, squabbles began among the “winners,” each wishing the juiciest piece of power. Gaddafi said in his time that the Arab revolution would go on till the achievement of Arab unity.²⁰ It seems that the Libyan revolution will follow the same pattern with, alas, no unity in sight.

Today, having completed the revolution, neither the United States nor France nor the UK knows what to do next. In fact, they could have abandoned the country to its fate, yet they want to extract hydrocarbons. They are worried because ISIS and Al-Qaeda have come to Libya to stay and because the country has become a source of never ending migrant flows moving from Africa to the south of Europe and further on to Central and Northern Europe. Oscar Wilde, classic of English literature, warned that a chess game cannot be won by merely sweeping the figures off. The coalition unconcerned with the country’s future just swept the main figure off.

Set up when Gaddafi was still alive and having the West on his side, the NTC tried, without much success, to remain in control after the Colonel’s murder. According to an American source,* the government that the NTC presented on November 22, “failed to address pressing security issues”; it did not, likewise, move far in drafting a new Constitution, building up new power structures, establishing law and order, and demobilizing the militia units formed to fight Gaddafi and his allies.²¹ In 2012 and 2014, the country elected, under close supervision of the West, the General National Congress (GNC) and, later, House of Representatives (HoR). Under pressure of threats and blackmail, the

* The Congressional Research Service (CRS) conducts research and analysis for Congress on a broad range of national policy issues and suggests variants of further actions.

turnout in both cases was unacceptably low that disrupted the usual course of voting. The country fell apart into enclaves.

The July 2012 elections replaced the NTC with GNC, a patchwork and, therefore, equally inefficient structure. The problem was further aggravated by the fact that those who had “won” in Libya staffed the new structure with their loyalists who carried no weight with the local population. The attack, in September 2012, at the American diplomatic mission in Benghazi, in which four American diplomats, including American Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens,* were murdered, made the local context even more complicated. The West was shocked; Americans could not find plausible explanations. For the first time, the U.S. and allies felt impotent.

In Libya, the UN was not efficient either; in the remaining months of 2012, the UN SC passed several resolutions (2009, 2016, 2017, 2022) that called on the NTC to restore law and order and respect human rights; the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was set up. Resolution 2016 (Point b) identified the first steps toward establishing the country’s financial and economic system; prevention of “proliferation of arms and related materiel” (Resolution 2017) and other measures were designed to regulate the situation. It was suggested that those groups and individuals who had undermined law and order in Libya and thwarted the measures of the transitory period should be restricted in their movements and that financial sanctions should be imposed on them. It was clear nevertheless that these measures would never work: the Libyans who continued living according to their rules merely ignored them. In the country with uncontrolled borders, embargo on arms deliveries was useless; there was also enough arms and weapons inside the country.

By the end of 2012, Americans recovered from the shock and continued their mediation efforts. It turned out that the GNC members had failed to reach an agreement on the matters of prime importance: the duration of their power and adoption of the laws of Islamic governance. Armed militia that had moved to the fore plunged the country into a legal

* This murder raised numerous questions. Indeed, why was he killed in Benghazi, the place where the anti-Gaddafi riots had begun? How could Gaddafi’s supporters organize a wide-scale attack at an alien territory if, indeed, they were the perpetrators? How could the terrorists enter the territory of the American diplomatic mission? After the capture of the American embassy in Tehran in 1979, the American diplomatic missions are the most reliably protected in the world. If the attack was planned as a revenge for the film that defamed the Prophet Muhammad and that had been never shown in Libya, it remains unclear how the Islamic radicals learned about it.

chaos while criminal and Islamist groups got a free hand. In late 2013, election campaign to the Constituent Assembly began; from the start, the candidates could not agree on the term of office of the GNC's powers; on whether those who had filled administrative posts under Gaddafi should be allowed to run for the assembly; whether Islamic laws should receive an official status; on the issues of representation and the future of the militia units.

By the time of the election to the House of Representatives (HoR) in 2014, it turned out that the GNC members did not want to transfer their powers to the newly elected HoR members; the problem defied solution. The HoR members elected by the city of Tobruk, the Libyan National Army (LNA) and some of the militia units from the Benghazi district responded with their own coalition that began fighting radical Islamists supported by Qatar, Turkey and Sudan. In the west of the country, the rest of the GNC members and militia units joined forces within the Libya Dawn coalition that refused to recognize the LNA.

The UN-mediated efforts finally persuaded some of the coalition members to start talking; ceasefire agreements were signed. The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), a United Nations-led initiative, was signed on December 17, 2015 in Morocco and created an interim NTC of all major political forces and the so-called Presidential Council for Libya of nine members with Fayez al-Sarraj, brought to Libya by Italian military, as prime minister. By September 2016, the LNA and loyal military groups established their control over several infrastructural objects of key importance around Sirte and refused to accept the conditions set up by the LPA. By that time, the leader of the eastern group Khalifa Haftar had been promoted from general to field marshal.* In Libya's eastern part, premier of NTC al-Sarraj managed to organize administrative control limited to Tripoli. According to an Italian source, militia units around Tripoli are less inclined to take orders from the NTC and the Presidential Council. In the south, Fezzan and other provinces became black holes of sorts where Toubu, Awlad Sulaiman, Warfalla, and Tuareg tribes are fighting for control over smuggling routes.²²

Today, the territory of Libya is divided between local factions, influential chieftains and field commanders; on top of this, it is inundated by fighters of ISIS and Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia) defeated in Syria in the course of full-scale fighting. According to American sources, over six

* He is especially appreciated not for his military successes but because he printed Libyan dinars for Cyrenaica, which consolidated his authority.

thousand ISIS fighters have already reached Libya. Islamists established their control over vast territories in the country's historic regions – Tripolitania, Cyrenaica (Barqah) and Fezzan. The militia of Misurata, that had earned support of the United States, played an important role in routing radical Islamist groups.

The United States as the key external player frequently shifted the solution of Libyan problems to its allies and UN structures. In 2011, during the regime-change operation, Washington extended its military, economic, humanitarian, etc. aid to the total sum of \$163 million; in 2012 and 2013, the aid dropped to \$38 million a year and to \$4 million in 2014. In the next two years, the U.S. allocated \$27 and \$18 million; in 2017, the figure reached \$130 million.²³ In July 2014, the U.S. Department of State discontinued its activities in Libya; American diplomats organized the so-called Libya External Office functioning at the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia to supervise their programs in Libya. In 2018, security in the country, in which Americans intended to introduce law and order, leaves much to be desired, and they do not return their embassy to Tripoli.

On the whole, American armed forces carried out two big operations in Libya: in 2011, when Gaddafi was deposed, and in 2016, when the positions of ISIS were destroyed in the vicinity of Sirte; between these operations, they bombed the ISIS and Al-Qaeda positions with unclear results. American observers “attribute Libya’s divisive politics to simple binaries – Islamist versus secular, east versus west, tribe versus tribe, urban versus rural, ethnic majority versus ethnic minority.”²⁴ The external curators, likewise, may disagree. Italians stake on Fayeze al-Sarraj, whose positions are rather shaky, while the French prefer Khalifa Haftar as a much stronger leader. Italians accuse the French and Nicolas Sarkozy of stirring up the Libyan mess. “The Trump Administration has maintained U.S. recognition of the GNA and signaled continuing interest in providing U.S. foreign aid and security assistance to support Libya’s transition.”²⁵ In short, there is no full-scale civil war, yet armed clashes go on unabated; this means that so far common points between the sides will hardly be detected.

According to American assessments, ISIS units were driven away from a considerable part of the country, yet Washington has so far demonstrated no progress in achieving national unity. In May 2017, American Ambassador to Libya Peter Bodde and the Commander of United States Africa Command General Thomas Waldhauser arrived in Tripoli to discuss the problems of reconciliation and assistance in the security sphere

with leaders of different groups. No solution was found, and, according to officials, early in 2018, the US was still bombing the ISIS positions.

The political process unfolding in Libya is a long story. Some people discern certain traits of mediaeval fragmentation aggravated by the legal mess in which those involved exchange roles, shift power and gain weight. Some people discern the division of the spheres of influence among clans and criminal groups; others describe what they see as anarchy. Ravil Mustafin who spent many years in Libya has written: "The country's future and regional security are threatened by the on-going transformation of 'revolutionary militias' into well-organized and well-armed mafia structures. They have already crushed down the state, imposed their decisions on it and distributed a considerable part of resources among themselves."²⁶ It seems that the Russian phenomenon of "Makhnovshchina" is applicable there with certain reservations. While Nestor Makhno was an ideological and practicing anarchist, the Libyan revolutionaries set themselves no similar aims and yet arrived at similar results.

What Next?

LATE IN 2018, Libya will elect its president. Today, it is too early to predict for how long different groups will remain at daggers drawn or whether they will be brought together by the coming election. There are several solutions to the problem. Arturo Varvelli, an Italian, has written: "Mediation could be intensified on the levels of civil society, local representatives, and economic elites.... The international community can also engage in training the Presidential Guard and other security forces on the ground. These efforts should be undertaken within a theoretical framework for a decentralization process that shifts functions and duties of the state from the center to the periphery. The stabilization of the whole of Libya should start from the local level and move from the bottom-up. The establishment of a minimum level of security in the city of Tripoli, which by itself comprises almost a third of the population of Libya, could allow the PC/GNA to initiate a series of economic projects to repair Tripoli's infrastructure such as restoring roads and rebuilding schools and hospitals that have been badly damaged by war."²⁷

There is a commonly shared opinion that at this point the future of Libya looks hopeless with no unified centralized and stable state in sight. Two problems require immediate attention: the sphere of oil extraction

and transportation so far in a mess needs tighter control; the same fully applies to population migrations caused by fighting and total poverty. The migration flow from Libya has already reached the figure of 700 thousand.

Leaders of different groups, with inevitably temporary sponsors and patrons, pursue different aims. The country badly needs a strongman, a person respected enough to unite all forces. Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar cannot play this role: his authority is limited to Cyrenaica, the northeastern part of Libya. He is not young; we can hardly expect a lot of enthusiasm from the man of 75. Recently, however, he came up with his own solution to the Libyan problem: a march on Tripoli to push all armed groups out of the country. It seems that he intends to deport the rich leaders of militia groups abroad, help them settle there and promise that the new Libyan power will leave them alone.²⁸ This looks reasonable; it remains to be seen whether the opposition and its Western patrons are ready to accept the plan and to which extent they will modify it.

According to an American source, “the risk of a full-scale civil war remains real.”²⁹ It turned out that the Libyan authorities cannot knock together a stable government, ensure security and set up a financial system. People, on their side, are fed up with the war and want clarity and predictability.

The United States and its allies have found themselves in a far from simple situation, in a vicious circle of sorts. The West argues that elections and stabilization require certain conditions otherwise elections will bring no fateful positive changes. Western politicians are talking about national reconciliation, election and a ceasefire in Tripoli, a centralized security system for the unified financial and economic space, as well as a central bank for Libya, etc. The sides involved in the contemplated reconciliation might have very different ideas on the above.

Many experts have pointed out that the situation in Libya is very close to that in Afghanistan: the civil strife will go on for years if not decades. There are certain factors, however, that affect all possible transformations today or in future and positively or negatively.

Today, the absence of a strong consolidating and compromise figure, a moral beacon recognized as such across the country and able to unite the nation is one of the main problems. The revolutionary upheaval moved to the fore well-known figures with an experience of state governance and certain ideas about the country’s future: Mustafa Abdel Jalil, Gaddafi’s comrade-in-arms during the revolution; Abdel-Fattah Younis,

former minister of the interior; Abdel-Rahman Shalqam, former foreign minister; Moussa Koussa, who replaced Shalqam at the post of foreign minister, etc. Later, politicians of the second echelon, much more aggressive and much better suited to the demands of time, came to power to look after their own interests, widen the zones of their influence and get bigger incomes. They have no ideas, let alone theories and concepts, about the country's future. In his time, Russian Ambassador Oleg Peresyphkin wrote: "The opposition wants to remove Gaddafi; some of its members have no ideas about the future. At first, they will settle scores, fight for high posts and quarrel over the future type of the state."³⁰ Score-settling has been going on for seven years now. The West is baffled: there is no solution and no common denominator of all conflicting groups and clans. Certain things are, nevertheless, obvious.

First, the principles of Western democracy are inapplicable in Libya and in other Arab countries with the experience of color revolutions.

Second, the ideological vacuum can no longer be tolerated – the life of common people should acquire a meaning. The first GNC favored toward Islamism. Will Libyan Islamism be closer to the ideas of ISIS, Al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood or to relatively moderate Islamism? This question remains unanswered. Libyan Islamism will probably remain as patchy as the country's political map. There is a contradiction: so far, the Libyans have only one doctor (by this I mean the West) with the prescriptions of his own. It remains to be seen whether the Libyan national idea will suit the doctor.

Third, we cannot exclude that certain values of the Jamahiriya will be revived; there is a widespread nostalgia for the times of Gaddafi and an awareness of losses. This is further confirmed by the intensive political activity of Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam who plans to run for the president in 2018.

Fourth, until law and order are restored in the country and along its borders in the first place, Libya will remain one of Europe's headaches. In the south, the migration "gates" are widely opened; huge masses of Africans cross the territories of the Toubu and Zuwayya to reach the Mediterranean coast and South, Central and Northern Europe.

Fifth, in this context, time is a negative factor: during the eight years that have already passed since the regime change, people have become more or less adjusted. Those who rule certain territories will be hardly ready to share power and even less ready to share petrodollars. This means that Libya might be divided into Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The land-locked province of Fezzan might be divided too.

Libya is brimming with all types of weapons; in an absence of guarded border, the arsenals can become even bigger. In the past, every year Libya bought from Russia weapons to the sum of \$1 to \$2 billion and spent a lot of money on weapons from other countries. The armed militia units probably have at their disposal considerable amounts of destructive weapons to be used, if needed, in the rivalry for petrodollars.

The West that deposed Gaddafi at the price of billions of dollars is determined to consolidate its economic positions in Libya. This means that in future, too, political processes will unfold under its control and that its puppets will not be abandoned. The Libyans who, on the one hand, expect that the West will start pouring money into Libyan economy have, on the other, no positive feelings about the countries that bombed their country in 2011. This is true of those who supported Gaddafi and, probably, of those who opposed him. No matter what, Libya is doomed to close cooperation with Western Europe, the main user of Libyan oil. Libyans are not enthusiastic, to say the least, about the internal order prescribed to them by the victors whom they do not trust. The West, on its side, while steering toward consolidation of Libyan society, is highly apprehensive, and with good reason, of possible Islamization and radicalization.

There is, however, a ray of sunshine in the gloom: Libya has sold and will be selling oil, the main source of well-being for its peoples. To attract clients, the country should demonstrate stability and order. This is true not only of drilling rigs but also of transportation and pipeline infrastructure, ports and terminals and, obviously, the financial system. The proven oil reserves of about 48 billion barrels ensure Libya a place in the world's top ten. This will probably inspire the players both inside and outside the country to seek peace and compromises.

Strange as it may seem, the inability of the West to cope with the Libyan riddle increased Russia's chances in this country. For many decades, Arabs were balancing between the leading powers. Today, Russia is the only country that can bring peace and order: Italy, France and the rest of the EU countries associated with the United States cannot object to the latter's policy, let alone oppose it. Russia's involvement in internal settlement will add weight to the process. Today, when law and order have become indispensable for the revival of the country's economy and trade, the "victor-countries" start talking about Russia more and more often. Italian expert Andrea Beccaro has pointed out that Libyans know Russians well: between 1973 and 1992, over 11,000 Soviet/Russian advisors and specialists were stationed in Libya. "Furthermore, almost all

senior Libyan commandants were trained in the Soviet Union; the same was true between 2004 and 2011. As a result, the Libyan National Army (LNA) almost entirely relies on Soviet training and weapons.”³¹ The results of interaction between Libya and the Soviet Union/Russia in the sphere of energy production are no less important.

NOTES

¹ Quoted from: El-Khawas, Mohamed. *Qaddafi: His Ideology in Theory and Practice*. Brattleboro, Vermont: Amana Books, 1986, p. 127.

² *Ibid.*, p. 83.

³ *Zelenaya kniga. Chast pervaya. Reshenie problemy demokratii. Vlast naroda*, p. 37.

⁴ *Ibid. Chast tretya. Obshchestvenny aspekt Tretiy vsemirnoy teorii*, p. 26.

⁵ *Ibid. Chast pervaya*, p. 16.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁸ *Ibid. Chast tretya*, p. 53.

⁹ El-Khawas, Mohamed. *Op. cit.*, p. 119.

¹⁰ It should be said that, according to Academician Yevgeny Primakov, Gaddafi did not tell the whole truth: he had gathered money from foreign companies in exchange for the right to extract hydrocarbons in Libya. See: Primakov Ye. “Na veto velichie derzhavy bazirovatsya ne mozhet,” *Moskovskie novosti*. April 7, 2011.

¹¹ http://www.gazeta.ru/2003/12/20/box_3681.shtml

¹² Egorin A. *Qaddafi. Khronika ubiystva*. Moscow: Algoritm, 2013, p. 8.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁴ Podtserob A. “Gaddafi, kotorogo ya znayu, nikogda ne otstupayet,” *Izvestia*. March 29, 2011.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁶ <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/03/23/501364/main20046134.shtml>

¹⁷ Egorin A. *Op. cit.*, p. 14.

¹⁸ RIA Novosti // https://ria.ru/arab_ly/20110321/356344423.html

¹⁹ *Trump prigrozil lideru KNDR liviyskim stsenariem*. 18 maya 2018 g. // <https://news.mail.ru/politics/33503687/?frommail=1>

²⁰ See, for example: Mohamed El-Khawas. *Op. cit.*, p. 127.

²¹ Blanchard Ch. *Libya: Transition and US Policy*. Wash.: Congressional Research Service, May 2, 2018, p. 6.

²² Varvelli A. “Through the Strains: A Viable Roadmap for Libya?” *Looking Ahead: Charting New Paths for the Mediterranean. Mediterranean Dialogues*. Rome, 2017, p. 60.

²³ Blanchard Ch. *Op. cit.*, p. 38.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

²⁶ Mustafin R. “Iz revolyutsionerov – v mafiozi,” *Nezavisimaya gazeta. NVO*. August 24, 2018.

²⁷ Varvelli A. *Op. cit.*, p. 61.

²⁸ For more detail see: Mustafin R. “Haftar obeshchaet osvobodit Tripoli ot vooruzhennykh gruppirovok,” *Nezavisimaya gazeta*. September 13, 2018.

²⁹ Blanchard Ch. Op. cit., p. 1.

³⁰ Peresyypkin O. “Mertvyi Gaddafi im strashnee, chem zhivoy,” *Moskovskie novosti*. April 29, 2011 // <http://www.mn.ru/newspaper/world/68964>

³¹ Beccaro A. “Russia: Looking for a Warm Sea,” *Foreign Actors in Libya’s Crisis*. Ed. by K. Mezran and A. Varvelli. Milano: Lidizioni LediPublishing, 2017, p. 76.

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The Latin American Region and the “New Normal”: Where Do We Fit In?

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THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION is changing so rapidly and spontaneously that there is every reason to speak about heavy turbulence in the global economy and international politics. The Latin and Caribbean America (LCA) region is not immune from these general disturbances. It is difficult to conceptualize what is going on.

Modern reality seems uncertain and unpredictable because academic and political reflection is not keeping up with the accelerating changes and unexpected twists that are taking place. Finding no convincing explanation, many in the academic and expert field have settled on a framework formula dubbed the “new normal” that is in fact rather ambiguous.

In one sense, this refers to replacing the old process of regenerating the world system with a more complex configuration of basic development preconditions that come with less favorable conditions for economic growth and greater risks of various types of setbacks accompanied by costs that are hard to eliminate. We already see this replacement happening, resulting in what is believed to be a “new normal.” In another sense, this refers to the onset of a stage that rejects the old mechanisms of development and coexistence on the planet. This is a very protracted process. A difficult search for a balanced and inclusive *modus vivendi* on the world stage in the context of the altered general conditions lies ahead.

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And ultimately (at the end of this process), we will supposedly get a set of development conditions that will become the new norm.¹

To what extent is the “new normal” spreading to Latin American countries? To what extent does it alter the regional reality and prospects for our relations with Latin American countries? And what does it ultimately mean for Russian-Latin American relations? These questions are the focus of this article.

The Dominant Trends of the Global Context

WHEN CONSIDERING the global context, several key characteristics stand out. Despite a slight rebound in business activity in traditional global economic centers over the past two years, broadly speaking, the sluggish trends have not yet been overcome, and the recession following the 2008-2009 global economic crisis has dragged on for too long. The gap between the financial sector (its formal and shadow segments) and the real economy is not closing. This imbalance, which became one of the central reasons for the first extraordinary global economic crisis of our age, is redoubling, and therefore the risk of another extraordinary failure is rising. Globalization is maintaining momentum, but it is increasingly clearly starting to lose ground to deglobalization countertrends in several areas. Accordingly, there is an obvious need, driven by the depreciation of the Bretton Woods system, for new global governance mechanisms. But they are not yet coming into focus. Rather the opposite is happening.

Much has been said and written about the U.S.’s growing protectionism and sanctions extremism. Perhaps now it is time to call a spade a spade. Because essentially what we are dealing with is “economic terrorism.” On the other hand, what does the U.S. president’s threat to withdraw from the World Trade Organization or statements by his national security adviser regarding sanctions against the International Court of Justice, which intends to try American soldiers for criminal actions in Afghanistan, amount to?

The “new normal” is associated with rising inequality, particularly in the social sphere. In what are seemingly the most prosperous countries, income inequality indicators (including the Gini coefficient) have started inching higher.² It is noteworthy that this trend started after the elimination of an antipode in the face of the USSR. The need to demonstrate social competitiveness with the West seems to have faded. Moreover, the

welfare state is starting to be dismantled, as is currently happening in the U.S., France and other Western European countries.

Alternative centers are coming to the fore of economic leadership. China and India are demonstrating particularly impressive results. And they are not depreciating with the transition to GDP growth levels of 6% to 7%. But at the same time, the lagging economic potential of other BRICS members (including Brazil) in the past few years has proven quite palpable. Granted, this is not a huge setback to their prospects, but it nevertheless clearly indicates the need to substantially adjust development models and strategies, and to turn more energetically to innovative practices in keeping with the approaching technology paradigm.

The combination of the uneven development of national economies in the global context and the devastating effects of "exporting democracy," mediated by the demonstration effect in the transnational media space, is leading to stepped-up international migratory flows that destabilize society in recipient countries and cause depopulation in the countries of origin, depleting their human capital.

The means and technologies of informational expansion are becoming an increasingly powerful tool. The all-seeing eye of electronic monitoring and the ubiquitous virtual manipulator are capable of achieving political results in the interests of the northern hegemon in many areas – including, of course, Latin America. The achievements of "social engineering" could subsequently be utilized. And if that is not enough to achieve the "desired result," legitimate and illegitimate sanctions are rolled out.

The international community was simply stunned by the new Washington administration's voluntaristic decision to withdraw from the 2015 Paris Agreement to counter climate change, essentially torpedoing it. The agreement came at the cost of many years of arduous negotiations in search of a difficult compromise. Meanwhile, every year we are convinced of the growing risks and destructive power of natural disasters stemming from climatic deviations.

As we can see, the "new normal" means major complications for the

Much has been said and written about the U.S.'s growing protectionism and sanctions extremism. Essentially what we are dealing with is "economic terrorism."

development of small and large societies during the painful restructuring of the global economic system. This situation creates many new traditional and nontraditional risks and threats – including the emergence of acute geopolitical and geoeconomic conflicts degenerating into a lengthy confrontation accompanied by sanctions and informational pressure that the leaders of the West's NATO are using to weaken alternative centers of influence and replace undesirable regimes.

We cannot ignore the fact that the “new normal” is creating a breeding ground for separatist ambitions and changes to integration involvement (Brexit, etc.). In the present circumstances, the authority of the nation-state and national sovereignty often comes into conflict with the assertion of local identity (national, ethnic, linguistic, etc.).

It seems that in our bid to promote a polycentric world, we did not fully consider the likelihood of resistance from the “collective West” – its opposition to changes in the hierarchy of world leadership. This objectively and subjectively not only complicates but also destabilizes relations on the world stage. It brings not only friction and conflicts, but also a slide toward large-scale confrontation. The new structuring of the global system of international relations, supplementing the capacity and experience of the UN, seeks to minimize the cost of confrontation. But for now, only in potency.

The question naturally arises: To what extent is the “new normal” normal? In fact, it is largely abnormal. Not only because the world has entered a period of unprecedented restructuring, but because the past does not want to reconcile with the future and is acting destructively against it.

Metamorphoses in Latin America

THE GLOBALIZATION of recent decades has had its effect: The LCA is significantly more involved in global processes. However, countries in the region increasingly appear not only as an object of these processes but as actual protagonists – subjects of the evolution and restructuring of the system of international relations. This does not mean that the region has lost its peripheral status. That status is of course still observed in the region's persistently lagging prosperity level, scale and quality of science and education, and pace of technological innovation.

At the turn of the 21st century, the LCA underwent a considerable metamorphosis. The countries of the region, one after another, resolutely abandoned vulgar neoliberalism and, utilizing the fruits of democratic

transition, opened up an electoral path to power for the revitalized political left. Such was the will of the majority that spurned the abnormally high social costs of neoliberal practices.

The "left turn" has taken many various forms (from radical statism to soft center-leftism), testifying to the objectivity and similarity of the basis for reproducing the leftist political culture, as well as to the diversification of economic and political conditions. Measured in terms of population and GDP, the "left turn" has affected about two-thirds of the region.

The run-up to the 2008-2009 global economic crisis was marked by the diversification of LCA countries in the world market (in terms of geography and nomenclature), their use of increased liquid reserves to address the external debt burden and, accordingly, to reject the prescriptions imposed by the IMF. Economic regulators in LCA countries learned to slow down inflationary processes, and the efficiency of tax administrations increased.

The affirmation of the standards of socially orientated development can be considered unprecedented. Many countries have launched extensive programs to support the poor. Redistribution mechanisms started to be used more actively. As a result, by the early 2010s, more than 40 million Latin Americans had emerged from poverty, adding to the mass of solvent consumers and thus consolidating domestic markets in the region. This was facilitated by a cycle of high prices for raw and semi-refined products, which continue to account for a significant share of exports from the region.³

All this allowed the Latin American countries to weather the most recent global economic crisis with minimal costs, unlike the collective West. However, the reserves created in the previous stage and the reforms undertaken to adapt to the post-crisis conditions proved insufficient to maintain acceptable economic growth. Left-leaning governments failed to hold onto power amid the post-crisis recession and given lower prices and decreased demand for exports from the region. This once again confirms that it is more profitable to be in the opposition when the "cows are sickly and thin." Decreased stocks for feeding the masses inevitably led to the growth of mass discontent, which was actively utilized by the right-wing opposition and external manipulators. But there is also another significant aspect. Unfortunately, many leftist leaders and their supporters have not been able to resist the temptation that comes with power that allows them to opportunistically "steer" financial flows. As a result, left-

wing forces have been discredited in the eyes of the masses and their zone of activity has diminished drastically.

It seemed that the idea of “right-wing revenge” had gained currency in the region. But it is not able to fully express the essence of the latest developments in the LCA region. First, in some cases, leftists still hold power (in Uruguay, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, not to mention Cuba). Additional confirmation of this is the victory in the Mexican presidential election of center-left Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Second, not all current developments unambiguously indicate a shift to the right. It is more a shift to the center. After all, to seize or retain power, right-wing forces need to consider the demands of the masses, who have gotten used to the sponsorship of previous left-wing governments. In discourse and practice, the left is becoming a bit more pragmatic, considering the priority of the rule of law while recognizing and using incentives for constructive entrepreneurship. Pragmatism from both sides presents a lot of symptomatic surprises. For example, center-right and center-left forces often form electoral coalitions to oppose third forces.

Meanwhile, the center-right forces that have replaced left-leaning governments in several countries in the region (including Argentina and Brazil) are confronting protest sentiments from the poor and, increasingly, the middle class. Current world market conditions and the “new normal” framework are not conducive to consolidating their economic and social position in the country.

When considering the main features of the “new normal” in the LCA, special attention should be paid to the appreciable slowdown of economic performance indicators. The cyclical slowdown was broken only in 2017, after two years of negative regional GDP growth (-0.2% in 2015 and -0.8% in 2016). The GDP growth rate hit 1.2% according to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLA). Consequently, domestic and foreign corporations are still cautious about investing in the region. According to 2017 results, fixed capital investments decreased (-0.8%). The rate of investment generally remains below 20% of GDP.

However, the ECLA’s 2018 assessments are rosier. Regional GDP growth is expected to hit 2%. It looks like in 2017 the LCA economies started to emerge from prolonged recession. Foreign trade has revitalized in the region; total exports grew by 11% and imports by 9%; inflation has slowed. There has been relative stabilization of national currencies and a

subsequent increase in international reserves. At the same time, there is still high unemployment (9.4% of the economically active population), a fiscal deficit (-3.1% of GDP in the region), as well as high state debt (55.3% of LCA GDP) and external debt (38.6% of LCA GDP). There has been a decline in foreign direct investment (-5%).⁴ The main factors of instability and vulnerability for the Latin American economies remain dependence on commodity prices and weakness in the global manufacturing market.

Despite the still languid situation, major global market players are continuing to “stake out” access to strategic resources in the region, anticipating more encouraging prospects. The revitalization of foreign capital inflow is stimulated by the liberalization of state control in strategic economic sectors of many countries in the region.

The LCA countries once again face a difficult choice when implementing integration. Faith in closed regionalism has weakened. Polarization is noticeable within major regional groupings: the Community of Latin America and the Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Union of South American Nations (USAN). In the latter case, this has led to the exit of almost half of its participants, putting the fate of the union in question. The drift toward open regionalism is accelerating. Until recently, even despite adverse domestic market conditions, the countries of the region tried by all available means to increase the odds of joining globalization processes – whether by joining cross-border value chains, building preferential trade bridges with the most dynamic foreign markets or associating with various megablocs.⁵

The change of administration in Washington very much surprised and in some cases unsettled the countries of the region. The current U.S. administration’s torpedoing of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Project and intention to change the rules of the game in its favor in transatlantic partnership negotiations; Washington’s current review of NAFTA and a number of bilateral free trade treaties; the protectionist measures designed to “bring back manufacturing and jobs”; and, finally, the push to build a border wall fencing off Mexico (and make Mexico pay for it) essentially changes the context of relations between the Latin American community and its large northern neighbor.

The process of normalizing relations with Cuba has frozen. Even in this respect, Donald Trump is seeking to disavow the course of the previous administration. But the Barack Obama administration’s practice of employing sanctions has not only diminished but increased. In the LCA

region, this is confirmed by the actions being taken against Venezuela. Trump's unpredictability and pressure is pushing the LCA countries to diversify their foreign policy by expanding links with alternative power centers, including China and Russia. By doing so, they reasonably hope to minimize their vulnerability in a situation when Washington unabashedly exerts its will on them.

With respect to the manifestation of countertrends reducing or neutralizing the effects of globalization, it is noteworthy that processes of structuring international relations are emerging in the regional format before they are at the global level. The LCA and several other regions of the developing world are a clear example of this. Earlier models of sub-regional integration are being reevaluated while new international structures are forming. In the Latin American region, the crowning achievement of these efforts can be considered CELAC, whose purpose is to form a common platform on key issues of developing the region and the international agenda, and present the LCA's common position and collective approaches at key interregional forums.

Despite all the complexities of the present situation and frequent backward steps, the LCA is gradually expanding access to global governance mechanisms. Evidence of this is the participation of three major countries of the region in the decisions of the Group of 20 and Brazil's presidency of BRICS. Symptomatically, representatives from Latin American countries are being promoted to leadership positions in key international organizations: the OECD, the WTO, the FAO, and the hierarchy of the UN system.

Latin America has moral authority given that in the 20th and 21st centuries, the countries of the region, unlike other parts of the international community, have managed to minimize interstate armed conflicts and, in this sense, earn a reputation as the most peaceful region on the planet. This is affirmed by its lead in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones based on the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1967), as well as an initiative that culminated in the adoption of a UN resolution (1986)⁶ on the prevention of the militarization of the South Atlantic. It is important to emphasize the continuing commitment of LCA states to the basic norms of international law, and their recognition of the central role of the UN in developing and implementing the international agenda.

It is obvious that the "new normal," which has significantly altered the external context for regional development, emphasizes a dual imperative: on the one hand, to use intraregional cooperation more efficiently

and, on the other, to swiftly react to changes in the global power balance by engaging promptly in new structuring projects that meet national interests.

Guidelines for Russia's Latin American Policy

DESPITE the vicissitudes of current realities on the world stage, Russian-Latin American relations are characterized by generally positive results. Active and mutually respectful dialogue touching on not just bilateral issues but also the broader international agenda is maintained with most countries in the region. The second aspect of our relations emphasizes Russia's willingness to involve Latin American countries in efforts to discuss and address world problems. For Russia, this is a matter of principle.

We recall with bitterness the last decade of the last century. MGIMO Professor Yevgeny Mikhailovich Astakhov, an ambassador who worked for many years in Latin America, competently characterizes the situation at that time: "After 1991, Russia changed its geopolitical orientations and sought incorporation into Euro-Atlantic structures. In the 1990s, Russia did not have time for Latin America, and the former interest in the region faded. This led to the rupture of previously established relations and, in some cases, to the irreversible loss of invested funds. This sharp 'Russian style' course change negatively affected Russia's political and economic positions in the LCA. But most importantly, considerable damage was done to Russia's prestige, and in some countries, it lost credibility as a reliable partner."⁷

Nevertheless, Russian diplomacy managed to persevere and then build full-fledged relations with the overwhelming majority of Latin American and Caribbean countries. Significant gains have been made compared with the Soviet era and even more so with the collapse of the 1990s, especially in the Caribbean and Central America. Russia currently has 18 embassies and three consulate generals in the LCA, and its ambassadors have dual accreditation in 15 countries. In turn, 20 LCA countries have embassies in Russia and five have nonresident ambassadors. The most recent event was the opening of the Grenada Embassy in Moscow.

Special mention should be made of agreements on mutual visa-free travel that have symbolic as well as practical significance, demonstrating trust in interstate relations. And it must be said that there are almost no blank spots on the visa-free regime map of the LCA – except for Mexico.

The Russian president and foreign minister frequently hold meetings and talks with their Latin American counterparts in both bilateral and multilateral formats. In 2014–2017, meetings and high-level talks were held with the heads of 10 Latin American countries. In addition, contacts on the sidelines of international forums need to be taken into account; seven such meetings took place during the indicated period.

The past year was fruitful in this regard. In connection with the FIFA World Cup, the presidents of Bolivia and Panama and the president-elect of Paraguay visited Moscow. Although it is too early to summarize the results of 2018, mention should be made of the visit to Moscow of Argentine President Mauricio Macri, and meetings with the leaders of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina that, according to standard practice, should take place at the G-20 forum that will be held in Buenos Aires in November 2018. Political dialogue at the level of foreign and deputy foreign ministers is hard to assess numerically. This work is carried out practically every day and has extended to almost all the countries in the region in recent years.

The correction of the many distortions and deviations that were made in the 1990s, as well as Russia's new development trajectory associated with restoring the "power vertical" and strengthening national sovereignty and authority in the international arena, have of course impacted the Latin America dimension. But at the same time, more specific circumstances have made themselves known: the continued professionalism of our diplomats, and the preservation of a national school of Latin America studies in diplomacy and academia. (Incidentally, this contrasts with the erosion of Latin American studies in diplomatic and academic fields in the U.S.)

In the "new normal," countries in the region, feeling the need to diversify foreign ties, view Russia as a promising and in some cases strategic partner. For its part, the Russian Federation has significantly diversified its set of cooperation partners in Latin America. New partners include regions and cities, universities and museums, athletic associations, and ministries and government agencies with which cooperation had previously not been established, not to mention a significant expansion of the circle of business structures. Even despite the increasing pressure of Washington, which is trying to push an anti-Russian agenda on Latin American partners, the LCA countries usually manage to shy away from this kind of "solidarity" with Washington or London.

Of course, it cannot be assumed that Latin Americans have "innate"

immunity against anti-Russian inflammation. Soberly assessing the situation, we currently see examples of weak political will in situations where the right to an independent position must be firmly defended. And this could very well continue in the future. Nevertheless, the overall picture remains fundamentally unchanged. But our Latin American partners must now act with greater deference toward Washington and maneuver accordingly, especially when facing the threat of secondary sanctions. In other words, our work in the LCA will become more complex. This means that more hard work lies ahead in terms of promoting, financing, insuring, and even logistically supporting trade and investment deals.

The current state of economic relations is seemingly quite fruitful. This includes the supply of medium-haul Sukhoi aircraft to Mexico, the purchase by several countries in the region of Russian helicopters and power equipment, and the domination of our chemical fertilizer exporters in Latin American markets. However, the overall dynamics of trade turnover with countries of the region remains fragile and vulnerable with respect to critical market swings and geopolitical incidents.

The peak level of almost \$19 billion was reached in 2015, followed by a protracted slowdown. A recent low was reached in 2016 (\$12.1 billion). But a year later, the turnover growth curve nevertheless turned upward. Apparently, both sides adapted to changing trade conditions. At the same time, exports from the LCA are rebounding faster, in part because Latin American suppliers apparently managed to exploit niches in the Russian market that were abandoned by those who came under countermeasures for supporting the anti-Russian sanctions. On the other hand, our one-dimensional list of export products remains inert. Unfortunately, the types of products coming from the LCA have also changed little.⁸ Based on 2017 results, turnover remains below \$15 billion. This means major changes are needed in our approach to Latin America to rectify the trend.

The practical work of the upcoming stage will, of course, point toward the best solutions for determining subsequent measures. However, a priori, we can talk about some guidelines. For example, for the sake of staking out positions in Latin American markets, when pursuing business partnerships, managers of our enterprises and firms will obviously have to exercise greater flexibility when it comes to the terms of deliveries, the transfer of technology and “know-how,” and the degree of localization within the framework of investment projects. On the other hand, the competitiveness of our companies must be accompanied by greater discipline

in meeting obligations toward Latin American partners. In other words, in anticipation of stiff competition (and on an unequal basis for us), we will have to compensate for the lack of standard benefits by offering quality goods and services, not just price discounts. We will have to deepen and diversify partnerships with Latin American companies, making provisions for extensive cooperation.

Special attention should be given to multinational corporations formed in the LCA: the so-called “translatinas” that already have financial reserves, technological capabilities and commercial experience and, for the prospects of additional “room under the sun,” are ready to take bigger risks compared to Western transnational companies.

At one time (in the early 2000s), due to bureaucratic myopia we missed a good chance to become a member and shareholder of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB). Back then, there was talk of repurchasing a portion of the shares of the former Yugoslavia. The amount by today’s standards was a token \$20 million. Had we agreed to that, today we would have broad access to large-scale infrastructural and industrial projects implemented under IADB programs.⁹ In today’s conditions, we need to raise the issue of entering Latin American capital markets from completely different positions. A large and rather stable segment of these markets are subregional development banks, including the Andean Development Corporation, the Caribbean Development Bank, and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEL).

It is difficult to expect noticeable gains in the short term regarding the use of national currencies for mutual payments. Barter schemes and clearing arrangements are probably needed to get to that point. It is important to note that Latin American countries already have similar experience in their intraregional practice.

It is even more relevant today to shift economic relations with LCA countries from the level of merely exchanging goods to the level of connecting long-term business interests involving a rational combination of the comparative advantages of both parties. Preserving and strengthening economic relations with the LCA countries obviously depend on the potential for developing Russia’s economic system, and our ability to improve the mechanism for supporting export and constructive investment activities abroad.

Finally, the modern environment requires the maximum mobilization of funds and “soft power” reserves. In the international arena in general, and in Latin America in particular, much has seemingly been done in

recent years to strengthen informational and humanitarian positions. In the case of the former, we simply do not have the right to leave the informational field without a decent alternative. Unfortunately, in the case of the latter, financial support still comes from leftover funds, even though the general complication of the international environment today clearly requires rational but nevertheless sufficient support to achieve tangible positive results: the fortification of friendly public sentiment toward Russia in LCA countries.

Of course, it is obvious that Russian-Latin American relations are dependent on conditions on both sides, on the global situation, and on what the North American hegemon is focused on today and its ability to tangibly influence the course of events in the LCA. But in this case, a key point, and what can be considered a controllable factor, is the potential and dynamism of our economy, as well as our ability to make progress along an innovative path and in establishing mechanisms for Russia's effective participation in international trade and world politics.

NOTES

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Key words: “new normal,” Latin America, globalization, system of international relations, Russia.

From Global to Regional Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism: The CIS ATC's Experience and Prospects

A. Arefyev

THERE ARE many organizations on the international arena that are in one way or another involved in combating terrorism. Cooperation on the global level proceeds within the framework of the UN and its specialized agencies, Interpol and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT); the OSCE is also becoming actively involved in this process. In the Eurasian space, there are regional organizations, including the Antiterrorism Center of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS ATC), the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (RATS SCO), the Eurasian Group for the Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (EaG), and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

It would seem that an impressive international antiterrorism cooperation system is in place. However, in reality, the picture is somewhat different. A review of recent experience in international antiterrorism cooperation leads to a disappointing conclusion about current trends: On the one hand, the functional range of bilateral cooperation is often too narrow to cover all aspects of efforts to successfully combat terrorism and violent extremism; on the other hand, global cooperation is all-encompassing but not effective enough and does not take into account the specifics of counterterrorism cooperation in certain subregions.

Global organizations are currently coming under criticism, in particular over “the crisis of confidence in the OSCE” [3, pp. 30-43], which is not conducive to constructive cooperation among member states. Without such cooperation, “in the spirit of the commitments and declarations that

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have already been made, it is unlikely that new terrorist attacks will be prevented" [3, pp. 30-43].

This reality is compelling international organizations to build their activities on a regional basis. Moreover, calls for member countries to strengthen regional and subregional cooperation are contained in numerous UN Security Council resolutions [6].

These days, the main actors in antiterrorism cooperation are following this path. Consider Interpol's regional projects: Project Amazon (Central and South America), Project Pacific (Southeast Asia), Project Nexus (Europe), Project Baobab (Africa) and Project Kalkan (Central Asia). The last-mentioned project, which includes the CIS ATC, involves the gathering and sharing of information about terrorist organizations operating in the Central Asian region [10].

Over the years, the CIS ATC has accumulated extensive experience cooperating with a number of international, regional and subregional organizations, as well as with the national authorities of CIS countries in countering terrorism and violent extremism.

The CIS ATC provides significant support to several UN agencies, known primarily as UN Security Council sanctions committees (the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaeda and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities and the 1988 Sanctions Committee), as well as the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED). In addition, the CIS ATC is an active partner of the Global Research Network that was organized by the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) with support from the CTED and currently consists of think tanks and research institutions from Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, the Americas, and Oceania [14].

For their part, UN Security Council sanctions committees regularly invite representatives of regional organizations to their briefings on the situation in respective regions. Thus, in June 2017, Col. Gen. A.P. Novikov, head of the CIS ATC, held a briefing on the situation in the

Over the years, the CIS ATC has accumulated extensive experience cooperating with a number of international, regional and subregional organizations, as well as with the national authorities of CIS countries in countering terrorism and violent extremism.

Central Asian region [7], presenting the specialized regional organization's position on the situation in the region to Security Council members. In this context, it is also important to note the participation of the CIS ATC delegation led by A.P. Novikov in the first UN high-level conference of heads of counterterrorism agencies of member states, organized by the CTED [1], and the open briefing by the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee on Central Asia [8].

To get a better understanding of the current situation in the CIS region, last year, members of the sanctions committees monitoring team attended CIS ATC-organized expert consultations of representatives of security agencies, intelligence units and law enforcement services of CIS member states on combating terrorism and other violent extremism practices.

The CIS ATC's regional cooperation with the CTED is very constructive. The ATC's information regarding the situation in the Central Asian region and measures taken to counter terrorist threats is taken into account in preparing the UN secretary-general's reports.

In keeping with the CTC's mandate, its representatives regularly visit member countries to assess the implementation of the UN Security Council's counterterrorism resolutions. CTC delegations usually include representatives of international organizations operating in the corresponding region. Thus, in the course of such visits to Tajikistan [5] and Turkmenistan last year, CTC delegations included representatives of the ATC CIS, the OSCE, the CSTO, and Interpol. In 2018, similar visits were made to Armenia [15] and Azerbaijan [16]. These visits make it possible to discuss, at the working level, opportunities for enhancing each country's counterterrorism capacity by using these organizations' resources.

In following its antiterrorism policy, the OSCE also enters the regional level, which allows it to consider threats and challenges in a specific region, as well as to carry out local projects. At the same time, the OSCE's geographic reach is expanding [13]. Currently, the OSCE has missions in the post-Soviet space on various levels, in particular in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine. In Tajikistan, in close proximity to a region where counterterrorism has been a pressing issue for many years, in addition to the OSCE Program Office, the OSCE Border Management Staff College is based [11]. The college organizes training programs for senior personnel of border guard and customs agencies of OSCE member states and partners, inviting highly qualified experts and representatives of regional

organizations with relevant experience in the field as lecturers. These include the Coordination Service of the CIS Border Troops' Commanders Council and the CIS ATC. The OSCE office in Tajikistan praised the training sessions that ATC experts held for college students in 2017 and 2018 [2]. ATC representatives regularly participate in other OSCE events and activities (conferences, workshops, seminars) in the CIS and beyond, which testifies to the regional organization's influence and status, as well as to its potential for advancing CIS interests at various international platforms and venues.

Considering the urgency of preventing and suppressing terrorist financing, international cooperation among security agencies and financial intelligence units is acquiring special importance. Such efforts are currently being made within the framework of FATF-type organizations, in particular, the Eurasian Group for the Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (EaG). In conjunction with the EaG, the CIS ATC has established annual training programs for staff members of the relevant agencies directly involved in countering terrorist financing, in the premises of the International Training and Methodology Center for Financial Monitoring (ITMCFM). In addition, joint workshops are organized for exchanging practical experience. Last year, such a seminar was held together with the CTED, and the 2018 workshop is being prepared jointly with Interpol. Experts from non-CIS countries are also invited. Importantly, the uniqueness of these activities was noted in the UN secretary-general's fifth and sixth reports [9].

Collaboration between two CIS agencies – the CIS ATC and the CIS Council of Heads of Financial Intelligence Units (CHFUI) – is producing good practical results. A total of 99 persons involved in terrorist financing were exposed on the basis of the ATC's information about terrorists and extremists on an interstate wanted list as part of Operation Barrier, conducted jointly with CIS member states' financial intelligence units in 2017 alone [4]. It should be noted that so far no other regional organization outside the CIS has been able to produce such results.

To sum up, practical cooperation in combating terrorism on the regional and subregional levels is highly efficient. This is due to the high level of trust among regional actors and their common approaches toward countering threats specific to a region. It is important to note that CIS member countries could make wider use of the well-developed horizontal ties between the CIS ATC and specialized international organizations on the regional level to advance their counterterrorism efforts.

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Key words: CIS ATC, counterterrorism cooperation, Interpol, crisis of confidence, UN CTC, OSCE.

In Defense of Westphalian Principles

K. Gajiev

SWEEPING CHANGES of epochal dimensions are caused by the deep-cutting shifts in the most important spheres of social life at the national, regional and global levels, protracted social and economic crises, wars, disintegration of the old and emergence of new ambitious powers, etc. These shifts marked essential stages in the development of international political systems; they were responsible for the disintegration of great civilizations, empires, world powers, and the corresponding world orders.

In October 1648, the Westphalian system, the product of the Peace of Westphalia, ended the Thirty Years' War in Europe and buried Roman Catholic universalism and the Holy Roman Empire. The balance of power, the system formulated by the Vienna Congress of 1815, that rested on Westphalian principles was built up on the ruins of Napoleon's empire. The Versailles-Washington system is the product of World War I that destroyed the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires and detached big chunks from the territory of the Russian Empire. The bipolar world was one of the results of the rout of the Third Reich and the Land of the Rising Sun in World War II. In the final analysis, this war delivered a fatal strike to the great colonial empires of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Here I will try to identify and analyze systemic and structural components of the so-called liberal or unipolar world order that replaced the bipolar world order when the Cold War had ended and the Soviet Union with its history of triumphs and failures had disintegrated.

A Bit of History

HERE is a concise description of the nature and purpose of the Westphalian system, its principles and attitudes. It is rooted in the

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Reformation and the formula that appeared in the Augsburg Settlement of 1555 that guaranteed freedom of religion to all states and other units of the Holy Roman Empire: *cuius regio, eius religio*, which meant that the religion of the prince became the religion of the state and all its inhabitants. The prince or the ruling regime, therefore, could impose his/its religious system on any country under his/its jurisdiction. This formula served as the starting point of a set of values, principles and attitudes that laid the foundation of the Westphalian system of international relations.

It differed a lot from all previous systems that relied on dynastic interests; it laid foundations of national states as the main subjects of international relations; it introduced the principle according to which claims of any state to a certain territory under its jurisdiction are recognized if the rights of other states to pursue their aims in full accordance with their national interests are likewise recognized.

In the course of time, the principle of sovereign equality of national states irrespective of the forms of government was gradually formed: each and every sovereign state chooses its form of governance independently and rejects the supremacy of any other power. In other words, supreme power or sovereignty belongs to national state, the main or only vehicle of rights and duties of any particular nation in the system of international relations. As an exclusive vehicle of national sovereignty with a monopoly on legal violence, only state has the right to declare wars on and sign peace agreements with other states. According to a no less important principle, no state, no matter how powerful, can interfere in domestic affairs of other states irrespective of their form of governance. The principle of territorial integrity of any state was also recognized.

Eventually these principles developed into the balance of power. The Concert of Powers based on it was a result of the uphill talks at the Vienna Congress of 1814-1815 between the great European powers that ended the era of Napoleonic wars and opened a new page in the history of international relations. It was expected to block any attempt of any of the great powers to move, by political and diplomatic methods or by the use of force, to the dominant positions on the continent. The Concert of Powers was a union of autocratic Russia, the monarchy of the Habsburgs and liberal England, that is, a union of authoritarian and liberal regimes that agreed on what was allowed and what was banned in the foreign policies of each of the states irrespective of its state order.

The Westphalian system, however, was based on the hierarchical

principle: militarily stronger great powers controlled, sometimes in a tough way, smaller states and determined their fates. The so-called Holy Alliance (set up at the Vienna Congress by the Habsburg and Russian empires and Prussia) can be described as an extreme realization of this principle.

It should be said that the Westphalian system was a product of the Euro(West)-centrist world in which the existential problems of international relations were resolved by the Concert of the great powers of Europe. It was World War I that undermined the predominantly (or

It seems that Westphalian principles and guidelines – revived with a clear understanding that the sphere of their application is limited by the moral, ethical, axiological, ideological and other contexts of the day – might serve as an alternative to the liberal/unipolar world order.

exclusively) European nature of the balance of power. In the course of it, let alone after it, the European powers had to accept the de facto legitimate nature of the claims of the United States and Japan to the status of the custodians of the contemporary world. The Soviet Union that in the 1930s was developing into a big military and political power tipped the balance of power in Europe and all over the world.

Westphalian principles were significantly modified in the wake of World War II: in the bipolar world, the struggle for the hearts and minds of common people was one of the key elements of international relations. In this connection, it was especially important that after the war the United States pushed aside the traditional arbiters – Great Britain, France and Germany – and became one of the two (together with the Soviet Union) bulwarks of the postwar bipolar world order.

The world community became a hierarchy with two superpowers on the top; a group of great powers occupied a lower level of the same pyramid; the lowest levels belonged to the states with less or no international weight.

The ideological struggle between two military-political blocs – the East and the West – became one of the key factors that deserve special attention, while the systemic and structural specifics of the bipolar order and the Cold War times can be temporarily left outside the equation. Power, military power in the first place, was used to promote the way of

life, ideas about the world and the legitimacy of each of the blocs. The Cold War was a large-scale ideological war in which territorial issues were of secondary importance: each of the sides wanted regime change in this or that state to install its own regime – either socialist or capitalist.

The very concepts – the East and the West – shed their geographic definitions to acquire ideological dimensions. The conflict between the two blocs was a unique one: conceptually, it was inter-systemic and brimming with philosophical and ideological meanings. This explains how Japan in the Far East and Australia and New Zealand far removed from the Euro-Atlantic world became parts of the West.

The ideological dimension, one of the elements of the cornerstone of the bipolar world, was responsible for the strategic imperative that forced the majority of countries to close ranks around one of the two poles. The relations were not even strained; they could not be described as rivaling: they were short of a holy war in which one of the opponents would win and the other, disappear. It was a zero-sum game, in which wars and conflicts anywhere on the globe were regarded by the sides not so much as instruments of problem settling but as victory or defeat. A victory of one of the sides in any corner of the globe was interpreted as a defeat of the other.

With all possible reservations, it was these specifics of the bipolar world order and the Cold War that laid the first bricks into the philosophical, ideological and political foundation of the liberal world order. The norms related to human rights as one of the pillars of the world community legitimized in the UN documents also played a certain role in this respect.

I have in mind, first and foremost, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966. The role of the international financial institutions – IMF, WB and GATT/WTO – based on the Bretton Woods Agreement should not be ignored as well. They and the international organizations affiliated with them were based on liberal values, the principles and guidelines of the UN documents enumerated above that guaranteed human rights and freedoms. They were further developed in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe adopted in Helsinki in 1975.

The Final Act that confirmed the legitimacy of the key principles of the Westphalian system – sovereign equality, territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers – contained Point VII “Respect for human rights and

fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of belief” directly related to the subject discussed here. The United States was one of the first to make it the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Jimmy Carter, elected U.S. president in 1976, publicly confirmed it as one of the pillars of Washington’s foreign policy strategy by saying that “our commitment to human rights must be absolute” on the worldwide scale.

Advent of the Liberal/Unipolar World Order

THE END of the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s disintegration brought the liberal world order to the top of the pyramid and made it a synonym of a unipolar world order presided by Uncle Sam in splendid isolation. An influential part of the intellectual, political, media and tele-cinematographic-Hollywood establishment imagined that complete and final victory of Western liberalism on the worldwide scale spelt the end of history and systemic ideological confrontation between states.

Yet, nature abhors a vacuum. In any case, very much in line with the talk about the “end of history,” the final and irreversible triumph of liberal values and the Western/American way of life, etc., the axiological principles were promptly moved to the fore in the interpretations of the liberal/unipolar world order. As a rule, the previous forms of world order, including the Westphalian system, separated the ideological, let alone, axiological differences from inter-state relationships.

This means that the Cold War in which ideological struggle acquired a systemic character moved away from the historical tradition. In the bipolar world, Washington relied on moral, ethical and axiological aspects as an ideological justification of its foreign policy. Democrat John F. Kennedy, elected president in 1961, said in his inaugural address, very much in line with Woodrow Wilson: “Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”¹ Twenty years later, Ronald Reagan held forth about basically the same during the presidential campaign of 1984: “Is it morally right? And on that basis, and that basis alone, we make a decision on every issue.”² For him, it was America’s mission to save ailing mankind – no more, no less.

The ideological dimension of the relations between the East and the West did not sink into oblivion when the Cold War ended. Very much in line with the Kennedy-Reagan experience, it was transformed into axio-

logical domination. Samuel Huntington in his popular “The Clash of Civilizations” that appeared as an article and then as a monograph, described this metamorphosis in more or less clear terms. While Francis Fukuyama said that Western liberalism had scored the final victory on the worldwide scale and declared that history had ended, Huntington defined the 20th century as a century of ideological struggle and the 21st century as an epoch of civilizational clashes. He put his main idea into a nutshell of “The West against the Rest,” which meant a clash between the universal human values of liberalism and the rest of the world community.

There is a telltale fact: throughout the first decade and a half of the 21st century, the neocons, members of the right radical trend of American sociopolitical thought, played first fiddle in steering Washington’s foreign policy. The neocons of the first wave such as Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Daniel Moynihan, and Jean Kirkpatrick greeted the President-elect Ronald Reagan with the ideas of re-ideologization of politics, rearmament of foreign policy strategy to revive ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union. Irving Kristol offered their collective formula: “In the modern world, a non-ideological politics is a politics disarmed.”

The next generation of neocons that assumed the task of ideological justification of exporting democratic revolutions and human rights across the world, transformed Kristol’s formula into a fundamentalist statement. This claim was first formulated a week after 9/11 by President George W. Bush, who warned the human community: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,” a paraphrase of sorts of Lenin’s well-known “you’re either with us or against us.”

In February 2003, a month before the invasion of Iraq, the House of Representative of U.S. Congress heard about “the capitalist revolution,” a new expression that, according to Slovenian philosopher and culturologist Slavoj Žižek, was interpreted by the Americans as “export of their revolution across the world.” In this way, the U.S. replaced the Soviet Union as an “agent of world revolution.”³

On November 6, 2003, when the victory over the Iraqi army had already been announced, George W. Bush, speaking in Washington on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of The Heritage Foundation, announced the start of a new American foreign policy conducive to the “global democratic revolution”; in practice, this policy was launched by the aggression against Iraq.⁴

In March 2005, four American members of Congress – Senators Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) and John McCain (R-AZ) together with Frank

Wolf (R-VA) and Tom Lantos (D-CA) in the House of Representatives – introduced to the Congress the Advance Democratic Values, Address Nondemocratic Countries, and Enhance Democracy Act. M. Palmer, M. Horowitz, E. Kadel and B. Tantillo from the neo-conservative Hudson Institute also contributed to the document, which stated, in particular: “It is the policy of the United States to promote freedom and democracy in foreign countries.”⁵

The book by two members of the neo-con community William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan entitled *The War Over Iraq: Saddam’s Tyranny and America’s Mission* is highly illustrative in this respect. The authors did not mince words: “The mission begins in Baghdad, but it does not end there.... we stand at the cusp of a new historical era.... this is a decisive moment.... it is so clearly about more than Iraq. It is about more even than the future of the Middle East and the war on terror. It is about what sort of role the United States intends to play in the world in the twenty-first century.”⁶

The joint program of the U.S. and EU published in December 2005 by the Washington office of the European Institute was presented by Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, who specified: “We believe that the next great mission for us together is spreading the freedom we enjoy in Europe and America. We also need to complete our work in Europe by attending to the Balkans, Ukraine and Russia. We need to continue fostering democracy and opposing repression in Central Asia and the Caucasus.”⁷

Tony Blair, former prime minister of Britain, was of a more or less same opinion and unequivocally sided with the American policy of export of democratic revolutions. Trying to justify Great Britain’s involvement in the Iraqi war, he said: “The war on terrorism is not about security or military tactics. It is a battle of values, and one that can only be won by the triumph of tolerance and liberty. Afghanistan and Iraq have been the necessary starting points of this battle. Success there, however, must be coupled with a bolder, more consistent, and more thorough application of global values, with Washington leading the way.” He went on with: “We could have chosen security as the battleground. But we did not. We chose values.... We knew that you cannot defeat a fanatical ideology just by imprisoning or killing its leaders; you have to defeat its ideas.... We will not win the battle against global extremism unless we win it at the level of values as much as that of force. We can win only by showing that our values are stronger, better, and more just than the alternative.”

“The crucial point about these interventions,” the British prime minister went on to say, “is that they were not just about changing regimes but about changing the value systems governing the nations concerned. If we want to secure our way of life, there is no alternative but to fight for it. That means standing up for our values, not just in our own countries but the world over.”⁸ With all possible reservations it is too early to say that the incumbent administration of Donald Trump has already abandoned this strategy.

It seems that the liberal-democratic and market-oriented fundamentalists have armed themselves with the Marxian thesis “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” They are not ready to accept the world and its realities at their face value; they reject the real world for the sake of virtual, ideal world created by the adepts of liberalism.

When we talk about our understanding and interpretation of human beings and human values, we invariably keep in mind a morally ethical axiological element. Politics is realized in the field where power and morals meet and intertwine; state policies, however, differ radically from the conduct of an individual. This is one of the biggest problems: a man has the right to sacrifice boons or even life for the sake of the highest moral and ethical values while the state representing entire society protects its vital interests, ensures national security and is responsible for its continued existence. Politics is the art of the possible; this explains why frequently the state finds itself in a situation in which any decision not always and not necessarily corresponds to the generally accepted moral and ethical values, principles and guidelines.

To put this differently, in politics, foreign politics in the first place, realistic and balanced assessments and decisions prevail over moral, ethical or ideological principles and opinions. Foreign policy is not about realization of a certain set of ideological or moral-ethical attitudes. It is an instrument of efficient protection of the state’s national interests, ensuring national security and continued existence of the state. There is a set of issues – slavery, genocide, terrorism, tortures, racism, etc. – the assessment of which requires a moral and ethical dimension. In other words, politics should not disregard moral-ethical criteria and principles. They should be taken into account as an ideal of sorts which the state might accept as a beacon of its international politics but not as a standard or a guide to action. This is especially true when it comes to fighting off existential national security threats.

As a result of these novelties, the values of liberalism were gradually superimposed, throughout the entire postwar period, on the principles and values of the Westphalian system; they demanded that all differences between states, regions and nations regarding the observation of human rights and freedoms should be wiped off. In this way, the liberal values and principles pushed, so to speak, to the backburner the Westphalian principles and guidelines. The basic principles of the Westphalian system remained intact, at least *de jure*: national sovereignty, sovereign equality of the members of the world community of states in their bilateral relations and in dealing with the world community, territorial integrity, non-interference in domestic affairs, etc. Modified to different extents, they retained their consequence in the bipolar world and in the world dominated by liberal values.

In practice, however, these principles were not and are not strictly observed: there is a fundamental contradiction between Westphalian principles and the liberal values that can be hardly, or even never, resolved. It is responsible to a great extent for the turbulent state of the world community. These principles will not disappear without a trace; they will survive as one of the pillars of the coming (or already existing) polycentric world order.

It is obvious that the winners write laws and rules of the game in conformity with the specific conditions of any historical period and their own interests. Depending on the situation, the winners appropriate the right to interpret (or even violate) laws and rules as they see it fit. Indeed, in the West-centric world, the history of mankind written in the West was adjusted to its interests. The liberal world order was set up by those who represented the West to promote their own interests.

As a saying goes, if a gentleman cannot win by playing by the rules, he changes the rules. While a superpower sees no threats to its hegemony, it sees no need to change the rules. As soon as an opponent strong enough to challenge its legitimacy and rules appears on the horizon, the superpower starts hastily readjusting the rules. If this tactic fails, the rules are thrown away and violated. The wars the West, led by the United States, unleashed in the Greater Middle East when the liberal world order seemingly dominated, are an ample confirmation of the above. Irrespective of the results, the West violated the valid international laws.

Today, when the West-centric liberal world order is in decline and the talk about the unipolar world order lost its meaning, all liberal ideas should be shelved or, at the very least, significantly corrected to consider

the interests of new actors that serve as pillars of a new polycentric world order.

Is There an Alternative to the Liberal World Order?

TODAY, some people say that there is no alternative to the liberal world order. It seems that part of the intellectual elite of the West (of which I have written above) has imagined that the liberal unipolar order in one country and at the global level is a new answer to the new challenges of history. In fact, the victory of Western liberalism and the liberal world order was, in the final analysis, ephemeral and illusory.

The above is supported by any number of irrefutable facts; here I will limit myself to some of them. In the 1990s, when the liberal world order was at its height, India and Pakistan and later North Korea became nuclear states, despite the warnings and threats coming from the West. This is enough to doubt the monopoly of those who advocated the key role of a liberal/unipolar world order in decision-making related to the major issues of world politics. The inversion of the vector of the Western globalization project of the last fifteen years is especially illustrative in this respect. Ideologically, it was based on the so-called Washington Consensus, a quintessence of liberalism, addressed to the world that was expected to become mercantile and defy all alternative variants of the future of mankind.

It should be noted that the vector of globalization that began as a Western project designed to westernize the rest of the world was gradually changing, acquired new mission, new aims and guidelines. This looks more like inversion than anything else, since the project started serving the interests of the rising East in the widest sense of the word.

So far, the Western cultural stereotypes are still spreading across the ecumene, yet the West has already found it much harder to persuade the rest of the world in the superiority of its spiritual, moral and ethical values and principles. The world is disappointed in the Western (Anglo-Saxon) model of life, market economy and political democracy. The experience of Singapore and China's progress in the economic, technological, social, and military-political spheres raise social, philosophical, moral, and ethical questions about the so-called democratic states that claim monopoly on success. The nature of the political system of China and Singapore is not that important; what is important is its ability to successfully compete with the Anglo-Saxon model of political democracy

and with alien values, principles, conditions, etc. that are imposed on peoples and countries with indigenous sociocultural and political-cultural traditions.

Aggressive wars that the West as a whole, and the United States in particular, waged in the Greater Middle East and their export of the so-called democratic revolutions in this region undermined the old order much more successfully than all their enemies could have done. The boomerang returned to the West, Europe in the first place. Wars and export of revolutions caused havoc in the Greater Middle East; they destroyed secular authoritarian regimes that together served a sort of barrier, a buffer zone and a belt that protected the West against illegal migration and spread of terror. The failure of the so-called Arab Spring showed that the peoples of the Greater Middle East were not ready to embrace democracy Western style.

An upsurge of neo-right, right populist and nationalist movements is one of the obvious signs of a deep crisis of liberal democracy and the liberal order at the level of states and regions. The same fully applies to all sorts of new minorities that have moved to the fore to challenge the basic values and guidelines of liberalism – globalism, political integration within the European Union, Brussels' liberal immigration policy, political correctness, etc.

It turned out, however, that before the Soviet Union fell apart, the bipolar world order and the Cold War ended and even before the liberal world order became an indisputable fact, its first signs had been more or less obvious even if their nature and the real meaning were different. The euphoria caused by the “end of history” and the complete and final victory of Western liberalism was nothing but a fiction produced by the sleep of reason, so to speak. Today, it is becoming increasingly clearer that liberal democracy is not an inevitable future of mankind; the liberal world order as an answer to the question about the future is nothing but a fake or a false start.

Time has come to accept the fact that the world in which we lived yesterday has become history. We are moving (or have already moved) into a different and unfamiliar world that cannot be measured by yardsticks created in the world that is retreating, or has already retreated, into history. The liberal/unipolar world order is melting away together with the Western-Centrist or Euro-Atlantic world that created it.

No matter how hard the leaders of the collective West, and the United States in particular, try to substantiate unrivaled dominance and viability

of the liberal/unipolar world with no alternatives in sight, they have to accept, at least subconsciously, that new times are coming and that their weaknesses will be fully exposed. It seems that Thomas Graham, former senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff, was quite right when he said: "To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies."⁹

The analysts who describe the United States as a wilting power point to its declining might, meaningless waste of means and resources and expensive destructive wars. We can go even further and say that the great power phenomenon in its traditional interpretation is gradually leaving the geoeconomic and geopolitical proscenium.¹⁰ Tom Engelhardt, American analyst from *The Nation* journal, has asked: "And what would they think upon learning that, with the Soviet Union a quarter-century in the trash bin of history, the U.S., alone in triumph, has been incapable of applying its overwhelming military and economic power effectively? And what if I told them that, in this new century, not a single action of the military that U.S. presidents now call 'the finest fighting force the world has ever known' has, in the end, been anything but a dismal failure?"¹¹

Senility turns exclamation marks into question marks. In the course of time, imperial overstrain ruins even the mightiest military-political superpower; the United States, however, will not lose its status as the mightiest economic, technological and military-political power any time soon. In the foreseeable future, it will remain the key factor in the future of mankind. On the other hand, in the fundamentally changed realities, even the mightiest power can no longer enforce its values on the rest of the world. This has been recently fully confirmed by North Korea, one of the world's poorest countries whose strong willpower drove into a corner the superpower that threatened to wipe it away from the map of the Earth.

In this context, the West, the United States in the first place, looks at Moscow and Beijing as a revolutionary force determined to reverse the trend and processes of Westernization (or Americanization, in a narrow sense), to change the rules on which the liberal/unipolar world order rests.

Those of state figures, politicians and analysts who speak of Russia and China as revisionist states are right to a degree. The term used in American official documents carries a negative connotation: the tandem is determined to undermine the liberal world order. In view of the real

development trends, it is much more correct to speak about them as subjects of creative destruction of the world order that is growing older or has probably outlived itself and that no longer fits the geopolitical realities of the day. They are building a new polycentric world order with the updated Westphalian values, principles and guidelines.

The results of the aggressive wars unleashed by the United States in the Greater Middle East testify that it lost its creative potential and is rapidly turning into a destructive force determined to block the emergence of a new world order rather than lay its foundations.

It seems that Westphalian principles and guidelines – revived with a clear understanding that the sphere of their application is limited by the moral, ethical, axiological, ideological and other contexts of the day – might serve as an alternative to the liberal/unipolar world order.

This is one of the urgent issues on the agenda: mankind, as we know it today, can be hardly transformed into a community of peoples with a unified system of values, culture, lifestyles, stereotypes, behavioral standards, etc. The result, a unified cosmopolitan world, will be hardly accepted. Today, the world offers a new and much higher level of complexity and variety. Sociocultural and spiritual heritage defy transplantation. This means that all attempts to achieve spiritual, cultural and axiological uniformity are resolutely rebuffed: peoples are determined to defend their national-state sovereignties, identities, honor, and dignity.

The new world order cannot be reduced to any of the models imposed on the world community by any power or a group of powers with the strongest military-political and economic capabilities. It seems that the political order at the level of individual countries and the world order at the global level cherished by the Western liberal intellectual and political establishment will remain only as an ideal in their minds or in their political strategy. The new load-bearing structures of a new polycentric world order, which are as strong as the West, will hardly embrace this ideal. The exponential growth that has already become a dynamic trend of the contemporary world does not exclude direct extrapolation of the present into the future; it increases the chances of a multi-vectoral or, rather, multi-variant, nature of sociopolitical development of the contemporary world and, correspondingly, of configuration of geopolitical forces in the polycentric world order that is taking shape or that has already taken shape.

NOTES

¹ <http://www.coldwar.ru/kennedy/speech.php>

² *The New York Times*. October 8, 1984.

³ Žižek S. “Voyna v Irake: V chem zaklyuchaetsya podlinnaya opasnost?” *Logos*. 2003. No. 1, p. 76.

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⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Quoted from: Žižek S. Op. cit.

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⁸ Blair T. “A Battle for Global Values,” *Foreign Affairs*. January/February. 2007.

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¹⁰ For more details, see: Gajiev K. “Superpower Status: An Outgoing Phenomenon in the 21st Century?” *International Affairs*. 2017. No. 1, pp. 1-16.

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Key words: liberal unipolar world order, Westphalian system, East, West.

Basic Principles of Russian State Policy on International Information Security: Regulation and Implementation Mechanisms

S. Boiko

National Security Strategic Planning Documents on the Basic Principles of Russian State Policy in the Field of International Information Security

ON JULY 24, 2018, it was five years since the approval by the president of the Russian Federation in 2013 of a key strategic planning document in the sphere of national security called Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of International Information Security to 2020.¹ Ensuring international information security in today's conditions of unprecedented increase in information security threats is of primary importance for achieving national security. This conclusion is confirmed by the provisions of the main strategic planning document in the area of security, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation as approved by Presidential Decree No. 683 of December 31, 2015,² and by a number of other similar documents.

The Strategy emphasizes that the protection of national interests is supported by Russia's active foreign policy designed to create a sustainable system of international relations based on international law and underpinned by the principles of equality, mutual respect, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, mutually beneficial cooperation, and resolution of global and regional crises by political means.

In this context, according to the Russian National Security Strategy, the state seeks to develop an international information security system in order to achieve its goal of maintaining strategic stability.³

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The state's approaches in this area are also established in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation as approved by the Russian president on November 30, 2016.⁴

According to the updated version of this strategic planning document, one of the state's priorities in addressing global problems related to international security is to take the necessary measures to ensure national and international information security and counter threats to state, economic, and public security emanating from information space (cyberspace). It is noted that the fight against terrorism and other criminal threats involving the use of information and communication technology (ICT) is coming to the fore.

The document says that Russia seeks to prevent the use of such technologies for military-political purposes contrary to international law, including actions aimed at interfering in the domestic affairs of states or posing a threat to international peace, security, and stability.

At the same time, the Concept emphasizes that Russia seeks to develop, under the auspices of the United Nations, universal rules of responsible state behavior regarding information security, including through internationalization of Internet governance on a fair basis.

The Foreign Policy Concept, a key strategic planning document, also notes that Russia is proactive in international information cooperation and takes the necessary steps to counter threats to its information security. It is intent on promoting a set of legal and ethical norms for the safe use of ICT.

Another important strategic planning document in this area is the Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation as approved by Presidential Decree No. 646 of December 5, 2016.⁵

According to this document, Russia's national interests in the information sphere include efforts to facilitate the development of an international information security system aimed at countering threats of the use of information technologies to undermine strategic stability, strengthening equal strategic partnership in the sphere of information security, and protecting Russia's information sovereignty.

The Doctrine notes that the current state of information security in the sphere of strategic stability and equal strategic partnership is characterized by the desire of individual states to use their technological superiority to dominate in cyberspace.

The document emphasizes that the current global distribution of resources required to ensure safe and stable functioning of the Internet

makes it impossible to manage them jointly based on trust and fairness.

One of the conclusions drawn in the document is that the lack of international legal norms regulating interstate relations in cyberspace, as well as mechanisms and procedures for their application taking into account the specifics of information technology, makes it difficult to create an international information security system designed to achieve strategic stability and equal strategic partnership.

The Doctrine provides guidelines for ensuring information security in the field of strategic stability and equal strategic partnership. This includes, first and foremost, efforts to protect Russia's information sovereignty through the implementation of an independent policy designed to promote national interests in the information sphere.

Another important avenue is to take part in establishing an international information security system capable of effectively countering the use of information technologies for military-political purposes contrary to international law or for terrorist, extremist, criminal or other illegal purposes.

It is also necessary to create international legal mechanisms taking into account the specific nature of information technologies in order to prevent and resolve conflicts between states in cyberspace.

Much importance is attached to promoting in international organizations Russia's position advocating equal and mutually beneficial cooperation among all stakeholders in the information sphere, as well as to developing a national system for managing the Russian segment of the Internet.

The Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of International Information Security to 2020, approved by the Russian president on July 24, 2013 (No. Pr-1753), are a key strategic planning document in this field.

The main purpose of the Basic Principles, as formulated in the document, is international promotion of Russian initiatives to create an international information security system, including through better legal,

Russia's current state policy on international information security allows it to protect its national interests related to information security in the international arena.

organizational, and other support, and to foster interagency collaboration in implementing Russian state policy in this area.

The Basic Principles are the first strategic planning document in the Russian Federation that defines the basic concepts in the field of international information security:

- “international information security” is a state of the global information space that excludes the possibility of violations of individual rights, the rights of society, and the rights of the state in the information sphere, as well as destructive and unlawful impacts on the elements of national critical information infrastructure;

- “international information security system” is a set of international and national institutions designed to regulate the activities of various actors in the global information space.

According to the document, the main purpose of this system is to counter threats to strategic stability and facilitate equal strategic partnership in the global information space.

Cooperation in establishing an international information security system, as noted in the Basic Principles, meets Russia’s national interests and contributes to its national security.

The main threat in the field of international information security is defined as the use of ICT as an information weapon for military-political purposes contrary to international law; for terrorist purposes; for interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states; and for committing crimes.

The goal of Russia’s state policy in the area of international information security is to promote the establishment of an international legal regime aimed at creating conditions for the development of an international information security system.

It should be noted that the declared goal can only be accomplished with Russia’s participation in achieving the objectives that contribute to the establishment of an international information security system at the bilateral, multilateral, regional, and global levels.

An important objective is to create conditions for reducing the risk of ICT use to commit acts of hostility or aggression aimed at compromising the sovereignty and violating the territorial integrity of states and threatening international peace, security, and strategic stability.

Another primary objective is to develop mechanisms for international cooperation in addressing threats of the use of information and communication technologies for terrorist purposes, as well as to create conditions for addressing threats of ICT use for extremist purposes, including

for the purpose of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

It is also necessary to enhance the effectiveness of international cooperation in combating ICT crime.

One of the key objectives listed in the Basic Principles is to create conditions for ensuring the technological sovereignty of states in the area of information and communication technology and for overcoming information inequality between developed and developing countries.

The document identifies the main areas of Russian state policy related to the achievement of the above objectives and defines the mechanisms for its implementation.

The Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of International Information Security to 2020 are intended to make Russian foreign policy more proactive in reaching agreement and taking into account mutual interests in the process of internationalization of the global information environment.

Along with the above basic documents in this area, appropriate decisions of the Security Council of the Russian Federation are of great importance for the development and implementation of relevant state policy. They not only develop the provisions of these key strategic planning documents, but also set specific primary objectives in this area.

For example, at a Security Council meeting on countering national security threats in the information sphere held on October 1, 2014, the president of the Russian Federation noted that “we are working actively together with our partners on guaranteeing international information security, including through the United Nations, the BRICS group, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.”⁶

As part of a package of additional information security measures that had to be developed and implemented in the near future, the Russian president mentioned broader cooperation with global and regional organizations in the effort to ensure international information security.

In the president’s view, the United Nations, its relevant groups and specialized agencies should serve as a platform for assessing risks and developing joint measures in the sphere of information security and for analyzing the legal consequences of the decisions being made.⁷

The problem of ensuring international information security was also discussed at a meeting of the RF Security Council on October 26, 2017, among other issues related to the protection of the country’s information infrastructure and measures for its development.

According to the Russian president, one of our primary focus areas is to facilitate the creation of an international information security system, to develop cooperation with our partners on global and regional platforms, such as the UN, BRICS, SCO, CSTO, CIS, OSCE, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and to hold interagency consultations and talks.

A pooling of efforts in this area at the global level was mentioned as the main condition of effective struggle against current threats in the information sphere.⁸

Based on the results of these meetings, decisions were made to ensure more effective implementation of Russian state policy in the field of international information security and to help create a global system capable of addressing the challenges and threats to the world community in the information sphere.

The Basic Mechanisms for Implementing Russian State Policy in the Field of International Information Security

STATE POLICY in this field as purposeful government activity to ensure national security that enables the state to achieve certain goals in a particular field (in this case, in the field of information security) by using legal, economic, and administrative instruments based on resources at its disposal dates back to 1998, when a meeting of the Interdepartmental Commission of the Security Council of the Russian Federation for Information Security first approved a conceptual framework for state policy in the field of international information security.

Since then, a consistent effort has been made at the state level to create a system capable of providing effective solutions to problems in this area.

A major step in this direction was the president's approval in July 2013 of the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of International Information Security to 2020, which not only formulated the goal and key objectives of state policy in this area, but also defined the mechanisms for its implementation on a systemic basis.

Today, the implementation of Russian state policy in the field of international information security is ensured by an appropriate state system. The main elements of this system are the relevant federal executive bodies, which implement state policy in this area within the scope of their authority.

These bodies include:

- federal ministries (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media, and Ministry of Justice);

- federal services (Foreign Intelligence Service, Federal Security Service, Federal Guard Service, and Federal Service for Technical and Export Control).

The practical activity of these ministries and services in the field of international information security, as well as collaboration with other government agencies within the state system in this area, is carried on, as a rule, by their authorized structural units.

Responsibility for coordinating the activities of federal executive bodies related to the implementation Russia's state policy and promotion of its agreed position on this issue in the international arena is vested in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.

The main mechanism for coordinating these activities comprises an interagency working body set up under the auspices of the Russian Foreign Ministry and consisting of representatives of the above federal executive bodies, independent divisions of the Russian Presidential Administration, and the RF Security Council Staff, as well as a group of experts in the field.

From 2011 to 2013, the activities of these working bodies were directed by a special coordinator for the political use of ICT, a position (with the rank of ambassador-at-large) created in the Foreign Ministry of Russia to enable the holder of this position to work more effectively in coordinating the activities of the relevant federal executive bodies in this field.

Since 2014, the working bodies have been headed by a special presidential representative for international cooperation in information security, with A.V. Krutskikh, Ambassador-at-Large of the Foreign Ministry of Russia, appointed to this position by Presidential Decree No. 66 of February 6, 2014.⁹

At present, proposals for implementing the guidelines for Russian state policy in this area are prepared for the president of the Russian Federation by the working bodies of the RF Security Council in collaboration with the relevant independent divisions of the Russian Presidential Administration, federal executive bodies and organizations.

The key role in organizing these activities belongs to the Security Council's working body, the Interdepartmental Commission for

Information Security. Under Presidential Decree No. 1711 of December 29, 2012, “On the Composition of the Interdepartmental Commission of the Security Council of the Russian Federation for Information Security by Position” (as amended and supplemented),¹⁰ the Commission is headed by a deputy secretary of the RF Security Council. Since February 2017, this position is held by O.V. Khramov.

Along with deputy heads of federal executive bodies that implement Russian State policy in the field of international information security, the Interdepartmental Commission includes the president’s special representative for international cooperation in information security.¹¹

The Commission’s functions related to information security (particularly international information security) include preparation of proposals and recommendations for the RF Security Council in this area designed to:

- address identified and prevent potential threats (based on forecasting, identification, and assessment of threats and their sources);
- improve the activity of federal executive bodies (based on an analysis of information about the state of Russia’s information security);
- develop and implement state policy guidelines and coordinate the activities of federal executive bodies for executing the decisions of the Security Council;
- draft regulatory legal acts, etc.¹²

Annually, the Interdepartmental Commission for Information Security summarizes the implementation of state policy guidelines in the field of international information security over the past year and determines the main focus areas for federal executive bodies and organizations and their primary objectives for the current and, as a rule, the following year.

The decisions of the Interdepartmental Commission on this issue provide the basis for planning the work of all parties concerned in this strategically important area of activity designed to ensure Russia’s national security in the information sphere and are referred to all federal executive bodies and organizations represented on the Commission for subsequent implementation.¹³

Under Federal Law No. 172-FZ of June 28, 2014, “On Strategic Planning in the Russian Federation” (as amended and supplemented),¹⁴ responsibility for strategic planning in the field of Russia’s national security (including international information security) in the medium term (from three to six years) and long term (more than six years) is vested in the Security Council of the Russian Federation.¹⁵

The implementation of planned state policy measures in the field of international information security is monitored, in accordance with the decision of the Russian president, by the Security Council Staff, whose task is to provide annual summaries of information from the relevant federal executive bodies and organizations on the work performed in this field within the scope of their authority.

The aggregate results and proposals for improving efficiency in this strategically important area of activity designed to ensure national security in the information sphere are reported annually to the president of the Russian Federation. In accordance with the decisions of the head of state, the RF Security Council Staff in collaboration with the Foreign Ministry of Russia adjusts objectives in this area and specifies the measures to be taken.

Thus, Russia's current state policy on international information security allows it to protect its national interests related to information security in the international arena. The most important of these include efforts to facilitate the development of an international information security system capable of effectively countering threats to strategic stability in a situation of equal strategic partnership in the global information space, as well as protection of the information sovereignty of the Russian Federation.

A systems approach to accomplishing the declared goal of Russian state policy in the field of international information security makes it possible to successfully achieve objectives in this field based on effective mechanisms created for the implementation of this policy.

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Key words: information security, state policy, strategic planning.

Cooperation or Confrontation: Which Way Will the World Powers Choose to Confront Global ICT Threats?

N. Romashkina

INFORMATION and communications technologies (ICTs) are becoming a key factor in the world economy and global politics. However, besides offering unique opportunities, they carry global threats. For instance, non-state actors, both individuals and groups, have begun to practice subversion in cyberspace.

ICTs are becoming an important source of military power for nations, supplementing, and sometimes replacing, conventional weapons. ICTs may spark military conflicts between countries, and cyber wars may be no less destructive than regular wars. No country is safe against cross-border cyber threats or would be able to protect itself from them single-handedly.

This article analyzes escalating military and political cyber threats in a bid to answer the question whether world powers would be able to combine forces to neutralize these threats or whether they will inevitably remain locked in an increasingly intense confrontation. Three aspects of this confrontation are examined below – struggle for influence, armed conflicts, and attacks on infrastructures.

There still are no generally accepted international definitions of the terms “information threat” and “cyber threat.” Terminological differences between key state actors naturally bring them to different conclusions in investigating cyber threats and make them propound different solutions, which hinders debates among them on ways to handle these threats and hampers cooperation between them in addressing this problem. Hence the compromise terms “information and communications technologies

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(ICTs)” and “cyber threats” are used in international discourse on this problem. ICTs are processes and methods of work with information via the use of computing and telecommunications equipment.¹

Military and political threats stemming from ICT are security hacking, hacktivism, server disabling, theft, espionage, sabotage, destruction, strategic attacks, information attacks, psychological pressure, interference in the internal affairs of a state, terrorism, extremism, performance faults of ICTs, and threats caused by ICTs per se.

ICT as a Weapon in the Struggle for Influence

FIGHTING for influence means trying to take control over the adversary government’s decision-making and therefore it is the peak form of confrontation. It is also considered the most cost-effective form. Until recently, it had been the usual algorithm that, if a non-military attempt to gain influence didn’t work, armed force was considered the next most effective method. However, the situation has changed. Influence can now be achieved through attacks on the adversary’s infrastructures rather than through armed force.


This has been made possible by the rapid development of ICTs; the global computerization; the so-called network-centric organization of the technosphere; and resources for cyberattacks and cyber kinetic attacks* that can paralyze critical infrastructure facilities (see Figure 1). Damage that can be done to infrastructure by such attacks may affect whole social groups that are vitally dependent on such infrastructure.

ICTs offer unique opportunities for those struggling for influence. One of the most effective ways of gaining influence is the so-called soft power, a methodology developed in the United States, the country that is also generally recognized as the world’s soft power leader. It is through soft power that a key cyber threat, the threat of foreign interference in the internal affairs of a country, is carried out.

There have been dozens of instances of such interference with the use of ICTs over the past couple of decades. They include the Bulldozer Revolution in Yugoslavia in 2000; the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001; the Revolution of Roses in Georgia in 2003; the invasion of Iraq in 2003; the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004; the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2006; the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia in 2011; the

* Cyberattacks are attacks on information facilities while cyber kinetic attacks target physical objects.

Figure 1
Military cyber threats¹



Lotus Revolution, also known as the Twitter Revolution, in Egypt in 2011; the civil war in Libya in 2011; Euromaidan in Ukraine in 2013-2014; the Electric Yerevan protests in Armenia in 2015; and the current civil war in Syria, which began in 2011. All these acts of interference involved the use of what by that time were state-of-the-art ICTs.

Due to the effective use of ICTs in financial, organizational, logistical, information, and ideological soft power operations, it is highly likely that this methodology of interference will remain in use and become more sophisticated.

To sum up, key characteristics of influence struggle include the use of ICTs to take control not only over individual persons, including politicians, but also over huge numbers of people and whole social groups within brief periods with specific time limits. Such control is achieved by manipulating and disuniting people. Hence it is one of the main foreign policy tasks to ensure the security of society against hostile psychological influence and information.

Use of ICTs in Attacks on Infrastructure


ICTS ALSO possess a unique potential to disable infrastructure facilities that are so important for a nation that their destruction or inadequate operation would have irreversible adverse effects on the nation's security, economy, health service, law enforcement, etc. The cybersecurity of critical infrastructure means its protection from destruction or abuse by means of special ICTs.³

Countries with advanced ICTs take measures to minimize their adversaries' resources for attacking their critical infrastructure and to organize their own attacks on critical infrastructure in other countries, for which they build worldwide secret cyber intelligence networks (see Figure 2).

One of the world's first known cyberattacks took place in the former Soviet Union in 1982, before the Internet era. A virus implanted by group of hackers into the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system that was used to manage an oil pipeline in Siberia set off a powerful explosion. The attack had been organized by the CIA, but this did not transpire before Thomas Reed, former U.S. secretary of the Air Force and special assistant for national security affairs to President Ronald Reagan, brought out his book *At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War* in 2004.

The first instance of an Internet-based infrastructure being attacked

Figure 2
Cybersecurity of critical infrastructure²



occurred in 2007. A series of attacks crashed various websites in Estonia, including those of parliament and some ministries, banks and media outlets. The then Estonian foreign minister, Urmas Paet, blamed the attacks on the Russian government but failed to provide any evidence of this. According to a document published by WikiLeaks, the U.S. Embassy received a message that it was probably not Russia that had been behind the attacks.

Since then critical infrastructure have come under tremendous numbers of cyberattacks. Today, more than 30 countries possess software for attacking vital infrastructure. A cyberattack on a critical infrastructure causes an average damage of \$1.7 million and cyberattacks on an industrial company on average inflict losses of more than \$0.5 million a year. Cyberattackers may take advantage of errors and vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure, which become more likely due to increasingly sophisticated equipment and software used in such infrastructure.

The period between 2009 and 2012 saw a first ever – and so far the only – instance of use of cyber weapons, an operation that has become the main event in cyberattack history. In those years, critical infrastructure facilities in Iran, among them the nuclear power plant in Bushehr, the nuclear fuel enrichment plant in Natanz and some oil refineries, came under large-scale cyberattacks that aimed to curb the country’s sovereignty and force it to change its domestic and foreign policy. Stuxnet,

Duqu, Wiper, Flame and other kinds of malware were used. Most experts all over the world believe the attacks are qualifiable as a cyberwar – they think the attacks met all the criteria for this. It would not be an exaggeration to describe malware of this kind as potential strategic weapons.

Government agencies, water supply systems and other utilities, financial services, energy sectors, nuclear and manufacturing industries, and transportation networks have been among cyberattack targets over the last few years. There have been tens of millions of attacks yearly. This implies that cyberattacks against critical infrastructures are a key way of seeking psychological influence.

Cyber Threats to Military Facilities

CYBER THREATS to military facilities, which are parts of critical infrastructure, are undoubtedly a global problem. Special attention should be paid to the defense of strategic armaments, missile warning systems, nuclear command and control systems, and air defenses.

There exists a wide range of ICTs designed for military use. They underlie types of warfare that include command and control warfare (C2W) – the use of ICT for the physical destruction of the adversary’s command structure; intelligence-based warfare (IBW) – offensive and defensive operations based on automated systems that direct use of intelligence and that are themselves potential targets of cyberattacks; electronic warfare – the use of electromagnetic radiation in warfare (Russian sources use the term “radioelectronic warfare” for the same type of warfare); and information warfare, which uses equipment such as strategic communications and includes operations in cyberspace and outer space and operations based on the use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Of all military cyber threats those to nuclear forces are undoubtedly the most serious. The number one problem is the likelihood – albeit low – of ICT causing an unauthorized launch of a ballistic missile or leading to a mistaken decision to use nuclear weapons. The risk of unauthorized launches emerged the moment the first ballistic missiles came into being. Each time a new missile is developed, undergoes test launches, and put in service, measures are taken to nullify this risk.

During the Cold War, the possibility of accidental or unauthorized missile launches was a permanent source of anxiety both for the United States and for the Soviet Union, but technological achievements always come sooner than mechanisms for their safe use and for preventing their abuse.

There were technical failures and human errors both in the United States and in the Soviet Union in the Cold War era that could have caused nuclear missiles to be launched. Mistaken launches will be more difficult to prevent in the future. The digitization of strategic forces control systems in various countries makes it an increasingly imperative task to minimize the chance of an accidental launch – there has never been zero hazard. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the Russian Strategic Missile Forces (RSVN) are due to be completely digitized by 2020.

An accidental launch in Russia might be caused by a missile warning system falsely reporting a nuclear missile launch targeting Russia; by malware implanted into the communications of RSVN command and control systems;

or by the direct hacking of these systems' ICT resources. Hacker attacks may damage or destroy communications channels, hinder the operation of nuclear command and control systems and make top commanders suspect that these systems are misperforming. For example, hackers may use distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks to wreak havoc on communications, controls and target detection devices.

During a conflict, cyberattacks may provoke inadequate retaliatory options. A threat of weapon systems being disabled by a cyberattack might leave too little time to look for an optimum solution and cut down the conflict escalation ladder, for example it might lead to an unnecessary decision to use nuclear weapons.

One more danger are false flag cyberattacks. A false flag is an attack designed to be attributed to a group or entity that is not the actual attacker. Nor can one exclude a situation that may be perceived as effectively the starting point of mutual annihilation. All this would make unauthorized missile launches more likely, and hence undermine strategic stability.

Returning to our confrontation theme, during the escalation of a political conflict between states, one of the states may in advance plan a covert large-scale cyber offensive against the other state's infrastructures pivotal to the combat effectiveness of its armed forces. After that, the attacking state may threaten armed force in pressing the target state into decisions that are the goal of the attack.

Today's level of global strategic stability may be lower than that of 2017, when it was probably equal to that of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Cyber confrontations have a unique feature – the mutual vulnerability of large states to cyberattacks. One may say that they are equally vulnerable. There are various reasons for this vulnerability. First, countries with the most advanced ICTs are most vulnerable to cyberattacks. Second, the absence of any restrictions may stimulate all world powers to use ICTs for military aggression. Third, the state that is gaining the upper hand in a cyber confrontation may be running a serious risk of being misinformed and manipulated by the adversary. This may happen if the losing state finds out the cyber intelligence networks of the winning state and uses them to monitor that state's moves. This monitoring would require practically no effort from the losing state. Finally, it is the most serious threat that the use of malware may seriously undermine global strategic stability.

This is a major problem for all nations. Today's level of global strategic stability may be lower than that of 2017, when it was probably equal to that of the days of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Today's state of affairs is even more uncertain and unpredictable than that in 1962 and is marked by the absence of any generally accepted global rules.

What Is To Be Done?

A WIDE RANGE of very difficult measures needs to be carried out to make cyberspace more stable and secure. Here are some of these measures:

1. Inclusion of ICT security issues in agendas for bilateral and multilateral negotiations with Russian participation on nuclear weapons and strategic stability;
2. ICT-related bilateral and multilateral confidence-building measures with Russian participation;
3. Resumption and stepping up of interaction between Russia and the United States in line with the June 17, 2013, Joint Statement by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on a New Field of Cooperation in Confidence-Building, a document focused on threats caused by the misuse of ICTs;
4. Measures to be taken by nuclear powers: upgrading of cyber threat detection systems to ensure that such threats and their sources are detected and neutralized as early as possible; reliable protection of military facilities and critical infrastructures from cyberattacks; training of efficient specialized personnel, which, among other things, should include

the harmonization of training standards, the efficient territorial distribution of personnel, the duplicated processing of data, and the narrow specialization of software; ensuring the combat stability of their armed forces, primarily their strategic deterrence forces, in potential situations where infrastructures critical to them are damaged.

5. Theoretical, methodological and practical research into strategic stability problems and into information security issues.

6. Setting up a United Nations-overseen international regime to combat malware.

NOTES

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Key words: cyber threats, critical infrastructures, missile warning systems, nuclear weapons, Strategic Missile Forces (RSVN).

Russia and the Islamic World

Armen Oganessian, Editor-in-Chief, International Affairs

ESTEEMED COLLEAGUES, friends, welcome to the *International Affairs* magazine. Today, with this roundtable, we are resuming the tradition of holding our meetings and discussions in our old mansion.

The topic of today's discussion is more relevant than ever, multifaceted and going back many centuries: Russia and Islam.

We are grateful to Ramazan Gadzhimuradovich Abdulatipov, who will present to us his new book, *Sudba islama v Rossii* [The Fate of Islam in Russia], which was published in Egypt several days ago, and today we are holding it in our hands, here in Moscow. This book was published and brought to Moscow by Hussein El-Shafi, who also agreed to take part in our discussion.

Perhaps it is no secret that Ramazan Gadzhimuradovich Abdulatipov has been appointed as Russia's permanent representative to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Islamic integration systems are a major component of our country's cooperation with the Islamic world.

I suggest that we begin our discussion of this and other equally important issues related to Russia and Islam.

Ramazan Abdulatipov, Special Representative of the Russian President for Humanitarian and Economic Cooperation with the Caspian Countries

I RECENTLY LOOKED at the first Russian version of my book, which was published in 2002. I took a new look at its name: *Sudba islama v Rossii* [The Fate of Islam in Russia]. As a matter of fact, this fate is historical, controversial, not always easy, but ultimately a worthy one. This is even more so as far as Russia is concerned, because religions have always historically interacted here, especially in my native Dagestan, from where Islam in fact began to spread across the territory of today's Russia. More than 30 sahaba – companions of the Prophet – are buried in our city of Derbent.

The Derbent mosque is considered to be one of the first mosques in the Islamic world. There in the Caucasus, including Dagestan, prior to the 10th century, our ancestors were Christians and Zoroastrians. Judaism was also present there. There is also a very beautiful Armenian church in Derbent.

In my childhood, mother showed me stone structures on a mountain, built by our ancestors. When I grew up and became a university student, I took some kerosene and a rag, ascended the mountain and cleaned those stone slabs. I discovered a wash pitcher with the Star of David and an Arabic text. That was how various religions intertwined in our lands.

Islam is well positioned in today's Russia, which depends not only on the state. Any religion is used by various forces in their interests as a kind of spirituality or ideology. At one time, I met at Harvard with Samuel Huntington, a

scholar who wrote a well-known book about the conflict of civilizations. We argued for a long time. I said that this conflict should not be blamed on religion and culture, because true religion, faith and culture never clash, since they have common spiritual foundations: truth, love, beauty, etc. It is various forms of ignorance that clash. Ignorant forces often use religions, especially Islam, to their own selfish ends.

Unfortunately, sometimes entire states and heads of state become involved in this. Earlier, you could have read in *International Affairs* that the main conflict of the era was the confrontation between socialism and capitalism. These days, the main conflict is between ignorance and culture. For all the attention that is being given to the Islamic world, I believe Islamic education is low on the priority list of secular society. Because there is not only Islam. There are also Iman and Ihsan. Ihsan is virtue. Iman is faith. Islam is submission to Allah.

I am not a religious figure. I am a secular person, but I observe a minimum of Islamic norms. I am personally interested in the preservation of secular society in Russia, in both the Orthodox and the Islamic context, because if Russia does not have a consolidated secular society, the country could face deep disagreements, no matter what we might be saying

I am personally interested in the preservation of secular society in Russia, in both the Orthodox and the Islamic contexts, because if Russia does not have a consolidated secular society, the country could face deep disagreements.

about normal cooperation. One idea is the concept of Islamic cooperation. This is about the Islamic Ummah that is not divided on class or ethnic grounds. Today, there is the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), formerly the Organization of the Islamic Conference. S.A. Vorobiev remembers that in the mid-1990s, I repeatedly called for Russia to take its place in the OIC. Subsequently, Vladimir Putin supported this idea. Many people admired his remarks in Malaysia. He was followed by Tajik Foreign Minister T. Nazarov, who asked this question: How many heads of state representing other faiths make such remarks?

It seems that we have not yet fully used this status regarding the development of cultural, economic and financial cooperation. I believe we need to give higher priority to these issues in the future. There is a nongovernmental organization called the Group of Strategic Vision Russia-Islamic World. I attended one of the group's meetings. Perhaps it should play a more significant role. After all, the OIC is the second largest international organization, after the UN. The capital of its authorized bank (the Islamic Development Bank) is fairly large and it is friendly toward Russia.

As a person, as a Muslim, I would like to say that no political figure today is more concerned with problems facing Islamic countries and no one is more sympathetic toward Muslim countries and their rights than Vladimir Putin. Thanks to his proactive efforts, we have effectively defended Syria and Iran.

I always tell my brothers that Russia is God's country for us. I quote the words of Prophet Muhammad pbuh [peace be upon him] to the effect that motherland is part of our faith. And all this is pronounced in mosques. When I started working in Dagestan as the head of the republic, the Muslim Ummah was divided into two warring factions, but I managed to end that enmity. Once I saw two men hugging and crying. They had not prayed together for three years, and now they were praying.

Armen Oganesyanyan

YOU SAID that Russia has observer status in the OIC. What prevents it from becoming an OIC member?

Ramazanyan Abdulatipov

RUSSIA is not an entirely Islamic country, of course. It is believed that Muslims account for 17% to 20% of the country's population. In such

cases, observer status is granted at the OIC. Observer status does not involve any limitations on the country's participation in the activity of the General Secretariat. A lot of proactive work can be done there.

Konstantin Shuvalov, *Foreign Minister's Special Representative for Cooperation with Organizations of Muslim States, Ambassador at Large*

ACCORDING to the OIC Charter, any state that has a Muslim majority may join the Organization.

Armen Oganesyán

WHAT is the book's print run?

Hussein El-Shafi, *publisher (Egypt)*

WE RECEIVED the book a month ago. Ramazan Abdulatipov added a commentary to the previous edition, published in 2002. The new edition has the print run of 1,000 copies. With the author's permission, we are distributing it in Russia.

As a reader, I would like to say that the book provides a very frank description of the situation related to Muslims. The author makes realistic comments characterizing the life of Muslims in Russian society. As usual, there are no slogans. This book is truthful and just. I want to thank the author.

Armen Oganesyán

YOU TALKED about the fate of Islam in Russia and about a world based on interfaith dialogue. Nevertheless, when we look at what is going on outside Russia, we see that it is difficult to talk about this – consider, for instance, the conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites. How do you feel about this confrontation?

Ramazan Abdulatipov

ALBIR KRGANOV will talk about the disagreements between Sunnis and Shiites in more detail. When I studied materials related to Islamic cooperation, works by both Sunni and Shiite ideologists, I noted that a lot

is said about the need for cooperation, because there are no fundamental differences that would prevent such cooperation between Sunnis and Shiites. In Dagestan, I met with the ulema, including some radically oriented ones, inviting them to tea one by one in order to understand their way of thinking. When I talked to them, they brought their positions closer and decided to hold a joint meeting. I asked them if they all recognize Allah the Almighty and his Prophet Muhammad pbuh, the Holy Koran, five times prayers, etc. They answered in the affirmative. Then I told them that I could not understand why they were shooting at each other. I said that I could see nothing but their wounded pride. I believe this is essentially the way to talk at meetings between Sunnis and Shiites. Oftentimes, not only faith and religion are turned into politics. Religious leaders have enough methods – spiritual and educational, among others – to influence society and the state.

Albir Krganov, Mufti of the Spiritual Assembly of Muslims of Russia

I AM VERY PLEASED to be here among the respected experts. This is a great honor for me. It so happens that tomorrow I am leaving with our delegation for the 39th session of the Executive Council of the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) and the 13th session of the ISESCO General Conference. Russian religious figures will speak there for the first time.

Relations between Sunnis and Shiites are perhaps the main problem of the Muslim world. Why are they being set against each other and who stands to gain from this?

We would like to talk about Dagestan, particularly Derbent, which is 5,000 years old. Ahl al-Kitāb (People of the Book), Muslims of various madhabs live there, but they remain brothers and good neighbors, who have never fought with each other. This region was accessed by sahaba, and about 40 of them are buried there. Considering its historical uniqueness, we will propose to the ISESCO leadership our initiative that the city of Derbent, ancient Bab al-Abwab, be declared the capital of Islamic culture 2019.

I would like to remind you that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that in order to achieve reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites it is necessary to hold a joint Islamic conference and declare the unity of all Muslims. We are ready to work along these lines. The Amman Declaration of 2005 also reaffirmed the commitment of all madhabs in

Islam – Sunnis, Shiites, moderate Salafis, and the Sufi wing – to peaceful coexistence. All religious and philosophical schools should live in peace and understanding with each other. A secular state should be powerful and strong. Scholars, experts, Orientalists, and historians could also help religious leaders address these issues.

Pseudo-religious ideology is an instrument of war. People fight under these banners, kill each other and are unable to reach mutual understanding, and this has been going on for thousands of years. It is vital to ensure that religious leaders find common ground on all issues.

Speaking at the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly, Vladimir Putin said that Islamic religious leaders need to raise their voices and explain where the truth is and what Islam should be like. After all, the radicalization of society and religion is above all a consequence of distorted perceptions about Islam and its basic tenets, resulting from mass ignorance. And, of course, the situation is aggravated by the targeted impact of external factors. The Islamic world itself, in particular, its intellectual power – culture, education and knowledge – can stop this destructive process.

Islamic countries tend to share the opinion that, despite Western pressure on Russia, it will emerge as the winner in this situation. Russia has right spiritual and moral principles that serve as a foundation for state leadership and the people. Both Orthodox Christians and Muslims in Russia share common moral values.

In December, the international conference “Russia in the history of Islam: The role of outstanding theologians and diplomats” will take place. We will talk about the role of well-known people in our country’s history. Our first Muslim organization, whose first head was Khuseinov, an officer and diplomat, will turn 230. In 1926, Fahrutdinov attended the Islamic Congress in Mecca as the Russian representative. At our conference, we will also talk about other worthy people who have made a major contribution to our cause. The conference will not be purely Islamic. We have been in close contact on this matter with the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as with other faiths.

Islamic countries tend to share the opinion that, despite Western pressure on Russia, it will emerge as the winner in this situation.

Armen Oganesyán

WHEN you talk about ignorance, what do you mean?

Albir Krganov

A PERSON is sincere, but ignorant. Such a person has no inner linchpin and can be going any way. It is necessary to enlighten and educate people and give them reliable reference points. The number of believers has increased, but we do not have time to work with them.

Armen Oganesyán

SOME TIME ago, there was concern, in particular within law enforcement agencies, that young people who received an education in certain Islamic countries tend to exert negative radical influence on Russian school and university students. Has this problem been addressed?

Albir Krganov

WE ARE IN CONTROL and working to deal with this problem. Recently, a delegation from the Council for Islamic Education visited Egypt, where it was agreed that young people must not be admitted to studies without recommendation from our organizations. We all also took up this matter with Saudi Arabia. However, unfortunately, they did not support us. They have a liberal approach: Anyone can go online, register and go there for studies. We know that 800 people from Tatarstan alone are studying in these countries, most of them in Saudi Arabia, because student fellowships there are fairly high.

What is the problem with studying abroad from our perspective, apart from the religious and philosophical dimension? Students from Russia are trained and educated in mono-religious countries. By contrast, Russia is a multireligious state. Therefore, they do not know the history of the Russian Federation or the role of the Orthodox Church in our country's development. It is not enough for modern religious figures just to know prayers: They should also be able to analyze current processes, using their knowledge of history and philosophy. So, we have developed unified standards of education at our mosques. The situation has improved. Nevertheless, there are regions that are receiving funding from the out-

side, and this is where young radical oppositionists are being trained. Not openly, of course.

Ramazan Abdulatipov

WHEN I became the head of the Republic of Dagestan, more than 100 educational institutions there had no accreditation. We began working to rectify the situation. As a result, the Islamic Academy for the Humanities was established, which consolidated small educational institutions.

Konstantin Shuvalov

I WILL START by defining the subject under discussion. We are talking about the Islamic world and Muslim states as a factor in international life. This is a large group of states. There are 57 member states in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). They have a total population of about 1.5 billion and possess vast natural resources.

Is the Islamic world united? For the most part, it is not. Why not? Muslim countries themselves do not position or define the OIC association as an integration structure. Indeed, these are very different states – from the world’s richest in terms of national wealth to the world’s poorest. They are widely scattered geographically – on four continents. They address economic integration issues primarily within their regional associations. This is a part of the developing world that differs little from its other parts in terms of international status, economic growth indicators, and the traditions of promoting their interests. However, there is one significant distinction – namely, the religious commonality factor.

Muslim states see themselves as members of a civilizational religious association, i.e., the universal ummah. Their Organization of Islamic Cooperation (formerly the Organization of the Islamic Conference) was established to protect the religious rights of Muslims in Jerusalem. They argue about a lot of things among themselves, but they are always united around one thing: They are always on the side of their own vs. outsiders. This solidarity, which manifests itself in conflicts that Muslims are involved in, is invariably a point of consensus within the OIC, but consensus on other issues is rare.

Muslim states do not set themselves the goals of deep economic integration. At the same time, they are moving forward in trade and economic cooperation and are creating appropriate mechanisms for that. There is

a major joint financial operator – namely, the Islamic Development Bank. Tariff agreements have been reached, and it is planned to increase intra-OIC trade in the OIC member countries' trade turnover to 20%. This target has almost been achieved, and, considering that both rich and poor Muslim countries are involved in trade with the West, 20% is a significant amount. However, to reiterate, at this stage and in the foreseeable future, the Islamic world does not see itself as a single economy.

The OIC now rarely talks about the goal of the political or religious consolidation of the Islamic ummah. The OIC strongly condemns Iran and does nothing to reconcile it with Saudi Arabia or ease tensions between Sunnis and Shiites. There are other splits and cracks. The fragmentation of the Islamic world now is perhaps deeper than at the time when the Islamic Conference was established.

How should we build relations with this group of countries? Mainly by fostering bilateral relations with each of them. Other countries are doing the same. Yet, unlike certain other major countries, Russia does not gloat about the current discord in the Islamic world. We sincerely hope that splits and disagreements will be overcome. The unity of the Islamic world is not at odds with our short- or long-term interests. We believe disagreements should be resolved and are taking practical steps toward this end. I would not like to cite any specific examples, but there is one that is staring us in the face. Look at Washington's current policy as it is fueling Iranian-Saudi disagreements, adding fuel to the fire, building new blocs in the Islamic world, and setting one group against another. We are doing the exact opposite.

Russia's support for Muslim countries' cooperation among themselves, as well as with their external partners, manifests itself in our participation in OIC activities as an observer state. This provides additional opportunities for contacts with Muslim countries at international organizations, intercivilizational and interreligious dialogue and people to people contacts.

While prioritizing bilateral formats of cooperation with the Islamic world over multilateral formats, we follow a number of principles that all Muslim peoples view as signs of our political identity. I will tell you more about them in greater detail.

In addition to the aforementioned factors weakening the Islamic world, it is important to mention yet another one. The Western globalist project has entered a stage where the existence of strong sovereign states is seen as an obstacle. Sovereignty, the state and state institutions every-

where are constantly under attack. There is only one state that is sacred – namely, the United States, while all others are supposed to delegate their powers, dissolve within broader structures, and in any case exist in some less independent capacity.

The attack by globalization against state sovereignty has affected the Arab world the most. Let us look at the so-called Arab Spring. There were, of course, internal reasons for the upheavals that took place, but there was also the massive impact of globalist ideas aimed at undermining sovereign states. And they started shaking. That created fertile ground for a force that is intrinsically not connected with the state and, moreover, acts against it – namely, terrorism. Terrorists are united across borders. A weak state cannot defend itself against them.

What is our position? We believe in state sovereignty. This does not mean that we are against change, renewal or development, but this movement should be natural. It should not result from the transfer of some ready-made patterns to other territories or the construction of speculative, supposedly universal realities, rejecting historical, political and economic development. This approach is understandable and appeals to numerous patriots in the Islamic world.

In contrast to Soviet days, our current policy is free of ideology. This is where we differ from the West. I believe that neo-liberalism is increasingly acquiring the qualities of some quasi-religion. Penetrating the religious environment of the Islamic world, it acts not only as an importer of alternative ideas, but also as a fierce religious competitor. While Russia, which adheres to the principles of multipolarity and civilizational diversity, follows a policy of engagement with the Islamic world, accepting its religious and civilizational choice, the West aims to impose a globalist ideology that cannot accommodate true Islam.

Economically, of course, we have fewer opportunities for cooperation with the Islamic world than certain actors have. However, these opportunities are essentially different in their quality. Consider cooperation with OPEC on oil trade. No one has any doubt that this trade is conducted on entirely equal terms. It has nothing to do with the postcolonial paradigm of economic relations between the West and the East. We are seen as honest and equal partners, so there are some success stories.

Today, a great deal in the economic sphere depends on logistics and transportation. We have something to offer to our Muslim partners in this regard. As you know, our Chinese colleagues have a wide-ranging program called the One Belt, One Road. This appealing idea inspires other

transportation projects in Asia. We also have similar initiatives. Unfortunately, the work on the North-South project, linking the Indian Ocean and the Baltic Sea bypassing roundabout routes, is proceeding very slowly. This new project is not designed to replace or break anything: It is a form of diversifying transportation channels.

Our Islamic partners see our economic and political actions as our willingness to join forces and strictly adhere to principles of inclusiveness, openness, the rejection of isolationism and thinking based on bloc affiliation. The recurrence of this thinking is evident in Washington's attempts to solve problems related to its relations with Iran by setting up closed anti-Iranian associations in the Middle East. Our vision of ways of ensuring security for the Persian Gulf, as set out in well-known proposals, is fundamentally different.

Cooperation among Russia, Iran and Turkey on Syria also provides a good example of nonbloc efforts in dealing with security and counterterrorism issues. The formation and existence of this configuration has enabled many Muslim countries to see that past fears and prejudices must not be projected to Russia, that Russia is creating new paradigms of cooperation with the Islamic world, and that these paradigms are successful not least because they are in sync with Islamic political culture, in particular Islamic ideas about the origin of conflicts and conflict resolution technology.

In outlining the topic of discussion in their invitation to today's roundtable, *International Affairs* editors raised the question of whether Russia's policy toward Muslim states can create a space of safe political and other forms of cooperation in the Islamic world. Apparently, it cannot do so on its own, because this space should be organized and maintained by the states and people living there. However, the modern world is not divided by impassable barriers. External actors are involved in any regional situation, and this can either impede or facilitate security and cooperation. We have seen that different interests of external players have made it more difficult to achieve these goals in the Arab world, but progress is still being made, which is largely facilitated by Russia's policy.

Sergey Vorobiev, professor at the National Research University-Higher School of Economics

WE ARE HOLDING this roundtable while Russia is coming under pressure in various areas and under various pretexts. We realize that the situation is far from simple. This leads to the following conclusion:

Unconventional approaches are needed to overcome the crisis, including in our relations with the outside world. For instance, there is great potential in closer contacts with the Islamic banking system. According to some estimates, its total assets and reserves currently amount to \$2.5 trillion, with annual growth at nearly 10%. This system has demonstrated its remarkable stability during the financial and economic turmoil of recent years, even though Islamic banking as such is in its infancy. There are still some growing pains related to the legal aspects of Sharia law, since every Islamic credit institution is obligated to have a Sharia council that determines what is haram and what is halal.*

This is a special issue that requires a deep knowledge of Muslim law, Sharia law. However, it can be resolved. Right now, I can name Russian experts who are willing to work along these lines. Generally, this calls for political will in making decisions on a fairly high state level. The higher, the better. I believe it is necessary to establish a working group of experts. It could include representatives of the banking community, lawyers, Sharia specialists, etc.

Such a group would be able to assess the current experience in establishing Islamic banks, primarily in the post-Soviet space. For instance, all former Soviet republics in the Caspian basin are integrated into the Islamic banking system. We have the opportunity to consult with specialists who have already accomplished what we have yet to accomplish. This makes sense. Of course, there is a need for expertise on changes and amendments to Russian legislation, and according to expert estimates, more than 50 are needed. Since the early 1990s, we have repeatedly attempted to create financial institutions based on Islamic banking technologies, but all such attempts have invariably stumbled over legal issues. The country's current legislation does not allow for the introduction of Islamic banking products. Even large domestic banks that have declarations of intent on cooperation with the Islamic Development Bank, such as Vneshtorgbank and Vnesheconombank [Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs], are not making any progress.

They say constitutional reform is possible. If we do not rule out the possibility of making amendments to the Constitution, what can prevent amending certain legislative enactments? Incidentally, major U.S. and Western European banks are actively cooperating with the Islamic banking system.

*"Haram" refers to any action forbidden or proscribed by Islamic law; "halal" is the opposite of "haram."

Resolving this issue would give Russia a great advantage. We should not reject any alternative ways in banking and investment cooperation to preserve our sovereignty. Cooperation with the OIC should be built on a comprehensive basis. If we focus only on “mercantile” issues, that would prompt a negative reaction from our partners. Moreover, such an approach is out of sync with reality.

We are greatly interested in the cultural and educational aspect of these joint efforts. In the past, they talked about Islamophobia and now they are talking more about the threat of terrorism. However, Islamophobia has certainly not disappeared. It revived after the 9/11 drama and then continued to develop because of the monsters created by people taking cover behind pseudo-Islamic slogans (ISIS and so on).

At the same time, external forces that have nothing to do with Islamic religion are playing an unseemly role. Even events related to world sports can provoke people. For example, Khabib Nurmagomedov, Ramazan Abdulatipov’s fellow countryman, who was a great success in mixed martial arts, was provoked, on the one hand, as a Russian citizen, and on the other, as a Muslim. It would be a good idea to organize a major exhibition of world Islamic culture, as a step to prevent Islamophobia.

Our friends in the Arab world are working to foster cultural cooperation with the Russian Federation. Now Hussein El-Shafi is preparing to publish a book that is actually a story of outstanding Arab figures who have contributed to the development of cultural ties with Russia. Such projects deserve every support. By moving forward on all tracks, we could help advance our national interests and strengthen our country both at home and abroad.

Finally, about the Islamic banking system again. I believe this problem needs to be given higher priority. It is important that this system is not so closely tied to the dollar, although of course, its advocates do not live on another planet. Students at the Higher School of Economics, where I teach, often choose Islamic banking as a topic for their essays, term papers and graduation papers. And young people are always perceptive to new and promising trends.

Hussein El-Shafi, publisher (Egyptian-Russian Culture and Science Foundation)

FIRST OF ALL, I would like to say something as a follow-up to Sergey Alexandrovich’s remarks. Egypt has a big problem with wiring money to

Russia and other countries. According to some reports, Egypt cannot pay significant amounts in dollars, euros or any other currency. This is related to some serious restrictions. I believe it would be important to study this issue.

Now a few considerations regarding the realities of our life in Egypt. I note the growing level of radicalism in the country. There is an increasing number of people advocating the idea of defending world Islam, which should spread everywhere without any limits. The Koran says that faith is part of the motherland. However, people think differently.

I believe the fact that the Islamic world is constantly focused on history and never looks into the future is a serious problem. As a result, rules and laws that were, let us say so, good for past centuries are being applied today. Here is a case in point. A great number of marriages break up every year, among other things, because, according to an old Islamic tradition, it is enough for the husband to say that he is divorced. This is a disaster for a woman. The husband does not bear any responsibility either to his ex-wife or to his children because of divorce. A woman, however, loses everything she had, including status and livelihood. She must make enormous efforts to become legalized and find the means to support her children. Our president has addressed this issue. He has proposed that a marriage contract be signed, laying down the spouses' obligations, including the divorce procedure. One of the main points of such a contract should be the husband's responsibility to his children and his ex-wife.

There is yet another problem that we encounter almost every day. I am married to a Russian woman. She is a Christian. My children are told at school that their mother must not touch religious books with her hands, because she is of a different faith. I should add that this is a private school, and a very expensive one.

Generally, when I hear that a person should not sit next to you if he (she) is of a different faith, I am convinced that the person who says this has no idea about true Islam. Unfortunately, in my country, we come up against this position more and more often. This poses a very serious danger to society.

In Egypt, it was prohibited to establish parties on a religious basis, as enshrined in the Constitution, and this rule has been in force for four years. More than five parties are represented in our parliament.

In my country, we are faced with bigger problems than you in Russia. Here in Russia, there is no discrimination on religious grounds. I have never heard about the violation of Muslims' rights.

Overall, people in my country are traditionally friendly toward Russia and Russians. A large number of Arab people support Russia's foreign policy and Vladimir Putin. I am talking not about the official position, but about ordinary people in whose homes you can see Vladimir Putin's portraits. They approve of the fight against terrorism in Syria. Many believe that Egypt is not doing enough in this respect. Despite general slogans, we do not have an embassy in Syria. Our ambassador was recalled back in the days of the Muslim Brotherhood.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that it is very dangerous when religion interacts with politics.

Key words: Russia, Islamic world, OIC, UN.

“Sick” States and How to Cure Them

V. Vorobiev,

R. Iliev

THE ATTEMPTS to grasp the “nature of princes” and, in a wider sense, the nature of states go back into antiquity, yet the world in which we all live today and which has been thoroughly studied is still shattered by unexpected disasters that cause huge human and material losses. The states and the world community, no matter how mighty, cannot predict, let alone prevent, crises and catastrophes. Philosophers and political actors tell us that the past was not that bad and that more calamities are in store for mankind: the world is moving toward the “end of its ideology,” the “end of history,” the “end of civilization” and other no less disastrous ends.

Today, the “princes” responsible for the fates of their peoples have no scientifically substantiated instruments of forecasts and no choice but to build up reserves (just in case) or act fast in the usual and frequently senseless manner to liquidate the repercussions of crises and catastrophes.

The fates of states and the standard of living of their citizens depend on the decisions made by the system of state governance and realized in the forms of laws, resolutions and instructions of executive power and other enactments. This means that it is highly important to analyze how the system of state governance and constitutional laws (SG-CL) functions, to identify the problems, crises and conflicts inside the state and its interaction with the environment.

We have formulated the model of a “healthy” state and the

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In this article, the authors continue their studies of the “maladies” of states and treatment methods. It is also the role of the “prince” in social life, conflicts and their settlement and the methods of reconciliation between the citizen and the state that for many years remained in the center of scientific cooperation of Sergey Kuritz (who died in April 2018) and Valery Vorobiev.

foundations of reliable forecasting through systemic approach and the methods of medical diagnostics applied, for the first time, to the system of state governance and tested on the basis of Constitutions of 30 states.

Crises, problems and conflicts described by French jurist Maurice Hauriou as “maladies of states” that disrupt the usual course of life of citizens were not related to any specific state. Alan Ball, an outstanding American scholar, said that “the degree to which the state machine can successfully deal with the various problems or crises rather than confront them” determines the state’s ability to survive and develop. This is fully applied to what we can see in the world around us.¹ State as an institution is nearly six thousand years old, long enough for mankind to get accustomed to many of its “negative” features.

We have also become accustomed to the tragic cycle of history: replacement of “princes” – devastation, wars and human losses, riots and revolutions – new “princes” – new promises – another chain of disasters. In the last two centuries, only 20% of the UN members managed to partially avoid this tragic cycle and weaken the causes of riots and revolutions while another 20% of states are working over a new pattern of the power/people relationships.²

Since governance is based on compulsion and coercion, the activities of any state today are determined by the freedom of a physical person – the head of state (the “prince”) – to decide whether coercion should be applied to the performer (the decision in fact is to be made by the head of state). This is where the tragic cycle of history begins; it stems from an absence of a feedback that alone can put pressure on the subject of governance before the (a priori) decision has been taken.

In the state, the right to pass the most important decisions belongs to one person (the “prince”) or a narrow group of people (the elite). Decisions adopted by the leader (the monarch, president, Fuehrer, Secretary General, etc.) depend on the aim pursued by the head of state: satisfaction of the requirements and wishes of the citizens or of his own subjective preferences, such as to enjoy absolute power over his own people (dictatorship) or other peoples (a war), to win competition against heads of other states, etc. This means that we should bear in mind what A. Epstein said about problems: “The significant problems we face cannot be solved at the same level of thinking we were at when we created them.” The methodology of systemic approach that treats the state as an integral system in which millions or even billions of people (the system’s components) cooperate can bring us to a new level of thinking. This

means that the studies of “maladies” of the system of state governance and law (in the widest sense: constitutional, municipal and administrative) rely on the latest methodology or on methodologies so far untested in this field of human activity.

The methodological foundations of this study included systemic approach, Immanuel Kant’s teaching of pure reason, Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law, and the methods of medical diagnostics.

The methodology of systemic approach rooted in the Aristotelian teaching on deduction and developed by biologists and mathematicians A. Bogdanov, L. von Bertalanffy, W.R. Ashby, N. Wiener and others proved its worth in the naval battles of World War II.

Immanuel Kant’s teaching of pure reason, the cornerstone of the greatest scientific discoveries of the 19th and 20th centuries, revealed the sources of state governance and constitutional law, viz. the principles of governance in living nature, the product of billions of years of pre-human development.

Hans Kelsen’s pure theory of law served the third methodological foundation with the help of which the principles of organized governance, absent from the pre-human stage of evolution of nature, were discovered.

Medical diagnostics of human illnesses served the fourth methodological foundation. In the 11th century B.C., medicine created the atlas of human anatomy used to diagnose pathologies of parts and organs of any person and forecast the course of illnesses either treated or not treated.

The knowledge extracted from certain branches of philosophy, biology, cybernetics, management, marketing, law, sociology and other sciences was integrated on the basis of the methodologies described above.

These studies and their results are extremely useful for those involved in state governance; for state leaders fully aware of their responsibility to ensure an adequate quality of life for the citizens; for the civil society leaders who oppose the arbitrary rule of the powers that be; and for the leaders of the world community who can and should build up an efficient and fair system of governance.

The attempt to use a new methodological approach to the problems of state governance that applies, to a great extent, the methodology of natural scientists can be described as innovative.

Any state may fall ill at any stage of its life circle since all decisions are affected not only by time but also by internal circumstances (by which we mean the relationships between people and power) as well as by political (neighbors and the world community) and natural environment.

The centuries-old debates – whether the sick society or the sick state should be treated first – are scholastic. The state dominates: it educates the younger generations by planting in the minds of future citizens its ideas and its rules. So far, the status of the state remains a unique phenomenon that stays apart from all other types of human communities.

The nine theories of the origins of states (stretching from theocratic to psychological) accepted today can, in fact, be reduced to two sources – the sacral and the subjective (political). Historically, the principle of governance by diktat that imitated the practice of military command (at all time the “princes” commanded armed people) was accepted as the basis of the sacral and the political status of the state. Hence the demand for unquestioned submission to the leader and the personality cult of great military commanders from Alexander of Macedon, Hannibal and Julius Caesar to Genghis Khan and Napoleon.

The sacral status was typical for all sovereign states and empires of antiquity (Egypt, China and India) and the territories the populations of which followed Judaism, Christianity or Islam. The idea of the political status of the state is nothing but a misunderstanding. According to such prominent scholars as M. Weber, M. Duverger and J. Bentham, “politics expresses the desire of people in power to remain in power to preserve their control of society and acquire personal boons.” The authority of Aristotle was involved to justify the right of those in power to pass political decisions in their own interests or even by their whims. In the 3rd century B.C., the Greek philosopher used the word “politics” when he meant “state” (*politeia* – the rule of the majority).

Today, the word “politics” refers to the political system of society or the state. Very much in line with the well-known “divide and rule” principle, ancient states deliberately destroyed the desire of people to act together, a decisive factor in the fast and efficient development of mankind. It has been commonly admitted that cruelty of the environment can be opposed by human intellect and cooperation of people.

Later, power contributed a part of it to the myth about the nation, a cultural, in the first place, and an ethnic and social phenomenon, in the second. It was during the French Revolution that the concept of nation acquired its political meaning. The idea of a nation and the territory of its

state was and remains a source of instability that undermines the interests of citizens (World Wars I and II are the best confirmation).

“Collectivist ideology” that relies on the same (divide and rule) principles of state governance is another source of conflicts inside the state based on a political platform.

The status of the state as an organization, that is, a community of people set up for the sake of common security and worthy living conditions for this and future generations is an alternative to the sacral or political phenomenon.

This type of state has the right to pass laws to guarantee the rights and freedoms of man, apply legal coercion, print money, etc. while, if recognized, the status of an organizing force will relieve the state of numerous contradictions.

The system of state governance and constitutional law is the governing part of the state that consists of the subject of governance (center) that passes decisions about the actions of the community members and the object of governance (the citizens of the state). This means that the unified system of state governance and constitutional law consists of two sub-systems correlated among themselves as the initiating source of actions, which is governance, and the consolidating source of rules to fulfil these actions, which is law. Since the law should protect the private and social interests, it is represented by constitutional law that predetermines all other laws and is also responsible for the protection of interests of the individual and society.

The rule by diktat dominates the sphere of public law (of which constitutional law is part). Jurisprudence took shape as a science late in the 4th century B.C. in Ancient Rome. The science of governance appeared in the 19th century (in the works of Frederick Taylor on scientific management and the works of Woodrow Wilson, the 28th president of the United States, on the science of public administration) although the “arguments” of knowledge about management go back to the fifth millennium B.C. (the Sumerian civilization).

The gap of nearly two and a half millennia between jurisprudence and the science of administration explains the highly respectful attitude of the state to jurisprudence while governance, the state’s main occupation, was treated as a political skill.

Here is another example. Very much like Ancient Roman *politeias* (polises or cities), the emergence of democracy is normally associated with elections that ensure the rule of people.

State decisions might cause “maladies” of states. According to Russian scholar Alexander Bogdanov who created tectology, the universal organization science, “man is only a pupil who copies nature as the great universal regulator.”³

To go down to the roots of the “maladies” of a state, we should compare the system of state governance and constitutional law with the similar system of a “healthy” state. Civil society can play an important role in the process in the same way the human organism fights its illnesses through feedback (preservation of *homeostasis*).

The studies of the sources of “maladies” of state suggest that we need a unified diagnostic model of the etalon (non-etalon) system of SG-CL analogous to the atlas of human anatomy that brings together the principles and ties on which rests the Constitution (the fundamental law) of any state. It recreates the feedback principle similar to that in nature. This will allow people for the first time in history to control and correct the decisions before they are taken rather than correct errors made by those in power.

The etalon model of diagnostics is free from all systemic and formal causes, yet it is not completely free from defects. The developing science of state governance and constitutional law should enrich the etalon model in the same way as the analytical atlas of human anatomy created over three thousand years ago continues to be changed. The diagnostic model consists of three constitutional blocks: the purpose-oriented, state-executive and self-governance.

The first of them is intended to preserve the Constitution that defines the purposes of the state accepted by people. The idea of a Constitution as applied to the state as an organization was formulated in the 2nd century B.C. by Polybius in his *Histories*. The idea of a Constitution as a legal document (documents) of the highest legal status that establishes the foundations of governance, the legal, economic and political systems of society in any country, has been accepted in modern history.

Purpose is the foundation of any human alliance that transforms it into an organization, hence the purpose-oriented block. As the science of philosophy was developing, purpose became a special category of the organizational systems created by man (the state being one of them). The mission/purpose of the state reflects the preferences of the sovereigns as the highest subjects of state governance. In the etalon diagnostic SG-CL model, this role belongs to the people. There are other principles of governance (such as international law that regulates the activities of states and interaction between them) applied to any state.

Constitution is the vehicle of the purpose of the state. In modern times, the generally accepted basic documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 1948 and international pacts and conventions have made it much easier to formulate aims and purposes of state. This perfectly fits the Aristotelian "... the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life."⁴ In the etalon diagnostic SG-CL model, the purpose is defined as consistently improving the standard of living of citizens.

Since people as a sovereign and vehicle of power consists of many individuals, the role of the guarantor of the purpose and the Constitution is entrusted to physical persons. The guarantor either heads the state as a monarch with inherited powers or as a president elected by the people.

The state-executive block of the Constitution relies on the "divide but not rule" principle and is expected to make decisions that will transform the purpose of the state into facts of life of common people at each stage of development by coercing those who should fulfill the task.

The fulfillment of the main task of the constitutional block is entrusted to three sub-divisions: two independent constitutional-legal institutes (the legislative and judicial powers) and the administrative-governing institute (the government).

The first of them (the legislative power) passes civil and public laws. The second the constitutional-legal institute represented by judicial power is responsible for the protection of rights and freedoms of man and citizen.

The administrative-governing institute (the government) performs governing functions. It has the right to pass decisions of state importance that become legal norms (the right to impose sanctions). Its decisions are expected to realize the purpose of the state and the Constitution in the form of laws passed by the parliament and protected by judicial power, confirmed in the form of a verdict by the Constitutional Court (council) and promulgated by the head of state.

In the diagnostic model, each of the constitutional-legal institutes has its own elected head, the prime minister being the only exception. His status and the procedure of his election are new elements. For the first time, he is treated as a hired professional manager selected by the state constitutional commission, its members having the highest rating of managers of an organizational structure with the scope of activities being close to that of the state. The constitutional commission consists of people recog-

nized as best experts in management, marketing, economic and financial disciplines, state governance and law; they are confirmed on their posts by the head of state.

This is Jean-Jacques Rousseau's dream of *contrat social* translated into reality. Signed by two sides, this is an indisputable contract. It can be interpreted as a contract according to which one of the sides (the contractor) assumes the responsibility to ensure, for adequate payment, the results formulated by the other side (people as the sovereign) within the terms stipulated by the contract and leading toward the purpose formulated by the state. Payment depends only on the results achieved. Chosen by the commission, the candidate becomes prime minister with the right to "rule but not to hold the power."

Civil society is, in fact, responsible for feedback. There are municipal (local) administrations called self-governing for no real or legal reason. This explains why feedback in the form it exists in nature does not function in the system of state governance. This contradiction has been removed from the constitutional block of self-governance presented in the diagnostic etalon ST-CL model. The citizens of the state have the right to pass and fulfill decisions within the entire life cycle of man (2/3 of the day belong to private life and 1/3 to pragmatic occupations). The constitutional block of self-governance is related to the main part of the interests of the country's population.

Recognition of civil society and the duty of the state to support it legally and materially embedded in the Constitution is the critically important element of the SG-CL diagnostic model. Civil society, the members of which have the widest possible rights due to their education, upbringing and a special type of thinking, is the only real counterbalance to executive power.

In the diagnostic model, the sovereign-people perform, for the first time in history, two roles: that of the supreme law-giver and feedback executor. Executive power either can accelerate or slow down the process of settling problems and crises since the impact civil society (in its sovereign-people hypostasis) may apply to power is a real instrument of preventing or curing the "maladies" of state. In fact, this was the dream of the great philosophers of the past – Aristotle, Confucius, Locke, Rousseau, Weber, and Popper.

Citizens are personally interested in satisfying their interests expressed as a constitutional aim; due to the huge number of members ("the effect of a thousand eyes"), there should be no people appointed by

the state in the block of self-governance. Public governance is determined by the members of civil society that acquires legal and material support from the state-executive block under control of the head of state as the legal representative of sovereign-people.

The first legal condition – the rights of civil society to govern the state and law – is registered in the etalon model. Civil society should be supported by the state budget. The second obligatory condition – complete transparency of law-making – envisages the right of society to be involved in decision-making.

The block of self-governance performs numerous functions; civil society is capable to find the best possible solution that will determine the place and role of political organizations in the law-governed social state. Civil society that concentrates at the interests of the whole people and political parties that represent the interests of part of society are antagonists. Non-political parties, the Greens for example, may become natural supporters of civil society.

The diagnostic SG-CL model tried to resolve one of the most complicated problems responsible for the gravest “maladies” of the state, namely corruption caused by the political nature of decisions.

This means that the problems, crises and conflicts inside the state, between states and the world community and the environment cause the “maladies” that cost common people their standard of living, property and lives.

In the contemporary state, there are no principles of governance derived from nature; those that have been borrowed become distorted. The principle of feedback absent from the state machine of governance adds to the tragic circle of confrontation between the citizens and the state.

The provisions and conclusions offered above are very topical and are confirmed by wide-scale protests spreading across all countries of the world.

Social networks, a fairly recent phenomenon, have made information exchange about everyday life much easier and much faster thus urging people to protest actions; they and information technologies help common people fight injustices. Protest actions, however, cause more victims and bring no hope that the quality of life will improve any time soon. The tragic cycle of history is accelerating with no way out in sight.

To get out of it, people should build up, with the help of social networks, civil societies independent of the state yet relying on its legal and material support.

It is highly important to point out that the deficient system of state

governance and constitutional law concentrates decision-making (that is, power), the right to rule millions of people and force them obey its decisions in the hands of one man. Today, these decisions are called political decisions and the “prince” is not responsible for them to the people.

In fact, this regulatory system is dictatorship pure and simple. No efforts at separation of powers, no mechanism of checks and balances, no public local laws, no international agreements, no shifts from the parliamentary to the presidential forms of government and back, no transparent general elections, etc. can contain the dictatorship of the “prince.” The state machine cut in the patterns of antiquity endows the “prince” with the right of the sovereign and uncontrolled rights of executive power which do not promote progressive and efficient development.

Civil society can understand the cause and effect of deeply rooted “maladies” of states; it can inform the citizens and train future generations. If accepted as an equal and responsible partner of the state, civil society can help it resolve the burning problems of the quality of life of common people (which is especially important at the very hard period of transition toward a law-governed social state).

Without a clear understanding of the causes of the inevitable repercussions of the tragic cycle of history, especially in the context of the accelerating scientific and technical progress, we behave like certain tribes still living on Earth that have not yet realized in which way men are involved in the birth of children.

This makes it clear that the state, as a living system like any other, may fell ill which makes it highly expedient to go to the roots of causes of crises and conflicts inside the state; timely diagnostics and adequate treatment are equally important and no less expedient.

The attempt to use a new methodological approach to the problems of state governance that uses, to a great extent, the methodology of natural scientists can be described as innovative. It is a challenging and non-trivial task to confirm that the principles of governance in nature and the state have much in common and to elaborate the methodology of diagnostics of the “maladies” of states on this basis. This approach correlates with the cognitive mechanisms of the development of contemporary science and its basic features, the following of them deserving special mention:

- (1) the change of the development paradigm – from analysis to synthesis and transfer to nano-size;
- (2) interdisciplinary approach instead of narrow special approaches;
- (3) drawing closer and interpenetration of the nonorganic and organic worlds.

In this context, the idea of diagnostics of “maladies” of states and the search for adequate prescriptions and methods of treatment perfectly fit the logic of contemporary science. This means that in future we will be able to rely on the potentials of the system of state governance and constitutional law to radically improve the life of people on our planet.

THE STUDIES of the place and role of civil society, up to and including human rights and human capital components have not lost their topicality; they are gaining momentum in our country and outside it to become an object of profound studies by experts on political systems and societies of all types. In November 2018, we set up the Fund for the Studies of Civil Society and Human Capital to join the common effort.

It will study the emergence and development of civil society as an independent institute set up to correct the decisions of power on the road toward constitutional aims. It should be said that civil society deserves special attention as an instrument of immunization that can prevent problems, conflicts and crises inside states and in international community as a whole for the sake of higher living standards of the wide masses of people, in the first place, and the rights and freedoms of man and citizen.

Our Fund will analyze the importance and role of human capital in setting up a law-governed social state and assess the economic changes expected to create a healthy way of life with the help of an efficient system of health protection and education, accessibility of cultural values and physical culture and sports for millions of people. It is now and will remain highly important to study all sides of activity of the state and its legal mechanisms, political parties, civil society, the business community, and their common responsibility for the improvement of the functional qualities and the quality of human capital.

NOTES

¹ Ball, Alan. *Modern Politics and Government*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994, p. 251.

² For more detail, see: Kuritz S.Ya., Vorobiev V.P. *Bolezni gosudarstva (diagnostika patologiy sistemy gosudarstvennogo upravleniya i prava)*. Moscow, 2009.; Kuritz S.Ya., Vorobiev V.P. *Grazhdanin i gosudarstvo – tragichesky krugovorot istorii*. Moscow, 2011.

³ Bogdanov A.A. *Tektologiya: Vseobshchaya organizatsionnaya nauka*. Moscow: Ekonomika, 1985. Book 1, pp. 96-97.

⁴ Aristotle. *Politika*. Book 1 (Antologiya mirovoy filosofii). Moscow: Mysl, 1969. Vol. 1, p. 465.

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Education in the Field of Nonproliferation: Russia's Interests and Resources

*V. Orlov,
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“The NPT [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] is the main international treaty of today. There's simply no treaty that's more important. We should leave no stone unturned in pressing for compliance with this treaty because we'll all be done for without it. We should talk more about the NPT so that everyone knows about it.”¹

Roland Timerbayev, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, one of the authors of the NPT

SEEKING the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is the core of Russia's international security policy, which is confirmed by doctrinal documents² and by the position of the country's leadership. In opening a meeting on nonproliferation of the Russian Security Council back in 2003, Russian President Vladimir Putin said: “Along with international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains the main threat to peace in the 21st century.... Competent and effective policies in the sphere of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction mean the safety of our nation as a whole and of our citizens, ensure international stability and increase the authority of Russia in the world.”³

June 2018 saw the 50th anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT), which laid the foundations for nuclear nonproliferation. “Russia is aware of its responsibility as a founding and depositary state of the

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Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said at a jubilee conference. “Russia will continue to steadily work with all states that care about the future of the NPT so as to ensure that the treaty consistently functions and gains strength.”⁴

In a joint statement the same month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and then British foreign secretary Boris Johnson

Seeking the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is the core of Russia’s international security policy.

(Russia, the United States and Britain are the NPT depositories) called the NPT a “wise investment in our shared security and prosperity.” “Today, we pledge our unstinting commitment to preserving and deepening this legacy for future generations,” the three ministers said.⁵ Helping organize education in the nonproliferation field may become Russia’s long-term contribution to the nonproliferation regime.

Education as the Basis for the Nonproliferation Regime

IN 2000, the United Nations General Assembly asked UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to prepare, “with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts,”* to prepare a study to “assess the current situation of disarmament and non-proliferation education and training” and “recommend ways to promote education and training in disarmament and non-proliferation at all levels of formal and informal education.”⁶ In response, a study was carried out that formed the basis for a 2002 report by Annan to the General Assembly’s 57th session. “It is striking for someone of my generation to think that an entire new generation of human beings is coming to maturity without an ever-present terror of nuclear catastrophe,” the secretary general said in the foreword to the report. “Yet it is so, and that is for the better. The downside, however, is ignorance of the real dangers that do exist, especially the legacy of nuclear weapons inherited from the last century. Moreover, the companion of ignorance is complacency: what we know little about, we care little to do anything about.”⁷

The main part of the report were 34 recommendations for UN bodies, other international organizations, governments, educational institutions

* Vladimir Orlov, a co-author of this article, was a consultant to this group, which was set up under General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/33.

and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The report recommended preparing educational materials and translating them into all UN official languages, instituting programs and scholarships for students, lecturers and journalists all over the world, making use of digital technologies for distance learning, and using computer-based learning, simulation games and creative writing as education methods. The document suggested closer collaboration in nonproliferation education activities among civil society, national governments, international organizations, and business companies.

Nonproliferation education is consistently on the agendas of NPT review conferences and sessions of preparatory committees (prepcoms) for them. The 2010 Review Conference* approved an action plan. Education was the theme of Action 22 in the conference's Final Document. Action 22, which encouraged all states to implement the recommendations contained in the secretary general's 2002 report,⁸ remains in force. In a follow-up to Action 22, the prepcom for the 2020 Review Conference, at its first session in 2017, discussed a working paper on nonproliferation and disarmament education and awareness-raising.⁹

In view of Russia's unique role in nonproliferation, it is important to train the next generation of nonproliferation specialists who would take over today's knowledge and diplomatic experience. All nonproliferation specialists are aware that the government, businesses and research organizations need reserve personnel specializing in nonproliferation. Today, there are very few people working in the nonproliferation, strategic stability and arms control fields who would be able to replace today's prominent specialists.

Russia will need an army of young experts to assert its balanced positions on issues of nonproliferation, arms control and peaceful use of nuclear energy in international negotiations. In supplementing the central role of diplomacy in defending its principles, Russia needs more extensive use of expert and academic channels to make more detailed explanations of its position in order to avoid misunderstandings and misinterpretations.

The better Russia's position on nonproliferation is understood, the wider international support it may receive even though, due to political circumstances, such support might take the form of silent non-opposition. Russia cannot afford to lose allies and objective partners in nonprolifera-

* This was the last review conference to approve a final document.

tion affairs, whether it is the NPT review process, measures in the format of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or any other activities. By such allies and partners, we primarily mean member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It has to take Russia continuous and meticulous efforts to maintain alliances and partnerships with CIS states. In this sense, extensive use of Russian as one of the United Nations' official languages appears to be a natural task for the current and future generations of Russian diplomats specializing in nonproliferation.

It is important to remember what seems a simple truth: advocacy or promotion doesn't mean pressure. Even countries where the Russian language is still used extensively in government and education, don't always hold views on nonproliferation and disarmament that coincide with Russian views. Each CIS state has its own historical memory and geopolitical interests. This shouldn't be seen as an obstacle to education in the field of nonproliferation, a field so sensitive. Moreover, disputes that are constructive and based on knowledge may help defuse tensions. For this reason, international educational programs on nonproliferation that are written in Russian encourage critical thinking. We don't try to dictate to young people in other countries what they ought to think, but we do teach them to think and make critical assessments of a wide range of information.

Nonproliferation also forms the political basis for the use of peaceful nuclear technologies. "If nuclear power engineering complies with the NPT and follows the norms and recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and there are proper guarantees, it ... strengthens the global nuclear nonproliferation regime," said Nikolay Spassky, deputy general director and head of international activities of the Rosatom state corporation.¹⁰ In Spassky's opinion, shared by the authors of this article, this is what Rosatom should do internationally to avoid risks: put its best products on the world market – become an "irreplaceable" company; "scrupulously meet its commitments, regardless of the political situation"; "comply with all international requirements in the strictest possible way"; and ensure "competent and clear formulation of mutual commitments."¹¹

Nonproliferation education may, besides, become a long-term stability factor in Russia's cooperation with other countries in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Practice shows that a governmental agreement is not always a guarantee that a commercial contract based on it will be honored

– public opinion and specific political circumstances may reverse governmental agreements. Russia may avoid risks of politically motivated severance of contracts to build or run civilian nuclear facilities in other countries by proving advantages of Russian technologies to civil society in those countries and by measures to stimulate positive public attitudes in them to cooperation with Russia in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This means that nonproliferation education is a resource of public diplomacy for Russia.¹²

Russian Experience in Nonproliferation Education

RUSSIA has accumulated considerable experience in running nonproliferation education programs, from advanced training projects to master's degree courses. There are short-term courses in Russia for technical personnel and for scholars specializing in international relations and law. It is particularly important to enroll university lecturers and journalists in such courses because it often depends on their own knowledge how well their students or readers, who run into hundreds and perhaps thousands, understand nonproliferation issues.

PIR Center has for 18 years been running a program that is called the International School on Global Security and mainly consists of lectures, “nuclear module” seminars, and traditional debates on whether the world would be more secure without nuclear weapons. All the teaching and discussions during the program are in Russian. The program is a unique facility enabling young diplomats, military officers, scholars, technical personnel and students from CIS, European, Asian and North American countries to broaden their professional outlook on international security, including nonproliferation, and meet with leading Russian experts, government officials, NGO officers, executives in major private companies, and foreign diplomats posted in Moscow. Over the past five years, the school has been attended by citizens of more than 20 states, including CIS countries, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Iran, Syria, Mongolia, China, Italy, Finland, Germany, and the United States. In 2018, Alexander Protsenko,¹³ a young lecturer from Lugansk, became the best student of the 18th iteration of the school. PIR Center has also been running more narrowly specialized courses on nonproliferation for university lecturers. Altogether, more than 800 people have attended PIR Center courses, more than half of which were short-term programs.

Some of those who have completed PIR Center courses form a net-

work representing universities in several Russian cities – Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, St. Petersburg, Tomsk, Novosibirsk, and Yekaterinburg. There are bachelor's and master's programs on nonproliferation at some of those universities, and there also are groups of experts and independent centers in those cities that are deeply involved in nonproliferation studies.

In 2002, PIR Center published a two-volume manual entitled *Nuclear Nonproliferation*,¹⁴ Russia's first manual on nonproliferation, and then brought out a brief encyclopedia with the same title.¹⁵ In 2017, Tomsk State University published its own textbook¹⁶ and the Ural Federal University published a study written by a group of scholars.¹⁷ These two books represented independent scholarly schools. Those universities have accumulated enough research potential for international academic cooperation and for joining other expert centers all over the world in putting together global security agendas.

NGOs of various countries make use of the NPT review process and other international facilities to hype their own nonproliferation-related agendas, which often run against Russian interests. However, Russia's academia and expert community possess enough intellectual and personnel resources to successfully advance Russian interests. Russia needs more expert input to assert its position in nonproliferation affairs. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, at a meeting with members of Russian nonprofits in June 2018, confirmed that Russian diplomats need support from NGOs. "We are interested in our civil society actively participating in discussions held on multilateral platforms," he said. "So far, this participation is not as developed as we want it.... We support NGO activities in the Russian regions which will help us to develop our international ties, all the more so as each Russian region has international partners. This is also an important area of focus."¹⁸

PIR Center runs a three-year project that combines the training and international promotion of young experts on nonproliferation.¹⁹ The purpose of the project, Young Specialists in the NPT Review Process, is to train specialists by 2020 who would be familiar with expert and public diplomacy mechanisms in the NPT review process, would know how to organize events at UN facilities, and would be able to advance Russian agendas.

One more initiative is Russian-American "Track 2.5" diplomacy workshops, events aiming to draw young experts into international debates on the sidelines of sessions of the 2020 Review Conference prepcom and on the fringes of the conference itself. Whereas Track 1.5 diplo-

macy workshops are events for officials and experts, Track 2.5 is a format including the participation of young experts from Track III who make up a diplomatic reserve. Experienced experts would help them improve their skills during Track 2.5 workshops.

The participation of young specialists in Track 2.5 workshops gives diplomats and experts an opportunity for informal but in-depth discussions on important issues. It is also a useful format for a long-term Russian-American dialogue on nonproliferation.*

It is also important to familiarize foreign specialists with Russian nonproliferation and disarmament principles, and from this point of view it may be a fruitful albeit long-term investment to provide intensive specialized training for foreign students at Russian universities.

In 2010, Saint Petersburg State University launched an English-language master's program in arms control and strategic studies. In 2016, on PIR Center's initiative, the Russian Foreign Ministry's MGIMO University, the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and PIR Center launched the world's first dual-degree master's program in nonproliferation and global security studies.

It is a key feature of this program that, unlike under ordinary student exchange programs, Russian and American students spend nearly two years together. The program includes one term in Moscow, then two terms in Monterey, and then during a practice term at national government agencies, expert centers or international organizations. This gives students better understanding of Russian and American positions on nonproliferation issues and enables them to achieve mutual understanding.

"I believe that the choice of the subject of the program is of particular importance at this day and age," said MGIMO Rector Anatoly Torkunov. "I am certain that through academic partnership we shall make our invaluable contribution to increased global security at various levels."²⁰ "At this point, it is particularly important not to lose human and general academic contacts," Torkunov said. "I'm totally in favor of us setting up new joint master's programs with Western universities, both European and American, in favor of intensive student exchanges."²¹

With Russia and the United States divided on most nonproliferation issues, the importance of the MGIMO-Middlebury-PIR Center program is hard to overestimate, although its results will only be clear in 10 to 15

* In 2018, the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund financed the participation of three young specialists in a workshop held on the sidelines of a Geneva session of the 2010 Review Conference prepcom.

years, when those who have finished it have moved a good way up career ladders. We believe that it is even more important that the program is open not only to Russians and Americans but also to nationals of other countries, whom the program can help understand the reasons for Russian-American disagreements and help see foundations for an international dialogue, especially within the NPT review process. Besides Russian and Americans, those who are doing or finished the program include citizens of Ireland, Spain, Canada, China, and Mexico. We expect that quite soon the program participants will include nationals of countries in the Middle East and South, Southeast and Northeast Asia – regions where there is much interest in nonproliferation and a serious desire for cooperation with Russia in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Prospects for Nonproliferation Education

IT IS THE UNITED NATIONS that sets guidelines for nonproliferation education today as it did in 2002. The UN Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (ABDM) has repeatedly paid attention to educational issues in its annual reports. In reviewing the 2002 recommendations in a 2017 report, the ABDM concluded that “the study remained relevant and comprehensive” and recommended looking for “additional creative methods” such as “awards for best educators, journalists and writers in the field, the appointment of ‘peer ambassadors, seminars on best practice in disarmament education and online debates.”²² The ABDM made recommendations for students in countries that were just embarking on the peaceful use of nuclear energy,²³ and suggested organizing online courses, competitions of essays and brainstorming.* According to the secretary general, this would enable young people to seek solutions to problems and make them aware that they would be able to make their own contribution to improving the international climate.²⁴

In the near term, it will be in the interest of Russia if there are mass programs in English or other languages explaining the nature of Russia’s policy on nonproliferation, arms control, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.²⁵

In the medium term, online education should be supplemented with creative methods such as international competitions among lecturers, students and journalists, and participants in such contests should be brought

* Work of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. Report of the Secretary-General. General Assembly. 2018.

together in a community consisting of young people who are gifted and loyal to the nonproliferation idea, and who would take over the baton and further develop nonproliferation education on the basis of their own vision and of the needs of future generations. International debates, the modeling of negotiations and of the functioning of international organizations, and the drawing up of roadmaps for international cooperation are activities that would make young people “ambassadors of disarmament.”

One of the authors of this article* submitted to the UN secretary general a 10-year global plan for disarmament and nonproliferation education. This education would be conducted in all UN official languages. Afterward the authors elaborated on this plan and put it before the United Nations for approval.²⁶

The plan would comprise three stages. The first stage, to involve two years, would involve competitions for the best universities in various parts of the world, the best lecturers on disarmament and nonproliferation, and the best journalists writing on those subjects. The winners would become “UN ambassadors.” The same stage would include a symposium, at which competition winners would share their experience and, through debates with students, would set the main tasks for the future.

The second stage, to last three years, would involve international online debates among graduate and postgraduate university students in various parts of the world. In fact, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) might delegate this large-scale project to universities and organizations that have experience of such activities. The “UN ambassadors” would help organize such debates and would moderate them, simultaneously finding talented young people all over the world.

During the five-year third stage, the “UN ambassadors” would pass the baton to winners of the online debates. For two years, these young people would work jointly with the “ambassadors” but within the subsequent three years they would themselves become “UN ambassadors” and undertake the entire task of promoting disarmament and nonproliferation education.

We have no doubt that in Russia the plan would enable experienced professors and students (not only in Moscow or St. Petersburg but also in other parts of the country) to achieve their ambitions and become leaders rather than those who are led in the education process.

To sum up, combining traditional and innovative methods in nonpro-

* Vladimir Orlov has been an ABDM member since 2015.

liferation education will make it possible to train a new generation of Russian specialists and to familiarize foreign specialists with Russian principles on nonproliferation, arms control, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It would enable Russia to assert its nonproliferation initiatives more effectively, to make its policy clearer to the international community and achieve wider international support for it, ensure long-term civilian nuclear industry contracts for Russia, and attain long-term stability for nonproliferation efforts.

NOTES

¹ Timerbayev R.L. "Tsitata nomera," *Yaderny kontrol*, Issue 6 (500), 2018 // http://pir-center.org/mailouts/view-letter/id/1/letter_id/1472

² Russia "maintains an unwavering commitment to strengthening the political and legal foundations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, as well as the non-proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery." Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on November 30, 2016) // Website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs // http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2542248?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB; "The conduct of the Russian Federation in the international arena shall be based on an invariable of participation, jointly with other States, in seeking to strengthen international mechanisms of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, means of their delivery, and relevant products and technologies." Decree No. 683 of the President of the Russian Federation, "On the Strategy for the National Security of the Russian Federation" // *Rossiyskaya gazeta* // <https://rg.ru/2015/12/31/nac-bezopasnost-site-dok.html>

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⁴ Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov's remarks at the Conference marking the 50th anniversary of the NPT being opened for signing, Moscow, June 14, 2018 // Website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs // http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3259080?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=en_GB

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Key words: nonproliferation, education, security policy.

Maritime Freight in the Mediterranean Countries of the European Union

M. Kolesnikova

MARITIME FREIGHT is a priority development area of the European Union transportation industry. In 2016, 75.5% (1,783.2 million [metric] tons) of the EU's international cargo (2,362.8 million tons) was shipped by sea.

In value terms, this amounted to 1,697.2 billion euros, or 49.1% of the EU's total annual external trade volume (3,457.1 billion euros).

In 2016, in terms of the total internal cargo transport in the EU, which amounted to 3,661 billion t-km,* maritime transport ranked second after road transport.

Its share came to 1,180.8 billion t-km, or 32.3% of the aggregate amount.¹

Maritime cargo in the EU is handled by 1,200 maritime ports,² which as transportation hubs connect various modes of transport: water, road, rail, air, and pipeline.³ The freight turnover of all EU ports in 2016 is estimated at nearly 3.9 billion tons⁴; the freight turnover of major ports⁵ was about 3.8 billion tons.

The Mediterranean basin is the best logistical option for maritime cargo, accounting for a significant portion of EU trade and economic relations with the countries of the Persian Gulf, the east coast of Africa, as well as with India and the states of the Asia-Pacific Region.

In connection with this, an objective evaluation of the contribution of the Mediterranean countries of the EU to maritime cargo transport and the development conditions and trends of specialized segments of this industry seems timely.

* A ton-kilometer (t-km) is a nonsystemic unit of measurement used to measure freight volumes. One t-km is equal to one ton of freight transported over one kilometer.

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Contribution of the EU's Mediterranean countries to maritime cargo transport

INDICATORS for maritime cargo volumes handled in the main ports of the Mediterranean countries of the EU show that these countries account for over one-third of the total EU shipping industry: approximately 37% (see Table 1).

Table 1. Total Weight of Goods Handled in Main Ports of the EU's Mediterranean Countries, 2006-2016, mln tons

EU/ country	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2006- 2016, %	Share in the EU, %, 2006	Share in the EU, %, 2016
EU	3,729	3,829.2	3,566.4	3,643.5	3,712.9	3,792.5	1.7 (change)	100	100
Greece	131.5	121.6	105.7	131.8	145.9	157.1	19.5	3.5	4.1
Spain	414.4	416.1	377.1	418.7	427.7	451	8.8	11.1	11.9
France	342.4	346.2	311.5	298.4	296.7	289.5	-15.5	9.2	7.6
Croatia	19.5	25.3	19.6	15.4	14.5	16.5	-15.6	0.5	0.4
Italy	506	513.5	482.2	465.7	433.6	453.5	-10.4	13.6	12
Cyprus	7.6	7.9	7	6.2	7.2	10.3	34.2	0.2	0.3
Malta	3.6	3.4	3.8	3.3	3.5	3.8	5.7	0.1	0.1
Slovenia	15.4	16.5	14.6	16.9	18	21.2	37.6	0.4	0.6

Total*	1,440	1,450.5	1,321.5	1,356.5	1,347.1	1402.8	-2.6	38.6	37
Aggregate									
Greece, Spain, Italy, France	1,394	1,397.4	1,276.5	1,314.6	1,303.9	1,351.1	3.1	37.4	35.4

Source: Eurostat, Country level: gross weight of goods handled in main ports, by type of cargo // http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/mar_mg_am_cwhc

From 2006 to 2016, maritime freight volumes at major ports in the EU rose 1.7%: from 3,729.4 million tons in 2006 to 3,792.5 million tons in 2016.

The bulk of the EU's maritime cargo is handled at ports in France, Italy, Spain, and Greece. The first three countries are among the largest economies in the EU and among the states of the Mediterranean basin. In 2016, their share of the EU's GDP amounted to 14.9%, 11.3% and 7.5%, respectively. The share of Greece in the EU's GDP is significantly less: 1.2%.⁶

The aggregate contribution of France, Italy, Spain, and Greece in the total volume of goods shipped in the main ports of the EU in 2016 was 35.6% (Table 1). Thus, the ports of the four countries provided approximately 96.3% of the maritime freight transport of the EU countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. The share of other Mediterranean EU countries (Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia) was only about 3.7%.

Among the Mediterranean countries of the EU, the largest maritime cargo carrier in 2016 was Italy, which accounted for about 12% of all EU freight. It was the third largest cargo carrier among all EU member countries after the Netherlands and Great Britain.

In second place among the Mediterranean countries of the EU was Spain, whose ports handled 11.9% of EU cargo. It ranked fourth after Italy in the overall ranking of EU countries.

France is responsible for a substantial share of the EU's cargo turnover: approximately 7.6%. Thus, France ranked third in terms of mar-

* Total for eight Mediterranean countries of the EU.

itime freight turnover among EU member countries in the Mediterranean and sixth among all EU countries. According to 2016 data, Greece ranked fourth among the Mediterranean EU countries and eighth in the EU (4.1% of total EU freight volume). The total tonnage of maritime cargo handled by major ports in France, Italy, Spain, and Greece fell by 3.1% in the specified period. At the same time, the share of these countries in the total volume of goods handled in main ports in the EU fell by 1.8%.

Development of Specialized Segments of the Maritime Freight Industry in the Mediterranean Countries of the EU

CURRENTLY, the sectoral priorities of maritime freight are redistributing among various segments (cargo types), and significant changes are occurring in the development trends of those segments.⁷

In 2016, most of the cargo turnover of the EU was liquid cargo, which accounted for 38.1% of the total cargo volume handled in its main ports. It is followed by dry goods (22.2%), container goods (21.7%), as well as rolling cargo carried by ro-ro vessels⁸ (aggregate of 12.4%) (Table 2).

Table 2
Share of various cargo types in total volume of goods processed in the main ports of EU Mediterranean countries, %

Type of goods	Liquid		Dry		Large container		Self-propelled rolling cargo (ro-ro)		Nonself-propelled rolling cargo (ro-ro)	
	2006	2016	2006	2016	2006	2016	2006	2016	2006	2016
EU/Country										
EU	40.0	38.1	25.5	22.2	16.6	21.7	6.3	7.4	5.1	5.0
Greece	35.3	39.5	29.0	20.5	13.1	24.9	15.0	10.8	3.0	2.8
Spain	36.4	37.3	27.4	21.7	24.6	20.6	3.2	2.2	2.1	2.2
France	53.0	46.6	23.9	25.0	9.9	13.6	6.9	10.9	1.2	1.4
Italy	47.6	41.0	20.2	13.9	15.9	20.1	4.0	10.4	6.3	9.0

Source: Eurostat, Country level – gross weight of goods handled in main ports, by type of cargo // http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/mar_mg_am_cwhc

Table 2 shows the distribution of maritime freight in Greece, Spain, Italy, and France by cargo type. For example, in 2016, France specialized in liquid and dry cargo; and Italy and Spain in liquid and dry goods, and large containers.

In 2006-2016, the maritime ports in Greece, Spain, Italy, and France handled primarily liquid cargo (Table 3).

Table 3
Total weight of liquid cargo handled in main ports of the four Mediterranean countries of the EU (Greece, Spain, Italy, France), mln tons

EU/ country	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	Share in the EU, %, 2006	Share in the EU, %, 2016
EU	1,490.8	1,512.8	1,451.4	1,405.6	1,374.5	1,443.2	100	100
Greece	46.4	50.9	46.4	50.4	55.9	62.0	3.1	4.3
Spain	150.8	155.8	150.5	153.4	162.1	168.1	10.1	11.6
Italy	240.7	230.5	214.4	196.4	180.4	186.0	16.1	12.9
France	181.6	180.8	154.4	141.1	133.3	134.9	12.2	9.3
Total*	619.6	618.0	565.7	541.3	531.7	551.0	41.6	38.2

Source: Eurostat, Country level – gross weight of goods handled in main ports, by type of cargo // http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/mar_mg_am_cwhc

During this time, there was growth in the volume of processed liquid cargoes in the ports of Greece and Spain.

By contrast, a decline in transhipped goods was noted in France, where the decrease in absolute terms in 2016 relative to 2006 amounted

* Total for Greece, Spain, Italy, and France.

to 46.7 million tons (25.7%), and in Italy (54.8 million tons, or 22.8%).

While the total volume of liquid cargo handled in the main ports of the EU fell by 3.2% for this period, the corresponding figure for these four countries was 11.1%, primarily due to France and Italy.

Nevertheless, the total share of Greece, Spain, Italy, and France in overall transport operations relating to liquid goods remains approximately 40%. This confirms the importance to the EU economy of maritime cargo transport carried out by tanker vessels. The quantitative trends of the four Mediterranean countries of the EU, characterized by the fleet size of tanker vessels (Table 4), essentially correspond (except for Spain) with the above liquid cargo handling indicators.

Table 4
Number and gross tonnage of tanker vessels located in the main ports of Spain, Italy, France, Greece,* 2006-2016

EU/ country	Amount, thousands of units				Gross tonnage, mln. GT***			
	2006	2016	Share in the EU, %, 2006	Share in the EU, %, 2016	2006	2006	Share in the EU, %, 2006	Share in the EU, %, 2016
EU	108.99	95.864	100	100	1,326.49	1,344.10	100.0	100.0
Greece	9.691	9.978	8.9	10.4	43.03	59.44	3.2	4.5
Spain	17.811	12.123	16.3	12.7	314.65	233.98	23.7	17.4
France	9.641	5.967	8.9	6.2	153.21	113.25	11.5	8.4
Italy	17.42	10.834	16	11.3	219.69	171.03	16.6	12.7
Total**	54.563	38.902	50.1	40.6	730.58	578.19	55.1	43.0

Source: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/mar_mg_am_cwhc

* Determined on the basis of inward declarations.

** Total for Greece, Spain, Italy, and France.

*** Gross tonnage (GT) is a nonlinear unit of volume calculated by the formula: $GT=K \cdot V$,

In 2006-2016, the EU tanker fleet decreased by 12%. At the same time, there was a 1% growth in total gross tonnage.

Thus, the average gross tonnage of tanker ships in the EU increased over the specified period from 12.2 thousand GT to 14.0 thousand GT, or 15.2% (Table 5).

A similar trend of downsizing the tanker fleet is noted in Spain, France and Italy (5.68, 3.67 and 6.58 thousand units, respectively), despite an average growth of their gross tonnage, including in Spain (9.2%), France (19.4%) and Italy (25.2%).

Table 5
Average gross tonnage of tanker vessels in major ports of Spain, Italy, France, and Greece* 2006-2016, GT

Country	2006	2016	Growth
EU	12.2	14.0	15.2
Greece	4.4	6.0	35.3
Spain	17.7	19.3	9.2
France	15.9	19.0	19.4
Italy	12.6	15.8	25.2

Source: Eurostat, Country level – number and gross tonnage of vessels in the main ports (based on inwards declarations), by type of vessel // http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/mar_mg_am_cwhc

The top performer was Greece, where in 2016 there was growth relative to 2006 in the number of tankers (287), as well as total and average

where V is the volume of the vessel in cubic meters and $K = 0.2 + 0.021\lg_{10}(V)$. There is no unit of measure defined by the International Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships (June 23, 1969, London).

* Determined on the basis of inward declarations. Compiled by the author based on Eurostat data.

gross tonnage, which increased by 39.2% and 35.3%, respectively. This factor ensured growth in processed liquid cargoes in the ports of Greece, which rose over the specified period from 46.4 million to 62.0 million tons and allowed for the share of this country's total goods transhipped in the main ports of the European Union to increase from 3.2% to 4.5%.

Unlike in Greece, the general trend in Spain, France and Italy has been the downsizing of tanker vessels and their total gross tonnage at a level that could not be offset by a significant increase in vessel capacity. As a result, the tanker fleets of these three countries significantly reduced their share in the EU, both in terms of number and total gross tonnage, during the specified period.

Another prevalent type of cargo handled by the main ports of the Mediterranean countries is dry (bulk) goods. Table 6 presents the relevant data for 2006-2016.

Table 6
Total weight of dry cargo handled in main ports of Greece, Spain, Italy, and France, mln tons

EU/ country	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	Share in the EU, 2006	Share in the EU, 2016
EU	949.51	958.50	813.07	834.48	874.93	841.37	100.0	100.0
Greece	38.18	35.77	813.07	25.35	29.09	32.28	4.0	3.8
Spain	113.49	101.34	25.32	92.37	93.38	97.99	12.0	11.6
France	81.80	82.60	78.69	69.50	77.10	72.48	8.6	8.6
Italy	102.29	99.47	77.25	74.67	55.46	63.20	10.8	7.5
Total*	335.76	319.18	66.56	261.89	256.03	265.95	10.8	7.5

Source: Eurostat, Country level – gross weight of goods handled in main ports, by type of cargo // http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/mar_mg_am_cwhc

* Total for Greece, Spain, Italy, and France.

From 2006 to 2016, the total weight of dry cargo handled in main ports of the EU decreased by 11.4%, including in Greece (15.5%), in Spain (13.7%) and in France (11.4%). The largest decline was in Italy (38.2%). Thus, the reduction of the total weight of dry cargo showed corresponding trends in the EU and the examined countries.

Consolidated figures of the number and gross tonnage of EU vessels carrying dry goods in 2006-2016 (Table 7) show an 8% decline in the number of vessels despite an 16.4% increase in total gross tonnage.

Table 7
Number and gross tonnage of dry cargo vessels in key ports of Spain, Italy, France, and Greece,* 2006-2016

EU/ country	Amount, thousands of units				Gross tonnage, mln. GT			
	2006	2016	Share in the EU, %, 2006	Share in the EU, %, 2016	2006	2016	Share in the EU, %, 2006	Share in the EU, %, 2016
EU	46.38	42.51	100.0	100.0	550.96	641.10	100.0	100.0
Greece	6.02	2.29	13.0	5.4	16.83	24.29	3.1	3.8
Spain	7.64	6.25	16.5	14.7	103.61	157.13	18.8	24.5
France	3.69	2.83	8.0	6.7	49.36	49.26	9.0	7.7
Italy	4.19	2.47	9.0	5.8	74.03	53.28	13.4	8.3
Total**	21.54	13.84	46.5	32.6	243.96	283.96	44.3	44.3

Source: Eurostat, Country level – number and gross tonnage of vessels in the main ports (based on inwards declarations), by type of vessel:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/mar_mg_am_cwhc

A similar reduction in the number of dry cargo was recorded in all

* Determined on the basis of inward declarations.

** Total for Greece, Spain, Italy, and France.

four Mediterranean countries. The number of vessels decreased in Greece by 62%, in Spain by 18.2%, in Italy by 41.1%, and in France by 23.3%. At the same time, there was an increase in the gross tonnage of the dry cargo fleet in the EU, Greece and Spain. The gross tonnage of France remained virtually unchanged (decrease of 0.21%). Italy's figure fell 28%. As a result, the average gross tonnage in the EU increased from 11.9 to 15 GT; in Greece, from 2.8 to 10 GT; in Spain, from 13.6 to 25.1 GT; in Italy, from 17.7 to 21.6 GT; and in France, from 13.4 to 17.4 GT.

Thus, the volume of transshipped dry cargo and the number of dry cargo vessels decreased in 2016 compared to 2006. At the same time, there was an increase in the average gross tonnage of vessels designated for transporting dry cargo.

Transportation of container cargoes in the EU over the specified period showed positive trends overall (Table 8).

Table 8
Total weight of container cargo handled in main ports of Greece, Spain, Italy, and France, mln tons

EU/ country	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	Share in the EU, %, 2006	Share in the EU, %, 2016
EU	618.47	683.59	664.56	745.79	795.20	822.80	100.0	100.0
Greece	17.17	6.35	10.74	33.66	40.02	39.13	2.8	4.8
Spain	102.08	117.35	111.43	132.40	127.21	137.95	16.5	16.8
France	33.94	37.01	35.89	34.44	40.12	39.43	5.5	4.8
Italy	80.29	81.91	82.49	78.98	85.43	91.06	13.0	11.1

Source: Eurostat, Country level – gross weight of goods handled in main ports, by type of cargo // http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/mar_mg_am_cwhc

In 2006-2016, the total weight of container cargo handled in the main ports of EU increased by 33%, including in Greece (128%), in Spain

(35.1%), in France (16.2%), and in Italy (13.4%). The share of container cargo in the total volume of maritime cargo handled at ports in Greece, Spain, France, and Italy shows the biggest increase in the indicated period among other types of cargo. Thus, the increase in the transshipment of container cargo in the EU and the mentioned countries of the Mediterranean basin also showed general coincidental trends.

In 2006-2016, the number of container ships decreased in the EU by 12.4% and in Spain by 44.7% (Table 9).

Table 9
Number and gross tonnage of container vessels in the main ports of Spain, Italy, France, and Greece,* 2006-2016

EU/ country	Amount, thousands of units				Gross tonnage, mln. GT			
	2006	2016	Share in the EU, %, 2006	Share in the EU, %, 2016	2006	2016	Share in the EU, %, 2006	Share in the EU, %, 2016
EU	95.722	83.832	100.0	100.0	1,810.691	3,057.768	100.0	100.0
Greece	2.392	3.121	2.5	3.7	41.185	115.82	2.3	3.8
Spain	27.861	15.407	29.1	18.4	305.291	486.680	16.9	15.9
France	5.004	5.657	5.2	6.7	157.161	272.517	8.7	8.9
Italy	9.553	10.454	10.0	12.5	252.656	382.875	14.0	12.5
Total**	44.810	34.639	46.8	41.3	756.293	1,257.954	41.8	41.1

Source: Eurostat, Country level – number and gross tonnage of vessels in the main ports (based on inward declarations), by type of vessel: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/mar_mg_am_cwhc

* Determined on the basis of inward declarations.

** Total for Greece, Spain, Italy, and France.

In other countries, this figure increased, including in Greece (30.5%), Italy (9.4%) and France (13%). At the same time, the gross tonnage of these vessels in the EU grew by 69%; in Greece (181%), in Spain (59.4%), in Italy (51.5%) and in France (73.4%).

Thus, the average container tonnage in the EU increased from 18.9 thousand GT to 36.5 thousand GT; in Greece, from 17.2 thousand GT to 37.1 thousand GT; in Spain, from 11 thousand GT to 31.6 thousand GT; in Italy, from 26.4 thousand GT to 36.6 thousand GT; and in France, from 31.4 thousand GT to 48.2 thousand GT.

The best trends for the development of container ship fleets were recorded in Spain, where the number of container ships substantially fell despite a growth in gross tonnage, which permitted an increase in the total weight of container cargo processed in national ports.

Conclusion

THE MEDITERRANEAN basin is characterized by a high demand for its maritime cargo lines and holds great significance for ensuring the sustainability of the EU's external and internal trade and economic relations. In 2016, over one-third of the EU's maritime cargo trade was serviced by its Mediterranean member states. Most of the maritime cargo supplied to the EU across the Mediterranean entered through Greece, Spain, Italy, and France. The share of other Mediterranean EU countries (Croatia, Cyprus, Malta, and Slovenia) is insignificant.

During the entire examined period, the dominant type of maritime freight both to the Mediterranean countries of the EU and the EU as a whole was liquid cargo. In terms of total weight of transshipped cargo to major ports, liquid goods are followed by dry goods, then container goods, as well as rolled cargo delivered by roll-on/roll-off ships (ro-ro).

The most dynamic industry segment that showed significant growth in aggregate weight of processed goods was container freight. This form of transport saw an increase in the total weight of cargo and gross tonnage of the container ship fleet. The most innovative approach to the development of the sector was taken by Spain, where sectoral priorities were focused on reducing the fleet of specialized ships while at the same time building up their capacity.

Thus, container freight, based on objective figures, is now a priority development area in the maritime cargo industry in all four Mediterranean countries, as well as the EU as a whole.

Among the four Mediterranean countries studied, the best sectoral trends were demonstrated by Greece, where the growth rates for liquid and container cargo traffic are more significant than in other countries.

NOTES

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⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UN. Review of maritime transport 2017 // http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2017_ru.pdf

⁸ Ro-ro, an abbreviation of "roll on" and "roll off," denotes rolled cargo / Eurostat. Glossary: Roll on / roll off // http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Glossary:Roll_on_-_roll_off

Key words: maritime cargo, Mediterranean countries, European Union, main ports, number of vessels, tonnage, gross shipments.

Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Goods and Measures Against It

M. Oreshina

THE DELIBERATE DESTRUCTION of architectural monuments and works of art has a history that runs into millennia. The ravaging of Rome by the Gauls in 390 B.C., the demolition of churches during the 17th-century civil war in England, the methodical bombing of historic buildings during World War II, the destruction of cultural monuments in northern Cyprus after the Turkish invasion of it in 1974, the 1991 bombardment of the old part of Dubrovnik, a city that the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has had on its World Heritage list since 1979, the smashing by the Taliban of two giant statues of Buddha in Afghanistan's Bamyán mountains in 2001, looting and illegal archaeological excavations in Iraq after 2003, and the destruction of cultural objects by Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraq, Syria and Libya¹ are just a few examples of the outrages that have deprived world civilization of cultural gems and have supplied the black market with antiquities.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Organized Crime (UNODC), trafficking in cultural objects is, in terms of scale, in third place in the world after drug and weapons trafficking, and yields total global annual profits of between \$3.4 billion and \$6.3 billion.² According to the EU, illicit trade in antiquities and archaeological treasures from the Middle East brings ISIS "and other warring factions" between \$150 million and \$200 million per year.³

It is one of the priorities of international and regional organizations to take a wide range of measures to prevent the destruction of cultural objects in war zones and illicit cross-border trafficking in cultural property.⁴

Such measures include effective prosecution of cultural property-related crimes, the return of stolen but seized items to their lawful own

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ers, organization of governmental bodies to combat cultural goods trafficking, creation and updating of databases on such trafficking, and adoption of special legislation to combat trafficking in cultural goods looted in armed conflict areas.

Moratoriums on trafficking in antiquities coming from Iraq and Syria imposed in 2003 and 2015 respectively played an important role. Other measures believed to be important are the harmonization of national laws on imports and exports of cultural property; the verification of the authenticity of cultural objects that are on sale, including goods offered for sale through online auctions; the licensing of art dealers and auction houses; the development of databases and software to accurately evaluate cultural damage to Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Syria; the inventorying of museums; the digitization of archives and museums; and the mapping of archeological sites that are threatened with disappearance.

It is crucial to ensure increasingly close cooperation among the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), the World Customs Organization (WCO), and national judiciaries, customs services, law enforcement authorities, and cultural agencies to exchange confidential information on smuggling channels; encourage the development of national databases on legislation on cultural property-related crimes; make more effective use of the databases of the UNODC, Interpol, the International Council of Museums (ICOM), and UNESCO on member countries' legislation; and to make more detailed studies of online information on experts on cultural property-related crimes.

International financing of operations to combat cultural goods trafficking is generally considered the core of global action against this crime category. Mechanisms for such financing include the \$2.45 million UNESCO Heritage Emergency Fund, the Fund for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, also known as the fund for the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (\$350,000), and the International Alliance for the Protection of Heritage in Conflict Areas (\$75 million).⁵

Organizations involved in combating cultural goods trafficking include UN bodies – the Security Council, the General Assembly, UNESCO, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the UNODC, the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ), and the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Group on Protection against

Trafficking in Cultural Property. Among other bodies are the Interpol Expert Group on Stolen Cultural Property, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), the Council of Europe, the EU, ICOM, and the International Foundation for Art Research (IFAR).

Agreements dating to between 1950 and 1990 form the legislative basis for measures against cultural property trafficking. They include the 1954 Hague Convention for the

Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the two protocols to it, one of May 14, 1954, and one of March 26, 1999; UNESCO's 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transport of Ownership of Cultural Property, UNESCO's 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, and the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects of 1995.

There are some moot points in the 1954 Hague Convention. Clause 2 of Article 4, "Respect for cultural property," allows for cases of "military necessity" that may require a waiver of obligations to protect cultural property recorded in Clause 1 of this article. At the same time, Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the 1999 protocol to the convention criminalize making cultural monuments objects of attacks. However, neither Article 28, "Sanctions," of the Convention nor Article 15 of the Second Protocol, "Serious violations of this Protocol," prescribes any clear sanctions against offenders. They just authorize each member country to qualify such acts as offenses, punish them under its own laws, and prosecute resellers of stolen items, "extending individual criminal responsibility to persons other than those who directly commit the act."

The 1970 convention, the agreement ratified by the largest number of states, pursues three main objectives⁶: prevention of misappropriation, restitution of misappropriated property, and specific measures to control the export and import of cultural objects. The following are some of the convention's strongest points:

1. The convention has been joined by 137 countries, which shows growing support for it from UNESCO member states;

The protection of cultural heritage rapidly transcends the boundaries of narrowly specialized international bodies and is included in global agendas.

2. For many cultural institutions, 1970, the year the convention entered into force, is the benchmark for determining the origin of a cultural object as it prevents, or at least hampers, the counterfeiting of accompanying documents;

3. The harmonization of the convention with the national legislation of UNESCO member countries makes it possible to take account of the interests of the antiquities' markets of those countries, which include Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Japan;

4. Via the convention, UNESCO and other international organizations have seriously influenced education in the cultural property sphere;

5. The convention has helped bring out legislation – Articles 14 and 18 of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage of 2001, Article 21 of the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention, and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention;

6. The convention has led to the evolution of protection mechanisms for movable cultural property. There have been national lobbies for these mechanisms in various countries.*

The convention also has some weak points.⁶ For instance, although a revolutionary instrument and the result of compromises that took a lot of effort to reach, the convention contains ambiguities that in practice lead to different ways of implementation by signatory states. There are other unclear points as well, deadlines for suit filing being one of them.

Courts may have problems in dealing with claims of ownership of objects found in the course of illegal archeological excavations or items obtained through legal excavations but not yet included in official registers. One more problem is the absence of any statement in the convention

* U.S. art dealers were against the United States joining the movable property mechanisms but were defeated by an archeological and anthropological lobby. Remarkably, when UNESCO was holding initial debates on the draft of the convention, the U.S. delegation to UNESCO – as, incidentally, the British and Swiss delegations – was deliberately showing little interest in the planned document but during final debates on the draft the Americans suggested numerous amendments to the draft, effectively proposing their own version of the convention. The majority of member states supported the draft prepared by UNESCO's Special Committee of Governmental Experts. Mexico, which headed the group of states that had cultural objects stolen from them and out on sale in the United States, had Articles 7 and 9 included in the draft, articles that were imported intact from the American draft. It is also noteworthy that the United States only joined the convention in 1983. Congress had to choose one of three bills submitted to it in ratifying the convention. Other countries also had long and tortuous ratification paths. France ratified the document in 1997, Japan and Britain in 2002, Switzerland in 2003, Germany in 2007, and the Netherlands in 2009.

about whether any part of it is retroactive,⁷ and because of this no part of it can apply to cases that predated its entry into force. In practice, misappropriated items are appropriated through bilateral negotiations or judicial arbitration, or given as presents. Other moot points are what is to be done with a stolen item that one has acquired without knowing it has been stolen – whether, for example, acquirers are to be refunded if the item has been seized from them. This is not specified in Clause (b) (i) of Article 7, which deals with the acquisition and import of stolen property.

In 1983, the 1970 convention committee of experts asked the UNESCO Executive Board to investigate the convention's moot points. The UNESCO Secretariat considered pros and cons of adding provisions to the convention or drafting one more protocol to fill all the gaps. There was concern among experts that resuming debates on sensitive issues that had been raised at national level when the convention was being drafted but remained stalled would undermine confidence in the document and affect compliance with it. For this reason, the clarification work was frozen.

The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects of 1995 was drafted in response to a request from the UNESCO Secretariat for creating a single private law mechanism for the restitution of stolen or illegally exported cultural property, a mechanism that was to set a timeframe for filing a restitution application and to prescribe paying compensation. As of the end of June 2018, the convention was ratified by 44 countries.⁸ The reason for such a small number is the belief that the convention threatens the interests of private auction houses and might trigger antagonisms between antiquarians. This convention qualified private collections as parts of the world cultural heritage, thereby abandoning the principle of linking cultural objects to specific countries. This meant a broader interpretation of the cultural heritage than that in UNESCO's 1972 convention.

Over the past 20 years, the list of agreements dealing with the protection of cultural objects has been enlarged by the addition of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted in 2000, the 2003 UN Convention against Corruption, and UNESCO's 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. Moreover, between 2004 and 2017, resolutions on measures against trafficking in cultural property were passed by the UN Security Council,⁹ the UN General Assembly,¹⁰ the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,¹¹ the

Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,¹² the UNESCO General Conference,¹³ ECOSOC,¹⁴ the European Parliament,¹⁵ and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.¹⁶ Intensive action against ISIS and armed conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa were the reasons for the resolutions.

By February 2018, 26 EU countries had ratified or acceded to the 1954 Hague Convention, 25 had ratified or acceded to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, and 14 had ratified or acceded to the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention (two further EU member states were signatories to the UNIDROIT Convention but had not ratified it).¹⁷ However, with the exception of two EU Council regulations concerning Iraq (Article 3 of Regulation No. 1210/2003 of July 7, 2003) and Syria (Article 11c of Regulation No. 36/2012 of January 18, 2012),¹⁸ the EU still has no legal mechanism to deal with the import into the EU of cultural property.

Export of cultural objects from the EU is regulated by EU Council Regulation (EC) No. 16/2009 of December 18, 2008,¹⁹ on the export of cultural goods and Directive 2014/60/EU of the European Parliament and of the EU Council of May 15, 2014 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State.²⁰ Not many EU countries have legislation on cultural property trafficking that is up to today's challenges, and so the EU leadership is not prepared to delegate these tasks to national parliaments.

Brussels insists on harmonizing systems of control of the import of cultural objects into the EU, mainly to prevent the financing of terrorism, money laundering and organized crime besides protecting cultural property.²¹

On July 13, 2017, the European Commission put proposals for a system of customs control of import of cultural goods into the EU before the European Parliament and EU Council. The system, which would have been based on an EU regulation, would have involved licensing such goods and penalties for violating provisions in Articles 3 to 5 of this regulation, e.g., false information about the origin of cultural goods.²² The customs of each EU member state have been vested with extensive powers, including the right to seize and temporarily retain cultural goods for investigation purposes.

The EU expected that, if approved, the proposed regulation would come into force on January 1, 2019. By then, the customs of the EU countries would have been able to harmonize the planned regulation with their

laws. Three European Parliament committees worked on the proposed regulation.*

The Council of Europe brought out a treaty on May 19, 2017, entitled the Council of Europe Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property (CETS No. 221).**

Another agreement signed in the Council of Europe format is the Nicosia Convention (the Council of Europe's Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property). This convention is the result of the 6th Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible for cultural heritage, held in 2015 in Namur. The European Committee on Crime Problems took part in drafting the agreement.

Experts emphasized that there were uncertainties in international law about definitions of cultural property-related offenses. Articles 3 to 11 of the Nicosia Convention significantly broaden the range of actions that are to be qualified as offenses.

In that category they put theft, other forms of misappropriation, unauthorized excavation of cultural objects on land or under water and their unauthorized removal, unauthorized importation and exportation, acquisition of stolen objects, placing stolen items on the market, falsification of documents, destruction of and damage to cultural objects, aiding or abetting theft, or attempting to aid or abet it.

It will be aggravating circumstances if offenses are committed “by persons abusing the trust placed in them in their capacity as professionals,” by “a public official tasked with the conservation or the protection of movable or immovable cultural property,” if “[an] offence was committed in the framework of a criminal organization,” or if “the perpetrator has previously been convicted of the offences referred to in this Convention.”

The convention makes provision for preventive measures such as creating publicly accessible national databases on, and inventories of, cultural objects; export and import control; and introducing an obligation for art and antiquity dealers to record their transactions.

* The committees were International Trade (INTA), Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) and Culture and Education (CULT).

** As of November 24, 2018, 11 countries were signatories of the convention – Armenia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Russia, San Marino, Slovenia, Ukraine, Cyprus, and Mexico. By that date, the convention had only been ratified by two of them – Cyprus and Mexico, which holds observer status at the Council of Europe (the other 10 states are members of the Council) // https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/221/signatures?p_auth=8JFmfajf

As regards criminal and administrative penalties, the Nicosia Convention replaces the Delphi Convention of 1985 (the Council of Europe's European Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property, ETS No. 119, which was not ratified by a single member state of the Council of Europe).²³

The Nicosia Convention, the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, and the above-mentioned EU documents are generally accepted as a definitive international legal mechanism for the protection of cultural property.*

The Nicosia Convention is expected to gradually help overcome some difficulties facing law enforcement agencies and honest art dealers, including the comprehensive identification of stolen or looted cultural objects; improving the documentation of objects planned to be put on sale; and gaining unrestricted access to databases to check information on buyers and sellers.

Moreover, law enforcement and customs personnel should react more effectively to initial reports of the loss of cultural objects. Art markets need uniform rules for everyone involved in combating cultural goods trafficking, rules that are applied comprehensively and not fragmentarily, on a case-to-case basis. All signatory states of the convention should harmonize their criminalization standards.

There should also be realistic deadlines for the detection by customs of the origin of suspicious cultural objects. Transactions signed by auction houses and ordinary sellers should follow due diligence principles and information about such deals should be confidential. Online illicit trade in cultural objects is also a serious problem.

Legislative action is not the only condition for success, however. Signatory states of the above-described conventions became aware quite early that they also needed to launch practical measures, for instance setting up national services for the protection of the cultural heritage and putting together databases on stolen items.

In response to the destruction by ISIS of some cultural monuments in Syria and Iraq, a joint program was launched by Italy, Interpol, the UNODC, and UNESCO called "Protecting Cultural Heritage. An Imperative for Humanity. Acting Together against Destruction and Trafficking of Cultural Property by Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups." In 2015 and 2016, it was decided to set up units for the protec-

* Russia signed the Nicosia Convention on November 8, 2018.

tion of the cultural heritage in the police forces of some countries.²⁴ The tasks of those units include close cooperation among law enforcement agencies and governments in exchanging information on crime rings and on routes and destinations of stolen cultural items, carrying out joint operations, and combating online trafficking in cultural goods.

Specialized units for the protection of cultural heritage began to be set up as far back as the late 1960s. In Italy, the Carabinieri Headquarters for the Protection of Cultural Heritage (TPC) was created in 1969; in Estonia, there is a division for the control of electronic commerce in the Tax and Customs Department; the Argentine Federal Police established what is called the National Center for the Protection of Cultural Heritage in 2002; in the United States, the FBI instituted the Art Crime Team in 2004, which is headquartered in Washington; Switzerland set up a unit for the restitution of cultural objects in its Federal Office of Culture in 2005; Ecuador organized a service for the investigation of cultural property-related crimes in its Judicial Police in 2010; Mexico established a group for the prosecution of cultural goods trafficking in 2015; and the Swedish national police force set up the Wildlife and Cultural Heritage Crime unit in 2016.*

Interpol, ICOM, the UNODC, and the WCO keep databases on stolen or missing cultural objects.

Every June and December since June 1972, Interpol has been publishing a poster about missing works of art with the generic title “The Most Wanted Works of Art.”²⁵ Since 1995, Interpol has also been keeping a database of stolen works of art that, as of March 1, 2018, contained descriptions and pictures of around 51,000 items. Authorized users could have had direct access to the database since 2009.²⁶ Interpol says that, at the request of a member country, it can publish a special poster for

* In May 2016, Ukrainian law enforcement authorities with assistance from Interpol and Italian and Moldovan police found 17 paintings in Odessa that had been stolen from the Castelvechio Museum in Verona and were worth a total of about 20 million euros. The paintings included works by Jacopo Bellini, Andrea Mantegna, Peter Paul Rubens, and Jacopo Tintoretto. In Argentina, of 10,800 objects that were reported stolen, police have returned 4,288 works of art, 4,865 archeological objects and 4,288 paleontological items to their lawful owners. The FBI Art Crime Team has helped return a painting by Henri Matisse stolen in 2002 to the Museum of Modern Art in Caracas. Operation Pandora, carried out by Interpol, Europol, the WCO, UNESCO, and law enforcement authorities from 18 countries late in 2016, involved checking 48,588 individuals, 29 340 vehicles and 50 ships. During the operation, 3,561 works of art and cultural goods were seized, almost half of which were archaeological objects. Seventy-five people were arrested, and 92 investigations were initiated.

notable thefts. For instance, it has published posters about objects stolen by ISIS terrorists from museums in Syria and Iraq²⁷ – 500 objects stolen from a museum in Raqqa, Syria, in 2013-2014, 22 bas-relief sculptures stolen from the Artaban tomb in Palmyra, Syria, in 2014-2015, and 94 items stolen from a museum in Mosul, Iraq, in 2015. In November 2015, Interpol published a poster about the above-mentioned 17 masterpieces stolen from the Castelvecchio Museum in Verona.

ICOM compiles and publishes “red lists” – geographically based lists of inventoried objects in the collections of recognized institutions that represent the categories of cultural goods most vulnerable to illicit trafficking. The organization has red lists for Africa, published in 2000, Iraq (2003 and 2015), Latin America (2003), Afghanistan (2006), Peru (2007), Cambodia (2009), Central America and Mexico (2009), Haiti (2010), China (2010), Colombia (2010), Egypt (2011), the Dominican Republic (2012), Syria (2013), Libya (2015), West Africa and Mali (2016), and Yemen (2018).²⁸ Altogether 17 lists have been published. Besides, ICOM publishes the “One Hundred Missing Objects” series, which presents a selection of objects stolen from public collections or looted from archaeological sites.²⁹ The organization also maintains the so-called International Observatory on Illicit Traffic in Cultural Goods, an information platform supported by the European Commission and bringing together museum and law enforcement personnel.³⁰

The UNODC has developed a portal to facilitate the dissemination of information on the implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three protocols. The portal, called SHERLOC (Sharing Electronic Resources and Laws on Crime),³¹ consists of several databases on the national legislation of signatory states and on court rulings, including rulings on cultural property-related crimes. SHERLOC helps governments, law enforcement authorities and NGOs exchange information.

The WCO manages an electronic information exchange platform codenamed ARCHEO and containing contact details for 145 experts with tested reputations from various countries, international organizations and research centers.

The EU has developed a database on all measures relating to EU customs tariff, commercial and agricultural legislation. As the EU forms a single customs area, all its member countries must use the database, called TARIC (the integrated Tariff of the European Union),³² on a compulsory basis. TARIC is governed by Council Regulation (EEC) 2658/87

of July 23, 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff. Under this regulation, the customs of all EU countries are to use the same classification code for the same type of product. This applies to cultural property as well as to all other merchandise. TARIC is based on the WCO's Harmonized System Database, which is a nomenclature database. Experts believe the system needs revision to reflect structural changes in the imports of WCO member states.

The University of Geneva has developed its own database – ArThemis, which records case notes about art and cultural property disputes settled in court or out of court.

In conclusion, let us mention that the protection of cultural property in armed conflict areas has been included in the duties of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). This means that the protection of cultural heritage rapidly transcends the boundaries of narrowly specialized international bodies and is included in global agendas.

NOTES

¹ The European Union's Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union (DG TAXUD), said in its report, DG TAXUD Fighting illicit trafficking in cultural goods: analysis of customs issues in the EU. Final report. June 2017, p. 27, that, at the time of publication of the report in 2017, ISIS was "in control of around 100.000 cultural objects of global importance, including 4.500 archaeological sites, 9 of which are characterized as UNESCO World Heritage" // https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/annex_08_dg_taxud_study_fighting_illicit_trafficking_in_cultural_goods_en.pdf#page=87 See also: Cultural Property, War Crimes and Islamic State: Destruction, plunder and trafficking of cultural property and heritage by Islamic State in Syria and Iraq – a war crimes perspective. September 2016 by the Dutch National Police // <http://iadaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Cultural-Property-War-crimes-and-Islamic-State-2016.pdf>

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¹⁰ UN General Assembly resolutions: 66/180 of December 19, 2011, Strengthening crime prevention and criminal justice responses to protect cultural property, especially with regard to its trafficking // <http://undocs.org/A/RES/66/180>; 68/186 of December 18, 2013; Strengthening crime prevention and criminal justice responses to protect cultural property, especially with regard to its trafficking // https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CCPCJ/Crime_Resolutions/2010-2019/2013/General_Assembly/A-RES-68-186.pdf; 69/196 of December 18, 2014, “International Guidelines for Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Responses with Respect to Trafficking in Cultural Property and Other Related Offences” // and http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/196; 70/174 of December 17, 2015, “Thirteenth United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice” (the resolution was adopted during the Thirteenth Congress, held in Doha on April 12-19, 2015) // <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/443/27/PDF/N1544327.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹¹ Resolution 5/7 of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime in Vienna held on October 18-22, 2010: 5/7, “Combating transnational organized crime against cultural property” // http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/COP5/CTOC_COP_2010_17/CTOC_COP_2010_17_E.pdf; Resolution 6/1 of the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, held in Vienna on October 15-19, 2012 // http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/organized_crime/COP6/CTOC_COP_2012_15/CTOC_COP_2012_15_E.pdf

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¹⁵ In 2015, the European Parliament adopted three resolutions condemning the destruction by ISIS of cultural monuments in Iraq, Syria and Yemen – European Parliament resolution of April 30, 2015 on the destruction of cultural sites perpetrated by ISIS/Da’esh

(2015/2649(RSP)) // <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015-0179+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>; European Parliament resolution of June 11, 2015 on Syria: situation in Palmyra and the case of Mazen Darwish (2015/2732(RSP)) // <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015-0229+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>; European Parliament resolution of 9 July 2015 on the situation in Yemen (2015/2760(RSP)) // <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-2015-0270+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN>

¹⁶ Deliberate destruction and illegal trafficking of cultural heritage, report by Stefan Schennach, Committee on Culture, Science, Education and Media of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), June 6, 2018) // <http://semanticpace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbmQvbnVncveG1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4dHluYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0yNDU0OCZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdC9QZGYvWFJlZi1XRClBVC1YUwYUERGlnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTI0NTY4> // PACE resolution 2234 (2018), “Deliberate destruction and illegal trafficking of cultural heritage” // <http://semanticpace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbmQvbnVncveG1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4dHluYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0yNTAxOSZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdC9QZGYvWFJlZi1XRClBVC1YUwYUERGlnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTI1MDE5>

¹⁷ Briefing: EU Legislation in progress. Regulating imports of cultural goods, p. 2 // [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614697/EPRS_BRI\(2018\)614697_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614697/EPRS_BRI(2018)614697_EN.pdf)

¹⁸ Council Regulation (EC) №1210/2003 of July 7, 2003 concerning certain specific restrictions on economic and financial relations with Iraq and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 2465/96 // <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003R1210&from=EN>; Council Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 of January 18, 2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria and repealing Regulation (EU) No. 442/2011 // <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32012R0036&from=EN>

¹⁹ Council Regulation (EC) No. 116/2009 of December 18, 2008 on the export of cultural goods // <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32009R0116&from=EN>

²⁰ Directive 2014/60/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 15, 2014 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2012 (Recast) // <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0060&from=EN>

²¹ At a meeting in Brussels in 2016, 180 member states of the World Customs Organization unanimously passed the Resolution on the Role of Customs in Preventing Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Objects // http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/about-us/legal-instruments/resolutions/resolution_cultural-objects.pdf?la=en

²² Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the import of cultural goods. Brussels. July 13, 2017, COM(2017) 375 final, 2017/0158 (COD) // https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:e1fd9ba7-67a8-11e7-b2f2-01aa75ed71a1.0003.02/DOC_1&format=PDF

²³ The Delphi Convention, which was opened for signature in Delphi on June 23, 1985, was signed by Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Liechtenstein, Portugal, and Turkey. Since it has not

been ratified by any of the Council of Europe member states, international experts see it as unsuccessful // https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/119/signatures?p_auth=8JFmfajf

²⁴ Creating a National Cultural Heritage Unit. The Value of a National Unit Dedicated to Fighting Crimes against Cultural Heritage and the Illicit Traffic of Cultural Property. March 2017 // https://www.interpol.int/content/download/34601/453595/version/6/file/007-41_WOA%20Brochure-web_LR.pdf

²⁵ <https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Works-of-art/Posters>

²⁶ <https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Works-of-art/Database>

²⁷ <https://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Works-of-art/Posters>

²⁸ Red Lists Database // <http://icom.museum/resources/red-lists-database>

²⁹ <http://archives.icom.museum/100objects.html>

³⁰ <https://www.obs-traffic.museum>

³¹ <https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/about-us/index.html?lng=en>

³² https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/calculation-customs-duties/what-is-common-customs-tariff/taric_en

³³ Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff // <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex:31987R2658>

Key words: cultural heritage, United Nations, UN Security Council, UNODC, UNESCO, UNIDROIT, Interpol, WCO, Council of Europe, European Union, European Parliament, PACE, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Syria, prosecution, cultural property-related crimes, conventions, units for the protection of the cultural heritage.

“I Do Not Feel Like a Stranger When I Am in Russia’

Abdel Hakim Abdel Nasser

International Affairs: Dear Mr. Abdel Hakim Abdel Nasser, this year marks the 100th anniversary of the birth of your father, the famous president of Egypt and one of the most prominent political leaders of the Arab world. How do you remember your father?

Abdel Hakim Abdel Nasser: Despite his enormous workload, my father, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, was a real father to us. We were always aware of his presence. He was a good father, even though he was strict toward us. He always said that we were no different from other Egyptian families and that any privileges were only temporary and could not be used for personal gain.

Q: Gamal Abdel Nasser went down in history as the president of Egypt who built a new relationship with our country. That era was also marked by the construction the Aswan Dam across the Nile River, as well as by many projects that the Soviet Union helped Egypt carry out to develop its economy. At the same time, the USSR made a great contribution to ensuring Egypt's defense. How did the Egyptian people assess those events then and do they remember them now, almost 60 years later?

A: I was still a little boy during the Suez crisis, but I remember very well the day the construction of the Aswan hydroelectric power station was officially launched, January 9, 1960, even though I was only five years old. There was a very good reason for that: My father was not there for my fifth birthday (I was born on January 8). He had left for Aswan to attend the launch of the dam construction project. In those days, all of Egypt celebrated the great event. I remember very well the ceremony to

Abdel Hakim Abdel Nasser, political and public figure, son of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser

divert the Nile River and how lucky I was to go to Alexandria with my father to welcome the guest of honor, Mr. Nikita Khrushchev. He was very excited to see me with my father and he said that I should definitely meet his grandchildren, the children of Rada Nikitichna and Alexey Ivanovich Adzhubei, so dad invited them to visit Egypt.

During the Soviet leader's visit, my father awarded Nikita Khrushchev the Order of the Nile, Egypt's highest state award at that time. Khrushchev conferred upon President Nasser the title Hero of the Soviet Union, the first foreign recipient of this award.

Later, as a schoolboy, I learned in detail about the history of the Aswan HPS construction project. I realized that imperialist states wanted to take advantage of our need for this structure to their own ends. However, my father nationalized the canal. Some 97% of the revenue it generated had previously gone to countries that had absolutely nothing to do with it. After all, the Suez Canal was on Egyptian soil, with more than 120,000 Egyptian workers dying during its construction. Was it fair for Egypt to receive just 3%? Those countries conspired against Egypt and behaved aggressively toward it. The Egyptian and Arab peoples, together with their leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, were determined to fight until final victory. At that time, the position of our Russian allies was crystal clear. The Soviet side issued a warning to aggressor countries and was ready to target its missiles at their capitals unless the fighting halted immediately, and they left Egyptian territory. Egypt prevailed and gained full control of the Suez Canal. As is known, at that time, the Soviet Union provided Egypt with technical support for the construction of the Aswan hydroelectric power plant, and hundreds of Russian engineers and technicians arrived in Aswan and lived there with Egyptian engineers and workers until the construction was completed. President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the completion of the great project in July 1970. The USSR was a real friend to us, who supported our country without any conditions such as those that imperialist countries sought to impose on us.

Q: Gamal Abdel Nasser is considered one of the greatest Arab politicians of the past century, who strove to unite the Arab world. After all, during the Arab Spring, demonstrators carried his portraits.

A: Gamal Abdel Nasser worked to translate into reality the idea of Arab nationalism, based on anti-imperialism and pan-Arabism. However, he

understood that the unification of the Arab world was a long, gradual process in the economic, social and political spheres.

Regarding unification with Syria, such integration could only be possible under his leadership, since he was the only Arab leader who had authority and political support of the masses. That step was designed to protect Syria from external aggression. President Gamal

Abdel Nasser agreed to the unification on the condition that all political parties in Syria were dissolved. The outcome of the referendum of the Arab people in Egypt and Syria on the creation of a single state under Gamal Abdel Nasser's leadership was full approval of the unification.

The unification provoked the anger of all reactionary regimes in the Arab world and imperialist countries, where the division of the world was a means of controlling it.

Their goal was to destroy the new association.

Even though Syria soon withdrew from the union, Egypt retained the name the United Arab Republic while Gamal Abdel Nasser remained president. He was convinced that Arab unity was the will of all Arabs. These days, religious and ethnic wars and conflicts in the Arab world have once again made the idea of Arab nationalism relevant and very much in demand, because this is the only way of bringing these wars and conflicts to an end.

Q: Historically, Russia and Egypt have wide-ranging ties. What areas you can call the most effective today?

A: In the 1950s and the 1960s, we received unlimited assistance from the USSR in agriculture, industry and defense. Of course, the construction of the Aswan hydroelectric complex was by far the most significant project. The Soviet Union helped lay the foundation for heavy industry – the metallurgical and aluminum sectors. The Egyptian Army's victory in the 1973 war was achieved with the help of Russian arms. All this was done because of friendship. The Egyptian people hope to restore Egyptian-Russian partnership, as was the case in the 1950s and the 1960s while taking into account present realities.

As for the media, today, one Russian channel has become very popular in Egypt.

I see Russia as a great power that is opposed to all forces of evil.

Q: Mr. Nasser, what does Russia mean to you personally?

A: To me, Russia is a friend who is guided only by the highest possible principles in relations with us. I see Russia as a great power that is opposed to all forces of evil, despite their great wealth. I recall Yury Gagarin's visit to Egypt in 1962. He came to our home, and I was fortunate enough to communicate with him. I still keep the medal commemorating the first manned space flight that he gave me. Every victory scored by Soviet cosmonauts was also our victory. I do not feel like a stranger when I am in Russia. It is my second home. The Russian people are the true friends of the Egyptian people.

Key words: President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Arab world, Aswan, Egypt.

Russian-Language Radio Broadcasting by Stations Outside Russia: Trends From 2010 to 2018

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RUSSIAN emigrant communities abroad have always been known to have their own Russian-language media. This has been done since before the 1917 revolution.¹ Scholarly descriptions of Russian emigrant media are normally limited to newspapers and journals that have played important roles in the life of emigrant communities.² However, over the last few decades, the Russian diaspora has been setting up other forms of Russian-language media, forms that media researchers know little about and that include radio stations.

This article is an attempt to fill this gap by making statistical and other descriptions of Russian-language radio broadcasting through airwaves and of trends in it between 2010 and 2018. The reason why we chose 2010 as the starting point of our study is the publication in that year of the *Catalogue of Russian-Language Radio Stations Worldwide* (Katalog russkoyazychnykh radiostantsii mira), a book that represented the first large-scale attempt in Russia to systematize information about Russian-language broadcasting by stations based abroad and was a project supported by Russia's Federal Agency on Press and Mass

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Communications.³ The catalogue contained information on 175 radio stations that were based in 50 countries.

The Soviet-era term “foreign radio broadcasting in the Russian language” denoted either broadcasting by foreign governmental stations that were based outside the Soviet Union and targeted its population or broadcasting by religious or nongovernmental propaganda stations that were also located outside the Soviet Union. Soviet and post-Soviet Russian researchers described these forms of broadcasting as “psychological warfare.”⁴

The situation changed drastically in the 1990s – many of the Western radio stations, among them Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), the BBC Russian Service and Radio France Internationale (RFI) were allowed to freely broadcast in Russia. Russia regularly published a reference book, entitled *Radio Broadcasting in the Russian Language*,⁵ that contained detailed information about every foreign station broadcasting in Russia, including its wavelengths and program timings. However, by 2010, foreign stations began to gradually close their broadcasting facilities in Russia and go over to the Internet.⁶

In recent years, there have been increasing doubts about the effectiveness of Russia’s own broadcasting for foreign audiences.⁷ From this viewpoint, the *Catalogue of Russian-Language Radio Stations Worldwide* was an essentially new step in radio research as it described not only major cross-border broadcasters but also local stations based in various countries.

In April 2018, Moscow hosted the Fourth International Forum of Russian-Language Broadcasters, organized by the Russian Academy of Radio with support from Russia’s Foreign Ministry, Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International Cultural Cooperation, and Rossiya Segodnya International News Agency.

The forum organizers asked the authors of this article to find out what had changed since 2010 in Russian-language radio broadcasting by stations based abroad. This led to a study whose findings were first set out in a presentation at the forum and partly in a report on radio broadcasting in Russia for 2017.⁸ The study was then amplified after some methodological clarifications with the result that the list of foreign-based stations that were known to broadcast in Russian was enlarged substantially.

Broadcasting in 2010

AN ANALYSIS Of the *Catalogue of Russian-Language Radio Stations Worldwide* made clear that its information was incomplete – there were broadcasters, including some based in former Soviet republics, that the *Catalogue* failed to mention. Nor was it always clear whether the entities it did mention were radio stations as such or radio outlets of some organizations as the introduction to the book did not explain this or provide any clues.

The *Catalogue* just divided the stations into state and nonstate entities. The latter category included private commercial stations and stations set up by non-governmental organizations, among them religious stations such as Adventist World Radio – The Voice of Hope, and propaganda broadcasters such as RFE/RL. To be fair to the authors of the *Catalogue* they had never set themselves the task of making a comprehensive study, and the fact that some broadcasters remained outside their scope by no means belittles the importance of the information that they collected and systematized.

The United States was the world leader – there were 27 stations broadcasting in Russian in it, more than in any other country.

Table 1, which is based on the *Catalogue*, gives an idea of what the global distribution of stations broadcasting in Russian was like in 2010.

Table 1
Geography of stations broadcasting in Russian in 2010

	Number of countries where stations were based	Number of state stations	Number of nonstate stations	Total
Europe	25	25	76	101
Asia	18	14	22	36
North America	2	2	30	32
South America	3	2	2	4
Africa	1	1	---	1
Australia & Oceania	1	1	---	1
Total	50	45	130	175

The United States was the world leader – there were 27 stations in it, more than in any other country. Europe was the leader among regions – there were 101 broadcasters there that were spread among 25 countries. It needs to be clarified that a station was included in the *Catalogue* if it possessed an operative transmitter that was registered and located in the country where the station was based. Europe's list includes all former Soviet republics and countries that accepted large numbers of immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Russian-speaking immigrants from modern states on the former Soviet Union's territory. The European countries that had the largest numbers of Russian-language broadcasters in them were Ukraine (23), Germany (16), Latvia (10), Moldova (9), Belarus (7), and Estonia (7).

Asia was in second place with a total of 36 stations spread among 18 countries. The top six countries were the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan (9), Kyrgyzstan (7), Armenia (2), Tajikistan (2), and Uzbekistan (2), as well as Israel (2), whose population includes numerous immigrants from the former Soviet Union.

North America was in third place. Only two countries there had Russian-language broadcasters – the United States (27) and Canada (5). In South America, only three countries had Russian-language radio services – Argentina (1), Brazil (2), and Ecuador (1). In Africa, there was only one station with a Russian service – governmental international broadcaster Radio Cairo. There was also only one station in Australia.

Broadcasting in 2018: Study Guidelines and Methods

THE INFORMATION in the *Catalogue* needed verification. Besides, much has happened in the world in the eight years since the book came out. There is wide-scale Russian-language broadcasting in two unrecognized states that came into being a few years ago – the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and the Lugansk People's Republic (LPR). State companies in various countries specializing in international broadcasting have been reorganized. Some foreign stations have ceased to broadcast in Russian. Other Russian-language broadcasters have gone online, which means the transmitters criterion has had to be discarded. Some European countries have launched measures to “counteract Russian propaganda,” which included setting up Russian-language broadcasters that are effectively anti-Russian. In other words, Russian-language broadcasting has grown in scale and changed ideologically.

All this meant that the global number of Russian-language radio services as stated in the *Catalogue* needed revision. We decided to limit ourselves to stations broadcasting through airwaves with transmitters outside Russia and to disregard online services.

We used a range of methods, which included searching the Internet for information on radio stations; compiling a database on stations; verifying information in the *Catalogue*; and checking the frequencies of stations whose websites we had come across. We conducted our research at the School of Communications, Media, and Design of National Research University-Higher School of Economics between March and September 2018. Our study was divided into two main periods.

During the first period, which took place in March and April, we carried out our main search, which was a four-stage effort. During the first stage, we detected websites with information on airwave broadcasters.* This information was assembled into a database that underlay our further work. The second stage had the task of going through this database to find out what languages the stations were broadcasting in and selecting those broadcasting in Russian. During the third stage, we were finding out what countries those stations were based in and selecting stations based outside Russia. We double-checked the list obtained through this triple sifting by trying to pick up broadcasts by the use of frequencies stated on the broadcasters' websites. This was the fourth, final stage. This work resulted in a list of 349 radio stations. The findings of the first period were presented at the International Forum of Russian-Language Broadcasters in April.

The second period lasted from July to September and involved some methodological clarifications. First, we had found out that the websites we had studied during the first period contained no information on many of the stations based in countries bordering Russia. These included many FM broadcasters in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine that had been set up by regional authorities, municipalities or large companies. Moreover, careful online monitoring showed that there were also other stations in ex-Soviet republics that had been neglected during the first period. The reason was that many of them were FM services most of whose content consisted of music, advertising, and brief insertions of Russian speech. Not all of them were identified as Russian-language services in our database.

* The bulk of this information was collected from fmllist.org, fmscan.org, guzei.com, liveonlineradio.net, radiomap.eu, rwmassmedia.com, vsefm.com, vcfm.com, web-fm.ru, and worldradiomap.com. More than 400 other websites were used.

These and other facts prompted a need for a more precise definition of a foreign radio station broadcasting in the Russian language on airwaves as opposed to the Internet. As a result, the following definition was adopted:

We defined stations of this kind as stations that conduct airwave broadcasting through transmitters located on the territory of a foreign state and uses Russian as the sole language or as one of the languages of broadcasting in any formats, including news programs, songs, advertising or comments of any kind, at least once a week and for no less than 30 minutes per day.

The 30-minute timeframe is by and large a tradition among foreign stations broadcasting in Russian. For example, Radio Afghanistan's schedules for the period from March to October 2018 had slots of 8 pm to 8.30 pm Moscow Time for Russian-language broadcasts.

This methodological clarification led to more searching. We carried out a further set of tasks, including:

- perusing the websites of local administrations that contain information on local radio stations and mention that they are broadcasting in Russian;
- verifying information obtained thereby by studying other websites;
- monitoring online musical radio stations to find out whether their content included Russian-language songs, advertisements, slogans, etc.

This work led us to enlarging our list of stations. As of September, we had a list of 448 stations that were distributed among 57 countries and met the above-cited definition. This is the number of stations whose existence we have been able to prove – there are likely to be more stations.

Region-by-Region Broadcasting in 2018

THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED search methodology produced other interesting results as well. For example, the total number of radio stations worldwide broadcasting through airwaves stood at a little more than 198,500 as of the start of April.* There were, moreover, a total of 252 countries that had radio stations in them. This number included unrecognized states, dependencies and disputed territories. And broadcasting was conducted in 141 languages.

Before we go into details, let us mention one more method that we

* We cannot guarantee, however, that our information is comprehensive as our methodology could not have enabled us to determine the precise number of stations.

used. One of the criteria for listing a state in the *Catalogue of Russian-Language Radio Stations Worldwide* were its legal borders recognized by the international community. For this reason, stations in unrecognized or partly recognized republics on the territory of the former Soviet Union were recorded in the *Catalogue* as belonging to the countries that those republics were formally parts of. Those territories were the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, the Republic of Abkhazia, and the Republic of South Ossetia. In 2014, the DPR and LPR joined this category. In planning our study, we decided to list such territories as separate countries due to their de facto rather than their de jure status. This, we assumed, would ensure more accuracy.

Table 2 shows the regional distribution of Russian-language broadcasters as of September 2018. In comparing statistics in Table 2 and Table 1, we can see that broadcasters in Europe, Asia and North America had grown in number considerably since 2010.

Table 2
Russian-language broadcasters by region in 2018

	Number of countries	Number of state stations	Number of non-state stations	Total
Europe	25	76	169	245
Asia	24	58	94	152
North America	2	---	43	43
South America	3	2	3	5
Africa	2	1	1	2
Australia & Oceania	1	1	---	1
Total	57	138	310	448

Kazakhstan was the leader among individual countries, having 59 stations in it. Then came Belarus with 48 and the United States with 39 stations.

Ukraine was the leader in Europe with 28 stations. It was followed by the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (26), the DPR (23), Latvia (21), Germany (18), Moldova (18), the LPR (15), and Estonia (12).

There were more Russian-language broadcasters in Britain, Finland

and Cyprus, and Russian-language services had emerged in Spain and Monaco. All the new stations in the West were nonstate entities. Simultaneously, state radio stations in Hungary, Italy, Spain, Serbia, and Sweden had ceased to broadcast in Russian.

Kazakhstan remained the Asian leader with 59 stations, many more than the country had had in 2010. Kyrgyzstan was in second place with 22 stations. There were also more Russian-language broadcasters in Armenia (11), Tajikistan (9), Uzbekistan (8), Abkhazia (6), South Ossetia (6), Azerbaijan (4), the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (4), and Mongolia (3). Radio Afghanistan has a Russian service that was not mentioned in the *Catalogue of Russian-Language Radio Stations Worldwide*. Unlike in 2010, there were now Russian-language broadcasters in the United Arab Emirates and Thailand. There were, as we said above, more Russian-language broadcasters in North America as well, mainly in the United States, where the number of stations had risen to 39 from 27. All the new stations were nonstate entities. Meanwhile, the Voice of America (VOA), a U.S. governmental station, had ceased to broadcast in Russian, and so had Radio Canada International.

In South America, there was one Russian-language station on top of those listed in 2010. There was one more station in Africa, a broadcaster that had been set up in Madagascar. The number of stations in Australia had stayed unchanged.

Broadcasting in Post-Soviet Space: Ideological Confrontations

THE TERRITORY of the former Soviet Union is represented in our database by 19 countries – Abkhazia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the DPR, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, the LPR, Moldova, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Tajikistan, Transnistria, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. No Russian-language broadcasting was found in Turkmenistan. Our study, may we repeat, did not cover Russia. The above-listed 19 countries had transmitters in them that were used for Russian-language broadcasting by 330 stations, which made up 73.7% of all foreign stations broadcasting in Russian. We tried to divide this multitude into two categories based on the state/nonstate and external/domestic criteria. The external stations were divided into those domiciled in Russia and those domiciled in other countries. Below we will refer to the latter group as “other” Russian-language stations. As a result, we received six types of stations: (1) state stations domiciled in the country where they

were based; (2) state stations that were Russian legal entities; (3) state stations domiciled in other countries (other state Russian-language broadcasters); (4) nonstate stations domiciled in the country where they were based; (5) nonstate stations that were Russian legal entities; and (6) nonstate stations domiciled in a country other than that in which they were based (other nonstate Russian-language stations).

Table 3
Russian-language broadcasters in countries on former Soviet Union's territory as of September 2018

	Stations domiciled in country they were based in	Russia-domiciled stations	Other stations	Stations of unclear domicile	Total
Abkhazia	4	2	0	0	6
Azerbaijan	1	2	1	0	4
Armenia	3	5	3	0	11
Belarus	39	5	0	4	48
Georgia	0	1	2	0	3
DPR	6	10	0	7	23
Kazakhstan	41	7	0	11	59
Kyrgyzstan	9	18	2	1	22
Latvia	17	10	0	0	21
Lithuania	1	1	3	2	7
LPR	9	6	0	0	15
Moldova	5	8	2	3	18
Nagorno-Karabakh	2	2	0	0	4
Transnistria	11	10	1	4	26
South Ossetia	4	2	0	0	6
Tajikistan	5	3	1	0	9
Uzbekistan	6	2	0	0	8
Ukraine	17	0	0	11	28
Estonia	3	2	4	3	12
Total	183	82	19	46	330

Table 3 gives an idea of the distribution of stations on former Soviet territory on the basis of four criteria: (1) stations established in a specific country outside Russia and based in that country; (2) Russian stations having outlets outside Russia (Russian state stations permitted by the authorities of foreign countries to have outlets in them or stations domiciled in those countries but operating officially there under Russian brands); (3) stations whose content is created in third countries; and (4) stations of unclear origin. A station was put in the fourth category if it had been impossible to find out who had founded or owned it or if it was a station that was based outside Russia and had the same name as a Russian station, but the latter denied any connection with it. The latter was the case either if a Russian brand was unprotected abroad or if the station that misused the name of a Russian entity was not properly registered or was a pirate broadcaster.

Let us make brief descriptions of the first, second and third groups. As regards the group based on the first criterion, the structure of broadcasting in Russian in a former Soviet country is determined by the status of the Russian language in that country and the scale of the use of Russian by its population. Kazakhstan, which had 41 stations, and Belarus with 39 stations held the top two rungs in this group. The stations in those countries are either state national-level broadcasters or regional or municipal stations that exist in nearly all regional centers and larger municipalities or local commercial stations, mostly music broadcasters. Ukraine and Latvia were also prominent in the first group, each of them having 17 Russian-language broadcasters domiciled in it.

The second group are both state and nonstate commercial Russian stations. The state ones include Vesti FM, Mayak, Radio Zvezda, Radio Rossii, and Radio Sputnik. Radio Mir may be considered part of this group. It is owned by the Mir Interstate Television and Radio Company (MTRK Mir), established by the governments of some of the member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The nonstate subgroup are 27 stations, 24 of which are mainly music broadcasters. The talk stations in the group include Komsomolskaya Pravda with its outlet in the DPR and Ekho Moskvyy with its outlets in Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria. But the content of their broadcasts is not always original Russian. There is one talk station that stands apart in the group – educational broadcaster Radio Vera (Radio Faith), which has an outlet in the DPR. There also is a record of unauthorized use of a Russian brand by a local station. One example is

the Biznes FM radio in Kazakhstan, which has nothing to do with the influential Russian station of the same name.

The third group consists of three subgroups. One of them are governmental stations that have received permission from some of the ex-Soviet republics to locate transmitters in those countries. They include Polskie Radio (Polish Radio), Radio France Internationale (RFI) and Radio Japan. Another subgroup are international religious stations, Adventist World Radio – The Voice of Hope, Semeynoye Radio Eli and Trans World Radio. The third subgroup is only one station, RFE/RL, which is formally nongovernmental and non-religious. RFE/RL was set up during the Cold War, mainly for propaganda in the Soviet Union. Times have changed, but RFE/RL continues to advance the interests of the United States and its allies and fans sentiments against the Russian government among its Russian-speaking audiences. Meanwhile, RFE/RL broadcasts quite many high-standard educational programs that attract numerous listeners.¹⁰

The presence of Russian and third-country stations in former Soviet republics other than Russia reflects the foreign policy priorities of those republics. Georgia, for instance, openly distances itself from Russia. There are only three Russian-language broadcasters there, according to our search, two of which are outlets of Western propaganda stations, RFE/RL and RFI. The third one is an outlet of Russian commercial station Avtoradio. No state Russian station broadcasts in Georgia. Diplomatic relations between Georgia and Russia have remained severed since the conflict of 2008.

Lithuania is another example of pro-Western orientation. Three propaganda stations, RFE/RL, Polskie Radio and Radio Japan, have transmitters on its territory. Only one Russian station, Novoye Radio, is present there.

Estonia hosts outlets of four foreign but not Russian stations, among them RFE/RL, plus religious broadcasters Adventist World Radio – The Voice of Hope, Semeynoye Radio Eli and Trans World Radio. At the same time, there are outlets of Russian commercial stations in Estonia. At least two of them – Yumor FM and DFM – have broadcasting facilities there.¹¹

The opposite ideological pole are pro-Russian countries. Those have outlets of Russian state and non-state commercial stations in them while third-country stations are not represented at all. Those countries are the unrecognized republics of Abkhazia, the DPR, the LPR, Nagorno-Karabakh, and South Ossetia. Radio Sputnik is present in all five coun-

tries, Vesti FM in the DPR, LPR and South Ossetia, Mayak in the DPR and LPR, and Radio Rossii in the LPR. It would be fair to put Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the same group as Radio Sputnik broadcasts in both countries.

Transnistria is a similar case with three Russian state stations – Vesti FM, Radio Rossii and Radio Sputnik – having transmitters on its territory, although Trans World Radio also has an outlet in the unrecognized republic.

Trans World Radio has an outlet in Azerbaijan as well, though Radio Sputnik is present there as well.

Some of the countries prefer an ideological balance, making its territory available both to Russian state stations and Western or pro-Western propaganda broadcasters. Armenia hosts transmitters from Radio Sputnik, on the one hand, and Polskie Radio and RFI, on the other. Both Radio Sputnik and RFE/RL are represented in Kyrgyzstan and Moldova. Radio Sputnik, Radio Zvezda and Radio Japan all have transmitters in Tajikistan.

Belarus stands alone. It has let in Russian commercial broadcasters but stays away both from Russian state stations and from Western propaganda ones. Radio Mir, whose owner, MTRK Mir, has the Belarusian government among its founders, takes a strictly neutral line in respecting the interests of the MTRK Mir founder nations.

Latvia and Ukraine are different from the rest in the sense that neither Russian state stations nor Western propaganda ones broadcast from their territory, but Russian commercial broadcasters are present in both countries – Retro FM and Russkoye Radio have outlets in both of them and Yumor FM and Ekho Moskvyy do in Latvia. However, local outlets of Russian stations often broadcast local content, which produces the impression that both countries try to keep their radio free from any foreign ideological influences. The nationalist governments of Latvia and Ukraine keep their countries shut to Russian stations that have the slightest indication of support for Russian official policies in their content. They are not too eager to fall under Western influences either, except that RFE/RL has a Ukrainian-language service in Ukraine, though it has no Latvian-language service in Latvia.

Hence, all this broadcasting activity reflects an ideological confrontation between pro-Russian and anti-Russian forces that try to bring Russian-speaking audiences in post-Soviet countries under their influence.

TO SUM UP, the study has produced several important results. It has resulted in a definition of foreign broadcasting in the Russian language that has made it possible to take a new approach to the issue. Before the beginning of the 21st century, this concept was chiefly taken to mean political propaganda and religious broadcasting on long, medium, short and ultrashort waves. After the *Catalogue of Russian-Language Radio Stations Worldwide* came out in 2010, this category of stations was enlarged by adding national, regional and local stations using all frequencies, including FM.

A new methodology was used to search the global media space for foreign stations broadcasting in Russian. It led to two remarkable collateral findings: it was found out that there were, in total, a little more than 198,500 airwave radio stations worldwide as of the start of April 2018, that there were a minimum of 252 countries that had such stations in them (this number included unrecognized states, dependencies and disputed territories) and that broadcasting was conducted in at least 141 languages.

The study also highlighted some trends in foreign broadcasting in Russian over the past decade. Let us briefly describe them once again:

1. The number of Western countries conducting governmental broadcasting in Russian has gone down. Canada, Hungary, Italy, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, and the United States are among countries that have closed down their Russian-language radio services.

2. Meanwhile, Poland, France and Japan have boosted governmental Russian-language broadcasting, and governmental broadcasting in Russian has been organized in Afghanistan.

3. RFE/RL has cut down its Russian-language broadcasting. As of September 2018, it had outlets in only five former Soviet republics – Estonia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, and Moldova. Several years ago, it was present in more countries.

4. There has been more activity at local level both in former Soviet republics and in countries outside former Soviet territory – local broadcasters have grown in number in Britain, Cyprus, Germany, Mongolia, Spain, and the United States. Russian-language radio services have been set up in Madagascar, the United Arab Emirates, and Thailand.

5. The total number of airwave Russian-language broadcasters of all kinds has been put at 448 as of September, with 330 of them based in for-

mer Soviet republics and the other 118 in other countries. Altogether 57 countries had airwave Russian-language radio services in them.

6. Russian state broadcasters have built up their presence in former Soviet republics other than Russia. Five of them – Vesti FM, Mayak, Radio Zvezda, Radio Rossii, and Radio Sputnik – broadcast in 13 countries on former Soviet territory, including unrecognized states. The interstate Radio Mir broadcasts in two countries – Belarus and Kazakhstan.

7. The number of nonstate Russian stations broadcasting in ex-Soviet republics other than Russia has also gone up. The most active of them are Avtoradio, which now has stations in eight countries, Europa Plus (six countries), and Retro FM (six countries).¹² Altogether, 27 nonstate Russian stations were found to be present in 19 countries on ex-Soviet territory.

8. There is an alarming trend – the emergence on former Soviet territory of numerous stations that use well-known brands but have no proven connection to the owners of those brands. There are more than 30 such stations. This trend hampers the identification of stations and offers an opportunity for ideological manipulations. Such broadcasters include Ukraine's Biznes Radio and Radio Vesti, names that falsely suggest some formal connections to Russia's Biznes FM and Vesti FM. These Ukrainian stations make interpretations of political events that are very different from interpretations by the Russian broadcasters whose names they partially copy.

In conclusion, the above-described trends in Russian-language broadcasting by stations based outside Russia should be seen through the prism of Joseph Nye's soft power doctrine.¹³ This would open up new opportunities for building and promoting positive images of Russia among Russian speakers across the world.

NOTES

¹ See, e.g., Yeremin M.A. *Russkaya pressa za rubezhom, 1855-1917*. Samara: Publishing House of the Volga State Academy for Social Science and Humanities, 2011; *Periodicheskaya pechat rossiyskoy emigratsii. 1920-2000, collection of articles* / Ed. by Yu.A. Polyakov and O.V. Budnitsky. Moscow: Institute of Russian History, 2009; and *Russia which we preserved... The history of the Russian foreign press in the XIX-XXI centuries*. Moscow: World Trade Center, 2012.

² See, e.g.: Bazanov P. N. "Parizhskiy zhurnal 'Vozrozhdeniye' i russkaya filosofiya," *Vestnik Russkoy khristianskoy gumanitarnoy akademii*. 2017. Vol. 18. Issue 3, pp. 131-141; Goryacheva Yu.Yu. "'Novy zhurnal' (SShA) – vedushchy literaturno-istorichesky zhurnal russkogo zarubezhya," *Etnodialogi*. 2014. No. 1 (45), pp. 51-56; Denisenko A.V. *Zhurnal "Sintaksis" v kontekste zhurnalistiki russkogo zarubezhya*. Moscow: RUDN,

2013; Zakeyev A. M. "Vospriyatiye Nitsshe v filosofii russkogo zarubez'ya (na primere zhurnala "Sovremennyye zapiski")," *Vestnik Baltiyskogo federalnogo universiteta im. I. Kanta. Seriya: Gumanitarnyye i obshchestvennyye nauki*. 2014. No. 6, pp. 29-35.

³ *Katalog russkoyazychnykh radiostantsiy mira*. Publication supported by the Federal Agency on Press and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation. Moscow, 2010.

⁴ See, e.g., Alov, Gennady; Viktorov, Vasily. *Radioagressiya. Svidetelstva, fakty, dokumenty: Psikhologicheskaya voyna*. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1985; Kashlev Yu.B. *Ideologicheskaya borba ili psikhologicheskaya voyna?* Moscow: Politizdat, 1985; Panarin, Igor. *Pervaya mirovaya informatsionnaya voyna. Razval SSSR*. St. Petersburg: Piter, 2010; Panfilov A. *Radio SShA v psikhologicheskoy voyne*. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1967; Pocheptsov G.G. *Informatsionno-psikhologicheskaya voyna*. Moscow: Sinteg, 2000; Trofimchuk N.A. *Klerikalnaya radiopropaganda – orudiye "psikhologicheskoy voyny."* Moscow: Znaniye, 1988.

⁵ See, e.g.: *Radioveshchaniye na russkom yazyke*. Issue 7. Autumn 2003-Spring 2004 / compiled by Alexander Berezkin, Konstantin Gusev, Alexander Demytyev, and Igor Yaremenko. Moscow, 2003.

⁶ See, e.g.: Zykov N.A. "'Golos Ameriki' v novom tysyacheletii: razvitiye kommunikativnoy strategii," *Mediascope*. 2012. Issue No. 3, p. 5; Kolchina A.S. "Mesto i rol zapadnykh radiostantsiy v informatsionnom prostranstve SSR i novoy Rossii (na primere radiostantsiy 'Golos Ameriki,' BBC i 'Radio Svoboda')," *Mediascope*. 2016. Issue No. 4, p. 28; Saakov R.R. "Transformatsiya veshchaniya russkoy sluzhby BBC – perekhod k multimediynosti," *Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya 10. Zhurnalistika*. 2009. No. 4, pp. 96-98; Temirov M.S. "Konvergentsiya mediaplatform v amerikanskom inoveshchani: metodologiya i tendentsii," *Vestnik Voronezhskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Seriya: Filologiya. Zhurnalistika*. 2012. No. 2, pp. 216-222.

⁷ See, e.g.: Ivanitskaya Ye.V., Dmitriyev O.A. "Rossiyskoye inoveshchaniye segodnya: ot mezhdunarodnogo propagandy k alternativnomu informatsionnomu veshchaniyu," *MediaAlmanakh*. 2017. No. 1 (78), pp. 69-79; Sorokina V.S. "Problema effektivnosti rossiyskogo inoveshchaniya v Yevrope i SShA," *Kontsept: filosofiya, religiya, kultura*. 2017. No. 2 (2), pp. 127-136.

⁸ *Radioveshchaniye v Rossii v 2017 godu: sostoyaniye, tendentsii i perspektivy razvitiya*. Sectoral report. Moscow: Federal Agency on Press and Mass Communications, 2018, pp. 41-46.

⁹ *Frequency schedules of Russian-language broadcasting services*, March-October 2018 // Novosibirsk DXing Website // <http://www.novosibdx.info/schedules.html>, retrieved on September 30, 2018.

¹⁰ See, e.g.: Kolchina A.S. *Radio Svoboda kak literaturny proyekt: sotsiokulturny fenomen zarubezhnogo radioveshchaniya*. Moscow: Higher School of Economics Publishing House, 2016.

¹¹ *Radioveshchaniye v Rossii v 2017 godu: sostoyaniye, tendentsii i perspektivy razvitiya*. Sectoral report. Moscow: Federal Agency on Press and Mass Communications, 2018, p. 37.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

¹³ See: Nye, Joseph S. Jr. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books, 1990.

Key words: Russian-language broadcasting, foreign broadcasting, state stations, non-state stations.

Bringing the Spirit of Openness to the World

Li Hui

SOCIALISM with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era. This important political statement was made at the 19th CPC Congress. It holds great significance for advancing party and national affairs. The first year of implementation of the decisions of the 19th CPC Congress and 40 years of reform and opening-up in China make it clear that this policy will continue and bring the world even more opportunities.

At present, the global economic crisis has still not been fully overcome; hegemonism, unilateralism and trade protectionism are clearly manifest; and instability, uncertainty and volatility remain serious problems. Meanwhile, there is growing expectation in modern international relations of openness, inclusiveness, mutually advantageous cooperation, and advancement of a system of free and multilateral trade. May the whole world truly enjoy the fruits of economic globalization!

As a world economy, China will continue to keep pace with major global trends, act as a responsible power, and make a positive contribution to peace and stability throughout the world and to human prosperity and happiness.

Implementing reform and opening-up is the inevitable path of the “Chinese dream”

IN THE 1970S, the new scientific and technological revolution contributed to the rapid development of the world economy. At the same time, China's economic and scientific strength clearly lagged behind the international advanced level. Faced with major difficulties at home and tremendous outside pressure, the CPC convened the Third Plenum of the 11th CPC Central Committee, which adopted the important decision to pursue the policy of reform and opening-up, thus taking a decisive step

Li Hui, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People's Republic of China to the Russian Federation

that determined China's destiny. Since then, a new page has begun in the history of China's development.

The essence of reform and opening-up is liberalizing and developing social productive forces, enhancing comprehensive national strength, avoiding excessive ideological bias and creating

socialism with Chinese characteristics. From villages to cities, from experimentation to propagation, from the economic system to all aspects of public life – comprehensive reforms were firmly implemented. From coastal cities to territories along rivers and in border areas, from east to west, China decisively flung open the doors of opening-up to the outside world.

China's unprecedented large-scale reform and opening-up significantly mobilized hundreds of millions of Chinese, enabling the country to successfully make a great, historic shift from a highly centralized planned economic system to a dynamic socialist market economic system, from a semi-closed society to a society of complete openness, from a population that was guaranteed only food and clothing to a nation of affluence and prosperity.

Over the past 40 years, the Chinese people have acted in a spirit of complete unity and cohesion, persistently and courageously moving forward, sowing the seeds of enlightenment, and creating with their own hands a great epic poem of the development of the country and the nation. Today, we can rightfully say that revival of the country and the nation is necessary in the logic of historical progress and in keeping with modern development trends.

China had no ready experience of reform and opening-up it could follow. Several generations of Chinese leaders kept moving forward despite difficulties in search of innovation. In the first years of reform, a special economic zone and a household contract responsibility system were formed; publicly owned enterprises were reformed; the planned commodity economy was developed; the objectives of "one center and two basic points" and "science and technology is the primary productive force" were addressed.

During the reform period, a goal was set of reforming the socialist market economy system, and a strategy was proposed for science and education, for developing western China and for promoting China's

The life of the Chinese people has moved from scarcity to abundance, from poverty to prosperity.

accession to the WTO. During the period of the deepening of reforms, a goal was set to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects; the “nine state rules” helped develop the capital market; the great historical task was assigned of building a new socialist village; the strategy of boosting China’s central region was implemented; and Beijing hosted the 19th Summer Olympic Games and Shanghai hosted the World Expo.

During the period of the comprehensive deepening of reforms, President Xi Jinping proposed the One Belt, One Road initiative on the principle of joint consultation, joint construction and joint use. Twelve pilot free trade zones were established in Shanghai, Guangdong, Tianjin, Chongqing, Hainan, etc., and a new district, Xiong’an, appeared. A mechanism was launched for the interaction of the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges and the unification of the trading systems of the Hong Kong and Shenzhen stock exchanges. The Chinese RMB was formally included in the SDR basket. A G-20 summit was held in Hangzhou. The first high-level forum on international cooperation within the One Belt, One Road framework was held. And a BRICS summit took place in Xiamen and a SCO summit in Qingdao. Today, the Chinese people can proudly say that reform and opening-up is China’s strategic choice for development. China takes practical steps to promote economic globalization for the benefit of the people of all countries.

Over the past 40 years, China has undergone momentous changes: It has gone from a “backward country” in modernization to a “practical center” of modernization, from an “underdeveloped country” to the “most competitive developing economy,” from “providing clothing and food to people” to “building a moderately prosperous society” and the further “comprehensive building of a moderately prosperous society,” to the revival of the nation that is welcoming a bright future.

In 1978, China’s share of the world economy was only 1.8%, while in 2017, it had increased to 15.3%. China became the world’s second largest economy and the largest industrial country, the largest country in terms of trade in goods and amount of foreign currency reserves. GDP per capita increased from \$155 to the current level of \$8,800. China became a middle-income country. Over the past 40 years, China’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 9.5% at comparable prices. In dollar terms, China’s foreign trade increased by an average of 14.5% annually.

The life of the Chinese people has moved from scarcity to abundance, from poverty to prosperity. More than 700 million people who were poor according to current UN standards have successfully emerged from

poverty, amounting to a more than 70% reduction in the number of poor people in the world. 40 years ago, China did not have a single private company and no company on the list of the world's 500 largest companies. In 2017, 115 Chinese enterprises made that list. Several world-famous Chinese companies have emerged, such as Huawei, Alibaba, Haier, etc. In the 1970s and 1980s, people in China watched television on 14-inch black and white screens, used telephones with keypads and abacuses, and now almost every Chinese person has a mobile phone. High-speed rail, online shopping, mobile payments and bike-sharing have become China's "four new great inventions." The whole world is flabbergasted and surprised by the wisdom and speed of the country's development. Today, the Chinese people can say with full confidence that reform and opening-up as a second revolution in China not only profoundly changed China but also had a strong impact on the whole world.

Economic globalization is the main trend of the world economy

ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION as a result of the development of modern economics and technology to a certain extent is adapting to the demands of the continued development of productive forces; providing a powerful stimulus to world economic growth; and playing an important role in promoting the international division of labor, optimizing the economic structure, innovating the development model, promoting international relations, integrating international interests, and advancing human civilization and contact among the peoples of all countries. Even though difficulties have arisen in the process of development, in the historical perspective, it should be noted that economic globalization is an irreversible trend and objective fact of our day.

On the one hand, the countries and regions of the world are becoming more economically interrelated, and scientific and technological progress is by and large facilitating substantial economic integration that is favorable for forming a single global market. Global resources are being optimized to minimize costs and maximize profits. On the other hand, global rules governing economic activity and competition are being formed that are becoming the basis for establishing a system of global economic governance. This provides material and institutional conditions for developing economic globalization. Consequently, our world has become a global village where all countries closely coexist. Openness will lead to progress and isolation to backwardness.

Following the general trend of economic globalization, China is gradually becoming an indispensable hub in the cycle of positive global economic development. On the one hand, China receives large volumes of raw materials, energy resources, funds and technology, and on the other, it supplies huge amounts of high-quality products on the global market. At the same time, Chinese companies are constantly evolving in both directions. A firm foundation in manufacturing and strong domestic demand form a solid basis for rapidly optimizing the manufacturing structure in China and moving toward innovation. In 1990, China's share of world production stood at 2.7%: ninth place in the world. In 2010, the rate was 19.8%, already first place in the world. China's development has become an important growth engine of the world economy. China is currently the only country that has all industry types included in the UN classification system. China, as a country that is benefiting the most from globalization, is now using its ability and plans to provide assistance to globalization and the whole world.

Developing China's foreign trade is an important contribution to restoring the global economy and trade. According to WTO data, in 2017, China accounted for 10.2% of aggregate global imports and 12.8% of global exports and was the main trading partner of 130 countries. China still leads among developing countries in terms of attracting foreign investment and investing abroad. This makes China's development the most eye-catching success story of globalization. China's participation in economic globalization not only brings benefits to the more than 1.3 billion inhabitants of China, it also stimulates the prosperity, stability and sustainable development of the world economy.

With economic globalization come inevitable trade disputes. The causes of bilateral trade imbalances are very complicated. China and the U.S. are the two leading economies and powers with influence in the world today. Their trade relations not only carry great importance for the economic development of each country, but they also have a significant impact on global economic stability.

Chinese-U.S. trade and economic relations have always been tense and difficult. In recent years, following the rapid development of trade and economic relations, trends have emerged leading to the aggravation of the situation. Trade friction between China and the US has grown steadily since March 2018. Over time, the trade and economic conflicts between the parties began to deepen, widen and become murky. Their negative impact has become more obvious with each passing day, strik-

ing a powerful blow not only to the market economies as a whole and posing a serious threat to the economies of the two countries, but also hampering the recovery and growth of the world economy. The parties recognize that developing healthy and stable trade and economic relations is essential for both countries, and they are seeking through dialogue and consultation to resolve relevant trade and economic problems. The parties conducted consultations in May, June and August 2018.

On Dec. 1, Chinese Chairman Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump reached important agreements on bilateral trade and economic relations at a meeting during the G-20 summit. The parties agreed to stop raising tariffs and imposing other restrictions on trade, and commented that groups for addressing trade and economic issues of the two countries must hold consultations to develop agreements to facilitate the speedy normalization of trade and economic relations and implement the principle of mutual benefit.

The agreements reached by the leaders of the two countries are, of course, a breakthrough at the current stage, and bilateral relations could soon stabilize, which is in the interests of both China and the U.S., as well as the expectations of the whole world. Therefore, negotiations and consultations are the best way; trade wars only cause harm and provide no benefit. Only peaceful development and cooperation can implement the principle of mutual benefit and common gain.

China unswervingly advocates openness to the outside world

OVER THE PAST 40 YEARS, openness to the outside world has been a constant state policy of China. While interacting and integrating with the rest of the world, China still maintains the independence of its own cultural traditions and development path. The Chinese people take into account the conditions of their country. They look at the whole world, guided not only by the wisdom accumulated from an ancient and rich civilization, but also the practices they adopt from each Eastern and Western country, continually moving toward the world and integrating with it.

The process of China's opening up to the outside world has not always been smooth, but it has already come a long, tortuous and difficult way. Despite turbulence from drastic changes in regions of the world, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the U.S., as well as Asian and international financial crises, China fully upholds the crucial decision that "peace and development remain the main themes of modernity."

China consistently asserts an independent and self-sufficient foreign policy of peace, and always firmly adheres to the need to move along the path of reform and opening-up. Today, the combined might of China and its international status has significantly increased; its degree of openness to the outside world has moved to a new key stage. In the past, opening-up has focused on “borrowing,” but today’s China is more more focused on “moving outside the border.”

The country actively participates in managing the global economy and plays a role in jointly building an international platform for cooperation. Situated at a new historical starting point, China faces a convoluted international economic and political environment that requires it to broaden its historical vision, and maintain its determination and precision of action amid the “variability” and “continuity” of the external environment. We must steadily expand opening-up, implement its strategy more actively, continue to increase its volume and level, improve its structure and mechanisms, as well as boost high-quality development at an unprecedented level. China has a solid “path,” and theoretical, modal and cultural assertiveness to boldly take opening-up to a higher level.

In recent years, China has constantly proposed new measures to promote and accelerate openness to the outside world. Chinese President Xi Jinping in a report to the 19th CPC Congress commented that the Chinese doors of openness are not closing, but only opening more and more.

At the 2018 Boao Forum Conference, he commented that in 40 years, China has achieved economic development under conditions of openness, and the country’s continued economic development is impossible without even greater openness. In this regard, a series of important measures are envisaged such as significantly expanding market access, creating a more attractive investment climate, strengthening the protection of intellectual property, etc.

Last year, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang stressed at the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference that it is necessary to further expand and improve the level of openness; improve its formation, mechanism and mode; and promote qualitative development through high-level openness.

During the recent G-20 summit in Buenos Aires, Chinese President Xi Jinping underscored that the policy of reform and opening-up has brought China tremendous benefits, and the country will firmly and unswervingly follow this path. It is clear that China intends to steadily

deepen reform and opening-up. Because the Chinese people are constantly exploring their development path, rapidly achieving success, steadily keeping pace with the times, persistently and courageously pressing forward and continually embracing the whole world with a broad mind.

Reform and opening-up is a great process of the joint development and progress of China and the world. China's opening up to the world always leads to a deeper level of globalization with greater breadth and impact. While opening the national doors for creation, China, in its opening-up to the outside world, is showing the commitment, responsibility and spirit of a great power; is becoming the chief stabilizer and energy source for global economic growth; making a "Chinese contribution"; and offering a "Chinese project" of peaceful development of the whole world.

China firmly adheres to the concept of global governance based on the principle of joint discussion, joint construction and joint use; actively supports the UN and other international organizations as leading global platforms for economic governance; protects the status of the WTO as the main channel of global trade and investment liberalization; has been making efforts to improve the multilateral trading system; continuously deepens regional economic cooperation; and is quickly implementing the strategy of free trade zones, having become a key player, builder and supporter of global economic governance.

China has put forward and promotes an initiative for collectively building the One Belt, One Road. Along with the rest of the world, it is leveraging development possibilities and preparing a big and delicious cooperation "cake." Currently, more than 140 agreements have been signed with states and international organizations on cooperation within the framework of the One Belt, One Road initiative. Trade turnover between China and member countries of the economic development initiative has exceeded \$6 trillion. The amount of Chinese investment in countries within the zone of the One Belt, One Road initiative has come to more than \$80 billion. This investment has led to the creation of 24,000 jobs, and the amount of tax and other payments to local budgets has exceeded \$2 billion, which has boosted the economies of those countries and raised the living standard of their residents.

Based on the traditional philosophy of "harmony," China is working to build a human community with a common destiny, and a pure and beautiful world where there is lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity. This idea, which incorporates Chinese wisdom and the

aspirations of the entire world, has great inspirational force. It has been universally recognized by the international community, is reflected in many UN documents and has become the bright banner of China, leading humanity down the path of progress. China's policy of reform and opening-up meets the historical demands of the Chinese people for development, innovation and a wonderful life. Chinese innovations and development are in keeping with the spirit of the times: The peoples of the various countries of the world need development, cooperation and a peaceful life.

Peace is the main theme and development is a firm law. No country can respond on its own to the various challenges facing humanity in a complex and volatile world. The Chinese people will continuously together with the international community make a greater contribution to the development of humankind, persevere on the path of peace and development, actively develop global partnerships, adhere to multilateralism, energetically participate in promoting reform of global governance, create a new type of international relations, and encourage the creation of a human community with a common destiny.

Key words: Chinese socialism, openness to the outside world.

Russia and Iceland: Strengthening Ties in Keeping With Tradition (Toward the 75th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations)

A. Zaitsev

ON OCTOBER 4, 1943, at the height of World War II, our country was one of the first to recognize the independence of Iceland and establish diplomatic relations with it. It is noteworthy that this happened before the Republic of Iceland declared its independence.*

“Throughout these years, Russian-Icelandic relations developed steadily,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov wrote in his address to readers of a collection of documents entitled “SSSR/Rossiia-Islandiya: 1943-2008” [USSR/Russia-Iceland. 1943-2008], “They were driven by our peoples’ sincere interest in each other’s lives, mutual sympathy and the desire to strengthen multidimensional contacts. However, naturally, our ties are not limited to the last seven decades; they go way back in history.”¹

A Brief History

CONTACTS between Iceland and Russia were first mentioned in Icelandic sagas and they date back to the times of Vikings traveling in the ninth to 11th centuries on en route “from Varangians to Greeks.” There is evidence of Icelandic merchants’ presence in Rus [Old Russia] in the 10th and 11th centuries. Back in the 10th century, Torvald the Traveler, a

* On February 28, 1944, the Althing approved a resolution abolishing the Danish-Icelandic Act of Union of November 30, 1918. On March 8, 1944, it adopted the Constitution of the Republic of Iceland. On May 17, 1944, parliament passed a resolution stating that Iceland would not extend the treaty with Denmark that had expired in December 1943. Following the May 20-23 referendum on the abolition of the Union with Denmark, on June 17, 1944, the Republic of Iceland proclaimed its independence.

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character in Icelandic sagas, witnessed the baptism of Rus and built a church in Polotsk.

The development of ties between the ancient cultures of our peoples and their mutual enrichment was largely facilitated by the proximity of their destinies and the great similarity of Russian and Icelandic characters forged in the challenging struggle with harsh northern nature. Cultural ties not only often moved far beyond ties in other areas, but also fostered trade that was mostly linked to the sea and its resources, which was essential for the well-being of both peoples.

Russia's interest in Iceland and its culture has long been known. In the first half of the 19th century, an Icelandic grammar was published in Russia and first Icelandic sagas were translated into Russian. In 1870, the Russian corvette *Varyag* visited Iceland, with the Grand Duke, the future Emperor of Russia Alexander III on board. However, broader ties began to develop only in the early 20th century.

Little-Known Facts From the History of Diplomatic Relations With Iceland

THE ESTABLISHMENT and development of relations between our countries are amply reflected in Russian and Icelandic foreign policy archives (most of them published for the first time) in the collection of documents "USSR/Russia-Iceland: 1943-2008," compiled jointly by the two countries' foreign ministries.

After June 1926, relations between our countries were maintained through Denmark, which, under the Danish-Icelandic Act of Union of November 30, 1918, retained the functions of defending the island and conducting its foreign affairs. Agreements to that effect were formalized on June 22-24, 1926 with the exchange of notes. In a note dated June 22, 1926, Danish Chargé d'Affaires ad interim in the USSR E. Thorp Pedersen announced the de jure recognition of the USSR by the Royal Government of Iceland. In response to that, in a note of June 24, 1926, USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G.V. Chicherin "expressed the Union Government's deep satisfaction with the establishment of normal relations between the two countries."²

The establishment of direct diplomatic relations between our countries was formalized when Foreign Minister V. Thor sent a telegram announcing the Icelandic government's intention to appoint its envoy to the Soviet government in Moscow.³

The signing of the agreement between the two governments on the exchange of diplomatic representatives was preceded by efforts to sound out the Soviet government's position regarding the establishment of direct diplomatic ties with Iceland that began in 1942 with contacts in London between Iceland's envoy Petur Benedictsson and Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain I.M. Maisky.

On February 4, 1943, USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov sent Ambassador I.M. Maisky a telegram informing him that "the Soviet government does not object to the Icelandic government's proposal regarding the establishment of direct relations between the USSR and Iceland.... The Soviet government does not object to the establishment of a Soviet mission in Reykjavik, without waiting for the end of the war."⁴

Our country's enterprises and companies remain interested in expanding business ties and are optimistic that the protracted pause in bilateral cooperation with Iceland will come to an end in the near future.

On July 27, 1943, in a telegram to USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov, Icelandic Foreign Minister V. Thor confirmed that his country's government would be pleased to see the normalization of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Iceland.⁵

In response, referring to the talks that had taken place between the Soviet ambassador to London and the Icelandic envoy to London, in a telegram dated September 21, 1943, USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov informed the Icelandic foreign minister that "the Soviet Government is ready to exchange diplomatic representatives and appoint its envoy to the Government of Iceland in Reykjavik in the near future."⁶

On March 19, 1944, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary A.N. Krasilnikov presented his credentials to Regent of Iceland S. Björnsson (following Denmark's occupation by German troops, it was announced in Copenhagen that the king of Denmark would be unable to perform his duties as the Icelandic head of state and these functions were assigned to the regent) and then again, on August 11, to Björnsson as the president of Iceland. Iceland's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the USSR P. Benedictsson, who was

appointed on January 21, 1944, also presented his credentials in the Kremlin twice – the second time on August 2, 1944, from the president of Iceland.

On June 17, 1944, A.N. Krasilnikov attended the ceremony of the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Iceland.

In December 1955, on Iceland's initiative, the diplomatic missions in Moscow and Reykjavik were upgraded to embassies.

Reykjavik viewed the country's diplomatic recognition by the Soviet Union, an influential world power that had promptly responded to the newly independent republic's appeal, as significant and substantial support for the evolution of the Icelandic state.

In preparing for the declaration of independence, Iceland was extremely interested in enlisting international support for its future status, above all from three world powers – the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom, regarding them as guarantors of its national sovereignty.

In his letter with instructions to Iceland's envoy to Great Britain P. Benedictsson, dated November 23, 1943, Foreign Minister V. Thor stressed: After working for years in one direction, now it is very important – especially if the allies win the war – to prepare for closer international cooperation, including among the great powers – the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Russia.... It is essential to establish good relations with Soviet Russia, as well as with the other two great powers.⁷

As President S. Björnsson received credentials from A.N. Krasilnikov, he said that he viewed his appointment as a sign of friendship on the part of the Soviet Union. He added that he also still believed that friendly relations between the two countries would develop in the future and lead to productive cooperation between the two nations. He said he wished political, economic and cultural ties between Iceland and the Soviet Union would strengthen and bring lasting benefit and happiness to both countries.

On January 26, 1944, the *Djóðviljinn* daily commented: "This should be viewed as a very important step for Iceland's foreign policy, especially for its independence and self-determination. Envoys from the three mightiest powers that are fighting for democracy will be present in Iceland. Iceland's independence requires friendship with all the three powers. The Soviet Union – a great country that has withstood the toughest test of fire ever faced by humankind – has recognized our independence by establishing diplomatic relations with us and sending its envoy to us."

Economic considerations were also of vital importance for Iceland. The aforementioned letter by the Icelandic foreign minister, dated November 23, 1943, stressed that the war was nearing its end, and so Iceland desperately needed new markets for its products. In that context, many people were looking to Russia, in particular with regard to purchasing large shipments of salted herring. Iceland was also interested in buying lumber from the Soviet Union.

Traditional Friendly Relations

THE ESTABLISHMENT of direct diplomatic ties between the USSR and Iceland had a major impact on the subsequent development of traditional friendly relations.

A sound foundation for them was laid during the war years. Older Icelanders remember very well the allied Northern convoys formed in Iceland that delivered critical supplies to the ports of Arkhangelsk and Murmansk at the cost of many lives. Likewise, our people never forgot that sincere help and helped Iceland in kind.

In an interview with the editor-in-chief of the Icelandic newspaper *Morgunblaðið*, a participant of Northern convoys (as part of British crews) that delivered military supplies and food to Soviet Northern ports during the war, the author of this article learned some little-known details related to the preparation and organization of Arctic sea convoys from Iceland's fjords.

In one of them, namely Hvalfjörður (Whale fjord), an hour's drive from Reykjavik, there is still a semi-dilapidated pier. According to local residents, this fjord proved to be "bewitched" for Nazi aviation because of abnormal natural phenomena: Whenever warplanes approached, thick clouds would appear above it, preventing targeted bomb attacks. From this fjord the first Northern convoy of Allied troops was sent to Arkhangelsk in 1941. I also remember stories about the warm welcome that Arkhangelsk and Murmansk residents gave to convoy participants. A monument in honor of the seamen who died in Arctic convoys was erected at Reykjavik's central cemetery.

The ties between our countries especially strengthened in the 1950s, when, at the height of the second "cod war" (1958-1961), in response to Iceland's expansion of its economic zone to four miles and a ban on foreign vessels fishing in its fjords and bays, the United Kingdom imposed a trade embargo, the Soviet Union came to Iceland's aid, buying over

20% of Iceland's salted herring exports and a significant share of other fish products. At the same time, supplies of Soviet goods that the young republic desperately needed in those years, including crude oil and oil products, ferrous metals, machine engineering products, grain and wood, helped modernize Iceland's industry and agriculture.

The first postwar decades were marked by growth in bilateral trade: The Soviet Union accounted for 20% of Iceland's imports and 21.6% of its exports.

During the subsequent decades, the Soviet Union also had leading positions in Iceland's foreign trade turnover of Iceland. In 1979, Iceland exported to 40% of all salted herring and a significant share of other fish products to the USSR. In addition to trade, cultural, educational and scientific ties were given a new impetus.

The achievements made in previous decades laid a sound groundwork for the further development of our countries' relations in various fields.

The Declaration on the Basic Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Iceland, signed in December 1994, reaffirmed the countries' desire to "continue strengthening the solid foundation of friendship, equality, geographical proximity and their cultural and economic ties." In their relations, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Iceland "are guided by principles of peace and friendship based on good-neighborliness and sincerity."⁸

This provided a good foundation for the active development of political dialogue, including at the top level, and the expansion of the legal framework of bilateral ties.

In addition to traditional cooperation in fishing and fish processing, cooperation in transportation, culture, sports, and tourism has made headway. There are mutually beneficial prospects for joint efforts in areas such as renewable energy, information and communication technologies, the food industry, pharmaceuticals, and the transport sector.

However, since 2014, on Reykjavik's initiative, many dialogue channels have been frozen, parliamentary ties have been practically reduced to zero, and the level of contacts between the relevant agencies is very low. In recent years, the volume of Russian-Icelandic trade and economic cooperation has lagged behind the two countries' needs and resources (in 2011-2014, annual trade turnover exceeded \$200 million).

Nevertheless, Russia is not scaling down its cooperation with Iceland and remains open to cooperation on a partnership basis. It is important that despite the negative impact of EU sanctions, which Iceland has fully

joined, and Russia's food embargo in response to that, our country's enterprises and companies remain interested in expanding business ties and are optimistic that the protracted pause in bilateral cooperation will come to an end in the near future.

Further cooperation between Russia and Iceland is in the long-term interests of our peoples.

NOTES

¹ *SSSR/Rossiya-Islandiya. 1943-2008 gg. Sbornik dokumentov.* Izhevsk: KnigoGrad, 2013, p. 5.

² AVP RF. F. Za – Islandiya. D. 1. Sbornik deistvuyushchikh dogovorov. Vyp. V. M., 1930, pp. 12-13.

³ AVP RF. F. Za – Islandiya. D. 2.

⁴ FDG HA/ A/059/Jg/10/G/22/L/173 K/ 129

⁵ *SSSR/Rossiya-Islandiya...* p. 24.

⁶ AVP RF. F. Za – Islandiya. D. 2.

⁷ *SSSR/Rossiya-Islandiya*, p. 23.

⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 328-332.

Key words: Republic of Iceland, 75th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations, Russian and Icelandic archives.

Russia and Guinea: 60 Years of Diplomatic Relations

A. Bregadze

WHEN we talk about the 60 years' sovereignty of the Republic of Guinea (Guinea) in its present borders, we mean "French Guinea," which was a "separate" colony within the federation of French West Africa with its capital in Dakar (now the capital of Senegal) from 1895 to 1958.

As regards the history of the peoples living in today's Guinea, archaeological evidence shows that its territory has been inhabited since Neolithic times, according, for example, to the ethnic handbook *Afrika* (Africa, Moscow, Sovetskaya entsiklopediya, 1986, in Russian). Some territories of what Guinea is now were incorporated into early state entities known as Ghana and Mali, which were part of the Mali Empire from the mid-13th century to the end of the 15th century. The Mali Empire had its own constitution (the Kurukan Fuga Charter), which defined, among other things, the role of men and women in the Empire, the terms of land ownership, the rules of succession to the throne, the inheritance rights of ordinary people, and even the need to protect the environment. It is no accident that, according to the same encyclopedic dictionary, "the French colonial army met with stiff resistance from the native population (in this case, of Guinea), crushing it with extreme brutality" (the first French settlement in the territory of Guinea – a fort in the region of Boké – was founded in 1865-1866).

Thus, it would be more correct to say that October 2, 2018, was the 60th anniversary of Guinea's liberation from French colonial rule as Guinea declared itself a sovereign state, the Republic of Guinea. In our interdependent, globalized world, the term "independence," especially when applied to a former colony in the late 1950s, is a relative concept.

But talk of the possibility of granting "independence" to the French

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colonies started much earlier, notably with the well-known historical phrase of General Charles de Gaulle: “There can be no progress unless people benefit from it morally and materially on their native soil; unless they gradually rise to a level where they are able to participate, in their own country, in running their own affairs.” This phrase is part of his famous speech at the opening of the Brazzaville Conference organized during World War II by the French Committee of National Liberation to define the role and future of the French colonial empire and held from January 30 to February 8, 1944.

Let us recall that occupied France in 1944 also had problems with its national sovereignty, to say the least. That is why it was not for nothing that de Gaulle initiated the Brazzaville Conference, whose main idea was as follows: let

us join our efforts (including with representatives of the colonies) to liberate France, whereupon the colonies will be granted independence. In other words, de Gaulle invited the French colonies to make a deal based on political considerations for the sake of his own political goal, for the sake of a Free France.

At that time, such a step on the part of de Gaulle required courage, because his own position was very insecure, to put it mildly: by a special decree of December 8, 1940, de Gaulle, then a deputy of the French minister of war, had been stripped of his French citizenship and sentenced to death by the Vichy regime for rejecting Marshal Pétain’s proposal to sign an armistice with Nazi Germany and for urging the French people to resist in his BBC broadcast from London on July 18, 1940.

It is an incredible historical paradox that de Gaulle, the founder of the Fifth Republic and its president from January 8, 1959 to April 28, 1969, a man stripped of his French citizenship and sentenced to death, was the embodiment of legitimate France, seen by many as “The Greatest Frenchman of All Time.”

But the very same man, Charles de Gaulle, was “for some reason” clearly annoyed at the results of the referendum in Guinea on September 28, 1958, when 95.4% of the local population voted for independence instead of accepting de Gaulle’s offer to join the new French Community. He was particularly outraged by the statement of the then Guinean leader,

Sixty years is quite a short time in the history of the Guinean and Russian peoples, but much has been done during this period.

Ahmed Sékou Touré, that Guineans preferred freedom in poverty to opulence in slavery.

De Gaulle was so upset that he left Conakry in a hurry, forgetting his famous cap in the process. The Guineans kindly forwarded the cap to him in Dakar without delay. After that, the French left Guinea just as hurriedly as their idol.

“Guinexit” was quick and decisive, and no electoral college, even if there had been one in Guinea, could have overruled the will of “rank-and-file voters,” that is, ordinary Guineans.

Thus, it was the Guineans themselves who chose their own destiny on September 28, 1958. Independence was never “granted” to them. They voted for it quite democratically, and their Territorial Assembly (proto-parliament), later transformed into the National Assembly (by analogy with France), approved the choice of the Guinean people, as formulated in the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Guinea: “By its vote of September 28, 1958, the people of Guinea opted for freedom and, on October 2, 1958, declared a sovereign state: the Republic of Guinea.” Its first president was Ahmed Sékou Touré, whom many Guineans regard as a kind of Guinean Che Guevara. Clearly, the events of October 2, 1958, removed a very important stone from the foundation of the French colonial system, so that the whole building of French and then of global colonialism began to sag.

Following France’s abrupt withdrawal from Guinea, the new republic was gradually recognized by other countries, primarily those of the socialist community. The Soviet Union was among the first to do this, recognizing the Republic of Guinea on October 4, 1958, only two days after it had declared itself a sovereign state.

On October 4, 2018, the Russian Embassy in Conakry held a reception to mark the 60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Russian Federation as the successor to the USSR and the Republic of Guinea. It was attended by a very representative government delegation and by Djene Kaba Condé, the wife of President Alpha Condé. There are plans to hold various events to celebrate this occasion, as well as to create a Square of the 60th Anniversary of Russian-Guinean Friendship.

Sixty years is quite a short time in the history of the Guinean and Russian peoples, but much has been done during this period. From 1958 to the beginning of the 1980s, the Republic of Guinea, strongly influenced by the USSR and other socialist countries, tried to implement new

principles in its economy and social sphere, including principles based on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and a one-party system, in which party and government structures were merged into single organs of power that performed both political and administrative functions. The highly contradictory experience of Guinea's socialist development actually ended with the death of President Sékou Touré in a U.S. hospital (a revealing fact) in 1984.

The Military Committee for National Recovery, that was set up following a coup on April 3, 1984, was headed by Colonel Lansana Conté, whose agenda was to encourage private enterprise and attract foreign capital to the country. Subsequently promoted to the rank of general, Conté was elected president in 1993, 1998, and 2003 (the third time as a result of a 2001 referendum that allowed him to run for a third five-year presidential term, although the country's Constitution limits the president's tenure to two five-year mandates). The opposition did not recognize Conté's third mandate; the situation in the country, including the economy, worsened sharply; and general strikes held in 2006 and 2007 unfortunately led to loss of lives. Lansana Conté died in December 2008.

After his death, the military once again came to power. They were led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, whose methods of government raised a storm of protest among the local population. In September 2009, the military opened fire on a mass rally, killing hundreds of people. The investigation into this crime is still in progress. Camara's successor, Sékouba Konate, was able to ensure a peaceful transition to civilian rule. In December 2010, Professor Alpha Condé, a "staunch pan-Africanist" and an "eternal opposition leader," assumed office after winning a run-off presidential election in November. In 2015, he was re-elected for a second term as president of Guinea, this time winning an outright majority in the first round of voting.

It took Alpha Condé a long time to rise to power in Guinea. He even served a jail sentence under President Lansana Conté. His political career is somewhat like those of Sékou Touré and Mandela.

Alpha Condé runs Guinea quite successfully. Today, there is hardly a country in the world whose companies are not present in the Guinean market. Diversification of Guinea's economic ties with the outside world is Condé's "forte." Bauxites and gold are the main export items. It is only natural that the leading Russian investors in the Guinean economy are United Company RUSAL (aluminum) and Nordgold Management (gold).

I would particularly like to mention President Condé's efforts in the

electrification of Guinea and eventually of its neighboring countries. In particular, the construction of the Kaleta hydroelectric power station (240 MW) was completed in September 2015, and two other hydropower plants – Souapiti (450 MW) and Amaria (300 MW) – are currently under construction. This mega project is being implemented with active Chinese assistance.

The Guinean economy is doing quite well: in 2018, it grew by 5.8% with inflation at 8% (6.8% in 2016, and 6.9% in 2017). In the World Bank's Doing Business report for 2018, Guinea is ranked 153rd (out of 190 economies) with the prospect of rising to 152nd place in 2019. International financial institutions annually reaffirm their confidence in the Guinean government and president by extending massive new loans to Guinea (an important criterion).

Unfortunately, the Russian presence in Guinea fell sharply at the beginning of the 1990s, after the breakup of the USSR. Starting from 2000, with the arrival of UC RUSAL and then of Nordgold Management, relations between Russia and Guinea were gradually restored (though not without problems), including in traditional areas such as training of national personnel, military-technical cooperation, and healthcare.

The latter is largely associated with the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak in Guinea, when UC RUSAL built a special stationary hospital in the city of Kindia to fight the epidemic, establishing a Russian-Guinean research center on its basis with the assistance of the Russian Ministry of Healthcare and Rospotrebnadzor. Research conducted at this center has recently made it possible to develop a new, powdered form of Ebola vaccine that can be stored at -5°C, which is invaluable for Africa.

President Alpha Condé has already made two visits to Russia. The first was a working visit in June 2016 in his capacity as co-chairman of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, and the second was an official visit in September 2017 as president of Guinea and the then chairman of the African Union.

The development of Russian-Guinean relations is clear evidence of Russian interest in Africa and African interest in Russia. It is therefore quite logical that a Russia-Africa summit is planned to take place in our country in 2019. Africans remember very well the Soviet Union's decisive role in their liberation from colonial dependence. It is only natural that today many of our African partners, like those in Guinea, view Russia primarily as a strategic political partner, which does not prevent us from becoming a reliable economic partner for Africans as well, especially

where a solid groundwork for this was laid back in Soviet times. Guinea is a case in point.

Owing to the policy of the USSR, a strong Russian-speaking diaspora still exists in Guinea. Many Guinean graduates of our colleges and universities hold senior positions in the Guinean government and in other public institutions. They seek to pass the baton of respect for the USSR and Russia to their children and grandchildren. In this context, it is essentially important to resume the work of the Russian Center of Science and Culture in Conakry, as our Guinean partners, primarily graduates of Soviet and Russian higher education institutions, have long requested.

Numerous facilities designed by Soviet architects testify to the former massive presence of the Soviet Union in Guinea. This includes a radio center (1961); a sports complex with a central stadium and one of the buildings of the Polytechnic Institute with a mosaic façade (1964); the six-story building of Hotel Camayenne (1965); the medical faculty of the Polytechnic Institute (1969); and the Oceanographic Center (1981). The Soviets built many roads, whose quality is still an object of admiration for local people. These facilities are very symbolic, because they reflect the wide range of previous cooperation between our two countries, which is gradually being restored.

On the 60th anniversary of the Republic of Guinea, there was a traditional exchange of congratulatory messages between the foreign ministers of Russia and Guinea, Sergey Lavrov and Mamadi Touré. In these synchronized messages, both ministers independently noted that relations between Russia and Guinea could serve as an example of mutually beneficial cooperation based on long-standing traditions of friendship.

In a congratulatory message to President Alpha Condé, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized that further development of the two-way dialogue and constructive cooperation in different areas is in the interest of the peoples of our countries and serves to strengthen peace and stability on the African continent.

In the context of the 60th anniversary, many Guinean graduates of Soviet colleges and universities have published their reminiscences. These contain many specific, subjective, and contentious comments. A pamphlet by Alama Kandé about Guinean students in the USSR (*Étudiants Guinéens en URSS: Souvenirs et témoignages*, L'Harmattan, Guinea, in French) attracted my particular attention. The author concludes his very interesting work by asking this question: did we return from the USSR as communists or, on the contrary, as advocates of capitalism? The

question is left unanswered. However, Alama Kandé is confident that the young men and women who returned from the USSR have become patriots of Guinea and that this feeling is what gives them strength to continue working for the benefit of their country. This is an excellent result and an impressive conclusion. The effort was not in vain. And so it shall be!

Key words: Russia, Guinea, diplomatic relations.

Consular Services of Russia in the Second Quarter of the 19th Century

O. Lebedeva

IN THE SECOND QUARTER of the 19th century, there was still no agreement among political and diplomatic circles on consular services and functions. Some of its members insisted that consulates should remain commercial organizations that looked after the interests of the citizens rather than the state. Their opponents preferred to see them as political and diplomatic units designed to serve the state interests and the private interests of citizens.¹

The latter was much more accepted in the Russian Empire. Franz Borel, prominent diplomat, summarized and organized all available information about consular services in his book *O proiskhozhdenii i funktsiyakh konsulov* (On the Origins and Functions of Consuls) published in 1801. He proceeded from the idea that the political and economic functions of consulates should be united: trade abroad was inefficient without state support.²

The political-diplomatic principle was rooted in the past. It was Peter I who had set up the institute of consuls to support Russia's trade interests.³ Russian consuls, especially those stationed in the East, never separated politics from economy.

At that time, any country had the right to station its consuls in any country while rejection of the host country to accept was interpreted as an insult. Certain locations, that should have been agreed upon well in advance, were the only exception.

Russia was actively using this right: by 1825, it had 61 consulates of different levels (25 of them consulates general) in different countries. During the next quarter-century, Russia doubled its number: in 1854, it had only 18 consulates general, while the total number of consulates was

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increased, due to economic considerations, to 129.⁴ This was not the biggest number – in 1833, the U.S. had 152 consuls scattered across the world.⁵

Russia followed the world standards of organization of consular services based on the territorial principle: each of the consular districts (either a whole country or its part) had a consul or a consul-general appointed to the most important places, vice-consuls served in the biggest trade centers or ports inside consular districts. In Turkey, for example, there were five consuls-general serving at one and the same time.

If needed, consular districts might be extended to important points outside their initial borders: the consulate in Marseilles, for example, was asked to extend its services to the ports in Algeria where Russian merchants needed assistance. In spring 1842, consul A. Ebeling included the French Mediterranean ports into the sphere of his responsibilities.⁶

In the mid-18th century, consulates had been functioning under the Collegium of Foreign Affairs. Between 1809 and 1812, they functioned under the newly set Expeditionary of Consular Affairs; later, they became part of the Department of External Relations that closely cooperated with the Department of External Trade at the Finance Ministry. The consuls, however, were regarded, first and foremost, as diplomats.⁷

In Europe, consular services were transferred to foreign ministries much later. In France, for example, this happened in 1793 while the consular officials were treated as naval officers for several decades longer. Until the 1840s, Great Britain remained undecided whether its consuls were diplomats in the first place or functionaries of the ministry of trade.⁸

Russian diplomats stationed by the Foreign Ministry supervised the Russian consulates functioning in the same country. There were certain exceptions from the rule: in 1835-1856, the Russian consulates in Spain were supervised by the Russian embassy in France for the simple reason that Russia had no embassy there.⁹ Sometimes, consuls were instructed to cooperate with the ministries of war and of the navy.

The status of consulates was usually re-adjusted to fit the context. For example, between 1813 and 1842, the vice-consulate on the Ionic Islands was transformed into a consulate general to adjust the status of its officials to that of their colleagues from other countries.¹⁰ In 1845, the status of the consulates in Marseilles, Le Havre and Rouen was likewise upgraded to deal with the increased volume of international trade and the number of Russian ships that entered these ports. Emperor Nicholas I eagerly accepted all suggestions.¹¹

The candidates to the post of a consul were invariably discussed with the Foreign Ministry and approved by the emperor; their new posts were confirmed by patents. For example, in 1835, when A. Ebeling was discussed as a candidate to the consular post in Marseilles, he was recommended by the Russian Ambassador in France Karl Pozzo di Borgo as a person who would be useful for Russia as a consul.¹²

Not infrequently retired military and bureaucrats in strained circumstances sought consular posts yet few of them succeeded. For example, Lieutenant M. Savinich begged the post in any country up to America¹³ while Captain Kh. Reutern was seeking a post in Germany.¹⁴ Such requests, even those supported by prominent politicians, were often rejected.

Consular posts went to civil servants; consuls-general had assistants, the practice unique in European diplomacy. In fact, assistants were mainly used in Oriental countries; in Europe, Russian consuls coped with their duties on their own. Consul Gerasim Vashchenko stationed in Sliven (the Ottoman Empire) with a perfect command of Turkish was one of the few exceptions.¹⁵

Consular posts corresponded to the fixed ranks in the Table of Ranks. The Rules of 1834 assigned the 6th rank of the Table of Ranks to consuls-general and the 8th and 9th ranks, to vice-consuls.¹⁶ Later, the 5th rank was established for Moldavia and Wallachia.¹⁷ In some cases, consular secretaries who coped with a huge amount of papers could aspire to be raised to the 9th and 10th ranks depending on the circumstances.¹⁸

Salaries depended on the rank and place of service: the consuls stationed in Asian countries earned more than their colleagues stationed in Europe. The consuls-general in Asian countries earned, on average, 2,625 rubles a year against 2,365 rubles paid to consuls-general in European countries (the highest salary level could be two or three times greater than the lowest).

Consuls in Asia and Europe were paid on average 1,515 and 1,230 rubles respectively (likewise, their salaries could be much higher or much lower). Vice-consuls usually were not paid at all; only three of them got 1200 rubles a year. Salaries of consular officials were also different –

Russia was the first of the European countries to annul the principle of extraterritoriality, so that its citizens could build equal relations with the local people.

from 600 to one thousand rubles a year; in some cases, house rent was added to the salary.

On the whole, the salaries of Russian officials were lower than those of their European colleagues even if they spent more or less the same amount of money and sometimes fell into big debts not infrequently paid by the state. For example, consul Konstantin Bazili in Beirut lived in a sumptuous flat which, in his opinion, demonstrated luxury Russian style although it was far beyond his income.¹⁹

It should be said in all justice that consuls of other countries, likewise, felt the pinch. In France, the problem was resolved as late as 1833; American consuls, who until 1856 had no salaries, lived on shares from trade duties and were not alien to abuses. There were three consular ranks: those who had the top rank received regular salaries yet could not be involved in trade deals; the second and third ranks could conduct trade activities; officials of the second rank got minimal salaries while officials of the third rank had no salaries at all.²⁰

The practice of hiring non-staff consuls with no salaries selected from local tradesmen was accepted in Russia. Their services were rewarded with the right to collect consular duties and certain other trade privileges. In the 1830s, in Gallipoli, there was someone who served a non-staff consul of three countries which brought him good money; he planned to transfer his business to his children while remaining a non-staff consul of only one country.²¹

The post gave economic advantages and raised the status of non-staff consuls among their trade partners. In some cases, consuls could ask for state or material award for non-staff consuls. For example, F.A. von Brin, Russian consul-general in Sweden, asked for a state order for the non-staff consul who served in the Swedish capital to reward him for many years of impeccable service.²²

In fact, not infrequently, non-staff consuls represented several countries. In the mid-19th century, a certain Bulgarian represented in Giurgiu five states and during official ceremonies, in full conformity with the rules, reappeared five times. Despite this, he traded in all sorts of goods and set his own prices.²³

This was also practiced in Russia. I. Semme, a vice-consul in Stavanger (Norway), sought an analogous position from the Netherlands; his request was supported by his superior A. Mekhelin, consul of the Russian Empire in Norway.²⁴ He got the post. The Russian consul stationed in Turkish Trabzon also represented Sardinia. This was allowed

even to official consuls: F. Borel who served in Portugal represented the Russian and Austrian interests.²⁵

Non-staff consuls in ports were to be approved by the Foreign Ministry; all candidates were requested to present recommendations. I. Rian was appointed vice-consul without salary in Barcelona on the strength of his recommendation as a moral and politically respected person.²⁶ Non-staff consuls were few and far between: this practice was mostly applied to vice-consuls with the powers limited by the locality or the city in which they served.

In France, the post of the consul might be entrusted to local people, preferably merchants; in Great Britain, until 1825, consular positions were reserved for representatives of the titular nation; foreigners could aspire to the posts of vice-consuls and incomes in the form of a share of trade duties.²⁷

The institute of non-staff consuls had certain advantages: they knew a lot about the current state of affairs and local traditions; they were paid no salaries, something that Russia with serious financial problems at the time found quite attractive. On the other hand, these people, who knew next to nothing about diplomacy and paid more attention to trade than to anything else, could not properly perform their consular duties. This was especially obvious in the Eastern countries where number of duties was much higher.

In these conditions, merchants had the right to complain about consuls to the Foreign Ministry. If their complaints were accepted as true, the consul in question could be recalled. This happened in 1829 when a commission investigated the accusations of incompetence against consul M. Filli.²⁸

There were consulates in big ports in which Russia had trade interests. Normally, the Foreign and Finance Ministries initiated creation of new consulates, sometimes initiatives came from other sources. In any case, to be realized they should have been supported by weighty arguments.

For example, in 1829, the idea of establishing a Russian consulate in Rouen, an important French port actively used by Russian merchants who traded in French fabrics and wines of Champagne, was brought up and supported – the port had a customs office, courts of justice and manufactories – on a condition that another consulate would be closed to avoid overspending of budget money.²⁹

The new consulate was united with the consulate in Le Havre as the

center of a new consular district. The decision was prompted by the ports' geographic proximity.³⁰ The planned to open the new consulate in 1830 but due to political reasons it was opened three years later with Karl Stoffregen as consul.

To be realized, the initiatives formulated outside the ministries should be supported by heads of diplomatic missions who were expected to supply relevant information. For example, in 1836-1838, it was discussed whether Russia needed several new consulates in Persia and the neighboring regions of Turkey. I. Simovich, who represented the Foreign Ministry of Russia in Turkey, insisted that they were very much needed yet pointed out that Great Britain would vehemently oppose them. This opinion was supported by other officials who agreed that the project was politically inexpedient³¹; it was never realized.³²

On many occasions, consulates served political purposes. For example, Russian consulates in Turkey set up in Adrianople and Sliven in the wake of the war of 1828-1829 were expected to support the region's Bulgarian population.³³

In 1831, Ivan Paskevich, Viceroy of the Caucasus, favored a consulate in Erzurum, an important trade center and the crossroads of the trade routes of Transcaucasia; it was expected to give Russia better chances to represent its interests than it could do from Constantinople. He was also convinced that an official representative would be able to closely observe military preparations if Turkey decided to attack Russia; the same fully applied to illegal supplies to the Caucasian mountaineers.³⁴

Consulates in the East were usually deeply involved in politics; the Orientals were not quite reliable in their agreements with the "infidels" especially at the local level which meant that the consuls were expected to inform promptly about any possible violations.

For example, in 1838, it was discovered that in Sinop Russian prisoners of war were sold into slavery; in a special letter to the Foreign Ministry, it was advised to open there a consulate since the consulate in Trabzon belonged to a different consular district and therefore was unable to interfere.³⁵

Apollinary Butenev, Russian Envoy in Constantinople, informed the ministry about the countermeasures taken and recommended that Russia should open its representation in the above region. As he pointed out, it was practically impossible to discontinue slave trade even if the Porte repeatedly confirmed its intention to do this.³⁶

Russian diplomats eventually forced Hussain Bey, the local musse-

lim,³⁷ out of office; a full-scale vice-consulate was set up in Sinop next summer; B. Mikeli from Toscana filled two vice-consular posts. He was expected to oppose slave trade and disrupt communication between the Caucasian mountaineers and Turks. Despite his non-staff status, the Italian was on Russia's payroll.³⁸

The status of the Russian consuls in the Ottoman Empire was emphasized by their uniform (the same worn by the diplomats of the Foreign Ministry of Russia) which is explained by the diplomatic status of consuls and their assistants.³⁹

Sometimes, merchants also asked the state to open consulates. Late in 1838, for example, the Russian-American Company asked St. Petersburg to open a vice-consulate in Valparaiso (Chile), the main port through which Novo-Arkhangelsk (Alaska) was supplied with grain and other goods. British merchant G. Lyon highly respected by the local merchant community was selected as the best vice-consul candidate. Russia agreed yet the fact that St. Petersburg, following the decisions of the Vienna Congress of 1815, had not recognized Chile as an independent state created certain problems.⁴⁰

In the fall of 1847, an idea of a consulate on Hawaii⁴¹ was raised yet the series of revolutions in Europe detracted the attention of the Foreign Ministry of Russia. The ministry got back to this idea ten years later. The idea was dropped since the ministry had no money while the Russian-American Company that wanted the consulate in the first place had no intention to pay for it.⁴²

Consuls were appointed by a standard procedure worldwide which envisaged a government patent that confirmed the status of the appointee and demanded acceptance by the host country.⁴³

Upon arrival, the consul received an *exequatur* and informed his government about this. The procedure was free with the exception of Spain, Brazil and Sardinia where duty should be paid. Sometimes, the receiving side deliberately dragged out the process to obtain political or other preferences. In 1827, the Russian consul in Brody (Austria) waited for half a year for his *exequatur*.⁴⁴

Real work began as soon as *exequatur* was received; the first year was invariably accompanied by detailed instructions of the Foreign and Finance Ministries. Russian consuls relied on the Consular Charter adopted in Russia in 1820 as the main guiding document that specified the rules of consular activities.⁴⁵ It survived practically unchanged till 1858 and in many respects was based on the similar French document slightly adapt-

ed to the Russian conditions.⁴⁶ It took into account consular experience⁴⁷ and recommendations of the Ministry of Finance.⁴⁸ It was a clear job description that specified the rules of office work, the basic tasks of the consular post, etc.

In the 1820s, Austria repeatedly asked the Russian Foreign Ministry for the permission to familiarize itself with the Consular Charter in order to compile on its basis its own guidelines for the newly set Austrian consulates in the East.⁴⁹

The Charter described the main purpose of consular work as protection of all interests of Russia within consular districts. In ports, consuls registered all ships carrying Russian flags; received reports from captains, extended all kinds of expertise and other necessary services. Consuls also helped Russian compatriots, issued marriage documents and acted as intermediaries in disagreements between compatriots. They were expected, with certain exceptions, to compile reports and other documents. Early in the 1840s, it was decided to regularly check the work of consulates-general to ensure that they fully performed what was expected from them under the Charter.⁵⁰

In fact, this depended on the diligence of consuls. F. Borel, for example, was known as an enthusiastic observer of all rules⁵¹; he was carried away by his inordinate interest in science (agriculture, mineralogy, etc.) and his ardent desire to use the knowledge to the use of Russia.⁵² This was far from common among the Russian consuls, not all of them could boast of similar enthusiasm.

Not infrequently their financial reports to the Ministry of Finance were few and far between which means that the ministry had to ask consuls-general for adequate information. This happened in 1839 when Consul-General of Russia Shteven was asked to help obtain information from the vice-consulate in Hammerfest in Norway. We do not know why the vice-consulate neglected its duties; we cannot exclude a possibility that the reports arrived on time, yet the ministry wanted more reports from the region.⁵³ Active trade activities in Northern Norway kindled a lot of interest in Russian officials.

The consul stationed in Tabriz was instructed to send his reports via the Foreign Ministry of Russia that had much better possibilities to organize reliable communication; information directly related to trade was immediately sent to the Department of Foreign Trade.⁵⁴ All consular reports from Persia were also sent to Paskevich who ruled in Georgia.⁵⁵

Despite the obvious domination of trade and economic issues, the

consuls were expected to fulfill certain political functions. In 1827, A.I. Gesler stationed in Cádiz (Spain) was instructed to closely watch the developments unfolding in the country against the background of the revolution and promptly inform the Russian envoy in Madrid about the situation in his district; he could rely on the lower consuls and was expected to cypher his messages.⁵⁶ This cost Russia 900 rubles of budget money; a third of it was paid as part of the salary while the rest was used to pay for the office work and postal services.⁵⁷

All consuls were expected to cooperate with the War Ministry: they gathered information about military units and warships and the dates they set out, about building or modernization of fortifications, etc.⁵⁸ In short, they worked as full-fledged intelligence operatives.

Under international law, all consuls enjoyed certain privileges; they were free and immune as long as they performed their functions; when involved in local affairs, they followed the local laws. Their houses were immune to billeting; all documents and objects were likewise immune as the property of the state which the consul represented.⁵⁹

The Russian consuls stationed in the East had more or less similar privileges with certain legal rules applied to the subjects of the Russian Empire. In an absence of an agreed document related to their duties and functions, the consuls stationed in the East were mainly guided by recommendations and instructions issued by the Foreign Ministry and other ministries. Many of these documents with no official status of any kind survived for over a decade. It is noteworthy that everything entered into consular books in the Ottoman Empire was written in Italian; there were no similar limitations in Persia where Russian was used.

The European and Asian consular services differed a lot where their functioning and organization were concerned, and they deserve closer scrutiny. In the East, the consular rights stemmed from capitulation agreements which presupposed that all European citizens living in Eastern states obeyed the laws of their countries and were suable by the consuls-general of their countries. Capitulation agreements made the consuls diplomatic representatives; this meant that in Asia a consul was a much more influential figure than in Europe and the United States.

There is an opinion that the capitulations were intended to subordinate the Porte; in trade, however, this was an objective approach. In the 16th century (when capitulations appeared), Turkey, that wanted and needed external trade, could not protect all foreigners across its territory. As a result, it built up a system in which the “infidels” could not be

judged on the basis of the Sharia to avoid denigration of this Islamic canonical law.⁶⁰ It was the duty of the sultan to issue capitulations; they needed confirmation when a new sultan ascended the throne. Violations, however, were frequent which forced European authorities to go straight to the sultan for justice.

In the course of time, capitulations developed into an agreement that gave Europeans certain advantages inaccessible for local merchants: they were allowed to operate outside their initial territories; they could choose currency and enjoy the minimal export and import duties of 5% and 3% respectively; they were exempt from certain taxes, etc.⁶¹ No wonder Europeans figured prominently in Turkish economy and trade.

Under capitulation agreements, foreigners could hire local dragomans (interpreters) who acquired all relevant privileges. It should be said that Europeans preferred non-Muslims, that is, local Greeks or Jews, to the Arabs. In 1848, however, consul K. Basili stationed in Beirut had an Arab among his dragomans (for him the oath of allegiance was translated into Arabic).⁶²

Not infrequently, consuls abused capitulations: they hired subjects of Eastern countries and rewarded them with money to give them the privileges enjoyed by Europeans. In this way, they acquired hundreds of assistants. According to unofficial information, up to 10% of the non-Muslim population of Constantinople and the biggest cities were protected by capitulations. Some of them were subjects of three or even five states and could select the most suitable of them if need be.⁶³

The Russian consuls, likewise, offered their protection; in the Ottoman Empire, they had the unique privilege of investigating claims of local merchants to Russian subjects without involving Constantinople which the local business circles appreciated.⁶⁴

The practice of capitulation agreements gradually developed and spread outside the borders of the Ottoman Empire. By the mid-19th century, they became too inclusive and the rights extended to Europeans in Eastern countries too wide.⁶⁵ Europeans, likewise, felt constrained: Turkish authorities had no right to detain European citizens on consular territories and could not, therefore, transfer them to Europeans for investigation.⁶⁶ The consuls, on their side, refused to hand over Europeans detained on the territory of consulates to local authorities to avoid precedents.

The subjects of the Russian Empire used capitulations since 1774 when Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Kuchuk-

Kainarji. It allowed Russia to open its missions in any city of the Porte with the same rights as those used by European states. This somewhat contradicted the official policies of Constantinople that feared that Europe would spread its influence across the empire's vast territory.

Russia further consolidated its position in Turkey by the Treaty of Adrianople that demanded that local authorities should respect Russians.

It was the common practice in the Russian mission in Constantinople to appoint dragomans to all sorts of consular posts. In 1827, for example, A.A. Timoni, who worked in one of the departments of the mission in Constantinople, successfully coped with an impressive task of data gathering in Greece and was awarded with an order and a cash prize; the request to appoint him a consul in one of the Greek cities⁶⁷ was, however, declined.

A similar system of capitulations was used in Persia. The first trade agreement was signed in 1717 under which Russian consuls could be stationed in Persia despite the persistent efforts of Persian authorities to limit Russia's presence and influence in the country. The Russian consul appointed to Gilian in 1821⁶⁸ started functioning seven years later, after the war of 1826-1828. The same can be said about the Russian consuls in Resht, Zenzeli and other cities. The draft treaty of 1829 contained a section dealing with consulates in Persia and the opposition of local authorities.⁶⁹

The capitulation rights of Russians in Persia were finally confirmed by the Treaty of Turkmenchay of 1829 that specified the rights of the Russian subjects in Persia and the rights of other foreigners. The Persian courts of justice acquired the right to examine cases of Russians who violated the laws when dealing with Persians while the right of punishment belonged to the Russian administration. No other European country enjoyed similar privileges in Persia.⁷⁰

In 1851, Russia acquired the right to open consular missions in China; in 1858, the immunity of Russians was legally confirmed. Russia had no consuls in other Eastern countries; it tried and failed to consolidate its presence in Bukhara in 1821 and 1841.⁷¹

In Khiva, obviously hostile to Russia, the situation was the same.⁷² The first treaty signed in 1842 contained no mention of consulates.⁷³

On the whole, consuls in Eastern countries faced considerable risks. In 1845, for example, in Tabriz (Persia), Russian consul Alexander Ozerov acting on instructions from St. Petersburg arrested a certain Soleyman-khan of Sheka who had abandoned Russian service and

became a robber. Having heard the news of his arrest, local people crowded at the Russian mission to demand his liberation. The crisis was settled by the consul who demonstrated inordinate self-control and personally discussed the issue with the mujtahid* who had incited the crowd in the first place. Standing under the flag of Russia, Ozerov vowed that his country would punish those who interfered with the fulfilling by its subject of absolutely legal demands. This calmed the mob.⁷⁴

From time to time, consular missions were closed; sometimes, consular posts were liquidated while consuls were either promoted to higher posts or moved to another place of service. In 1833, for example, the consular post in Sliven (Turkey) was closed because it had completed its mission of protecting the local Bulgarians.⁷⁵ Local authorities, likewise, could liquidate missions by revoking their exequaturs for very serious reasons.

In 1832, the Russian consul in Alexandria had to leave Egypt to demonstrate that Russia was on the side of the Ottoman Empire in its armed conflict with Egypt.⁷⁶

In Russia, the existence of consular service was motivated by political and diplomatic reasons, and the consuls were expected to take the state interests into account. This explains why it was part of the Foreign Ministry of Russia.

The service was organized along the standards borrowed from the European tradition; the rank of the missions depended on the sum-total of political and economic reasons while the sizes of consular districts were never permanent because they changed together with the situation.

The institute of non-staff consuls was widely used; they were selected from those who knew more than the others about the specifics of local trading and had good contacts among the local merchants.

Consuls normally worked in big cities and big sea trading ports and harmonized economic demands with political expediency. Consular missions could be opened either on requests from diplomats or merchants.

Normally, civil servants approved by the Foreign Ministry and personally by the emperor could aspire to be appointed consuls-general and consuls. A consul could have several assistants depending on the volume of work. Vice-consuls and non-staff consuls were selected by consuls and approved by higher instances.

The consular service in Europe and America was carried out accord-

* In Shia Iran, head of the religious Muslims, an analogue of mufti of the Sunnis.

ing to the 1829 Charter that described the consul's duties and outlined his responsibilities. In the East, the consuls were instructed to provide legal assistance to compatriots. They were immune to the local laws and courts where the "infidels" were not popular. The consuls were expected to supply intelligence about military and naval forces.

They were, likewise, expected to regularly report to the Foreign and Finance Ministries about trade; the extent to which they fulfilled their duties depended on the diligence and the feeling of responsibility of each consul. It should be said that, on the whole, reports were more or less regular.

Russia was the first of the European countries to annul the principle of extraterritoriality, so that its citizens could build equal relations with the local people. Other countries did the same much later.

The list of duties of the Russian consuls was a long one; it included diplomacy, trade, judiciary and administrative functions. It was next to impossible to fulfill all these various duties at one and the same time which explains why Russian subjects frequently complained about the way the missions were functioning. Nevertheless, consuls actively helped Russian merchants to widen their trade with foreign states.

In general, consular service of the Russian Empire practically did not differ from the European norms including functional dualism, privileges and the right to open missions. At the same time, Russia was the first to appreciate the political potentials of consulates; this was an important step toward upgrading the prestige of consular service in interstate relations.

NOTES

¹ Komissarov B.N., Bozhkova S.G. *Pervy rossiysskiy poslannik v Brazilii F.F. Borel*. St. Petersburg, 2000, pp. 16-17.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

³ Ulyanitsky V.A. *Russkie konsulstva za granitsey v XVIII v.* Part 1. Section 2. Moscow, 1899, p. 120; Perventsev V.V. "Iz istorii konsul'skoy sluzhby Rossii XVIII v." *Voprosy istorii*. 1985. No. 8, p. 163.

⁴ *Ocherk istorii Ministerstva inostrannykh del 1802-1902*. St. Petersburg, 1902, pp. 97-98, 132.

⁵ Zallet R. *Diplomaticheskaya sluzhba. Ee istoriya i organizatsia vo Frantsii, Velikobritanii i Soedinennykh Shtatakh*. Moscow, 1956, p. 244.

⁶ Archives of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire (AVPRI). Record Group 161.IV-2. Inventory 148. 1842. File 27. P. 1-4, 6-8 reverse.

⁷ *Ibid.* Record Group 1. Inventory IV-2. 1809. File 1. P. 4 reverse.

⁸ Zalett R. *Op. cit.*, pp. 57, 69, 159.

⁹ Russian consulates in Spain functioned from 1841 to 1854 in Cádiz, Corunna and

- Tarragona. See: *Sbornik dokumentov "Rossiya i Ispania."* Vol. 2. Moscow, 1997, p. 327.
- ¹⁰ AVPRI. Record Group 161. St. Petersburg. Glavny arkhiv. IV-2. Inventory 119. 1830. File 25. P. 2a, 3 reverse.
- ¹¹ Ibid. Record Group 161.I-1. Inventory 781. 1845. File 277. P. 11-11 reverse.
- ¹² Ibid. 1835. File 266. P. 21-22.
- ¹³ Ibid. Record Group 161.IV-2. Inventory 148. 1845. File 12. P. 1-3.
- ¹⁴ Ibid. 1852. File 9. P. 1-10.
- ¹⁵ Ibid. Record Group 161.III-4. Inventory 100. 1833. File 2. P. 7-35 reverse.
- ¹⁶ State Historical Archives of Russia. Record Group 1149. Inventory 2. 1835. File 45a. P. 116-119.
- ¹⁷ Ibid. File 456. P. 157.
- ¹⁸ Ibid. P. 154, 155 reverse.
- ¹⁹ Blank V.B. *Vospominaniya Vasiliya Borisovicha Blanka // Russkiy arkhiv.* 1897. No. 10, p. 203.
- ²⁰ Zalett R. Op. cit., p. 245, 252.
- ²¹ Chaykovsky M. *Zapiski Mikhaila Chaykovskogo (Mehmed Sadyk-pashi) // Russkaya starina.* 1898. No. 5, pp. 433-434.
- ²² AVPRI. Record Group 161.I-1. Inventory 781. 1836. File 267. P. 59.
- ²³ Chaykovsky M. Op. cit. // *Russkaya starina.* 1898. No. 11, pp. 462-463.
- ²⁴ AVPRI. Record Group 161.IV-2. Inventory 148. 1855. File 21. P. 1-4.
- ²⁵ Komissarov B.N., Bozhkova S.G. Op. cit., pp. 71, 85. In 1817, Crown Prince Pedro, future emperor of Brazil Pedro I, married the daughter of Austrian emperor Franz I. F.F. Borel at the time served charge d'affaires of Russia in Portugal and consul-general in this country.
- ²⁶ AVPRI. Record Group 1. Inventory I-1. 1827. File 1. P. 105, 106-106 reverse.
- ²⁷ Zalett R. Op. cit., pp. 69, 158-159.
- ²⁸ Iz dnevnika P.G. Divova // *Russkaya starina.* 1898. No. 12, p. 619. In the 1828 and 1829, M.P. Filli is registered as a vice-consul with consul-general in Venice S.N. Narantsi.
- ²⁹ AVPRI. Record Group. 1. Inventory IV-5. 1829. File 8. P. 1-1 reverse.
- ³⁰ Ibid. P. 2-2 rev.
- ³¹ Ibid. Record Group 161.IV-2. Inventory 119. 1831. File. 4. P. 9-28.
- ³² Ibid. P. 34-35.
- ³³ Fonton F.P. *Vospominaniya. Yumoristicheskie i voennye pisma iz glavnoy kvartiry Dunayskoy armii v 1828 i 1829 gg.* Leiptzig, 1862. Vol. 2, p. 195.
- ³⁴ AVPRI Record Group 161.IV-2. Inventory 119. 1831. File 4. P. 1-2 reverse.
- ³⁵ Ibid. P. 38-39.
- ³⁶ Ibid. P. 41-42 reverse.
- ³⁷ Ibid. 1833-1862. File 6. P. 65-67.
- ³⁸ Ibid. P. 43-45.
- ³⁹ Ibid. Record Group 149. Inventory 502a. File 852. P. 11.
- ⁴⁰ Ibid. Record Group 161. IV-2. Inventory 148. 1839. File 6. P. 1-7.
- ⁴¹ Ibid. 1847 г. File 35. P. 2-3 reverse.
- ⁴² Ibid. P. 4-18 reverse.
- ⁴³ Naumov D.A. *Konsulskoe pravo Evropy i Ameriki.* Moscow, 1856, p. 57.
- ⁴⁴ AVPRI Record Group 1. Inventory IV-5. 1826. File 11. P. 1-2 reverse, 8-12, 15-17, 45-49.

- ⁴⁵ Ibid. Record Group 132. Inventory 724. File 111. P. 2.
- ⁴⁶ Ibid.
- ⁴⁷ Komissarov B.N., Bozhkova S.G. Op. cit., pp. 26-29.
- ⁴⁸ AVPRI. Record Group 159. Inventory 749/4. File 31. P. 56-57.
- ⁴⁹ Ibid. Record Group 161.IV-7. Inventory 126. 1818-1832. File 3. P. 296-298 reverse.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid. Record Group 161.IV-2. Inventory 148. 1842. File 26. P. 1-2.
- ⁵¹ Komissarov B.N., Bozhkova S.G. Op. cit., p. 48.
- ⁵² Ibid. P. 54.
- ⁵³ AVPRI. Record Group 161. IV-2. Inventory 148. 1839. File 28. P. 1-4 reverse.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid. Inventory 119. 1828-1830. File 10. P. 102-104.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid. P. 105-108 rev.
- ⁵⁶ *Vneshnyaya politika Rossii v XIX- nachale XX vv.* Vol. 7 (15). Moscow, 1985-1995, p. 84.
- ⁵⁷ AVPRI. Record Group 161.I-1. Inventory 781. 1832 r. File 2636. P. 42-42 reverse.
- ⁵⁸ Naumov D.A. Op. cit., pp. 72, 84.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid. P. 199, 202, 204-206, 208.
- ⁶⁰ Yastrzhembsky V.A. *O kapitulyatsiakh v Ottomanskoj imperii.* Kharkov, 1905, p. 69.
- ⁶¹ *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya na Balkanakh. 1815-1830.* Moscow, 1983, p. 14.
- ⁶² AVPRI. Record Group 180. Inventory 517/1. File 741. P. 1-1 reverse.
- ⁶³ Sheremet V.I. *Osmanskaya imperia i Zapadnaya Evropa. Vtoraya tret XIX v.* Moscow, 1986, p. 102-103.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid. P. 85, 105.
- ⁶⁵ Martens F.F. *O konsulah i konsulskoj yurisdiksii na Vostoke.* St. Petersburg, 1873, p. 260.
- ⁶⁶ Blank V.B. Op. cit., pp. 206-207.
- ⁶⁷ *Vneshnyaya politika Rossii v XIX-nachale XX vv.*, p. 104.
- ⁶⁸ *Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossijskoj imperii. 1 sobranie.* Vol. 37. No. 28772, pp. 872-873; Shtaty konsulstva, see: Ibid. Vol. 44. Part 2. Section 4, pp. 37-40.
- ⁶⁹ *Vneshnyaya politika Rossii v XIX-nachale XX vv.*, pp. 69-70.
- ⁷⁰ Martens F.F. Op. cit., pp. 281-282.
- ⁷¹ Kinyapina N.S., Blied M.M., Degoev V.V. *Kavkaz i Srednyaya Azia vo vneshnej politike Rossii.* Moscow, 1984, pp. 225-226.
- ⁷² AVPRI. Record Group 137. Godovye otchety MID. Inventory 475. File 2. P. 228.
- ⁷³ Kinyapina N.S., Blied M.M., Degoev V.V. Op. cit., pp. 242-244.
- ⁷⁴ Khadzhi Iskander. *Iz moey sluzhebnoy deyatelnosti // Russkiy arkhiv.* 1897. No. 3, pp. 489-491.
- ⁷⁵ AVPRI. Record Group 161.IV-2. Inventory 119. 1832-1857. File 5. P. 2-3 reverse, 15-20.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid. Record Group 161.IV-5. Inventory 123. 1832. File 1. P. 1-2.

Key words: Russian consular service, consuls, Consular Charter, dragoman, vice-consular posts.

The Disaster of the Frigate *Alexander Nevsky*: A Tragedy or a Rescue Story?

M. Vanin

THE MEANING of a historical event can largely be explained by its legacy. This is the attitude of people in Lemvig and Thyborøn, two small coastal towns in the northwest of the Jutland peninsula. For a century and a half, they have treasured the memory of a drama that took place on September 25, 1868, off what the local population justly calls an “iron coast.”

The drama was a shipwreck not far from Thyborøn that local people still see as the chief landmark in the history of that region. At 4 a.m. on September 25, a severe storm caused *Alexander Nevsky*, one of the largest and best-equipped frigates of the Russian Imperial Navy, to run aground in that area during a voyage from the Mediterranean to Kronstadt. The construction of *Alexander Nevsky*, which had been built in 1861, involved the use of 7,400 cubic meters of oak – Kurland, Kazan, Prussian, and Italian, – more than 2,000 cubic meters of larch, more than 1,000 cubic meters of pine, 300 tons of iron, 57 tons of copper, and 30 tons of hemp. The ship had capacity for a crew of 750, including 48 officers.

The frigate’s armaments consisted of 51 60-pound (196-millimeter) caliber cast-iron Paixhans guns of the Dahlgren type (Paixhans guns were smooth-barrel low-trajectory cannon firing explosive shells). Twenty-three of them were “long-range” and 28 “short-range” guns with ranges of 3.8 and 2.8 kilometers respectively. There was a 17-gun closed battery on each side of the ship, and other cannons were on the upper deck.

Vice Admiral Konstantin Possiet, who was commanding the voyage, had made a fatal decision that night by opting for the use of the sails rather than the steam engine to take *Alexander Nevsky* into the Skagerrak strait. The commander of the frigate, Captain 1st Rank Oscar von

Mikhail Vanin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the Kingdom of Denmark



Alexey Bogolyubov. The shipwreck of the frigate *Alexander Nevsky* (the daylight version). 1868



Anchor in Thyborøn

Kraemer, considered this the wrong decision but could not dispute Possiet's order.

Local people were woken up by cannon fire – the *Alexander Nevsky* was firing its guns to attract attention and receive help. Danish fishermen who came to the coast saw something that many compared afterward to Doomsday. The frigate was seen about half a kilometer from the shore against the background of dark rainclouds amid the raging North Sea waves. The crew had obviously done everything possible to prevent the frigate from turning over – the masts had been chopped down, heavy items had been thrown overboard, and all the cannons had been put along the same side of the ship.

Local people began what became the biggest sea rescue operation in Danish history. An attempt by the crew to connect the frigate with the shore with a rope had a tragic ending – two officers, a quartermaster and two sailors drowned in trying to get one end of the rope to shore in a lifeboat. Nevertheless, life rockets were fired from the shore, and one of them did get a rope to the ship. After that, the crew began to take the passengers ashore in a lifeboat. The passengers included His Imperial Highness Grand Duke Alexey Alexandrovich, who had been taught seamanship from Possiet.

By joint efforts, the Russians and Danes were able to rescue 719 of the 724 people who had been aboard. Immediately after the rescue operation, the Russians held a brief thanksgiving service, and then a funeral service for those who perished. *Alexander Nevsky's* wrecking is the subject of two paintings by Russian artist Alexey Bogolyubov.

Despite the language barrier, the Danes warmly welcomed the Russians and put them up in their homes. Records of reminiscences of local people kept at museums in Lemvig and Thyborøn, make clear that, in spite of the horror of what had happened, they were glad about the sudden arrival of the Russians, who reciprocated with friendliness and thanked their rescuers.

Several days later, Grand Duke Alexey Alexandrovich and Vice Admiral Possiet left for Berlin while the rest of the crew proceeded to Aarhus, from where they returned to Russia on the frigate *Jylland*, made available to them by the Danish royal court.

Alexander Nevsky with everything on board was left to the population of Thyborøn in gratitude for rescuing the Russians. Anything of any value that was on board – heavy mahogany furniture, gold-framed mirrors, personal belongings of sailors, and even nails – was brought ashore



The grave of Russian seamen

by local people and passed on from generation to generation. Most of this was auctioned off subsequently, but many families in northwestern Jutland still keep some of the items and are proud of them.

In 1958, one of the *Alexander Nevsky's* anchors was installed in the center of Thyborøn to commemorate the shipwreck. There is a permanent exhibition at the Lemvig Museum describing the tragedy.

This year, another anchor from the frigate was placed as a monument next to the cemetery in Harbøre where quartermaster Petty Officer Odintsov and seamen Shilov and Polyakov are buried. (The bodies of the two officers who drowned had been returned to Russia.)

The installment of the second anchor was simultaneous with the opening of an exhibition at the Thyborøn Coastal Center of items from *Alexander Nevsky* that had been borrowed from private collections.



Wreath laying ceremony

Lemvig Mayor Erik Flyvholm, members of the local administration, descendants of Oscar von Kraemer, and a Russian delegation participated in these events.

That day, as 150 years before, Russian as well as Danish was spoken in northwestern Jutland as the Russian guests were remembering a rescue operation that came to symbolize Russian-Danish unification in an ordeal.

This little-known page in the history of the Russian Imperial Navy is still venerated in Lemvig municipality. The drama of 150 years ago proves that at a time of distress people will disregard disagreements and help one another. This is how it was a century and a half ago and how it is today. There were quite frequent shipwrecks in that dangerous area in those times, but local people still refer to the disaster of September 25,

1868, as “the shipwreck.” Stories about it have been going on from generation to generation.

Historical memory has had a special value at all times. Owing to the population and authorities of Lemvig municipality, the drama of September 1868 is still alive in collective memory. Legacy preservation projects are an important source of an ongoing Russian-Danish cultural dialogue. The Russians have always been and remain open to cooperation with any nation that shares a page of history with them and takes genuine interest in it.

The survival of the *Alexander Nevsky* drama in collective memory is largely the result of efforts by the Russian State Naval Archive; the Central Naval Museum in St. Petersburg; Alexander Sverchkov, a retired Russian diplomat; Alexander Belov, secretary of the Russian State Duma Group for Liaison with the Finnish Parliament; Mette Lund Andersen, head of the Lemvig Museum; and Erik Flyvholm, mayor of Lemvig.

Key words: frigate *Alexander Nevsky*, Russia, Denmark, historical memory.

The Reburial of the Remains of Suvorov Army Soldiers in the Chapel of the Dead on Switzerland's St. Gotthard Pass

K. Nefedov

SEPTEMBER 2018 included what was a significant date in Russian and Swiss history – the 120th anniversary of the opening of the Russian Cross monument at the Devil's Bridge in the Schöllenen Gorge in Switzerland. The Russian Cross, which stands near the town of Andermatt in the canton of Uri, is a monument to Russian soldiers who died as their army, led by Alexander Suvorov, was crossing the Alps in September 1799. The Suvorov Days, an annual event in Switzerland that commemorates Suvorov's Swiss campaign and has been held in the second half of September since 1999, invariably arouses interest among Russians and Swiss. The successful record of the Suvorov Days shows that Suvorov campaign memorial activities are a valuable contribution to the conservation of the joint Russian-Swiss historical and cultural legacy.

Memorialization of Suvorov's soldiers who died in Switzerland is one of the tasks of the Russian Embassy in Bern. The embassy loyally observes old traditions such as an annual wreath-laying ceremony on September 24 at the monument at the Devil's Bridge "To the Valiant Comrades-in-Arms of Generalissimo Field Marshal Count Suvorov of Rymnik, Prince of Italy, Who Perished in Crossing the Alps in 1799." Recently, new traditions have emerged as well. Since 2004, flowers have regularly been laid at the memorial stone for "The Fallen Warriors" in Unterengstringen, near Zurich, and a similar ceremony has been held at the Russian Cross monument in Muotathal municipality in Schwyz canton since 2012.

The embassy helps install new memorial signs and plaques, publish

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Russian soldier, 1799

books about Suvorov and his Swiss campaign, and make documentary movies. In 2012, a monument called The Russian Soldier was unveiled in Wichlen (Elm) in Glarus canton. In September 2015, a new plaque was put up on the Panix Pass (which links the cantons of Glarus and Graubünden), replacing one that had been lost. In 2014, 2015 and 2016, museums and exhibition centers in Russia, Belarus, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland ran successful exhibitions of works by Russian artist Alex Doll. The exhibitions, which showed paintings with the generic title “Following Alexander Suvorov’s route in Switzerland,” motivated Russian television channel Zvezda to make a documentary film entitled *Suvorov, the Alps, 200 Years Later*.



Flower laying ceremony at the Chapel of the Dead on St. Gotthard Pass.
September 24, 2015

One of the more prominent events was the reburial of the remains of several Russian soldiers in the Chapel of the Dead on the St. Gotthard Pass in September 2012. The soldiers had served in the corps of General Alexander Rimsky-Korsakov, which was part of Suvorov's army. The reinterment was the result of a huge amount of work that began by opening an exhibition in Zurich in June 2005. The theme of the exhibition, which was entitled "Zurich in 1799: A City at War," were two battles near Zurich in 1799 between the French army and the forces of an anti-Napoleonic coalition. The show was held at the Haus zum Rech, a historic building in the very center of the city.

The central item at the exhibition were the remains of an unknown Russian soldier in a glass case. Workers who had been digging the Milchbuck Tunnel in Zurich in summer 1976 came across pieces of nine skeletons. Studies that took years brought Swiss archeologists to the conclusion that the bones were the remains of soldiers of Rimsky-Korsakov's corps who had been killed on September 25 or September 26, the two days in 1799 on which the Second Battle of Zurich was fought.

This conclusion is stated in the book *Zurich in 1799: A City at War* (Zürich 1799: Eine Stadt erlebt den Krieg. Zurich, 2005), and the opening of the exhibition with the same title was timed to coincide with its publication. Russian Embassy officials who were present at the opening of the show were stunned. At that moment, the decision was made to bury the remains of the nine soldiers in keeping with the Orthodox custom.

Since 2005, the embassy was in regular contact with Swiss authorities over the possibility of interment and was looking for a site for it. Eventually, it was decided to lay the remains in the Chapel of the Dead, where there already were graves of soldiers and officers in Suvorov's army who had been killed in battles on the St. Gotthard Pass or had or died of wounds sustained during them.

The remains were the property of Zurich canton under Article 724 of the Swiss Civil Code, but, under an agreement of July 30, 2012, that followed lengthy negotiations, the canton handed them over to the embassy for burial. After simultaneous talks with the government of Ticino canton, the embassy received approval for interring the remains in the Chapel of the Dead from Airolo Mayor Franco Pedrini and Ticino Chancellor Giampiero Gianella. The former gave the go-ahead on May 10, 2012, and the latter did it in a letter to the embassy on July 11.

The Chapel of the Dead is a mid-16th-century rectangular building with a semicircular apse that stands on a rock over a gorge 20 meters



The reburial of the remains of the Russian soldiers who served in the corps of General Alexander Rimsky-Korsakov in the Chapel of the Dead. 2012

deep. It is made of boulders and pieces of granite. For centuries, the chapel was the burial place for travelers and pilgrims who had been found dead along the pass. In September 1799, Russian soldiers and officers killed in fighting Napoleon's troops during the crossing of the Alps were laid to rest there. The chapel keeps a copy of a 13th-century Mandylion icon of Jesus Christ from the Monastery of St. Joseph of Volokolamsk in Novgorod, Russia, which had been presented to the St. Gotthard National Museum by Patriarch Alexy II, former head of the Russian Orthodox Church, and passed over to the museum by Metropolitan Pitirim. The flags of Suvorov's army had on them the image of Christ shown on the icon.

In summer 2012, the Chapel of the Dead building underwent renovation under a joint project by Switzerland's Alexander Suvorov Cadets Foundation and Pro St. Gotthard Foundations that had the approval of cantonal and local authorities, was financed by private sponsors, some of them Russian, and was overseen by architect M. Vanetti. The final stage of the renovation included laying slabs of granite from the Saint-Gotthard Massif on the floor with 1799 carved on them.

It was only on September 23, 2012, that the 2005 interment project was completed. That day a funeral was held that included a civil ceremo-

ny, military honors and a church service. Among those present were Russian Ambassador to Switzerland Alexander Golovin, Ticino politician Norman Gobbi, the Pro St. Gotthard Foundation's President Dick Marty and Secretary Livio Lombardi, officials of the cantons of Zurich, Uri and Ticino, and students of the Lieutenant General Valery Khalilov Moscow Military Musical School.

The funeral opened with the Swiss national anthem and speeches. This was followed by a prayer led by Hieromonk (priest-monk) Svyatoslav, chief priest of the Orthodox Church of the Protection of the Theotokos in Melide, Ticino canton. After that, Gobbi, Marty and Golovin threw earth that had been brought in capsules from Russia into the grave. Now it could be said that the war in the Alps had properly come to an end – as Suvorov said, “a war is not over before the last fallen soldier has been buried.”

As a sacred tradition, since then a delegation of the Russian Embassy to Switzerland has been placing a basket of flowers at the Chapel of the Dead every year on September 24. This year was no exception. The memorial events of 2018 are a “dress rehearsal” for large-scale celebrations in 2019 of the 220th anniversary of Suvorov's Swiss campaign.

Key words: Russia, Switzerland, Chapel of the Dead, reburial.

A Final Bow: In Memory of Baron Eduard Falz-Fein

N. Danilevich

BARON Eduard Alexandrowitsch von Falz-Fein passed away at the age of 107 at his villa in the Principality of Liechtenstein. He is well known in Russia for his generous philanthropy and ambitious international projects. He helped repatriate artifacts with historical significance for the Russian state, restore Orthodox churches, establish museums, preserve Russian graves abroad, and develop new tourist routes.

He enjoyed brilliant success as an athlete, journalist, businessman, publisher, and collector. In 1987, the Crimean Astrophysical Observatory discovered a small planet about 273 million kilometers from Earth. It is called Eduard Falz-Fein. It is comforting to think that his everlasting star is shining out there in the mysterious vastness of space.

Folk Baron

THE CITIZEN from the unknown and distant Principality of Liechtenstein appeared suddenly on our TV screens on the *Vremya* news program. News relating to his appearance sparked astonishment and delight: Why is he buying such treasures for us? Why does he feel an affection for us? He found a portrait of Prince Grigory Potemkin-Tavrishesky in an antique shop in New York and gave it to the palace in Alupka. In Frankfurt, he bought a rug of the tsars that had been taken from Livadia Palace during the war and returned it to its former place. At Sotheby's in London, he fought to the bitter end for a painting by Konstantin Makovsky and immediately sent it through our embassy in Moscow to the Soviet Culture Fund.

The baron's "Hollywood" appearance, foreign title and unusual name was out of character for the main news program of the USSR. This paradox can presumably be explained by the fact that Raisa Gorbacheva, wife

of the first president of the USSR, supported emigrants through the Soviet Culture Fund and encouraged the repatriation of cultural artifacts. "White" emigration had already left the scene of history and, as the baron once remarked, Moscow was reaching out to emigrants before it was too late: "I was caught by the tail."

No one envisioned in the first years of perestroika that the idea of returning would become such an inspirational force.

In the very first issue of the journal "Our Heritage," the name of Baron Eduard Falz-Fein, from the unfamiliar Principality of Liechtenstein, appeared alongside the names of distinguished members of the editorial board. A story was published about Askania-Nova, his villa that was teeming with artifacts of imperial Russia. An imposing, life-size figure of the baron descending a staircase, captured masterfully by a photographer, was the first thing to catch the eye of those who called on him. Here was a Russian aristocrat, dignified and open to the whole world, living among galleries of royal portraits interspersed with portraits of his own illustrious ancestors who for centuries served Russia faithfully and loyally.

His lineage through his mother's side traces back to the boyars of Old Rus, who were close to the tsar. The Yepanchin family hails from the same stock as the Romanovs and is recorded in the Velvet Book. Eduard Alexandrowitsch's father belonged to the Falz-Fein family of prominent landowners who were granted nobility only in 1914.

With a pair of boots flung over their shoulders, the German colonists came from their crowded homeland to the broad Russian expanses. Catherine the Great had invited them to settle the arid southern steppe, newly conquered by Grigory Potemkin. They came to Russia empty-handed but nevertheless brought and spread the high culture of agriculture and animal husbandry, and showed an example of conscientious and disciplined work.

The Falz-Fein family had access to the Black Sea through its own port of Khorly, in Karkinit Bay, which does not freeze even in winter. European-flagged merchant ships would berth in the warm harbor, where they loaded grain, oysters and merino wool. The domestic market was expanding with a wide supply of agricultural products. They provided the army with horses, clothes and food. The baron always stressed that his ancestors never owned serfs and were never exploiters but used free workers and paid them well. And most importantly, they worked the earth from dawn to dusk for seven generations before they were granted their coat of arms and nobility.



In the early 20th century, when the family tree was beginning to wither, a long-awaited son, Eduard, was born on September 14, 1912. Therefore, the family took a jaundiced view of the newborn boy's upbringing as the future heir, a landlord who must be practical and well-tempered. Eduard was not coddled as a child and taught strict sense from a very young age. Three governesses were sent for from abroad as soon as the child began to utter his first words. Thus, he spoke fluent French, English and German.

When I poured over the unopened archives of the baron and studied his complex family tree, a title came to mind of a book I had conceived of writing – “Baron Falz-Fein: The Life of a Russian Aristocrat.” “Aristocrat” in Sanskrit means “supreme.” And it largely explains the high degree of civil responsibility that Eduard Alexandrowitsch received

from his extraordinary ancestors. By virtue of their background and upbringing, aristocrats, according to Nikolai Berdyaev, have an inherently rather high place in society and therefore have enough spare energy to serve other people.

Our Heritage

THE SOVIET CULTURE FUND existed for a short time before the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was there, at 10 Gogol Boulevard, that I first heard Eduard Alexandrowitsch speak. He looked rather peculiar. He had the old Russian face of an ageless baron. He wore an Austrian suit of expensive cloth with a banded collar and velvet lapels, a silk embroidered tie and starched cuffs with pearl cuff links. His handsome, slender profile and dark tan was beautifully complemented by thick hair neatly parted to the side.

And his manner of speaking was extraordinary. He spoke off the cuff, without notes. His outward gentle manners belied the relentless efficiency of someone not accustomed to wasting time. With humor, he so good-naturedly shamed the inactivity of the Soviet Culture Fund office that it was impossible not to marvel at his diplomatic skills. He said that all the refugees whom he preliminary approached and reached agreements with on transferring family artifacts to Russia had not yet received any request from the Soviet Cultural Fund: "The Nabokovs, Trubetskys, Vasilchikovs are waiting. I worked on them all, but there's not been a peep out of you. Again, they scold me: 'In our homeland, we are enemies of the people. But you walk on their red carpet and sidle into their embassies. They pillaged us and divested us of our homeland, yet you are helping them. Why?'"

At the time, I was a fine arts correspondent for the CPSU Central Committee's "Soviet Culture" newspaper and had to write an account of everything that went on at the Soviet Culture Fund. For us, the handsome, smart and energetic baron was a true hero. I wanted to interview him about his quest for Russian artifacts in world auctions and about his heroic ancestors, but it was unacceptable to write about private collectors in our stringent newspaper. Even uttering the word "auction" was dangerous. "Art is priceless," right, so how could it be sold or bought?

But this solid dam of mistrust soon burst. I think the charm and huge personality of Baron Falz-Fein played a big role in rehabilitating private collecting and the notion of the "Russian emigrant."

Collector-Patrons

IN 1975, Sotheby's auction house put a large collection of Russian artifacts up for auction in Monte Carlo. Never before had such large bibliographical collections gone on the market. An expensive, gold-embossed hardcover auction catalogue, "The Diaghilev-Lifar Library," was released – itself a rarity and very valuable. It was the largest private collection of Russian books and manuscripts outside of Russia. The catalogue contained 1,000 lots, including "Fyodorov's Primer," from the era of Ivan the Terrible, the "The Codes of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich" and "The Court of Catherine II" – an album of silhouettes from the collection of Count Andrei Razumovsky. It also included a very rare and amusing book, "The disgrace of strange and ridiculous wedding rituals of various foreigners and resident peoples in Russia," as well as an autograph of Aleksandr Pushkin from "Eugene Onegin" and a first edition of "The Gabrieliad."

But bidding was lackluster, and on the first day, the baron bought 100 books at half price – for 100,000 francs.

"On the second day, during a break," recalls E.A. Falz-Fein, "a horrified man burst into the auction hall and rushed to the clerk:

'Do you know if such and such a book was sold? I absolutely have to buy it.'

"He was told that he was already too late, and that its new owner was sitting in the hall. He went up to the baron and spoke in heavily accented French:

'Dear fellow! Yes, you are one of us!'

'Not only am I one of you, but I like you, I feel for you and I would like to help you, but I am chased away from the Soviet Embassy. They don't even want to talk to me. I am an enemy of the people; this is immediately obvious, right?'

"He laughed and said:

'We'll joke later. You bought the book? Yes or no?'

'Yes, I did.'

'Dear fellow! I'll be hanged if I don't deliver it.'

'Don't worry. Nobody will hang you. Here is the book. Take it home, give it to the Lenin Library and say that it is a gift from a certain Russian who remembers and loves Russia even though he was kicked out of the country, stripped of his citizenship, his property was seized, and his grandmother was brutally killed.'

When I gave him my business card, he was surprised:

‘Falz-Fein! A sweet name!’

‘You know it? Why is it sweet?’

‘I was born in Odessa before the revolution. There was a well-known Falz-Fein chocolate factory there.’

It was my grandmother, Sophia Bogdanovna, who made candy. She also had an oyster factory, a cannery, a port of Khorly and a shipping company on the Black Sea.

That was a real meeting! I was struck by the truly unique person fate had sent my way. We hugged goodbye. And from that moment until the day he died, Ilya Samoilovich Zilbershtein and I were friends.”

After that meeting, the baron and certain emigrants began to think about sending their archives back to their homeland. However, so much time had been lost. Eduard Alexandrowitsch bitterly recalled how frightened they all were: “Everyone feared contacting representatives of the USSR. Everyone was horrified by the abbreviation that had replaced Russia, the historical name of our beautiful motherland. Try taking the name “France” away from a French person. That would be simply unthinkable. The French would never allow that; they would take to the barricades. The symbol of the hammer and sickle was also frightening. Behind it was the blood of the tsar and his innocent children, inhuman repression of the people, the squandering at auctions abroad of national treasures that had been in museums. Zilbershtein was the first person I trusted.”

For Zilbershtein, any piece of paper was significant because he saw value in it. He not only collected but studied and published. Emigrants, including the baron, gave him their archives, knowing that they would forever be kept in Russia and someday historical truth would be restored. They viewed the Soviet professor as an ally in their pursuit of this great, albeit distant goal.

Person-Legend

IN 2003, in Liechtenstein, my book “Baron Falz-Fein: The life of a Russian Aristocrat” was translated into German. A local publisher found someone who knew the subject of the book well. The baron’s lawyer and then-foreign minister of Liechtenstein Dr. Ernst Walch wrote a heartfelt foreword: “It is a great honor in my capacity as minister of foreign affairs of Liechtenstein to write opening remarks for the publication of a book about Baron Falz-Fein, a privy minister of foreign affairs of the principality. I am especially glad to do this for a friend.

“Baron Eduard von Falz-Fein is one of a kind: He is inquisitive, wise, multilingual, cosmopolitan, a Liechtensteiner-Russian and at the same time a Russian-Liechtensteiner who is rooted in tradition and knowledgeable of history yet always open to innovation, accepting the challenges of our time and opening so many doors to the future.

“The baron opened Liechtenstein to foreign tourism, developed the tourist industry and thus created a foundation for today’s prosperity. He has consistently supported world-class sport – his love has always been cycling – and institutionally he created and strengthened the Olympic idea in Liechtenstein. He produced the film “Lyudmila”* and thereby preserved history for future generations. We must express our gratitude to him for his work.

“For Eduard, people are the focus of all that he does. He skillfully makes contacts with the great and small of the world, brings people together, supports talents, opens so many people’s eyes to the good of our world and life that he loved, and persuades others with charm and humor of the correctness of his ideas, projects and plans. Eduard knows how to enchant his listeners with stories and anecdotes. He is always lighthearted without losing a sense of responsibility, the value of history and the seriousness of life.

“Eduard is an inherent diplomat. He embodies Russia in Liechtenstein and Liechtenstein in Russia. He builds bridges and helps the great to understand the small and the small to understand the great.

“Baron Eduard is a lover of life, a man who loves the world and people. This book is a written testament of this great man, Edie, who calls me his friend.”

The circle of life is over. Baron E.A. Falz-Fein lived more than 100 years in exile and only five years in his homeland. But it seems that he never left Russia.

Eduard Alexandrowitsch’s cherished memory will remain in our hearts.

Accept our final bow.

Key words: aristocrat, emigrants, philanthropy.

* The film “Lyudmila” [“Children in the Woods”] was Baron Falz-Fein’s first and last experience as a movie producer and director. It tells about patriarchal life in an alpine village. The film stars Maximilian Schell. This role was his film debut.
